| 18 February 2005 | Friday | 08 Muharram 1426 |
Broad hostility to US occupation
Promoting harmony
Nothing new about Page 3
As the Quran is not a textbook of political science, one should not expect it to contain systematic chapters on each aspect of an Islamic government. Its primary concern in the realm of politics is not the form of government, but as explicitly expressed in chapter three verse 110, the function of an Islamic government - "to enforce values recognized as good (maroof) and forbid those which are abhorrent (munkar)."
While it does not prescribe the details of a specific kind of government and avoids laying down a rigid framework of polity, it would be a folly to suppose that it does not provide sufficient indicators regarding the system of government.
A government which is really competent to interpret maroof in the contemporary situation and enforce it, and, similarly, identify munkar and forbid it, must meet four requirements set out in the Quran, not serially, but in different contexts.
First and foremost, it demands that it should be a government enjoying people's confidence and respect - not an arbitrary, arrogant dictator's rule. The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) was addressed by the Almighty thus: "We have not sent you as a warder over them." (4:80).
The Almighty meant these words and His Apostle, while founding the first Islamic state after the conquest of Makkah, acted upon them. It was his humility and humbleness as a conqueror and magnanimity and generosity as a wielder of authority that won the hearts of those who were Islam's sworn enemies, and, in the words of Abdur Rahman Azzam, "the tribes went over to Islam en masse in the span of one day and night". (The Eternal Message of Muhammad)
The year after Makkah fell, in one hour's engagement on one day with hardly a dozen deaths, is called the 'year of deputations' as deputations swarmed from all parts of Arabia to swear allegiance to the new state of Madinah only because the person who was at the helm, though in fact the 'emperor' of Arabia, lived as simple a life as the poorest among the tribes.
The head of the first Islamic state was widely different in dress and demeanour, in diet and dwelling and in daily routine from the bejewelled, bedecked crowned kings and potentates of contemporary Byzantine and Persian empires. The first four Caliphs who succeeded him as head of state followed in his footsteps as faithfully as was possible.
The edifice of modern western political and social systems, it must be underlined, was built not on the ashes of the long-lasting, widespread Roman empire, the pride of all Europe, but on the foundation laid in an oasis of Arabia in 630 A.D. (or 8 A.H.).
The Second requirement according to the Quran, is "administration by mutual consultation" (42:38). In other words, no one, even a pious and popular ruler should rule without "consultation."
The Prophet was advised by the Almighty "to consult them (the Companions) in appropriate matters" (3:159). This obligation to consult, cuts at the roots of despotic and autocratic rule and demands the setting up of a consultative organ.
It is generally thought that kings and queens are not in sync with the modern concept of democracy. But democracies in Europe have allowed kings and queens to remain as heads of state.
Even the so-called 'mother of parliaments' is quite comfortable with the reigning Queen Elizabeth II. But all these hereditary monarchs are no longer arbitrary rulers, because they have to go by what the elected cabinet of ministers and consultative body decides.
The Quran accords legitimacy to the kingship of Hazrat Daud and his son Hazrat Sulaiman (Biblical David and Solomon) as they were divinely-guided benevolent rulers.
The Quran also speaks well of Queen of Sheba who always acted on her chieftains' "considered advice and decided no case unless they consulted her" (27:32). In short, an ideal government should run the affairs of the state by installing a suitable system of 'mutual consultation.'
The third requirement, in the light of Quranic indicators, for a government to be able to encourage good values and discourage bad ones is that the constitution of the state should recognize that the supreme sovereignty belongs to Allah and not to a 'mortal God', as invented by Hobbes, or the 'general will', in Rousseau's terminology, or the 'proletariat dictatorship' in Marx's parlance, or the 'majority party' in modern democracies.
In a truly Islamic dispensation, the majority party cannot legislate anything that is repugnant to Islamic tenets and teachings. Thus, the majority will is not sacrosanct, as in other democracies, at least in the sphere of law-making.
The Quranic verdict on this issue is unequivocal: "If you act on the advice of most of those on earth, they would mislead you from Allah's path, as they follow nothing but an opinion and indulge in conjectures" (6:116). This necessitates screening of all laws by a body like the Islamic Ideology Council in Pakistan and the Council of Clerics in Iran to act as moral 'guardians.'
