The response to the devastating earthquake of October 8 up north is a case of “management by crisis” which many are using interchangeably with “crisis management.” “Crisis management” is proactive in which the events are anticipated and measures taken in advance to either avert or mitigate the effect of the calamity.
Fire fighter organizations are supposed to be organized for “crisis management.” Attempts to contain lethal bird flu by segregating the migratory birds from the local ones, restricting imports from danger zones, expanding the production of anti-flu drugs, and attempting to develop anti-flu vaccines are all examples in “crisis management” to avert the crisis or to lessen its harmful impact.
A 5.0 Richter scale earthquake struck Tokyo in the middle of this month. Buildings in Tokyo shook but no building fell and no casualties were reported. The Kobe earthquake was a disaster as the buildings had not been made quakeproof and the Japanese government was adequately criticized for poor “crisis management.” Severe earthquakes hit some states on the West coast of the US. Other than a flyover or two falling, major damage and/or casualties are not reported as they too are equipped for “crisis management” through compliance with the building codes.
Katrina, however, was a mess in terms of “crisis management” as, despite early warnings, neither the local nor the state governments had taken adequate measures for a full evacuation of the city and quick rehabilitation of the ones affected. The dykes gave way causing flooding of New Orleans that the federal government tried to explain away by saying that “we had not expected this.” It is the inability to anticipate the various probable scenarios that reflects very adversely on crisis management capability. One is then left with no other alternative but to “manage by crisis.”
“Managing by crisis” is reactive. That is, to attempt to contain the after-effects of the crisis after it has occurred. Now, this reaction too could be of two types. It could be “rapid reactive” or it could be “slow/delayed reactive.” Response to Katrina was of the slow/delayed reactive type. But, just because the US response to the aftermath of the storm was slow/delayed reactive is no reason why other crisis-hit governments must benchmark it and use it to explain their delayed response to their natural calamities.
While Katrina had been predicted years ago, its cause, according to some experts, is rooted in the high levels of energy consumption that cause CO2 emissions and global warming leading to higher ocean temperatures and thereby hurricane formation as wind blows over warm waters.
As high levels of energy consumption, according to some expert opinion, is boomeranging in the form of wild hurricanes, even prediction closer to hurricane arrival failed to alert the governments at the various levels in the affected East coast US states. This lack of preparedness despite fairly accurate predictions is hardly a behaviour that some present as an excuse for their own delayed response to their natural crisis.
As for earthquakes, a UCLA expert now claims that they can be predicted. However, until such time that this technology or know-how spreads, at least, the quake prone areas should be made quake-proof by ensuring compliance with the requisite building code. Two of SOS Children’s Villages up north withstood the earthquake with only minor damage to the buildings as these were built to international standards for earthquakes. Otherwise, life in tent cities would be a lot safer than in shabbily and poorly constructed concrete structures.
Given the fact that we were prepared for neither of the above, at least, the “reaction” from the country’s organized structures could have been quick enough to rescue and provide relief. For, the probability of saving lives under concrete structures is a lot higher than those under mud houses as the former allow air passage that mud houses block. So, even though Bam (Iran) had all mud houses that fell after their devastating earthquake almost two years ago, search and rescue operation carried on for several weeks after the earthquake.
Our search and rescue operation was abandoned in less than a week even before it gained pace and even though the probability of finding life was higher as the structures were of concrete.
Some people are now being rescued by chance and at random but a major search and rescue operation was given up even before it was organized in a big way. Focus shifted to relief instead when both search/rescue and relief could have proceeded in parallel.
And, even before relief operations could gain meaningful momentum, it was reconstruction and development of model towns that appeared on the horizon. While there would be nothing like having quake-proof model towns and it is good to plan long-term but in this scenario it is important not to lose sight of the short-term when rescue and relief are of utmost importance first and foremost. For this purpose, it was important to have mobilized adequate domestic and foreign resources on war footing.
Some of the blocked roads were later on opened up by commendable efforts of Pakistan army. A question, therefore, is as to why this resource could not be deployed fast enough in large numbers to make the affected areas accessible by roads. Until then, why is it that adequate numbers of helicopters could not be made available for access by air?
One is curious to know the number of helicopters available domestically and their utilization because of which there had to be a wait of 2/3 days before about eight US helicopters were made available from Afghanistan. And, then another long wait for some more foreign helicopters whose supply only trickled in for several days making even the relief work difficult to execute at the required pace.
Pakistan’s embassies abroad could have campaigned for helicopters and tents feverishly if Indians’ were undesirable for the sensitivities involved. For until 9 to 10 days after the earthquake, still 20- 25 per cent areas had not received relief. And, according to the World Food Program (WFP), almost half a million people had not received food until ten days after the earthquake.
Pakistan’s earthquake of October 8 is one of the worst natural disasters experienced by the third world in recent history. The two previous ones known for their huge impact were the earthquake in Bam, Iran and the tsunami that struck the regions of Southeast and South Asia.
In both these cases, one can recall an overwhelming outpouring of sympathy, aid, and relief efforts by the world community. In the case of Iran’s earthquake, the US carried out major search, rescue, and relief effort which Iran welcomed always drawing a line between humanitarian assistance and their foreign policy outlook which the Iranians clarified as another matter.
Tsunami displaced some 1.5 million people and was viewed as calamitous. Pakistan’s earthquake has displaced twice as many, that is, some 3.3 million people. Over 50,000, according to conservative and cautious estimates, have perished and countless injured. This is a relief and rehabilitation effort of enormous proportions but to which the international response is lukewarm, to say the least.
Other than some assistance from the US, planned assistance by the World Bank and NATO, $130 million from Saudi Arabia, $150 million from Turkey, about $600 million pledged for reconstruction as compared to $ 5 billion required for the purpose; financial assistance mobilization appears like a task uphill. In addition, organized relief effort, temporary shelters, and large-scale food and medical aid is required in the short run without which there will, God forbid, be a calamity of another kind.
Pakistan will have to steer the relief and rehabilitation effort pretty much by itself. Pakistan needs to draw up a short- and medium-term plan for the purpose with resource requirements and their sources, domestic and foreign. Resource mobilization, operations’ execution, evaluation, and control are all important steps towards discharging this responsibility which cannot be passed on to others at random.
