| 06 February 2005 | Sunday | 26 Zilhaj 1425 |
A way out of the mess
The Baglihar dam controversy
For over a year since the issue of the historic joint statement by President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee, India and Pakistan have been engaged in a peace process. There have been intensive negotiations between the two sides on the eight-point agenda of a composite dialogue. These discussions have taken place in a congenial, business-like atmosphere, free of acrimony or grandstanding. There have been exchanges of visits at various levels.
The top leadership of the two countries has also met on the sidelines of the UN and in the context of Saarc. The two prime ministers were also to meet in Dhaka at the Saarc summit but it has been postponed. Moreover, there have been confidential meetings between the top national security officials of the two sides. The Indian external affairs minister is expected to visit Islamabad in mid-February.
The peace dialogue has been welcomed worldwide and probably some degree of international pressure continues on the two sides to resolve their differences. Moreover, through growing people-to-people contacts, a certain momentum of public opinion has developed in both countries urging that the dialogue must continue and the outstanding issues should be resolved. All of this is a welcome change from acrimony of the past and, in particular, the dangerous eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation witnessed in 2002.
However, the fact remains that the year-long negotiations have so far not produced any tangible progress in resolving any of the issues, of the composite dialogue. This is both disappointing and bewildering. While one can understand that issues like Kashmir cannot be resolved in a hurry, but at least there could have been progress on some of the less contentious issues. It is unlikely that such a fruitless dialogue can continue indefinitely.
So, what is holding up progress in the dialogue and what aye the prospects in Pakistan relations in the days ahead? Some hardheaded thinking is clearly needed on both sides about the options available to them.
Pakistan continues to emphasize the centrality of the Kashmir issue and its leaders keep saying that without a resolution of this issue, there can be no durable peace. On the other hand, while the Indian leadership has periodically talked about the need to find an "out of the box" solution of the Kashmir issue, it seems clear that there is no real "give" in India's position on Kashmir.
The utmost India is prepared to do is to formalize the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, with some minor adjustments, as the international border. India seems willing to facilitate easier travel between the two parts of Kashmir and to give the maximum autonomy to Kashmir while keeping it as an integral part of the Indian Union.
Pakistan says that the LoC itself is the problem in Kashmir and cannot become the solution of the Kashmir dispute. It is also insisting that there must be progress in tandem on the Kashmir problem along with progress on other issues. In this sense, the other issues have become a hostage of the Kashmir dispute. If this divergence of approach by the two sides towards the peace dialogue continues, it is likely that at some point of time in the near future, the negotiations would come to a sad end. What would happen next?
War is surely not an option for either side. They both possess nuclear weapons and delivery systems, including missiles. War will mean mutually assured destruction (MAD) and has got to be avoided under all circumstances.
The Jihadist approach followed since around 1990 carries its own perils, as the Kargil crisis of 1999 and the events of 2002 have proved beyond doubt. On both occasions, the two countries seemed to be on the edge of the precipice, and war could have even started unintentionally through a minor mishap or miscalculation. Moreover, the resumption of any cross-LoC activities, dubbed by India as a "proxy war", could bring irresistible international pressures on Pakistan to desist from such a course. Rational thinking would suggest that this is no longer a feasible option for Pakistan.
While the above two options need to be ruled out, there remains a third option for Pakistan viz. to return to the kind of "cold war" witnessed for the greater part in the relations between the two countries since their independence in 1947. In tangible terms, this would mean minimal contacts and communications lines between the two sides, the blocking of cooperation under Saarc, no gas line transit project, etc. In such a scenario, the defence expenditure could not be reduced and might even have to be increased.
An appraisal of developments in the past 57 years of Pakistan's existence shows that the confrontation with India has put a heavy strain on Pakistan's resources, simply because the ground reality that India is about eight times the size of Pakistan. As a consequence, half of the country was lost Pakistan has been unable to rise to its full economic potential and the common man has suffered in terms of low per capita income.
The social sector has been starved of funds resulting in denial of basic amenities of life, low literacy and poor health. This has also been a factor in the internal destabilization of the country with the rise of extremism, fanaticism and militancy.
