ALTHOUGH much has been written about the history of Afghanistan, the purpose of this article is to see if the past can provide any guidance to the future of the country when it is once again under the domination of a foreign power. Apart from the stunning beauty of its varied landscape, what is quite striking about this country is the fearlessly independent nature of its people who have never accepted foreign domination.

In its more than 250 years history as an independent country, the great powers made repeated attempts to subjugate Afghanistan but they failed miserably.

The invasion of 1839 by the British was to remove the independent minded Ameer Dost Muhammad Khan and replace him with the British puppet Shah Shujah who was being nurtured in India for almost three decades. After his initial success, the Afghans revolted, first killing the top British diplomats and military commanders and then massacring more than 1,500 officers and men of the British army while retreating from Afghanistan. Thus the first Afghan war exposed the myth of the invincibility of the British might. Earlier, Shah Shujah been killed.

The second Afghan war of 1879 was launched by the British for the same reason: to coerce the Afghans to side with them against ambitious and expansionist czarist Russia. Once again the British succeeded initially by installing a weak-willed ameer who signed the humiliating Gandamak Treaty acceding some important areas to the British and agreeing to the permanent stationing of a British resident at Kabul.

The unfortunate drama of 1842 was once again enacted in its gory detail: the British mission was burnt and razed to the ground; the British ambassador and his entire staff including 75 soldiers of the elite Corps of Guides who were guarding the embassy, were killed and the ameer was exiled to India. Wrecking unprecedented vengeance on the residents of Kabul, the British decided to once again leave the country without fulfilling their ambition of turning the country into a client state.

The third Afghan war of 1919 resulted in the Treaty of Rawalpindi which gave Afghanistan full control over its internal and external affairs. Thus the British finally gave up their dream of subjugating Afghanistan in order to secure the northwestern approaches to India.

One question, which is frequently asked is as to why Afghanistan has repeatedly attracted the attention of the great powers when the country has no oil or any other worthwhile asset. The answer lies in its strategic location straddling Central and South Asia that make it a convenient gateway to India.

The main reason, however, centred on the rivalry of Czarist Russia and imperial Britain in the 19th century, each one wanting Afghanistan as an ally in the “Great Game.” In recent times it was the desire of the Russians and the ambition of the Americans to foist their puppets on the unfortunate country which has resulted in its destabilization and destruction.

Between 1919 and 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the country, though remaining relatively calm, remained embroiled in internal strife resulting in the ouster of King Amanullah and the usurpation of the Kabul throne by a Tajik brigand “Bachai Saquo”, who was hanged and power assumed by the Musahiban brothers led by General Nadir Khan.

Upon Nadir Khan’s assassination in 1933, his son Zahir Khan became king and ruled for 40 years. He was ousted by his cousin Daoud Khan in 1973. Daoud abolished the system of monarchy and declared Afghanistan a democratic republic; a blunder for which the country is suffering to this day.

The other mistake which Daoud committed was to give relative freedom to the communists as he himself had come to power with the help of so these elements in the army. Tasting power, the communists struck decisively and murdered Daoud and his entire family in April 1978, thus ushering in a system which was anathema to the majority of the religious Afghans.

The Soviets decided to help their Afghan clients and invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. A long and protracted insurgency, aided and abetted by Pakistan, the United States and some other Muslim countries started which compelled Russian leader Gorbachev to describe the Afghan adventure as a “festering wound” and a great mistake. He ordered the complete withdrawal of Russian forces in 1989 which ultimately resulted in the ouster of their surrogates.

The Mujahideen government which assumed power in April 1992 lasted for four years and was ousted by the Taliban in 1996. They remained in power till December 2001 when United States forces invaded Afghanistan. Thus, since 1839 when Great Britain invaded Afghanistan for the first time, that country has witnessed twists and turns of history that very few other countries have experienced.

This brief recapitulation of the Afghan history leads one to the inevitable conclusion that though the Afghans never accepted foreign domination and were able to repeatedly oust foreign invaders, they were unable to manage their internal affairs. Except for the 40-year rule of Zahir Shah, the rest is a saga of disorder, destruction, assassinations, exile and violent wars of successions. One factor which repeatedly occurs in Afghan history is that whenever the Afghans felt that their rulers were being manipulated from outside, they reacted violently and got rid of them. Similarly, when a ruler tried to go against the acceptable norms and traditions of Afghan society, he was discarded.

Coming to the contemporary scene when the country is once again under foreign domination, it will be fair to assume that the end result will not be any different from what it has always been — the humiliation of the aggressor and the elimination of his supporters. The United States has very limited interest in Afghanistan, which is confined to the capture or elimination of Osama bin Laden. Once this limited objective is achieved or abandoned, they will pack their bags and leave. With them, should leave their local clients. Where will this leave Afghanistan is a question that needs be addressed.

