INTOLERANCE is one of the numerous forces that motivate violence. It is active disapproval, involving some measure of adversely discriminatory treatment, of persons who think and act differently from the way you do in matters you consider important. Short of physical violence, a common response to the dissident in many societies has been to deny him equal access to political participation, employment, professional education, housing, and other amenities. The object may be not only to place him at a disadvantage but also to belittle and humiliate him.

Persecution of dissident groups may spring from ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences. It has declined in western countries in relation to the older minorities as a result of remedial legislation and judicial decisions, education, assimilation, and acculturation. In America, for instance, discrimination against the Jews, and persons of Irish, Polish, and Italian origins has virtually disappeared, and that against Afro-Americans has decreased substantially. Its focus has shifted to the newer minorities, notably, the Muslims. The same holds for parts of western Europe.

Unesco lamented some 10 years ago that “residual and renewed religious intolerance has intensified and religious discrimination, segregation, and conflict undermine national unity” in several societies. At the present time this observation applies to the Muslim world as much as, or perhaps even more than, it does to other places. Violence inspired by differences of religious identity has gone on in the Sudan for years.

Sectarian killings abound in Pakistan, and, of late, they have surfaced in Iraq. Iranians whose observance of Islamic requirements does not meet the standards of the ruling clergy are excluded from elective political offices. I saw a report a few weeks ago saying that the Saudi Arabian police had arrested 40 Pakistani Christians for no reason other than that they had assembled in a private home to pray.

Intolerance is not the only state of mind leading to physical violence. We have been witnessing a frightening increase in the incidence of violence among adolescents in America.

In many such instances, a child has come to school with a loaded gun in his bag, taken it out, and shot down a number of other children indiscriminately. It is possible that this child had been watching television shows that glorified violence; he may have watched his father beat up his mother; or he may have experienced rejection at home or from other children. He may have come to believe that it is “cool” to be carrying a loaded gun, and that it is no big deal to blow away a few people.

We have all heard of sadists, those who enjoy hurting others. Related to them are the ones who place a low value on human life. Recall the kings in the bad old days who beheaded men for the most trivial of reasons. It may also explain the wholesale massacres that kings and conquerors ordered in cities they had ravaged: Alexander in Persepolis, the Abbasids in Damascus, the Christian knights (“crusaders” ) in Jerusalem, Halaku Khan in Baghdad, and Babar in Hangu (in our own NWFP), among others.

Students of proneness to violence distinguish between “instrumental aggression” (when the attacker stands to benefit from his act), and impulsive aggression in which he is acting from passion. History is replete with cases in which seekers of ruling authority and power have killed potential as well as actual rivals, including brothers and, in a few instances, even fathers and sons. Killing rivals in the pursuit of power has not ceased altogether, but it is no longer regarded as lawful or even as politically correct.

A few of the legitimate types of violence may be mentioned. One is allowed to kill another person in “self-defence,” that is, to avoid getting killed by him. Soldiers of one state may fight those of another, not because they have any personal quarrel with the latter, but simply because their superiors have ordered them to fight and kill “for king and country,” and “theirs is not to reason why.” A state’s judicial agencies may impose penalties, including flogging or even death, upon individuals who have broken certain categories of the law.

In the old days, and in some places even now, students in schools were, and are, given corporal punishment for failure to do their homework or for violating the school’s discipline. We shall leave these and similar other instances alone, for we must now return to violence that is perpetrated by private parties, and which is, for the most part, outside the law.

I read a few days ago of a woman whose face had been disfigured beyond all recognition because someone had poured acid on it. A rejected lover may have done such a horrible deed. It could have been a fierce proponent of a certain concept of modesty, which this woman might have been offending by going about bare-faced and all made up.

A few weeks ago (April 20) a mob killed a man in Nowshera because he had allegedly done something blasphemous and a local cleric had branded him as an infidel deserving to be put to death. On May 6 some persons, presumably affiliated with the Taliban, bombed a complex of video shops and music stores in Miranshah, because the products they sold spread un-Islamic types of fun and relaxation. According to a report in the Gulf Times (April 25), a man somewhere in the emirates killed his wife and four sons as “offerings” on the Prophet’s (pbuh) birthday.

