US needs to shape closer ties with Indian army: think-tank
By Our Correspondent
WASHINGTON, July 24: The United States needs to build an operational partnership with the Indian army, enabling US and Indian troops to work together in joint military operations across the globe, says a new study by the US Institute of Peace.
The Washington-based think-tank, which is funded by the US government, argues that “recent US-led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan amply demonstrate” the need for building such partnerships with friendly nations, particularly India which has the world’s second largest army.
Author Christine Fair, a programme officer for South Asia at the USIP, notes that the Indian army has conducted operations successfully in desert and jungle terrains, tackled rural and urban insurgencies, and operated at home and abroad –- principally in United Nations peacekeeping operations.
“Notably, India has a well-honed and exceptional high-altitude warfare capability, of which few countries can boast,” says Ms Fair while urging the US administration to develop a closer relationship with the Indian military establishment.
“There are reasons to believe that future Indo-US military cooperation is possible in particular political contexts and in specific kinds of operations,” says the author while acknowledging that India disappointed the US when it refused to send troops to Iraq.
The essay makes five main arguments: First, although there is considerable convergence at the strategic level, there are also significant asymmetries between the US and Indian armies. Second, while New Delhi values the increased service-to-service interactions, technology access remains the litmus test of the relationship. Third, although Washington and New Delhi have many shared security concerns, India will not participate in combat coalitions unless its own security is at stake. Fourth, while India is a reluctant multilateralist, this does not mean that the Indian army is irrelevant to the United States. It is conceivable that the Indian and US armies could operate together in the context of peace, counterterrorist, or counter-narcotic operations. Therefore, developing joint operational capabilities will be useful to the United States. Fifth, apart from troops, India has a number of other assets, including its vast military-educational institutions.
“Following the Indian military campaign during the 1999 conflict with Pakistan in the Kargil and Dras sectors and Operation Parakaram, the Indian army action during the 2002 standoff with Pakistan, foreign armies became increasingly interested in the Indian army,” says the author. After these two operations, several nations expressed the desire to send their officers for training to India. During 2003–04, over 3,200 army personnel from countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Africa were trained in India.
Reviewing the Indian army’s strengths and weaknesses, the study notes:
The Indian army is the world’s second largest, with some 1.1 million active personnel. The Indian army is regarded as generally well-trained and motivated, although there are reports of diminished morale and readiness as a result of its incessant involvement in counterinsurgency operations. While the Indian army easily meets its enlisted accession targets, for the past several years it has had a serious officer shortage.
The most recent report from January 2005 indicates that there is a continuing shortage of nearly 12,000 officers. The aging profile of the India army also has drawn concern in recent years.
Under current army practice, a colonel typically assumes command of a battalion at 42 years of age. In contrast, the age of battalion commanders of Pakistani, Chinese, and Israeli armies is between 35 and 37 years.
The Indian army is believed to have 1.1 million active troops, 300,000 active eserves1 and 500,000 in active reserves. A total of 46,000 territorial forces are also attached to the Indian army.
“The biggest concern is that India’s major platforms are not compatible with those of the United States,” says the author but quotes a US military official as saying that Indian and US have worked together in the past despite very different equipment and logistical arrangements.
The author describes the army’s main task –- guarding India’s borders with Pakistan and China –- as “onerous,” given that of its 16,500 km of shared borders, 7,000 km are disputed.