To find an answer one has to understand the ethos of Afghan society, its aspirations and its fundamental approach to life. Afghanistan is a tribal society where the ruler is expected to adhere to the norms of a code of honour. Here, I am reminded of an incident that happened when President Daoud visited Moscow in 1976. During the official meeting in the Kremlin, Brezhnev showed his displeasure over the presence of some western advisors in northern Afghanistan.

Sardar Dauod, miffed at his remarks, told Brezhnev to mind his own business as it was for the Afghans to decide who came to their country and where they would be located and stormed out of the room. He also refused a one to one meeting with Breznhev. Although eventually this “insolence “cost Daoud his life, he did not compromise his dignity and honour as a proud Afghan.

Afghans prefer their ruler to come from a known and respected tribal entity. That is the reason why Afghanistan has been ruled for over 200 years by a dynasty belonging to a powerful clan. And it is exactly for this reason that Zahir Shah ruled for such a long time.

Can the same or a similar system be successful once the intruders have been ousted or have left by their own volition. The answer is an emphatic yes as during Zahir Shah’s rule not only was the country politically stable but was quoted as a shining example of peaceful, international coexistence and cooperation as the Americans, Russians, Germans, French, Japanese and others were working side by side for the development of the country. If Sardar Dauod had not upset the apple cart in 1973, Afghanistan would have been in a different league today.

Unfortunately, the experiments carried out in the last 32 years have not brought the desired stability, harmony and unity to the country. Nor will the unfamiliar concept of ballot box democracy, sponsored by the Americans, succeed. Monarchy, as a vehicle for unity, is essential as Afghanistan has become a fractured country because of its recent history which has seen ethnic differences become more pronounced and arms proliferation.

In fact, if after the ouster of the Taliban, Zahir Shah was installed as the head of state with full authority, Afghanistan would have been presenting a different picture today. It is puzzling that although Zahir Shah was always a serious option, he was completely ignored at the appropriate time. This was possibly because of his unacceptability to the Americans who would not have been allowed to humiliate and massacre the Afghans as they have been doing. I have no doubt that given a chance the Afghans will once again rise to the occasion and restore their cherished system so rudely interrupted in 1973.

The writer is a former ambassador.

THE failure of the talks to resolve any of the river-water disputes with India (Baglihar, Kishenganga, or Wullar), followed by the recent flooding of vast areas in Punjab and Sindh, caused by the Indian decision to put 566,200 cusecs of water in the Chenab, has increased Pakistan’s concern about its rights as a lower riparian country granted by the 1960 Indus Water Treaty.

Federal Minister for Water and Power Liaquat Jatoi has disclosed that India informed Pakistan of its intention eight hours before releasing water into the river Chenab which enabled the government to evacuate people from river and canal embankments. However, the flood water has caused breaches in protective ‘bunds’ and huge damage to the rural economy in the affected areas in Punjab and Sindh.

Pakistan and India should give top priority to amicably resolving their water disputes because they contain germs of a future conflict. According to a recent report of the Geneva-based World Wide Fund for Nature’s Global Climate Change Programme (WWF), global warming is causing Himalayan glaciers to rapidly retreat, threatening to cause water shortages for hundreds of millions of people who rely on glacier-fed rivers in Western China, North-Western India and the neighbouring Pakistan. The report indicates that glaciers in the region are receding at an alarming average rate of 10 to 15 meters per year.

“The rapid melting of Himalayan glaciers will first increase the volume of water in rivers, causing widespread flooding, but in a few decades this situation will change and the water level in rivers will decline, meaning massive economic and environmental problems for people in Western China, Nepal, Western India and the neighbouring Pakistan”, says the WWF report, which was published in the run-up to two meetings in London on climate change organized by Britain as head of the G-8. In a letter sent to participating ministers, WWF stressed the need to recognize climate change as an issue that seriously threatens security and development.

The six rivers of the Indus water basin flow through Kashmir’s mountains and valleys from Tibet and water the plains below. In 1960, the World Bank brokered a deal which gave India the three eastern rivers — Ravi, Beas and Sutlej — while Pakistan was awarded the three western rivers, — Indus, Jhelum and Chenab.

The treaty has put out of bounds the ability to store, divert and regulate water of the rivers covered by it. While allocating the western rivers to Pakistan, the treaty did allow India some limited use of them, including ‘run of the river’ hydro-electric schemes, subject to certain conditions and parameters. The term ‘run of the river’ means the project does not involve any ‘storage’. And, therefore, India is not allowed to build storage facilities on the western rivers except to a very limited extent.

