FOLLOWING the recent visit of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Islamabad and New Delhi, the Bush administration has announced a new strategy for long-term US engagement with the South Asian region. An important element of this strategy is to build relations with Pakistan and India at the same time.

“What we are trying to do,” says Ms Rice, “is break out of the notion that this is hyphenated relationship somehow, that anything that happens that is good for Pakistan has to be bad for India and vice versa.”

Explaining the salient features of the new strategy, the US Secretary of State, in an interview published in the Washington Post, said she had been struck by the September 11 Commission advice to “invest in the relationship with Pakistan” or risk recreating the situation of the 1990s,when it forged links to the Taliban in Afghanistan. “Pakistan has come a long way,” Ms Rice went on, “it is on a better trajectory than it has ever been, or that it has been in many, many years.”

From the Pakistan point of view, the most significant element in the new package is the US decision to sell F-16s to Pakistan which is a reversal of US policy dating back to 1990 when Washington blocked the sale of F-16 jets as a sanction against Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. US officials have not identified the type of F-16s that will be offered to Pakistan, though they have made it clear that it will not be a version that is explicitly configured to carry nuclear weapons. Foreign minister Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri says Pakistan will get the latest version of F-16 C/D and the US has set no limit on the number of planes Pakistan could buy.

There has been no comment from Lockheed, but the Teal Group, an aerospace consulting firm in Fairfax, Virginia, estimates that the F-16s may cost about $35 million each. This, of course, does not include the cost of maintenance equipment and spare parts which may raise the price to $60 million to $70 million a piece, or even more. Our last purchase of F-16s was for $25 million a piece.

The nation expects that negotiations with the company on prices will be conducted with utmost transparency and scrupulousness. Since the delivery of F-16s is not likely to begin before 2008, Pakistan must keep in mind the reported decision of Lockheed to close down this line afterwards and start the production of a new model of combat jet.

As a part of the new strategy, Washington has also announced plans for “a decisively broader strategic relationship” with India and has not even ruled out the prospect of helping New Delhi develop nuclear power plants. As part of the plan, the US has offered India the F-18 aircraft with a licence to manufacture them in India, civilian nuclear energy and cooperation in space energy. It has also offered to help New Delhi increase its missile defence and early warning system. Therefore, there is no reason for New Delhi to worry about the supply of F-16s to Pakistan because what the US is now offering India is far more substantial and of a strategic nature. Faced with a challenge to its supremacy from a rising China, the US has no choice but to “ bet on India”, as succinctly put by India’s top strategic thinker, K. Subrahmanyam.

The offer for expanded cooperation is actually a part of US efforts to deepen ties with India as it moves away from its Cold War past as a heavily state-controlled economy, friendly with the Soviet Union. Despite its so called “disappointment” over the proposed sale of F-16s to Pakistan, New Delhi will continue to build a stronger and closer relationship with Washington, as it serves its vital national interests.

Coming back to the proposed sale of F-16s to Pakistan, it will no doubt be regarded as a personal achievement for President Musharraf. It will strengthen his position in his real constituency — the military. According to Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution, the author of the recently published book, The Idea of Pakistan, the proposed sale “symbolizes American support” for the policies of President Pervez Musharraf. Continuing, Cohen significantly says in addition to rewarding Musharraf’s steps against nuclear proliferation and terrorists, the sale may bolster Pakistan’s military enough to help it reach an agreement with India over the disputed territory of Kashmir.

Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz says the US decision to sell F-16s is a reward for supporting the US war on terror. But many in Pakistan are not convinced and ask the question: why has it taken almost four years to announce this reward and why this particular juncture to make it public?

The sequence of events has made confusion worse confounded. First came the ground-preparing statement of Information Minister Sheikh Rashid to the effect that Dr A. Q. Khan’s underground network supplied centrifuges to Iran. Then came the denial of the foreign office spokesman of a foreign newspaper report that Pakistan would be supplying components of centrifuges to the IAEA to check whether they were similar to the ones available with Iran.

But that denial boomeranged when President Musharraf announced that Pakistan was indeed considering sending a sample centrifuge to the IAEA in the context of allegations against Iran. And now a new twist has been introduced by the Pakistan foreign minister that Islamabad might hand over out-of date pieces of centrifuges at the “express request of Iran and the IAEA.” Are these injudicious efforts designed to conceal the fact that there has been a quid pro quo for the supply of F-16s?

The fate of the proposed gas pipeline from Iran hangs in the balance. During her recent visit, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice shared with her Islamabad hosts her government’s concerns about the gas pipeline project. Her message in New Delhi and Islamabad was clear and unambiguous — Washington does not want the project to go ahead.