In the light of this historical experience, the third option also does not seem to be in Pakistan's national interests.
All countries in the world make policies on a calculation of their national interests. Experts on international relations, as well as strategic thinkers, agree that the vital national interests are survival, territorial integrity, economic welfare and preservation of values. Clearly, the first three objectives take precedence over the fourth one in this list.
The time has come when we need to do some hardheaded thinking about the primacy of the Kashmir issue. So far as the merits of this dispute are concerned, Pakistan has a valid case and India is morally and legally wrong. However, India is determined to hang on to Kashmir and it is not feasible for Pakistan to force India out of Kashmir.
Despite all the efforts and sacrifices of the past half a century, the bottom line is that India remains in occupation of Kashmir. We can, of course, persist with the cold war policy for many more years to come, but there seems to be little prospect of any change in the Indian position on the issue.
The matter can also be argued from another angle. Pakistan's main case is that the Kashmiri people must be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination. The abiding assumption in Pakistan is that the exercise of this right will lead to the accession of the Indian-held portion of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. However, the reality seems to be quite different.
The likelihood is that if given a free choice, the non-Muslim majority areas in Jammu and Ladakh will opt for India. The Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley will probably opt for independence. It seems, therefore, that Pakistan will be left high and dry even if the Kashmiris get to exercise their right of self-determination, which, in any case, India is not prepared to allow.
Some circles in Pakistan argue that we must get Kashmir; otherwise India could, at its choosing, block the rivers flowing into Pakistan. But is this fear justified? The fact is that the Indus Waters Treaty signed in 1960 allocated these rivers to Pakistan and by and large the treaty has been implemented. Moreover, the Indus is a small river when it flows through Indian-occupied Kashmir in an inaccessible terrain between the highest mountains of the world, and India simply cannot block it.
Of course, we feel for our Kashmiri brethren and their interests are dear to us, But the interests of 150 million Pakistanis must at some point of time take precedence. Keeping in view the above-mentioned considerations, the logical conclusion is that Pakistan has to give a lower priority to the Kashmir and it should not be treated as the make-or-break issue in the current Pakistan negotiations. We should, no doubt, continue to press for a Kashmir settlement but it should not come in the way of progress on other issues.
Once there is a genuine normalization of relations between Pakistan and India, marked by close cooperation, tempers will cool down and the extremists would lose ground. Businessmen and others will develop vested interests in the maintenance of close cooperation between the two countries. In such an atmosphere, rather than through conflict and acrimony, there will be better chances of finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute.
The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan.
A way out of the mess
The conditions obtaining in Pakistan bear little resemblance to those existing in Iraq and even less to the ones prevailing in Palestine - the West Bank and Gaza. Both these nations (one, sadly, not a sovereign state yet) in quick succession have sent across a pertinent and powerful message to Pakistan, and that is: the only possible way to get out of a mess - no matter how and by whom it has been created - is to hold elections.
Though the events there are still in the making, the lesson emerging from the recent electoral exercises amid turbulence in Palestine and Iraq is that a ballot by the people, howsoever imperfect, stands a better chance of resolving conflicts than skilful bargaining by leaders or bombing by militants.
The conflict in Pakistan, though so far luckily confined to constitutional and economic issues within the ambit of the federation, has been widening because the parties involved have sought to resolve it either through political manoeuvres or by force. Artificial and insincere alliances one after another have been forged by the leaders only to stay in power or keep others out of it, but not mindful at all of the needs and expectations of the people.
Elections everywhere are expected to put an end to political controversies and general uncertainty. Paradoxically, the elections held here three years ago, in 2002, had exacerbated both. All elections in Pakistan held after 1970 were either flawed in concept or manipulated in practice. Both these evils found their culmination in the election of 2002.
A number of people were barred from taking part in the elections and, in addition, the chiefs of the PPP and the Muslim League were prevented from organizing their party campaigns. The screening of candidates and unusual restrictions arbitrarily imposed on them not only impaired the representative character of the assemblies but also shook political cohesion and loyalty to the core. Most to gain in this process were the parties of the religious right. Defying the general trend of drift and division, they joined hands to increase their representation in the parliament manifold without a significant increase in their popular vote.