Under the treaty, if India wants to build a project on the western rivers, it will have to give Pakistan the plan and designs in advance to enable Pakistan to satisfy itself that it is in conformity with the treaty conditions. Pakistan is given an opportunity to raise objections, if any, and that is how differences have arisen. Fortunately, in one such case, the Salal hydro-electric project, the governments of the two countries were able to resolve the issue. However, in other cases like Baglihar, Kishenganga and Wullar or Tulbul, the two sides have so far failed to settle their differences and the Baglihar dispute has been referred by Pakistan to the World Bank for arbitration.

The World Bank has appointed Professor Raymond Lafitte neutral expert (NE) under the arbitration provisions of the Indus Treaty to deal with differences that have arisen over the Baglihar Power project on the Chenab river. It may be added that the arbitration clause has been invoked for the first time in the 45-year history of the Indus Treaty.

Since differences over the Kishengnaga project on the river Jhelum have remained unresolved, Pakistan may be obliged to refer this project too to the World Bank. The NE’s findings will be final and binding on both the parties.

However, if the NE feels that the points referred to him are beyond his purview or that there is a ‘dispute’, the matter will have to go to a court of arbitration. Let us hope the problem relating to Baglihar will not reach the ‘dispute’ stage and will be decided by the NE.

The water bombs needs to be defused because experts foresee a looming confrontation between the two neighbours over sharing of river water. According to the Mumbai-based Strategic Foresight Group (SFG), the north-western India and the neighbouring Pakistani region, the breadbaskets of both countries, are drying out. In India, two lower riparian states, Punjab and Haryana, with nearly 20 million acres of cultivable land, will face a crunch over water in the next five to 10 years. Indian Punjab last year unilaterally annulled all water treaties with neighbouring states and has refused to build key canals to share water.

According to the SFG report, the situation is worse in Pakistan where the flow of river water is dropping at nearly seven per cent a year. The country’s vast irrigation network is silting up and agricultural output will reach a crisis by 2010, with two key commodities — food grain and cotton — badly hit. Like its Indian counterpart, Pakistani Punjab uses up much of the water that flows from Kashmir. Its smaller neighbour Sindh regularly complains that its share of water is being diverted upstream to feed large farms owned by influential Punjabi families.

In the coming years, water shortage is likely to increase tension between the two provinces threatening national unity and cohesion.

The SFG report further states that both India and Pakistan have reached the conclusion that the meandering route of the Chenab river on the Indian side of Kashmir is becoming a determining factor in any settlement. Although most of the Chenab river lies in Pakistan, its headwaters are in India’s portion of Kashmir. It is now obvious that India has designs on the river Chenab because it has identified no less than nine sites on the river for what it calls ‘hydro-electric’ projects which are likely to become controversial like the Baglihar dam.

The truth of the matter is that underlying the technical disagreements over Baglihar, Kishenganga or Wullar are much deeper issues and concerns. Pakistan is justifiably worried about the powers of control that any structure on the western rivers may give the upper riparian country (India). It is apprehensive of the possibilities of a reduction of flows downstream in dry season or, alternatively, of flooding in the rainy season. Pakistan is naturally concerned about the possible use of the river water as a weapon of war. Its apprehensions are, therefore, partly over water-sharing and partly over security aspects arising from the Indian control structures existing on its western rivers.

Pakistan’s anxiety over the security of its rights as a lower riparian country, granted by the Indus Water Treaty, is not, therefore, uncalled for. The reason is that though most of the Chenab river passes through Pakistan, its headwaters lie in India’s part of Kashmir. The situation has been complicated by New Delhi’s plan to build nine ‘hydro electric’ projects on the river Chenab. One of them, the Baglihar dam, has already become controversial.

No country has the right to deprive another of a shared resource which, thanks to geographic design, collects in a basin within its borders. The Indus Water Treaty about water sharing between Pakistan and India survived the 1965 and 1971 wars between the two neighbours and water flowed uninterruptedly during both the conflicts. It will be a tragedy of immense magnitude if the sanctity of the treaty is now violated by either Pakistan or India because that is bound to lead to disastrous consequences.

There can be no greater CBM than the resolution of differences over sharing of water under the 1960 treaty. Since the breadbaskets of both the countries will be facing shortage of water in the coming years, the two neighbours must act quickly to defuse the water bomb by implementing the Indus Water Treaty in letter and spirit. For that it will be necessary for them to get out of the prison of the past.

The writer is a former ambassador.

PRIME MINISTER Manmohan Singh wanted to combine his official visit to Washington with a trip to New York to attend the UN General Assembly session in September.

America was insistent that he should come independently of other engagements and even suggested middle of July as the convenient time. It had its way.

True, President Bush is a busy man but the Indian prime minister should not have been put to the trouble of undertaking an unnecessary journey when he has undergone a heart bypass and angioplasty. Why couldn’t he have travelled to Washington from London where he had gone a week earlier to attend the G-8 meeting? The importance of the US visit would not have lessened in any way.