The fourth requirement pertains to the 'quality' of politicians seeking election as members of the legislative organs. According to the Quran, it is only the "noblest" among the community of voters who deserve to be elected and "the noblest persons, in the sight of Allah, are the best in conduct, or the most pious, according to another translation" (49:13). Thus, the most deserving candidate should not be the most powerful or a known populist seeking popularity among the masses for personal fame.
It was, perhaps, in elucidation of this Quranic edict that the Holy Prophet is reported to have observed that "an Ethiopian slave (of his time) with right deeds to his credit has a greater claim to be the ruler than a wrongdoer from the nobility of Quraish."
As one may have noted these requirements do not suggest that an Islamic state should be a theocracy. On the contrary, the scale is in favour of a non-secular democracy.
Non secular because, firstly, unlike in a secular democracy, the sovereignty here belongs to Allah and not to the will of the majority of citizens of the state and, secondly, because all proposed laws have to be subjected to scrutiny and approval by an appropriate Islamic council before they become the law of the land.
Broad hostility to US occupation
The official results of the Iraq election have exposed much of the hype that emanated from the Bush administration and the media in the wake of the poll. Even through the highly distorted prism of a vote held under US military occupation, it is evident that the vast majority of Iraqis do not support the political setup installed by Washington in Baghdad.
Far from being a vindication of the US-led invasion, the outcome has confirmed that most Iraqis do not believe that American soldiers are bringing "peace" and "democracy" to the country.
According to official figures, just over half the eligible voters - 58 per cent-cast a ballot. In four predominantly Sunni provinces, the turnout was far lower.
In Anbar, to the west of Baghdad, where there has been fierce and mounting armed resistance to the US invasion, just two per cent of voters went to the polls. Like other areas of the so-called Sunni Triangle, it has borne the brunt of US military strikes. Tens of thousands have been killed and maimed or arbitrarily detained and tortured.
In the three other Sunni provinces, the higher turnout reflected the presence of significant minorities. In the northern Nineveh province, the figure was 17 per cent, most of the voters being Shias and Kurds.
In Diyala, where about a third of the population is Shia, the turnout was 33 percent. In Salahaddin, also with a substantial Shia minority, it was 29 per cent. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that just a tiny fraction of the country's Sunnis, who make up about 20 per cent of the country's population, took part in the election.
Such is the depth of the resentment, hostility and anger at nearly two years of US attacks that most Sunnis heeded the call of the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS) and various resistance groups not to vote. The AMS, an association of around 3,000 Sunni clerics, issued a public statement denouncing the election as illegitimate.
The main winners in the election were the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) - a predominantly Shia coalition - and the Kurdistan Alliance (KA) - comprising the two major Kurdish bourgeois parties.
The UIA received about 48 per cent of the vote and the KA some 26 per cent. The number of seats each grouping receives will only be finalized after any electoral challenges are settled.
It is estimated, however, that the UIA will get 140 seats in the 275-member National Assembly and the KA will have 75 seats.The UIA includes the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Dawa Party, both of which are sectarian Shia parties that seek to establish some form of Islamic state.
The other major coalition partner is the Shia Political Council headed by Ahmed Chalabi - a longtime US "asset" who fell out of favour with Washington last year. While all three groups fully supported the US invasion, the UIA had to distance itself from the occupation in the course of the campaign. Such is the depth of anti-US hostility that the Shia leaders appealed to voters to support the UIA as the means of ending the American presence.
Not only did the UIA have the public backing of Iraq's most senior Shia cleric - Ali al-Sistani - but the tacit approval of rebel cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who gained a significant following during the Shia uprising against the US military last year.
While he has been critical of the UIA for not being sufficiently firm over a date for US withdrawal and personally did not stand in the election, al-Sadr has not condemned this conservative pro-US alliance. According to an analysis in Forbes magazine, 12 individuals loosely connected to al-Sadr have been elected on the UIA list.