While the indictment of some party leaders and the disqualification of many individuals took a heavy toll, positive measures like the lowering of the voting age and joint electorates, surprisingly, failed to broaden the electoral base. The turnout at the elections, which had been consistently on the decline since 1970, touched an all-time low. Ironically, the assemblies of 2002 which only graduates were eligible to enter, turned out to be far more rowdy and less functional than the assemblies of the past peopled by the learned and the rustic alike.
It is a measure of the unrepresentative character of the assemblies and the low calibre of their members that the remedy for every problem from the terrorists sheltering in Waziristan to the tribesmen rocketing the gas fields of Balochistan to the use of Indus waters - is being sought not through debate and vote in the parliamentary chambers but by jockeying outside. The conduct of public affairs is characterized more by intimidation or bribe than by argument or fair play.
A consistent manifestation of this approach is to be seen in the making and unmaking of political alliances overriding the creeds and bypassing the assemblies. The PML (Q) and the MMA alliance started out as "natural allies" or one soul in two bodies as Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain was wont to say. Now his League is seeking a rapprochement with its arch adversary PPP while the MMA is also making overtures to the PPP as well as to Nawaz's Muslim League.
All this clandestine activity, quite obviously, is in pursuit of the political bosses' own power and profit, and not for the well-being of the people. The apathy of the people seen at the time of elections has only deepened at the pitiable performance of the assemblies and the cabinets.
If the parliament, especially the upper house, the senate, has shown some inclination to debate national issues, and protests on being ignored, the provincial assemblies have remained generally unconcerned and indifferent. The Balochistan assembly with the behemoth of its cabinet has been seen making no attempt at all to grapple with the Sui problem though it is essentially a responsibility of the provincial government.
Nor has it reacted to the development of the Gwadar port or coastal highway. It is the clan chiefs - Bugti, Marri, Mengal, etc. - who matter and speak for Balochistan, and not its representatives sitting in the assemblies. The NWFP assembly and ministers, likewise, had no part to play in the Waziristan episode.
When assurances are given or sought for the assemblies to complete their terms, a thought inevitably arises as to of what worth their performance has been in three years to deserve another two. In fact, so long as they remain in existence extra- parliamentary forces will continue to gain strength because the assemblies encompass neither the major political forces nor mirror the popular will. They longer they last, the more irreversible will be the damage they cause to the parliamentary powers and traditions.
In the presence of the ever so large and expensive assemblies, cabinets and bureaucracy, there is no doubt that the affairs of the state are being managed by the army and professionals including the prime minister.
The politicians are used only to run conciliatory shuttles or make noises to sustain this arrangement as long as they can. Truly representative, hence effective, assemblies and governments at the federal and provincial levels can emerge when the next elections - free and fair and open to all but felons - are held. And the earlier this is, the better.
The new assemblies, central and provincial, acting jointly shall have to amend the Constitution or write an altogether new one to keep ideology, religion and army out of the power structure, for it is the concentrated presence of all three in the largest province - Punjab - which has all but reduced the federation to a unitary government.
The Baglihar dam controversy
At the time of independence, the boundary between Pakistan and India was drawn right across the Indus Basin leaving the former as the lower riparian.
A dispute arose between the two countries, soon after independence, from the British, with regard to the utilization of the irrigation water when India, despite assurances to Pakistan that there would be no interference whatsoever with the existing flow of rivers, stopped the supply of water from the two headworks under its control. The shortage of water became so acute and intolerable that in May 1948 a high-powered delegation from Pakistan had to rush to New Delhi where it was made to sign an agreement, at India's bidding, before the flow of water was resumed.
Fortunately, the then president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), Eugene Black, offered the good offices of the bank for a solution to the sharing of the waters of the Indus Basin between the two countries. After protracted negotiations under the auspices of the World Bank, the two countries signed the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960, which sought to ensure optimum utilization of the waters of the Indus System of Rivers, based on the principles of equity and fair play. Under the treaty, the waters of the three eastern rivers (Beas, Ravi and Sutlej) were allocated to India and the western rivers (Chenab, Indus and Jhelum) to Pakistan for their unrestricted use.