Cases in which a man kills his family because he is no longer able to feed them are not uncommon. Far more numerous are the cases in which a man kills his wife because he suspects her of infidelity and those in which a father or a brother will kill a girl because they suspect her of covertly meeting a “stranger.” This is done to vindicate the family’s “honour.”

There are cases of private violence in which a person attacks another because he feels that the latter has defied his superior authority, and has thus been rebellious or insolent. Allow me to recall a well-known incident. Amir Mohammad Khan (the Nawab of Kalabagh), governor of West Pakistan, once summoned the principal of King Edward Medical College in Lahore, and instructed him to admit certain candidates. Seeing that their credentials did not meet his college’s pre-requisites for admission, the principal declined to oblige the governor.

Upon hearing this, the Nawab lost his temper and slapped the principal across the face. It was widely believed among his colleagues in the profession that this physical assault on his person shattered the good doctor’s equanimity for the rest of his life.

A person may attack another also because he feels that the latter has somehow belittled or insulted his station. Such may have been the reasons that made Rao Sikandar Iqbal, our defence minister, slap Syed Zafar Abbas Bokhari, a district police officer, in Okara on May 2 in the presence of Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, the Punjab chief minister.

Rao Sikandar has been a politician for some 40 years. He was reportedly secretary of the Punjab University Students Union during 1963-64, and he claims to have been one of the founding members of the PPP. He served in Benazir Bhutto’s cabinet during her two terms as prime minister. He is currently a leader of the PPP “patriots,” the group that defected from its parent organization to join hands with PML-Q to serve General Musharraf in the present ruling coalition. But more than all of this, he attended the Forman Christian College in Lahore at the same time that General Musharraf was a student there. It is believed that as a result he has ready and direct access to the general. No wonder then that he thinks very well of himself.

Apparently, he had organized some kind of a show to welcome Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz to Okara. He had set up large posters and lined up applauding men along the route the prime minister’s motorcade was to take. But apparently the police and security personnel escorting him took a different route with the result that he did not get to see the fanfare Rao Sahib had organized. As he put it, his “show” was spoiled. Who were the spoilers? He assumed they were the Punjab police and others acting under the direction of Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi.

Another person may simply have been disappointed at this turn of events. But Rao Sikandar Iqbal was angry. How and where was he to vent his anger? A mere scolding of someone or a shout of disapproval would not have expressed it eloquently enough. Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, Chief Minister of Punjab and one of the top leaders in PML-Q, was obviously beyond the reach of his fire.

In normal circumstances Rao Sikandar, as defence minister, would be the army chief’s boss. But in our present circumstances, when the army chief is at the same time the president of Pakistan, Rao Sahib is a powerless, and superfluous, appendage. He knows it and so does everybody else. It appears that since he could not vent his anger at Pervaiz Elahi, he chose in sheer frustration to hit a police officer.

His chosen victim’s formal status was much lower than his own, but in terms of the authority and power he actually wielded every day, he was by no means an insignificant personage. Rao Sahib may have figured that his action in slapping this officer would project him to his party workers as a fearless, indeed awesome, stalwart.

In any mature democracy conduct like that of Rao Sikandar would have led to the resignation or dismissal of the minister concerned. In our case, however, the fact stranger than fiction is that Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi were prevailed upon to apologize to Rao Sikandar and make amends.

There was even some talk at the time that the victim of his outburst, the district police officer in Okara, might be disciplined (instead of being compensated for his injuries).

The writer is a professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA. E-mail: anwarsyed@cox.net

PAKISTAN is far from being an Islamic welfare state but it has, assuredly, become a land of sectarian murders and senseless violence. Exactly a year ago the Madrasatul Islam and Ali Raza mosques in Karachi were bombed. This time it is the Bari Imam shrine in Islamabad and Madinatul Ilm mosque in Karachi. The target in all four, undoubtedly, were the unwary Shia worshippers and they died by the dozens.

On May 30 last year Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai of Pakistan’s largest seminary was shot dead. This year on that date it was Aslam Mujahid, a leader of Pakistan’s most doctrinaire politico-religious outfit with its student and labour affiliates, Jamaat-i-Islami. Both the Mufti and Mujahid were murdered in daylight rush hours. No trace was found of the Mufti’s assassins nor, it can be safely assured, would be of Mujahid’s whatever the president, the ministers and police officials might have to say to the contrary.