There was a time when Pakistan used to say that the pipeline from Iran would be feasible even if it were not extended to India. What is Islamabad’s position now? Will it be swayed by US foreign policy objectives and will Iran become off limits? If Iran is going to be to the Junior Bush administration what Iraq was to the Senior Bush, then Ms Rice’s message on the pipeline will certainly be repeated again and again and more forcefully.

It is a pity that the gas pipeline from Iran may become a victim of American foreign policy objectives because, if implemented, it would give both India and Pakistan a big economic stake in peace, an avowed objective of American South Asian policy. As far as India is concerned, the import of natural gas from Iran is an important element in New Delhi’s search for energy security.

At the invitation of the Pakistan prime minister, the Indian petroleum minister Mani Shanker Aiyar will pay a visit to Islamabad in May to discuss the Iran-India gas pipeline and prospects for bilateral cooperation in the hydrocarbon sector. The Indian petroleum minister will visit Tehran in June to seal a deal for the import of natural gas from Iran to India through Pakistan. This means Iran is not off limits and its gas pipeline continues to be a viable project for both Pakistan and India. New Delhi may however, exploit Tehran’s keenness to go ahead with the project to bargain for a better price.

The pipeline project will open up a new and potentially exciting chapter in Indo-Pakistan bilateral relations. Since each side will get an economic stake in the other, this is bound to generate stability and predictability in the political equation. Another advantage of the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline can be that its grid can be extended into Turkmenistan to allow Central Asian and Caspian gas to flow in. Also, the grid can be extended to China thereby tying Iran, Pakistan, India, China and Central Asia into a common energy network that would also lower the cost of transportation.

The writer is a former ambassador.

IT is sheer coincidence that the Chinese Premier Wen Jaibao and the Pakistan President Parvez Musharraf are visiting New Delhi within the space of four days this month. One leaves India on April 12 and the other arrives on 17. In a way, both are coming for the same purpose: to firm up the right on the Indian territory they claim.

However, the difference between the two is that Beijing has created congenial conditions for an agreement, establishing trade routes and economic ties with New Delhi. Islamabad, on the other hand, has yet to offer New Delhi the most favoured nation (MFN) status that India gave Pakistan some years ago. Islamabad concedes it has no other option because of the obligation under the WTO charter but doesn’t know how to cope with hostile domestic lobby.

There is yet another big difference. China froze its claim on the Indian territory so as to move ahead in other fields. Both sides decided not to disturb the status quo, although it tilted towards China. The result is the confidence the two have built to take up the prickly border question.

Pakistan wants even the 56-year-old Line of Control (LoC) to break up like a glass, as Musharraf put it in his latest statement. He does not favour implementing the confidence-building measures (CBMs) until there is a settlement on Kashmir. The threatening attitude by Islamabad has not undergone any change over the years, unlike that of Beijing which has been cooing peace for some time. It has reportedly offered to exchange the territory it has claimed in Arunachal Pradesh in the west with India’s recognition of China’s possession of Aksai Chin area in the east. New Delhi has come a long way since this is more or less what China had suggested to India as a solution before the 1962 war.

It may sound comical but New Delhi used to treat Beijing in the same manner as Islamabad does New Delhi. India’s stance then was not to hold any dialogue with China until it returned the territory it had occupied in the 1962 war. New Delhi has taken almost 25 years to face facts: one, what it claims may not tally with the reality on the ground; two, it is in no position to take back the lost territory forcibly. In adopting this line, the successive governments at the centre have gone even against parliament’s unanimous resolution to recover every inch of Indian land under the Chinese occupation. Pakistan may have to traverse the same path to come to the conclusion that the LoC cannot be changed nor can Kashmir settled through ultimatums or wars which, in any case, the two countries have fought four times in the last 50 years. The situation does not look like changing even after Pakistan’s acquisition of F-16s which at best can fuel the arms race.

This happened some 35 years ago when America gave Pakistan the Patton tanks. At that time also, Washington had assured New Delhi that Islamabad would not be allowed to use the Patton tanks against India. But it could not do anything when Pakistan introduced them in the 1965 war. F-16s are worse because they are the carriers of nuclear weapons. If hostilities are ruled out, then why F-16s or any other weapons?

Washington knows all that. But it has to sustain its armament factories which have many US Congressmen and senators in their pocket. It is no secret that the Lockheed Martin that produces F-16s was about to slash its workforce because it had no orders. The supply to Pakistan will keep the plant going and if India follows the Pakistan’s example, the Lockheed Martin may need to expand its business.

That the US is willing to give India more sophisticated weapons only complicates the situation, making Pakistan feel more insecure and taking the normalization between New Delhi and Islamabad farther. Dictatorship and democracy mean the same thing to America when its own interests are involved.

This is the reason why ‘China resents the role of the US in the Asia-Pacific region’, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice ruefully realized when she was not occupying the position. Understandably, Beijing does not want Washington to poke its nose all over the world, definitely not in the area that China believes is close to its frontiers. It is also worried over the proposition that America may “build India into a world power to counter China”. This may well explain why Beijing is keen on burying the hatchet with New Delhi even on the boundary question.

