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| July 20, 2005 | Wednesday | Jumadi-us-Sani 12, 1426 |
Sarhad station master held for negligence
LAHORE, July 19: The relieving station master of Sarhad railway station, Ikhtiar Ahmad, has been arrested for negligence which resulted in three trains’ collision on July 13, it is learnt. Sources told Dawn on Tuesday Mr Ahmad was handed over to the law enforcement agencies in the light of preliminary inquiry findings which would be submitted to Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz on Wednesday (today).
“The report is likely to be taken up in the federal cabinet meeting scheduled for Thursday,” the sources said.
Station Master Maqbool Sheikh was on rest on July 13 and assistant station manager Ikhtiar Ahmad of the relieving pool was sent in his place. But the ASM preferred to take a nap in a quarter and asked the signals man and point man to look after the control room. Ikhtiar Ahmad was among the five officers suspended from service soon after the collision.
A former federal government inspector of the railways was among a dozen or so senior serving and retired employees who questioned the findings of the preliminary report.
According to them, “Any train accident due to collision cannot take place, until and unless more than one person commit mistake or overlook operating rules.”
Before the submission of interim inquiry report, suspension of six field or operating officers from service by Railways Minister Shamim Haider did not look justified, as most of these officers were not directly or indirectly responsible for the fatal accident.
Furthermore, it was not clear whether the officers were suspended from service on the basis of the FIR lodged with Ghotki police or the Efficiency and Discipline Rules.
“The officers suspended from service were not named in the FIR. If they have been suspended from service under the E&D Rules, they have not been given a charge sheet yet.
“The steps were taken by the railway administration in haste and can be termed an eyewash or selection of scapegoats,” the railway people said.
A retired divisional superintendent said: “There is always a second or third safety catch or defence line, which if works averts collision. It is said that Karachi Express did not stop against red signal and overshoot. If it was so, why did not second defence line work?”
He was of the opinion that if the signal was red, points should not have been set for main line, rather for loop line or sand hump according to the standard III signalling, installed at Sarhad railway station. Green signal cannot be given until unless the points were set for that particular line, i.e. the down main line.
The second safety arrangement, he argued, should have diverted the Karachi Express on loop or sand line and averted collision with the Quetta Express.
A caution order had to be issued to the driver of the Karachi Express at Mirpur Mathelo station if the Sarhad station points for train reception were defective. Was this rule observed?
The collision of Tezgam with the derailed coaches of the Quetta Express also needed a thorough investigation, particularly the timings and observance of operating rules.
“According to rules if there is an apprehension of an accident to an expected train in block section on double line section or if an expected train is overdue by 15 minutes on double line section, the station master has to issue a caution order to the driver proceeding on adjacent line in the opposite direction, informing him about the situation and instructing him to keep the train under control and be more vigilant,” he observed.
“Did the Ghotki station master fulfil this condition with the driver of Tezgam proceeding in up direction towards Sarhad?,” the former DS asked.
The former FGIR said the inquiry officer should also take into account all other irregularities, directly or indirectly responsible for the fatal accident.
The emphasis on defect in some coaches of the Quetta Express and its undue stoppage at Sarhad station has no relation with the cause of the accident.
“On railway system a number of trains are stopped out of way at stations or even in block sections, but this does not become a cause of accident. Had there been no technical fault in rolling stock, locomotive, track or signalling, a train could have been stopped out of way by any passenger by applying breaks through the alarm communication system,” the ex-FGIR maintained.
Train operation, he said, should be the core activity of railway. For a safe, comfortable and punctual train service, suitable and experienced people should be posted at various management levels.
A senior officer was of the view: “There is no substitute to seniority, experience and training of train operation and railway system. In the recent past a number of junior and inexperienced people had been posted on railways workshop and operating divisions. Similar is the case with top management in the headquarters and ministry.
“Soon after the accident, we heard statements by Railways Minister Shamim Haider and other officers with surprise. We still fail to understand why non-technical and non-professional people speak about the cause of such tragic accident, and jump to conclusions. Train operation is a highly technical work involving a number of operating rules and expertise. “At present, the officers posted for train operation are also kept involved in other non-core activities like marketing of franchise, sale or lease of lands, protocol services etc. The required knowledge and experience of railway men should be diverted and used for core activity otherwise such accidents will occur and unsatisfactory train operation will continue,” the officer maintained.
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