The tragedy of the suicidal assault on Karachi’s Gulshne-i-Iqbal mosque has been made more poignant by the death of six youth in the fast-food joint — KFC — set afire by the rioters. The common past practice on such occasions is to burn vehicles and shops. This time the zealots or the hoodlums — one not distinguishable from the other — burnt to death even human beings. And then they would not let the Edhi rescuers save the dying ones who stood at their post in a manner reminiscent of the boy on the deck of a sinking ship in the British sea warfare lore.

In these times of sectarian madness those visiting a house of prayer knowingly risk their lives; those working in a restaurant for a living don’t. The strapping six youngmen had not bargained for death nor tried to escape it when it looked imminent. A special thought must be spared for Johny Terence for our religious leaders wouldn’t even pray for his soul nor would ministers condole with the bereaved. Even the president in his message hasn’t.

Thus, while sectarianism has entered a new and more brutal, dehumanizing phase, the outpourings from the maulanas and ministers remain routine and self-serving. Interior Minister Sherpao on whom it lies to ensure conditions in which the life, honour and property of every citizen are safe, says it is “extremely difficult” to prevent suicide bombings. Since he himself has disowned his basic responsibility he should resign. It might also incidentally help his political career which has been shaded by Mehran tapes and defection from the PPP.

The prime minister hasn’t spoken but he should surely act. He should offer the interior ministry to Mumtaz Bhutto, Mustafa Khar or Shahbaz Sharif. None of them would, at least, say the job cannot be done or is not worth doing.

Chaudhry Shujaat says the bombing should be investigated by a special squad, which is for the sake of saying it. It signifies nothing. He is however for once being realistic in suggesting that the causes underlying the sectarian tension need to be addressed. The causes are known but in political action expediency prevails.

Maulana Samiul Haq thinks there is no Sunni-Shia problem in the country and the two massacres, as before, are perpetrated by enemy agents (does he mean that even the arsonists of KFC were enemy agents?). He disclaims any responsibility on the part of Islamic elements. In doing that he had in mind, perhaps, the Taliban (mostly from his Akora Khattak seminary) who, now being hunted down as terrorists, in their heyday, he thought, should be ruling Pakistan, besides Afghanistan. Since the Maulana thinks there is no sectarian problem, there is nothing for him and other seminarians to do.

Since the interior minister, too, says he cannot do much, the mosque massacres and street riots that follow will continue and, perhaps, become more frequent and deadlier. Nobody should expect an end to the gory cycle if Qazi Husain Ahmad is right in alleging that the killers enjoy official patronage. Nor would it end if one were to go by a more widely held view that the very presence of religion in politics inexorably leads to sectarianism, which in turn breeds hatred periodically bursting out in violence.

Every politico-religious party is dominated by a sect even if belonging to that sect is not a condition for its membership. It is true of Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam or Pakistan, Jamiat Ahle Hadis, Tehrik-i-Islami (formerly TNFJ) and, you name it, every other party. The militant organizations, outlawed or operating underground, are also off-shoots or breakaway factions of one or the other mainstream party (the investigators of Karachi incident suspect that an injured bomber who was apprehended on the spot belongs to Lashkar-i-Jhangvi).

The political parties are formed but to capture state power. If a religious party can achieve that goal by appealing to sectarian sentiments, just as socialist parties do by exploiting economic iniquity, it would be vain to expect that it wouldn’t. The difference is that the aroused religious sentiment can lead to violence quicker and easier than a sense of economic deprivation. By one count sectarian violence in Pakistan has taken a toll of 170 lives just in last two months. It is for this reason and lessons learnt from the past that most countries of the world, whether democracies, monarchies or dictatorships, have chosen to keep the sensitive matters of faith out of the maelstrom of politics. It is of particular importance in backward societies where traditions are weak, people are gullible and rulers tend to be authoritarian. Exceptions like Sudan and Saudi Arabia are few.