Significantly, the UIA did not capture all the Shia votes. The current US-installed prime minister Iyad Allawi was able to make inroads into the UIA vote through a campaign focussed on its sectarian policies and its Iranian connections.
Many Iraqi Shia have a secular outlook and no desire to establish a theocratic state along the lines of the Iranian regime. As a result, whatever their misgivings about Allawi and the US occupation, a layer of Shia voters backed the prime minister and other secular parties. Allawi won nearly 615,000 votes - more than half his total - in Baghdad and the southern Shia city of Basra.
In the north of the country, Kurds turned out and voted overwhelmingly for the KA. Like the Shia majority, the Kurdish minority was led to believe that the election would be a means of ending their long history of oppression.
KA leaders fostered the illusion that the US occupation would lead to an autonomous or even fully independent Kurdish region that would end persecution and poverty. - Courtesy: World Socialist Web Site
Promoting harmony
Pakistan is a land of diverse cultures and ethnic, linguistic and racial groups. Since its creation, the country has had to face the problem of political instability, and national integration has always remained a crucial issue.
The fear of exploitation by Hindus, after the termination of British rule in the subcontinent, had led to the establishment of a separate Muslim homeland on the basis of the two-nation theory. However, after its creation, religion, which had played a key role in mobilizing the Muslims to support the demand for Pakistan, was unable to unify the disparate ethnic groups in the country.
Unfortunately, after the demise of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, ethnic concerns assumed enormous significance in Pakistan as a result of which the political system became more parochial in character.
The feudal lords, industrialists, civil and military bureaucrats who ruled the country ever since have been unable to transform the several ethnic groups in the country into a national community. Their ineptitude has eroded the concept of nationhood and have created and exacerbated differences and mistrust among the various ethno-linguistic groups.
There is a growing fear among the smaller provinces in the country that they are being denied their legitimate rights, guaranteed under the Constitution, as a result of which their economic condition is fast deteriorating.
It is imperative to immediately assuage this fear, which poses a potential threat to national unity. The case of the former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) is illustrative of how the failure to address such an important issue may lead to undesirable consequences.
In keeping with the principles of justice and fair play, enshrined in the Constitution, all the regions of the country should be treated equitably, in all aspects of governance, in particular, relating to their economic well being.
For there is always the danger that a population, out of sheer desperation, may go astray if its economic difficulties are not addressed in the desired manner and become unendurable. The ongoing turmoil in Balochistan bears testimony to this assertion.
It must be conceded that the Baloch masses have since long been languishing in abject poverty owing to inadequate economic development there, for one reason or another, which has generated frustration among them.
They are no longer prepared to accept a continuation of their present economic woes for an indefinite period which calls for the creation of a dynamic economy in that province to save its people from the severity of economic stresses.
In the past, some half-hearted efforts were made to address the grievance of the smaller provinces which remained inconsequential, particularly in the case of Balochistan, where individual and other vested interests took priority. This put the core interests of the province in jeopardy.
Regrettably, no perceptible change is discernible in this regard as, instead of alleviating the sufferings of the poor masses in the province, plans seem to be in the offing to mollify those very elements there who have always been keen on promoting their personal interests and, as in the past, tend to exploit the fluidity of the current political situation in the province for their own purposes. Needless to say, it would not be possible to pacify Balochistan without removing the sense of deprivation rampant among its masses.
The Constitution provides the necessary cover and mechanism for the protection of the rights of all the federating units, which are recognized by it as autonomous.
Successive governments in the country, however, did not avail of the constitutional remedy for this purpose. As a matter of fact, there has been a tendency among leaders of every political hue to gravitate more and more towards centralization.
Accordingly, they have encroached upon the functions and powers of the provinces. This has proved detrimental to the true growth of federalism in the country and has led to the unnecessary polarization between the centre and the provinces.
The mainstream, political parties in the country, who claim to be the exponents of federalism, were expected to strive for the equality among all the federating units which indeed is the most effective tool to establish durable national unity. However, these parties also remained complacent about the growing economic disparity among the regions, which has widened the gulf between different ethnic groups and weakened the bond of unity among them.