Probably, America feared adverse fallout from the defence treaty which Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed in Washington last month. (He persists on calling it an agreement). America’s reading was wrong. Except a few speeches by the Left and some comments in the press, there was hardly any unfavourable voice from the public. Jingo nationalism has developed in India at the expense of liberal thought. When consumerism takes over, defence becomes an obsession with those who matter. America should know this more than any other country.

What the US wants to convey is that India is its closest ally in this part of the world. This is, in fact, in line with the suggestions the Carnegie Endowment, a think-tank in America, has made to the State Department in its latest report. To align with India, the Carnegie report recommends that America should take five steps: 1. Help India’s power to grow to prevent China’s dominance. 2. End the illusory idea of military balance between India and Pakistan. 3. Endorse India’s membership in the UN Security Council, G-8, Apec, International Energy Agency. 4. Remove objections to the Iran-India gas pipeline. 5. Allow sale of dual-use technology, including nuclear safety equipment.

The CIA analysis also describes India as the most important “swing state” in the international system — a country that could tilt the balance between war and peace, between chaos and order. The National Intelligence Council, CIA’s brain trust, compared the emergence of India and China to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the US in the 20th century in mapping the global future.

“The US leaders are concerned about the growth of the Chinese military, its monetary policy, its vicious attacks on Japan and its increasing power projection capabilities. Both Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld have sharply articulated their doubts on these grounds. An unbridled China is not in the US interest and by bolstering India, the US can arrest the growth of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean rimlands and Chinese penetration of Myanmar,” says the report.

Of course, America’s emphasis is on building up India as a counter force to China, a “potential hedge against a rising China,” as an American thinker puts it. This is incorrect. New Delhi, with improving relations with Beijing, may never go back to the time when the two countries were at odds with each other.

There is a dispute over the boundary and it looks as if the two sides are beginning to appreciate sensitivities of each other. They may come to a settlement before long. Even otherwise, the region is big enough to accommodate India and China and there is no doubt that Beijing will one day follow the democratic way of governance to firm up relations with New Delhi.

By all means, India should take advantage of new thinking in America in the wake of Bush administration. In fact, stirrings were visible much earlier and former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee did a considerable work in the field. Robert Blackwill, US ambassador in New Delhi a few years ago, forced many positive changes in the US policy despite stiff resistance. But it is for India to consider how far it wants to go. Manmohan Singh has rightly said that India cannot be anybody’s suppliant.

Yet a country, which is giving a new interpretation to non-aligned movement (NAM), should not be acting in a manner that may create doubts in the minds of Third World nations. New Delhi’s argument in favour of NAM is that small countries should gather on the same platform to be a moral force against big, powerful nations. How does the exclusive arrangement with America fit into such thinking?

Some of the clauses in the treaty with the US impinge on New Delhi’s free say. It reminds me of the agreements or pacts during the cold war days which India vehemently opposed. Even if there is no obligation on the part of India to do what Nato, Cento and Seato demanded from its members, the pact with America amounts to an alliance. It excludes other nations and negates the UN Charter based on the one-world concept. Take a sub-clause of Article 4 of the treaty.

According to it, India and America will “collaborate in multinational operations when it is in their common interest.” If the “common interest” of the two nations transcends the interests of the rest, what is the UN for? America did not care about it when it attacked Iraq. A multinational operation has to have the stamp of the UN approval. This has been India’s stand. The acquisition of modern weapons from America could not be the reason for a turnabout.

When General Mohammed Ayub Khan took over Pakistan in October 1958, he offered India a defence pact. Jawaharlal Nehru, then the prime minister, rightly said: Defence against whom? The matter did not proceed further. Although President General Pervez Musharraf is heavily dependent on the US, he could not have liked America’s tilt towards India. At a time when India and Pakistan are in the midst of a peace process, any suspicion in Islamabad can be harmful. However, Pakistan should not read too much into the effusive statements America makes. Instead, Islamabad’s strategy should be to help a South Asian entity to emerge. It may be an economic union but the entire area has to have soft borders. And there is no place for terrorism in the region.

Whatever the calculations and compulsions of the military-led government in Islamabad, the common man in Pakistan feels insecure. He is terrified because he sees terrorists taking training in the midst of civilian population. A study conducted by the International Crisis Group last year said: “President Musharraf’s call for an end to the promotion of an ideology of jihad was welcomed around the world. Two years on, however, the failure to deliver to any substantial degree on pledges to reform the madressahs and contain the growth of jihadi networks means that religious extremism in Pakistan continues to pose a threat to domestic, regional and international security.”

How to retrieve Pakistan from terrorism should be top priority after the meeting between Bush and Manmohan Singh. More than that, they should be looking for ways to stabilize the region littered with failing states.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.