Otherwise also, the hostility with India does not pay China which has realized that the democratic system it resented during Jawaharlal Nehru’s days is not expansive in its policies. Nor is it difficult to live with such a country. In fact, Beijing wants to correct the impression that the communist China cannot live as a friend with the democratic India. The Chinese premier told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Laos recently that “the handshake between you and me will catch the attention of the world”. This is also meant to convey the US a message of sorts.

China is, therefore, keen on India and Pakistan finding a peaceful solution to their problems. This, Beijing believes, will keep America out of the region. China is as much talking about ‘a strategic alliance’ with Pakistan as America is talking about India. But what Washington and Beijing really want is to suck India and Pakistan into their scheme of things.

Alas, both New Delhi and Islamabad are still not focused on their region. Why don’t they come together to constitute another centre of power, from Iran to Myanmar. They are culturally akin to each other and command resources and markets which can excel other economic and military arrangements. They are talking about everything except an economic union. Were they to concentrate on forging alliances they would have America at their door, not the vise-versa.

People in India and Pakistan have shown that they want to live in peace. They have discovered that both can hit it off well. They should freeze their territorial disputes, as China has done, till they have built enough confidence in each other to take up even the most intractable problem like Kashmir. New Delhi and Beijing have walked far through the trade way.

This does not mean that Kashmir should be put on the back burner. The process of Kashmiris talking among themselves that began at Kathmandu should gain momentum. They should be allowed to meet freely. Something concrete may emerge from these contacts. India and Pakistan can pick up the thread from where the Kashmiris let it off.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

SOMETIME this summer President Bush will pick a new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to lead a US military that has been battered by the war in Iraq. When you ask military officers who should get the job, the first thing many say is that the military needs someone who can stand up to Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

The tension between Rumsfeld and the uniformed military has been an open secret in Washington these past four years. It was compounded by the Iraq war, but it began almost from the moment Rumsfeld took over at the Pentagon. The grumbling about his leadership partly reflected the military’s resistance to change and its reluctance to challenge a brilliant but headstrong civilian leader. But in Iraq, Rumsfeld has pushed the services — especially the Army — near the breaking point. The military is right that the next chairman of the JCS must be someone who can push back.

The process of selecting the next chairman is one of those subterranean Washington political affairs that the public often learns about when it’s over. But it is already a subject of lively discussion among current and former officers. Since there’s so much at stake in this year’s decision, here’s a JCS form sheet, based on conversations with current and retired officers and Pentagon civilians:

To appreciate the difficulty of the job, think about the body language when Rumsfeld holds a news conference with the current chairman, Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers. Rumsfeld is feisty, irreverent, outspoken; Myers is decorous, upright, respectful. Perhaps that’s the way it should be, but some in the military argue that Myers has taken deference too far. His friends counter that working for Rumsfeld isn’t easy and that Myers has tried, quietly and behind the scenes, to challenge the secretary when he was over the line.

Iraq has been a delicate dilemma for Myers — he needs to support the president’s policy publicly while also challenging the civilians privately. Critics think Myers sometimes erred in sounding too dutifully supportive, as in comments he made during an April 2004 visit to Iraq. The insurgency had exploded so violently then that there was contingency planning to evacuate the Green Zone. But Myers blandly called the intense fighting “a symptom of the success that we’re having here in Iraq,” according to a forthcoming history of the war by The Post’s Thomas E. Ricks.

The leading candidate to succeed Myers is the current vice chairman, Marine Gen. Peter Pace. He has served as Myers’s deputy since October 2001 and is the image of the solid, square-jawed Marine. His supporters say that after four years of dealing with the White House and Pentagon civilians, he has unique skills, especially in operating at the interface of political and military affairs. Pace’s detractors argue that he has been co-opted by Rumsfeld. They complain that he will sometimes pull his punches in meetings with the secretary and avoid criticizing him face to face.

Some observers think Rumsfeld has already decided to recommend Pace, and that he’s likely to pick Navy Adm. Edmund Giambastiani as Pace’s vice chairman. Giambastiani is a leading military expert on Rumsfeld’s pet topic of high-tech “transformation.” A Pace-Giambastiani team might help Rumsfeld lock in his legacy, but at a cost of continued grumbling in the Pentagon corridors.

A second Marine candidate is Gen. James Jones, who’s currently the NATO commander. He’s smart and sophisticated, with the polish of a corporate CEO. It’s said he was considered for chairman last time around but signalled that he wasn’t interested, and he was recently on the short list for director of national intelligence. Jones wouldn’t be pushed around by anyone, but observers wonder whether he would have the right chemistry with Rumsfeld and Bush.—Dawn/Washington Post Service