The growing menace of religious sectarianism is yet another factor that has impeded the promotion of national integration. It may be recalled that during the struggle for Pakistan, the absence of sectarian strife made it possible for the Muslims of the subcontinent to attain their goal. For decades after its creation Pakistan did not experience sectarian strife, which, however became rampant during and after the Afghan war.
Unfortunately, successive governments in the country did not make any serious efforts to control this menace, for reasons of expediency. As a result, aggressive sectarianism, in the course of time, has proliferated in the country, jeopardizing all prospects of national integration.
If deterrent measures are not taken immediately to eradicate the menace of sectarianism, it will become far more difficult to meet this daunting challenge in the period to follow.
Growing ethnicity and sectarianism in Pakistan are the most perilous factors threatening the fabric of national unity and call for conscious efforts, at all levels, to preserve the same.
The most overriding consideration for promoting national harmony is that it is inextricably linked to the sovereignty well-being of the country. National unity, however, springs from a sense of equality among the people in all parts of the country and cannot be imposed through superficial means or empty rhetoric.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Nothing new about Page 3
Anout 225 years ago the first Indian newspaper, a weekly, was published from the capital of the rising (although still far from pre-eminent) power of the subcontinent, the British Raj.
It was in the language that would soon become the lingua franca of power, English. Its owner was egoistic enough to name the paper after himself, which made him suitable for media.
The owner was also its editor, which makes him a contemporary spirit. And it might be of some comfort to present-day newspaper owners to realize that Hicky's Bengal Gazette had a second name, the Calcutta General Advertiser.
It appeared on January 29, 1780, the year in which Writer's Building was completed in Calcutta to serve as the office of the junior civil servants of the East India Company; Gwalior became a feudatory state of the British; Haidar Ali an ally of the French when they declared war on Britain; and Governor General Warren Hastings fought a duel in Calcutta with the aspirant for his job, Sir Philip Francis (neither died, though Hastings had the better of the encounter).
No line has better summed up the nature of the media business than the Gazette's motto: "A Weekly Political and Commercial Paper, Open to all Parties, but influenced by None."
News must be political and commercial. A newspaper must be open to all interests but subject to none. It must offer due respect to advertising. When you consider that there was a spelling mistake in the title, and lots of Calcutta gossip on its pages, then all the components of a modern newspaper may be found in the path breaker. After all, what is a newspaper without a typo?
The Gazette was launched by James August us Hickey (I presume you've noticed the typo), one of the most exotic stars of a multicoloured era. We think of the British as staid Victorian gentlemen with stiff necks and stiffer upper lips. But they stiffened after the uprising of 1857, when India was incorporated formally into the British Empire.
As long as the buccaneers of the East India Company, who created British rule, were in charge, life was not only more flexible but also more interactive with Indians.
The officials of John Company were a different breed whose favourite toast after victory at Plassey (Palashi) was to hope for "a lass and a lakh a day". After the excesses of Robert Clive and the corruption charges against Hastings, a lakh a day became more difficult, but the former option flourished. Many of the Sahibs were delighted to turn "native" as they discovered the pleasures of not merely living in India, but living in India like Indians.
Job Charnock, who founded Calcutta, married Leela, a beautiful Brahmin girl he rescued from suttee. Francis Day chose the site of the Madras fort only because it was near his Indian mistress' home.
The first British resident after the capture of Delhi in 1803, David Ochterlony, popularly known as "Loony Akhtar", deserves all the legends attached to his name; he was accompanied by all 13 of his wives when he went out to "take the air" every evening in Delhi, each wife on a separate elephant.
Reginald Heber, Bishop of Calcutta between 1823 and 1826, could not take his eyes off Bengali beauties bathing in the river at five in the morning and confessed that "the deep bronze tint was more naturally agreeable to the human eyes than the fair skins of Europe".
Hickey, a good journalist, wrote a splendid account of his Indian Bibi, the superbly named Jemdanee who "lived with me, respected and admired by all friends for her extraordinary sprightliness and great humour.
Unlike the women in Asia she never secluded herself from the sight of strangers; on the contrary she delighted in joining my male parties, cordially joining in the mirth which prevailed though never touching wine or spirits of any kind".
