THE massive earthquake that devastated most of northern Pakistan and Azad Kashmir, as well as smaller areas in Indian occupied Kashmir, has caused unprecedented death and destruction all around.

Most international experts are of the view that because of Kashmir’s hilly terrain and the shallowness of the earthquake, the scale and extent of the damage has been on a much larger scale than should normally have been the case. In fact, many foreign observers have remarked that the destruction defies human imagination.

That those primarily affected by this unprecedented calamity should be the poor and the disenfranchised Kashmiris, adds poignancy to what was already a most distressing situation. But as is usual in this part of the world, the tragedy has become an element in the ongoing political jostling between India and Pakistan for scoring points and gaining moral high ground. While Pakistan’s relief and rehabilitation effort has picked up steam and appears now to be moving in a fairly organized and determined manner, (after initial days of hesitant and disorganized half- measures), the most commendable role has been that of the common citizens, both individually and collectively in voluntary groups and in non-governmental organizations, who have responded to the national calamity with determination and unlimited generosity.

This is deeply gratifying for it has unveiled a refreshing new aspect to the national character. Equally commendable has been the enthusiasm with which the overseas Pakistanis have given of their time, energy and money to the relief measures. No less satisfying has been the response of the international community, which has pitched in with a remarkable show of international solidarity. This not only includes our traditional friends, but even countries with which Pakistan has had marginal relations.

It is, however, not my intention here to dwell on the international relief effort, but on the political fallout of this disaster on Indo-Pak relations in general, and on the issue of Kashmir, in particular. It would be recalled that in pursuance of President Musharraf’s call to move away from the past and to start “thinking out of the box”, Pakistan had already gone along with the Indian preference for the peace process to focus on confidence building measures. We did this while convinced that there was no validity to the Indian propaganda, that the growing people-to-people contacts and CBMs were the “panacea” for resolving Indo-Pakistan differences. In fact, the growing speed and scope of the CBMs had left a large number of Pakistanis confused and unsure of the real direction and sustainability of the current Indo-Pakistan peace process. Some time earlier, the veteran Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar had written in one of his pieces that the Indian leadership, including Foreign Minister Natwar Singh, was convinced that the Pakistani president was moving in the manner he was, because he had no options.

True, in the changed global circumstances, Pakistan’s options are limited. It is equally correct to say that our “friend” the US, now has a much greater stake in promoting India’s interest in the region and that this includes ensuring Indo-Pakistan rapprochement as a factor for ensuring regional peace and global stability. But limited options do not mean no options. India will never get genuine peace in the region if it continues to delude itself with these false notions.

We are thus faced with this strange and disquieting situation, wherein the CBMs have come to replace negotiations. Each new CBM offered by us is grasped by India, while being warmly welcomed by the international community, which appears to accept the false dictum that the “form” is more important than the “substance”. This has given rise to great unease and anxiety, even within the “establishment” in Pakistan which has begun to fear a slow erosion of the nation’s core interests.

These fears came forcefully to the surface when the much-anticipated four-hour long Musharraf-Manmohan talks in New York, on the sidelines of the UNGA, failed to produce any meaningful progress, on any of the major political issues separating the two countries. The two leaders were left to simply reiterate their expectations, without anything to substantiate these hopes.

To add to our worries, the second round of the composite dialogue between the two foreign secretaries that ended in Islamabad on October 4, was again a mostly sterile exercise. Official sources confirm press reports that indicate no substantive advance on any issue in the composite dialogue agenda, except for a decision to revive the joint commission that has remained frozen since it last met in 1981, and one CBM on missile testing notification.

On Kashmir, the joint statement merely observed that “possible options for a peaceful negotiated settlement should be explored in a sincere, purposeful and forward looking manner”. Surprisingly, no progress was registered even on Siachen, though Manmohan Singh had earlier promised to make it “a mountain of peace”, nor on Sir Creek.

The massive earthquake that struck Pakistan and Azad Kashmir was expected to provide the two countries the opening to initiate meaningful cooperation not only in the field of relief and rehabilitation, but also as regards some aspects of the Kashmir issue. The Indian relief supply was timely and valuable, and was accordingly appreciated by the government and people of Pakistan. But this good gesture was immediately followed by rather crude attempts by New Delhi to gain political mileage out of this tragic situation, when it offered to send its military helicopters to join in the relief work.

That India should have made this offer, knowing fully well the state of our relations and the presence of a large number of military bases in Azad Kashmir, was simply a poorly thought out PR exercise, devoid of any sincerity. And yet, well known Indian journalists such as Kuldip Nayar and Praful Bidwai have been critical of Pakistan for emphasizing its sensitivities, which they have characterized as a “fraudulent notion of national security and power projection”.

Kuldip Nayar, in fact, could not contain his happiness at his belief that the so-called terrorists must have suffered enormously in the earthquake, and “would not emerge again.” Regrettably, the international media too, has joined the fray, in its effort to promote its own concept of Indo-Pakistan normalization.

On the other hand, Pakistan has done well by making a series of unilateral offers, including the offer to open the LoC to allow people from across the line to come and join relief efforts in the quake hit areas. It has also offered mobile telephone companies to open linkages with their brethren across the LoC. These gestures should go a long way in bringing joy and happiness to many Kashmiris.

But we need to move cautiously, lest in our understandable desire to reach out to the victims of the earthquake we are railroaded into making concessions that may look like CBMs. Confidence-building measures are both easy to adopt and even easier to sell to the general public. But they cannot be a substitute for purposeful negotiations, that aim sincerely at resolving disputes.

Most appropriately, the Pakistani leadership has begun to warn that unless the underlined issues are resolved, the CBMs will wither away on the vine like short-lived spring flowers. But the statement indicating Pakistan’s willingness to make the LoC “irrelevant” has caused great surprise in the country. This cannot be treated as a mere confidence building measure. It is a major political decision.

Here it would be worthwhile to recall that in the wake of the January 2004 Islamabad declaration, which itself was the result of intense pressure from many of our so-called friends, both sides started talking of “soft” or “irrelevant” borders. If by “softness” Islamabad was referring to the easing of procedures to encourage reunion of divided families across the LoC, that would make understandable sense, but to talk in terms of making the LOC “irrelevant” is toying with an idea that is both impractical and highly dangerous, for once it becomes “irrelevant”, what happens to our historic stand on Kashmir?

In this context, it is important to recall that immediately after the Simla Accord was signed, it came under severe criticism in India from people who claimed that Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had succeeded in getting the better of Mrs Indra Gandhi in the negotiations. In response to this criticism, the Indians orchestrated a whispering campaign to the effect that Mrs Gandhi had agreed to the terms of the accord only after the Pakistani leader had assured her that once he had consolidated his power he would not be averse to turning the LoC into an international frontier. In other words, the Pakistanis would accept the formal division of Kashmir. No credible evidence of any such commitment by Mr Bhutto, has, however, been made available so far.

For Pakistan to now suggest that the LoC should become “irrelevant’ could be fraught with risks more serious than the proposal to convert the LoC into an international frontier. It is an initiative that needs to be very carefully examined by competent legal and diplomatic experts, for it could have long-term consequences for our historic stand on Kashmir. This is also an issue that needs national consensus so that we do not appear divided on an issue of such strategic significance to our security and well-being.

The writer is a former ambassador.