Regional rivalries over Afghanistan
By Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty
AS war-ravaged Afghanistan appears headed for economic recovery, there are signs of renewed interest, both by global and regional powers, in building ties with it. The US, which returned in force after 9/11, after having walked away in 1989, following the Soviet withdrawal, has a multitude of reasons, strategic, economic and political, to stay on and to protect its global interests now focused in Asia.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently visited Central Asia, Afghanistan and South Asia as new challenges emerged in Syria and Iran, while Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited China. With oil prices rising, and competition for control of the world’s largest reserves of oil and gas intensifying, the US not only wants to maintain its hold on the oil rich region, but is increasingly concerned with containing the terrorist threat on the one hand, and China’s emerging challenge on the other.
Afghanistan has assumed crucial importance as the gateway to Central Asia, and the transition point to South Asia. The initiatives being taken by its neighbours to build up their influence cannot but be of great interest to Washington.
As the results of the recent parliamentary elections in Afghanistan gradually unfold it is clear that President Hamid Karzai, who himself gained democratic credentials by his election earlier in the year, is assured of a continuing role in post 9/11 Afghanistan. The US has stepped up its military involvement in Afghanistan, as has Nato, to help establish the writ of the government throughout the country, though this will be gradual process.
In fact, there has been an increase in insurgency by the Taliban, so that the number of casualties among the US military and the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) soldiers, now drawn from Nato, has gone up steeply. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, made it clear during her visit that the US would maintain its military presence, without any deadline.
The task of reconstruction has started, and many governments that made commitments in pledging conference at Bonn and Tokyo, have begun to implement some of the projects, specially those pertaining to education, health and the restoration of the infrastructure. Private construction and repairs of damaged properties have also picked up momentum.
Given Afghanistan’s strategic location, and the prospect of substantial funds that are likely to be available, the neighbouring countries have stepped up trade links. As Pakistan has the longest border with land-locked Afghanistan, movement of both goods and labour to the country has increased in response to the demand. Iran has also increased its involvement in Afghanistan, helped by the fact that Persian is spoken widely there. Russia is utilizing its influence in the adjoining former Soviet republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to re-establish its historic role in Afghanistan and exporting a variety of goods, with an eye on oil and gas pipelines in the region.
One major country that lacks common borders with Afghanistan, but is determined to re-establish close political and economic links with Kabul is India. While seeking transit facilities through Pakistan, India is investing heavily in alternative outlets from Afghanistan through Iran. This would not only facilitate Indian exports to Afghanistan through its ports, but would also confer benefits on Iran.
An Iranian newspaper reported that the authorities in Pakistan were inclined to exploit Afghan dependence on Karachi port by holding up unloading essential supplies and thus creating artificial shortages and price hikes in Afghanistan. The paper also referred to constant pilferage from containers and trucks on their way to Afghanistan, with the goods being sold in Peshawar. The incident involving the theft of coins minted for Afghanistan by Germany had led President Karzai to bring up the matter with President Musharraf.
India was spending a part of the $500 million aid promised to Afghanistan on this road and Iran was engaged in improving the road from Zaranj to Chabahar, its port on the Persian Gulf closest to India. There was likely to be a substantial diversion of Afghan trade to the shorter route through Iran, and India was banking on increasing its exports substantially, as its goods were cheaper owing to the economies of scale.
Pakistan has not been oblivious to India’s plans, and activities that are designed to undermine Pakistan’s interests. New Delhi has capitalized on the resentment that had developed among various segments of the Afghan population against Pakistan on account of changes in its polices. The support extended to the Taliban between 1994 and 2000 had alienated the Northern Alliance, while the decision after 9/11 to join the US in its war against the Taliban could not but arouse Pashtun ire. Pakistan, therefore, decided not to seek any political role in the post 9/11 period, confining itself to supporting the Bonn process, and extending maximum help for Afghan reconstruction.
India, which had patronized the leadership of the Northern Alliance, now moved decisively to repair its relations with Afghanistan, that had been adversely affected by its support to Soviet intervention in 1979. The new official hierarchy in Kabul has welcomed various gestures from New Delhi including gifts of buses and civilian aircraft, and help with education and health services.
President Karzai realized the need to adopt a conciliatory policy towards Pakistan, while President Musharraf responded by backing him and strengthening his hand. The two countries found it necessary to collaborate in the fight against terrorists, the remnants of Al Qaeda and Taliban militants who sought shelter in Pakistan’s tribal area. India, prior to the revival of the peace process with Pakistan, used the numerous consulates it had established in Afghanistan, to spread disaffection among sections of the local population in NWFP and Balochistan that remained opposed to US intervention in the region, and Pakistan’s support for it.
Pakistan has stepped up practical measures to win the support of the present regime in Kabul, and to counter India’s moves to increase its influence as a part of its long-term strategy to emerge as the regional great power. Islamabad will launch major projects in health care, education and communication at a cost of Rs 4 billion ($67 million). Health projects include the Jinnah hospital to be built at a cost of Rs 1.2 billion, a kidney centre at Jalalabad for Rs 420 million and another hospital in Logar province. Pakistan will also build a science faculty block at Nangarhar University. Pakistan would spend over Rs 2 billion in building the 76km long Torkham-Jalalabad highway, and is also imparting police training to Afghan officers.
It can be said that India is working jointly with Iran to reduce Afghan dependence on Pakistan. Tehran has consistently sought to increase its presence in Afghanistan. The US, which views Iran in a hostile light, would be inclined to oppose the Indo-Iranian entente in Afghanistan. But since Washington has adopted India as its strategic partner in the Indian Ocean region and is more or less committed to supporting New Delhi’s ambition to become the dominant power in this region.
A certain element of competition for trade and political influence among countries bordering Afghanistan is inevitable. Iranian ambitions since the Islamic revolution have also worried the Arab rulers of Gulf states, some of which have large Shia populations. The US role in the region is likely to centre on its own interests and perceptions. With its military and nuclear relationship with India assuming unprecedented dimensions, it may not seek to impede Indo-Iranian cooperation except indirectly, by urging Pakistan to provide India transit facilities to Afghanistan, since this route is certainly more economical than the sea-land route through Iran.
China is likely to get more involved in the revival of the ancient silk route that linked it with Central and South Asia. As a matter of principle China remains opposed to the hegemonic approach of the US, and one of the objectives of launching the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is to help promote a multipolar world order. Pakistan, India and Iran have become observers in the SCO this year and are candidates for full membership.
The US strategy in Asia is clearly to build up a network of alliances, with Israel and India emerging as key players, both in the war on terrorism, and with regard to the long-term objectives of controlling oil and gas reserves on the one hand, and keeping the sea-lanes across the Indian Ocean open on the other.
So long as it is militarily present in Afghanistan the US is unlikely to allow the Indo-Iranian partnership to flourish. Iran may acquire easier access to Afghanistan for its own trade, but India would find it economically and politically more expedient to secure transit rights through Pakistan.
For political reasons including Iran’s sectarian and cultural inclinations, the Central Asian states may eventually prefer to use Afghanistan’s transit facilities, both for land transport and for pipelines, so that the exit to the sea would be routed through Pakistan. China would also be interested in reviving the ancient silk route to the west and link up through the Karakoram Highway with Pakistani ports. We need to developed our communications infrastructure keeping these prospects in mind.
Incidentally both India and Pakistan would like to expand Saarc. The difference is that India is more keen to sponsor Afghanistan, while Pakistan accords priority to China.
The writer is a former ambassador.