The sectarian sentiment is hard to understand and the forces it releases are harder to control. The remedies that glibly flow after every outburst of violence in Pakistan are either inadequate or impracticable, hence never applied. If the state were to try to control the lessons in madressahs and sermons in mosques, it would exacerbate and not lesson sectarian tensions, for the controller himself would belong to one or the other sect; fatwas, whether extracted or volunteered tend to undermine the law of the land (a murder must remain a crime whatever its motivation); no government is ever able to check foreign intervention in its affairs, much less Pakistan with its porous borders and dependence on foreign arms and aid; and every mosque or imambargah cannot be guarded nor is sectarian violence limited to places of worship.

No remedy conceived or applied in the past has worked. It would not at all work now that the standards of governance and tolerance both have fallen to appallingly low levels. Islam which means peace has been made into a metaphor for unilateralism, allowig one set of beliefs and notions to question the legitimacy of others. To this image transformation Pakistan has contributed in no small measure.

From Liaquat Ali Khan’s Objectives Resolution through Bhutto’s Islamic socialism to Ziaul Haq’s rule of Shariat and Musharraf’s Islamic moderation, it has been one sad tale of rising intolerance and receding virtues. Pakistan as a human, tolerant society has declined as religious fanaticism has become ascendant. If the people of Pakistan have been denied democracy and peace it is because of this, among other, factors.

Without looking for an alibi or a foreign peg to hang the blame on, the government should, for a change, tend the economy and maintain law and order and leave the people to take care of their own faith. Thus the state would be secular but society Islamic — it cannot be otherwise because 95 to 97 per cent of the people are Muslims.

ISLAMABAD has witnessed a welcome intensification of intellectual debate recently with participation of both foreign and Pakistani scholars. Many NGOs have taken the initiative to arrange seminars on topical issues. With the 9/11 terrorist attacks generally viewed as a watershed event in contemporary history, and Pakistan playing a crucial role in the war against terror, the emerging role of China is becoming a subject of growing interest.

This subject was taken up in a seminar organized by Friends, with the collaboration of the Hanns Seidel Foundation a fortnight ago with participation of Chinese, Indian and German scholars along with Pakistanis.

China’s global role has evolved in an interesting way since its 1949 revolution. The Cold War had already started, and the US regarded China with even greater hostility as the People’s Republic entered the Korean War in 1950, after MacArthur decided to cross the Yalu River, and turned the tables on the US from victory to stalemate. Indeed, even the Soviet Union turned against China, after Beijing refused to accept Moscow’s hegemony in 1959. As India tried to take advantage by increasing its militancy along the dispute border with china, the People’s Republic was virtually isolated. It was at this time that Pakistan and China developed a significant friendship, following the Boundary Agreement of 1963.

The US, with which Pakistan was allied in military pacts, took a dim view of this friendship and even imposed sanctions on Pakistan. However, a few years later, following Nixon’s election as president in 1969, Washington took a more pragmatic view of improving relations with China, which had come under strong Soviet military pressure. In 1971, it fell to Pakistan to play the role of intermediary in facilitating Sino-US rapprochement, and after Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, a strategic convergence developed between China and the US to counter Soviet militancy.

The decade of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan saw their joint support to the Afghan struggle, and Pakistan’s role as a frontline state was instrumented in forcing Moscow to withdraw its forces, and to concede defeat in the Cold War.

The post-Cold War relationship between the US, now the sole superpower, and China witnessed a dual approach by Washington. China’s adoption of a programme of economic reforms in 1978, involving its opening up to the outside world, and virtually abandoning the command economy system, led the US to adopt a policy of economic engagement, with rapid expansion of trade and investment. At the same time, the fact that the Communist Party retained political power, led the US to adopt a policy based on political containment, and to maintain all the restrictions and embargoes on the transfer of technology to China.

Following its Cold War victory, US conservatives began to think in terms of ensuring US hegemony in the coming century and the term “New American Century” became quite fashionable. As early as 1992, in the last year of the presidency of the elder Bush, two neocons, Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby, came up with the concept of a power-based world order, in which the US would establish total hegemony. The victory of Bill Clinton in 1992 consigned their ideas to cold storage, though the younger Bush adopted it, and proceeded to implement it following his narrow election to the White House in 2000.