So it was an exercise in double standards (typical, did I hear?) when Hickey sent the circulation of his paper up by sensational reporting on the first adultery case to reach the Calcutta high court.
The principal accused were Madame Grand, a young Dutch-English woman of exceptional beauty, who was born near Pondicherry and blossomed in Chandernagore, and, astonishingly, went on to marry Napoleon's brilliant foreign minister Prince Talleyrand; and Philip Francis, Hastings' quarrelsome deputy, who was caught by un obliging servants while clambering over the wall of her compound while her husband was away at dinner. (The servants refused to accept a bribe for letting their prisoner get away.)
The first sittings of the trial commenced on February 8, 1779, just in time for circulation growth. There is something to be said for the theory that Francis left India not because of his duel with Hastings, but because of the scandal.
If the laws of libel made it difficult to publish a story, Hickey happily switched to transparent pseudonyms like "Pompos" or "Turban Conquest" or "Hooka Turban" or "Chinsurah Belle". Here is an example of journalist double entendre: "March, 1781.
Public Notice: Lost on the Course, last Monday evening, Buxey Clumsy's heart, whilst he stood simpering at the footstep of Hooka Turban's carriage: as it is supposed to be in her possession, she is desired to return it immediately, or to deliver up her own as a proper acknowledgement."
There is nothing new about Page 3.As one commentator noted, Hickey "admitted contributions which, while hypocritically affecting to teach and uphold public and private morality, in reality pandered to the impulses of the prurient and the vicious".
Anyone recognize anything familiar? The owner-editor, of course, never descended from his high pedestal, pompously noting, in one instance, "Lothario's letter and poetry is received, but is not fit for insertion, nor will anything ever be inserted in the Bengal Gazette that can possibly give offence to the ladies". He was always happy, though, to give offence to the men.
Success, but naturally, encouraged competition. Success was not necessarily financial success, but Hickey's power became phenomenal. And so a salt agent called Peter Reed, in partnership with a theatre-person named B. Messink (I could not have made up name like Messink for a fictional newspaper proprietor even if I had tried), started the India Gazette in 1781.
Hastings, who hated Hickey's guts, helped the new paper. It was "well-printed," with four pages of 16 inches long, divided into three columns. Hickey joyfully nicknamed his rivals "Peter Nimmuck" (as in salt, of course) and "Barnaby Grizzle" (for reasons I have not been able to discover, but perhaps Messink was fat and bearish). Hickey was in rapture when the India Gazette closed down because Grizzle cheated Nimmuck.
Hickey's own publication did not survive much longer, but it was not "scurrilous" journalism that brought him down. He lost the battle of power with Hastings. On November 14, 1780, a diktat was issued from Fort William: "Public notice is hereby given that as a weekly newspaper called the Bengal Gazette or Calcutta General Advertiser, printed by J.A. Hicky, has lately been found to contain several improper paragraphs tending to vilify private characters and to disturb the peace of the Settlement, it is no longer permitted to be circulated through the channel of the General Post Office."
In a private letter to a friend in England, Hastings explained why he had been emboldened to act against Hickey. Hastings wrote that since his formidable enemy, Philip Francis, announced he would leave India, "I shall have no competitor to oppose my designs, to encourage disobedience to my authority, to excite and foment popular odium against me.
In a word, I shall have power, and I will employ it." I shall have power, and I will employ it. How many rulers of India have thought the same since! And how many journalists have responded in the manner Hickey did? Enough to ensure the honour of the profession. His paper was more noble in death than it had been in life.
Talking in the third person, Hickey responded: "Before he will bow, cringe, or fawn to any of his oppressors ... he would compose ballads and sell them through the streets of Calcutta as Homer did. He has now but three things lose: his honour in the support of his paper, his liberty, and his life; the two latter he will hazard in defence of the former, for he is determined to make it a scourge of all schemers and leading tyrants; should these illegally deprive him of his liberty and confine him in a jail, he is determined to print there with every becoming spirit suited to his care and the deserts of his oppressors... Shall I tamely submit to the yoke of slavery and wanton oppression? No!"
Enough said.
The writer is editor-in-chief, Asian Age, New Delhi.