Balochistan & ‘enlightened moderation’
By A.R. Siddiqi
“IN a comprehensive victory both sides are the winners”. This saying, generally attributed to Lord Buddha, may well be attributed, with equal truth, to any man of God and of peace. In his widely discussed thesis on ‘enlightened moderation’ (June 2004), President Pervez Musharraf defined his ‘strategy’ as a “win-win for all —- the Muslim and the non-Muslim world ... it must aim at resolutely resolving all political disputes with justice.”
Addressing the world community, Muslims in particular, the president went on to ask: “Is the way ahead one of confrontation and militancy?... The armies of Islam did not march forward to convert people to Islam through the sword, but to deliver them from the darkness they were under through a visible example of their virtues...”
Reduced to a Pakistani perspective, the Musharraf doctrine has a telling relevance to the crisis between Balochistan and Islamabad. Recent violence gives it the contours of an embryonic civil war or a low-intensity conflict.
A single day’s (March 17) bag of casualties, killed and wounded, on both sides exceeded the hundred mark — fellow citizens, whether personnel of the para-military Frontier Corp (FC) or Balochis. The cost of the physical damage done to vital Sui Gas installations, their repair and replacement is informally estimated at $3-4 million.
Historically, Balochistan had been through a long and continuing cycle of military interventions. It has been like that since April 1948, when the military had to show the flag to bring the recalcitrant Khan of Kalat into the national mainstream.
A similar intervention took place when the Khan of Kalat once again raised the ensign of rebellion around October 1958. However, what turned out to be the fiercest and the longest-lasting military action. It was ordered in April 1973, to end four years later in 1977. Civilian and military casualties, yet to be officially accounted for, ran into thousands.
Since about January this year, Balochistan has been in the grip of yet another civil-military face-off. Tension continues despite the mediatory efforts recently undertaken by the PML-Q chief, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain. Short of a military operation, the level of violence and the TV images of the tribal astride hill tops in their well prepared positions were daunting. Also accounts of the weaponry used and captured —- from sophisticated multi-barrel rocket launchers to heavy mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and automatics —- would show that apparently the stocks can last the militants for any length of time.
General Musharraf accuses the Baloch sardars of each “harbouring’ a private army. The Bugtis’ comprise some 7,000 militants, the Marris about 9,000 and the Mengals about 10,000. Who is funding them and providing ammunition to them to meet their ‘nefarious designs?’, the president want on to ask.
Even more important is the question whether by any chance, the insurgency was a combined effort of the three sardars or was Akbar Bugti’s own scheme. Should the first be true, it will lend an ominous dimension to the crisis. But the three sardars, in spite of their centrifugal proclivities, have hardly ever been known as a united force striving for a shared objective. Each has had his own tribal and personal interest to serve. Sardar Akbar Bugti is noted for his highly self-centred attitudes. Khair Baksh Marri is of a markedly quiet disposition, not given to high profile heroics. The Marris by and large are peaceful herdsmen rather than trigger-happy like the Bugtis. Sardar Ataullah Mengal is by far the most seasoned and even-tempered of the Baloch sardars. His brief tenure as Balochistan chief minister (1972-73) bears ample witness to his role and character as a responsible politician and administrator. Except for lip-service, both he and Khair Bakhsh have practically kept themselves out of the Dera Bugti mess. Thus, the report about the private armies of the three sardars — accounting for some 30,000 to 40,000 militants — forging a common anti-centre front will be bad news — if true.
Regarding a comparison between the Dera Bugti insurgency and East Pakistan, it can be understood largely in terms of our own traumatized mindset. Once bitten is twice shy: our threshold of tolerance and endurance in the face of a crisis has gone down.
The reported stand-off between the president and Akbar Bugti as to who should go the extra mile for a handshake reminds one of the stand-off between President Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The Sheikh would not respond to the president’s invitation to come to Karachi. Yahya for his part went to Dhaka only when it was too late. Public anger in the aftermath of the postponement of the inaugural session of the National Assembly scheduled for March 3, 1971 had already turned into a mass revolt. — The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army.