A basic and consistent characteristic of Chinese foreign policy is that it is based on principles. Right from the time of the revolution, when Mao Zedong announced that China had stood up, after centuries of colonization and exploitation, the country has followed an independent foreign policy, opposing hegemony, and seeking to promote a peaceful world order. China first enunciated the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence in 1953, and then proclaimed them jointly with India and Burma in 1954.

China’s programme of modernization and economic development has been the main priority of that country since 1978. Other aspects including foreign policy are being given secondary importance, except for issues pertaining to the righting of historical wrongs, such as the reunification with Taiwan. China’s primary aim has been to foster an international environment of peace and stability that would be conducive to its economic progress. It has sought to resolve disputes peacefully, or put them aside, in order to facilitate its peaceful rise. It has also sought to strengthen the role of multilateral organizations, both at the regional and global level. It has adopted a very responsible attitude on the global issues confronting mankind, including the environment, drugs and terrorism.

As China has achieved economic development at a remarkable rate, averaging nine per cent per year, and its GDP has grown five-fold in 25 years, while trade has expanded 20 times, it is viewed as the most likely challenger to the hegemony of the sole superpower. Indeed, on the basis of current trends, it may overtake the total GDP of the US in 25 years. Even before the events of 9/11 Bush had launched the concept of the ballistic missile defence, with China as its main target, though he invoked threats from rogue states as his reason china had raised objections to the concept, particularly as one of Washington’s aims was to protect Taiwan through the Theatre Missile Defence system. The 9/11 terrorist attack has had a positive effect on Sino-US relations, treated by Beijing as the most important aspect of its foreign policy. China joined the US in its war against terror, and offered its full cooperation. This had the effect of bringing the two powers closer to each other. However, the adoption by the Bush administration of the doctrine of pre-emption has again produced a divergence in their outlook.

China, it may be recalled,had supported the US attack on Afghanistan in October 2001, since it had the endorsement of the UN. China is backing the role of the UN, and of the international community, in the tasks of pacifying Afghanistan, and its reconstruction. However, China did not have the backing of the UN.

The overall effect of the war on Iraq, and the strategy being applied to pressure other countries such as North Korea and Iran, have led China to play a role that would facilitate peaceful settlement, and prevent recourse to war. China’s role has been particularly constructive in North Korea, where it has used its influence to promote six-power talks. China has shown patience,and maturity, in the face of moves that could be regarded as provocative, such as the stationing of US forces in Central Asia, and US efforts to establish control over the energy resources of Central Asia and the Middle East.

As we cast a glance over the post-9/11 world order, it is characterized not only by the total hegemony of the US, but encompasses other moves to prevent the emergence of a rival. From the statements of leading US politicians, and from the policies being adopted, such as strategic links with Japan and India, there can be no doubt that the US goal is the containment of China.

Political analysts in the US believe that China has a choice to make: falling in line with the established, US dominated world order or adopting an approach that would challenge it. China’s inclination, without directly challenging the US hegemony, is to support changes in favour of a return to the Five Principles, and to a more effective role for the UN. It believes that the emerging post 9/11 order must address the roots of terrorism, and deal with the problems of poverty and deprivation in the world. However, China has no intention of seeking a confrontation with the US in promoting its concepts, that have the support of the great majority of mankind living in the developing countries.

Indeed, now that Pakistan is the most-important non-Nato ally of the US, a question arises whether Pakistan can sacrifice its all-weather friendship with China, or deep-rooted relations with Iran. The consensus was that Pakistan must not buckle under US pressure, where its critical relationships, such as those with China and Iran were concerned.

The seminar, that heard many presentations on China’s role in the regional balance, came to the conclusion that China would continue to display restraint and patience, in response to US moves to tighten its hold over the world.

Indeed, its bilateral relationships, regional policies and global moves would eschew any confrontation with the US. Its responsible and stabilizing role would have the effect of prioritizing reason and peaceful negotiations. China would avoid providing an excuse to advocates of pre-emption to resort to force, whose futility is becoming evident in Iraq. The hope of the world lies in peaceful development, and in negotiated solutions of differences, with an enhanced role for the UN.