The treaty also provided that both countries shall have unrestricted use of the waters in each other's rivers for four distinct purposes: domestic use, agriculture use, restricted use of hydroelectric power, through a "run-of-the river plant", and non-consumptive use. However, both countries were prohibited from undertaking any "man made" obstruction to cause change in the volume of the daily flow of waters. The treaty specifically barred India, the upper riparian, from storing any water of, or constructing any storage on the western rivers, except limited storage to control floods.
However, in violation of this specific provision in the treaty, which has had a binding force upon it, India began to construct a dam on the Chenab river in the year 2000 and not a run of the river project, as claimed by it. According to technical experts, the design of the Baglihar hydro-power violates the terms of the Indus Waters Treaty as it will increase India's storage capacity, which can cause acute shortage of irrigation water in Pakistan.
Several studies conducted by different independent agencies have also confirmed that the Baglihar dam would adversely affect the irrigation system in Pakistan, which is linked to the Chenab River. Some experts also believe that the construction of the Baglihar dam may result in submerging the entire Doda district in occupied Kashmir.
It is pertinent to mention here that in those rivers which do not run through the land of one and the same state, as is the case with the six rivers allocated to Pakistan and India, the flow of water cannot be regulated arbitrarily by one of the riparian states. For it is a provision of international law that no state is allowed to alter the natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural conditions of the territory of a neighbouring state. For this reason, a state is forbidden to stop or divert the flow of a river which runs from its own territory to a neighbouring state.
Islamabad claims that it has been raising its concerns about the construction of the Baglihar Dam, since 1992, when it came to know of the project and after having failed to resolve the issue at the level of the Permanent Indus Commission as well as bilaterally with India it has approached the World Bank for the appointment of a neutral expert, as provided in the Treaty.
It is, however, amazing that all these many years India continued to construct the controversial dam, in violation of the treaty and the international law, while Pakistan watched helplessly and invoked the treaty provision concerning the appointment of a neutral expert when the dam is nearing completion. The ineptitude of the concerned officials, while handling a matter of such national importance and magnitude, is untenable.
In June 2003, when the Pakistan commissioner for Indus Water informed the government that the Indus Water commissioners of the two countries had not been able to resolve the issue, it should have acted immediately and asked the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert, as recommended by the commissioner. Instead, the government accepted India's request for bilateral meetings which was obviously aimed at engaging Pakistan in a lengthy and fruitless dialogue process. A number of bilateral meetings that took place between Pakistan and India without any tangible outcome confirms this assertion.
During his visit to New Delhi last November, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz also conveyed Pakistan's concerns to his Indian counterpart, Dr Manmohan Singh, and requested him to stop the construction work on the Baglihar dam pending resolution of the issue.
The Indian side did not show any flexibility and refused to stop work on the project even after the issue was raised at the highest level. The final meeting that took place between the water secretaries of the two countries, in New Delhi, in the first week of January, also ended without any result. Apparently, the Indian strategy is to delay the resolution of the problem and then present the dam to Pakistan and the world at large as fait accompli.
Pakistan and India had hammered out the Indus Waters Treaty to attain the most satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus System of Rivers. The treaty, which is considered a landmark in the realm of water-sharing, has survived despite many wars and continued strained relationship between the two countries as it ensured the judicious distribution of the available waters between them and served their interests well.
A drastic reduction of water supply to Pakistan, as a result of the construction of the Baglihar dam, with its present design, will not only erode the credibility of the treaty and defeat its very purpose but could also adversely affect relations between Islamabad and New Delhi.
It is, therefore, imperative that the controversy over the construction of the Baglihar dam is amicably resolved, even at this belated stage, in a spirit of goodwill and mutual understanding. In any case, the issue should not be allowed to become another major irritant in relations between the two states. Indo-Pakistan amity is of overriding importance and hence must be promoted and preserved at all costs. However, a greater effort in this regard is called for on the part of India, for obvious reasons.
The writer is a former ambassador.