Why India voted against Iran
By Karamatullah K. Ghori
INDIA voting on the side of the Americans and the Europeans against Iran at the September 24 IAEA board meeting in Vienna was bound to enrage the Iranians. The jury is still out as to how Tehran will ultimately react to the Indian perfidy. There have, so far, been conflicting reports from Vienna and Tehran. The Vienna missive spoke of Iran immediately retaliating by cancelling the $22 billion liquefied natural gas deal with India. But later reports from Tehran still left a modicum of shades of gray on the subject.
Irrespective of whether Tehran pays the Indians back in the same coin or sticks to its commitment on the gas deal with Delhi, it is not possible to water down Indian treachery and its impact that goes far beyond bilateral ties.
Many have been surprised by Delhi’s decision to stand up and be counted in the camp of western neo-imperialists out to nettle Iran on the nuclear issue. How can India, the self-proclaimed moral guru of the Third-World, stab a camp follower in the back? What, the argument goes, has happened, or is happening, to the erstwhile grain of India that regarded the West with so much suspicion and mistrust?
What baffles the observer is how an energy-starved India, which has been laying so much store by its frenzied rush to become an international economic power-house, even think of putting its lucrative energy deal with Iran on the line just in order to please its new western friends.
It wasn’t so long ago that India prided itself on its independent foreign policy of which opposition to the western camp was a cornerstone. India was given due recognition, by friend and foe alike, for its capacity to stand up to the bullies of the western world whenever it deemed its principles and scruples to be coming under attack. So what has so radically changed the Indian chemistry that instead of standing up to them now it is standing alongside them?
A plausible answer to that puzzle is, in one word, the sea change in the complexion of the Indian leadership. It goes without saying that the man at the top of a government or state matters much.
Bush has steered the US so aggressively on an imperialistic track because the man is hopelessly hooked on the neo-con ‘vision’ of Pax Americana in the 21st century. Blair, a supposedly enlightened liberal, has turned out to be a closet imperialist indistinguishable from the empire-builders of bygone centuries.
Manmohan Singh is the key to understanding the radical ‘shift’ in Indian foreign policy, especially in the context of the western world. He is a product of the World Bank, and this American-controlled entity is as much an imperialist outfit as was the benighted East India Company at the prime of Pax Britannica. In fact, British imperialism was in lockstep with the cut and thrust of the company, just as US neo-imperialism is, today, with the likes of the World Bank and IMF.
In yesteryear, the cross was the inevitable alter ego of the colonial sword. Today, the corporate culture is an essential clone of neo-colonialism of the neo-conservative brand. Pax Americana has been rigorously pursuing a two-pronged strategy of acquiring military bases wherever possible and supplanting in leadership positions wherever the acquisition of military foothold is difficult, Washington’s friends preferably those trained at the World Bank/IMF.
British imperialism was served ideally by the brown or black sahibs picked up from the natives. They lived up to Macaulay’s masterly vision of native loyalists — speaking their masters’ tongue and thinking like the masters — and delivering as expected of them to enhance imperialist interests without demur. The WB/IMF clones are, likewise, expected to do the bidding of these institutions and paymasters.
The watershed heralding a new course for Indian relations with the West, and US in particular, was reached two months ago when Manmohan Singh visited Washington and was rolled out the red carpet. The Americans cornered him to concede on the game plan for Iran by promising him an expanded programme of nuclear cooperation capped with technology transfer and dual-use equipment.
Manmohan found the offer tempting and irresistible and fell for it. Iran’s goose at IAEA was cooked then and there in Washington.
Congressman Tom Lantos, a ranking member (Democrat) of the House International Relations Committee, let the cat out of the bag when he boasted, on the heels of India’s helpful vote in Vienna, that Washington’s cooperation with India should “encourage quid pro quo diplomacy to engender consistent support for US interests.” Lantos was also unabashedly frank in admitting: “India cannot expect (us) to accommodate her while she totally disregards our interests...”
India obviously didn’t succumb to pressure from Washington and voted in its favour only to get it off its back. Far from being a one-time error, it seems to be part of a well-deliberated new policy to integrate India’s nuclear ambitions into the western grand scheme to keep the nuclear club’s door firmly shut on another Muslim state other than Pakistan that gate-crashed into the club and whose presence there is barely tolerated.
Credence to this was furnished only two days after the Vienna vote when Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh showed up in Ottawa to sign a deal with his Canadian counterpart Pierre Pettigrew calling for renewed nuclear safety cooperation and the supply to India of “dual-use items” to civilian nuclear facilities.
Canada has had a freeze on its nuclear cooperation with India since 1974, when India exploded its maiden nuclear device. Why should Canada, all of a sudden, feel the need now to roll back 30 plus years of treating India as a pariah in the nuclear field?
An official spokesman of the Canadian ministry of foreign affairs didn’t allow any suspense to shroud the precipitous Canadian move. Briefing the press, he admitted that Ottawa was impressed by India voting with Canada, the US and the Europeans “in condemning Iran for its nuclear activities.” What he didn’t say was that the government of Prime Minister Paul Martin has been bending over backward to please Washington, wherever possible, to make amends for Jean Chretien’s bold and principled decision to stay out of any involvement in Bush’s Iraq adventure.
So it is fairly obvious that India, under Manmohan, the World Bank man, is happily content to play footsie with its western friends and mentors, in order to reap a rich harvest in cutting-edge technology and state-of-the-art equipment from the West to whet its own appetite and become a world-class nuclear power.
Does it also presage India participation in the neo-con plans to tighten the noose around Iran’s neck?
India, it is a matter of fact, has been eager to get on board the rolling American bandwagon ever since 9/11. The BJP, for crass political expediency, may denounce Manmohan Singh for abandoning India’s no-truck-with-the-West attitude but the Vajpayee government, too, was petulantly anxious to join Bush’s battle against terrorism and did, for the record, offer its services for operations against the Taliban. Manmohan Singh isn’t, really the first in Delhi to go for the forbidden fruit.
But didn’t Delhi take into account the fallout of its provocative, anti-Iranian, move on its interest in buying the badly-needed Iranian gas for its ambitious industrial take-off?
It’s inconceivable that there was no such homework done in Delhi before the Rubicon was crossed in Vienna and a palpable backlash — inviting die was cast against Iran. So how were the tea- leaves read especially on an issue of such vital stakes as energy for a starving Indian industry?
It could only mean one of the two probable outcomes that the Indian pundits may be banking on. One, that Tehran would lump its pride and not abandon the gas pipeline-to-India-via-Pakistan scheme, because of it being too lucrative for Iran to abandon.
Two, that if Tehran, as expected, accords primacy to its well-known national pride and scuttles the gas deal, India’s western mentors would bail it out with another pipeline from some other source in the neighbourhood, say, for instance, Qatar. The gas-rich Arabian Qatar has had a foot in the door for India for several years.
What should Pakistan, caught in the middle, do? Nothing. It doesn’t have too many cards to play in this game of nerves, although Pakistan would be losing big bucks in royalties on the pipeline transit if the deal falls through.
The Iranians don’t trust Pakistan sufficiently, especially since Islamabad jumped on board the Bush juggernaut in Afghanistan. This came on top of the erstwhile mollycoddling of a Tehran-hostile Taliban regime in Kabul. But Islamabad can still softly and unostentatiously advise Tehran to be chary of an untrustworthy India which wouldn’t bat an eyelash before stabbing Iran in the back wherever its own interest so warrants. Anything warmer than a strictly cold business deal with Delhi could be tantamount to courting trouble.
The writer is a former ambassador.


