| 05 February 2005 | Saturday | 25 Zilhaj 1425 |
Balochistan: its past and present
Talking to the prime minister
Rice's European tests
If diplomacy fails to find a way out of Iran's nuclear imbroglio, the dispute on the subject could take a serious turn in the coming days. In a recent interview with NBC News, President Bush made it clear that the United States could take military action against Iran if that country was not forthcoming about its suspected nuclear weapons programme.
The European Union troika of Britain, France and Germany finalized an agreement with Iran last November aimed at getting Iran to abandon the manufacture of nuclear fuel that would be further refined to bomb grade.
The first deadline for the two sides to come up with a tension-defusing deal, following the "temporary" suspension of Iran's enrichment effort, is March, 2005. But already a controversy has arisen because the Europeans want to make the suspension permanent and would like Tehran to commit itself to abandoning the process completely. Iran has refused to oblige.
In a recent statement, Tehran made it clear that the length of the suspension would not be very long and would be valid for the duration of the negotiations and only on the condition of progress in talks.
At the heart of the dispute are "objective guarantees" about Iran's nuclear intentions. The Europeans point out that once Iran mastered making low-enriched uranium needed for power reactors, it would be in a position to make the highly-enriched uranium needed for the bomb.
Therefore, they want Iran entirely out of the nuclear fuel business. In return, they are offering better trade and political relations and help with other nuclear technologies. For its part, Iran is only offering "assurances".
Some analysts believe a combination of threats and offers may deflect Iran from further enrichment process. But that would need concerted pressure from Europe, America and others, including China and Russia.
In that case Iran's nuclear transgressions could be reported to the UN Security Council which could impose sanctions against Iran. But Tehran is offering oil and gas contracts to China, Russia and others to persuade them to break ranks with the Europeans and the Americans.
The danger there is that if Iran succeeds in blocking consensus on sanctions in the Security Council, then the Americans may be obliged to resort to debate on military action. On the other hand, the chaos in Iraq and higher oil prices have emboldened the Iranian regime which appears to be confident that it can withstand the US threat.
Interestingly, the Americans and the Europeans view Iran from different angles. As yet, there is no evidence at all that Bush's new foreign policy team will be more proficient at dealing with Iran than with the crisis in Iraq.
Also, Iran presents a far more complex challenge than Iraq did as it has already mastered key nuclear military technologies and has long range missiles that may eventually carry warheads.
Washington views Iran as a hostile, terror-sponsoring state, meddling in Iraqi affairs and on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons with which it could target Israel, with whom it has a long history of hostility.
The European view of Iran is more subtle and perhaps closer to reality.. Instead of confronting Iran, the European troika of France, Germany and Britain have negotiated a uranium enrichment freeze.
The Europeans attach a lot a importance to the competitive and contradictory power structures in the Iranian polity, with increasing competition for a more open society coming from Iran's younger generation.
According to the Europeans, Iran pricks America in Iraq, because it can have, and not because it has, any ambition other than having a friendly neighbour.
Interestingly, unlike the Americans, the Europeans take a charitable view of Tehran's interminable foot-dragging over nuclear inspections and cooperative measures. They ascribe it to defensive strategy which has more to do with national pride than with hostile intentions.
If the European assessment about Iran is correct, it is obvious that the harder the Americans push Iran, the more defiant and dangerous it will become. From this, it follows that if Washington persists in its current policy towards Tehran, then, like Iraq, it has the potential of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.
So why are the Americans pushing Iran so hard? Perhaps the most plausible explanation is provided by the problem of Israeli security. The Israeli Knesset was presented in July with an annual intelligence assessment that said Iran (now that Iraq has been crushed) was the greatest threat to the state.
Israeli deputy prime minister Shimon Peres recently stated that the world must mobilize against Iran as "it has become the focal point of all the danger" in the Middle East.
The Mossad's chief has told the Knesset's foreign affairs and defence committee that Iran is on the brink of achieving uranium enrichment capability and that by the end of the year it would reach "the point of no return."
In view of the above statements, the Israeli factor cannot be ignored in the case of Iran. The danger is that if it gets the green signal from Washington, Tel Aviv may repeat what it did to Iraq in 1981 when it destroyed Iraq's Osirik reactor near Baghdad.
Recently, musing aloud, US Vice-President Dick Cheney said that no matter how patient America remains with Iran, a "twitchy Israel" might be less so. However, leading American conservatives argue that if strikes are deemed necessary, for political and military reasons the United States should undertake them alone.
Going by American press reports it is evident that officials refuse to discuss what they will do if diplomacy fails in the case of Iran. The hard liners, led by Vice-President Dick Cheney, reject any deal with the Iranian theocracy.
The more moderate officials say it is not clear whether the religious conservatives in control in Iran are eager to engage with "the Great Satan" either. Apparently, Washington's war planners have updated their planning for a possible showdown with Iran.
The national security bureaucracy has conducted war games and considered other ways the US could respond if efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon fail. However, they describe the efforts as "prudent contingency planning" that should not be interpreted as sabre-rattling.
Other officials say that the US and its allies have many options short of military action with which to isolate and punish a government that they believe persists in trying to develop nuclear weapons.
According to the hard liners, only a credible threat, and if necessary, the use of air and special operations attacks against Iran's suspected nuclear facilities will prevent Tehran from acquiring warheads. But the moderates, who are far fewer in the second Bush administration than in the first, argue that if Iran does have a secret weapons programme it is likely to be dispersed and buried in places almost unknown to US intelligence.
Also, the potential for Iranian retaliation inside Iraq and elsewhere is so great that there is in effect no military option. But the hard liners argue that the cost of doing nothing may prove too high, and that a minimum of military strikes could at least set back Iran's nuclear programme by several years.
The plea of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) chief for a US-Iran dialogue is the only ray of hope in an otherwise gloomy perspective. IAEA head Mohammed ElBaradei has urged the United States to engage in dialogue with Iran over its nuclear programme.
According to him, no permanent solution to Iranian nuclear ambitions is possible without full US engagement. He has emphasized the need to address "Iran's sense of isolation and insecurity" after more than 20 years of economic sanctions imposed on its Islamic government.
Many observers believe that direct talks between the United States and Iran will go a long way in resolving the nuclear issue. But the problem is that after a quarter century of hostile relations, beginning with the toppling of the Shah and the 1979 seizure of the American embassy in Tehran, the US and Iran find themselves caught up in a vicious circle.
Too much of national pride is involved on either side to let them leave the beaten track and explore new ways of solving problems. However, there is not the slightest doubt, as the IAEA chief has hinted, that a dialogue between Washington and Tehran could lead to a deal on the nuclear issue in exchange for a US move to normalize relations with Iran. The coming days are fraught with great opportunities as well as dangers.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Balochistan: its past and present
Whenever there is a change in the status quo, there is always an opposition from those who are likely to be adversely affected. It looks that Balochistan is now poised for a change and economic transformation and hence consequent conflict and confrontation with vested interests.
So far, governments in Pakistan have been following the colonial policies and attitudes of the days of British rule, which need a change. In early 19th century, when the British had established their supremacy in the subcontinent Russia was advancing southward in Central Asia.
The British government at London was perturbed and considered it an imminent threat to the security and tranquillity of the British Indian empire and asked their government in India to checkmate the Russians.
Thus began the British involvement in this region. Till then the area now forming Pakistan, i.e., Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab and the North-west Frontier Province and the tribal belt were practically independent.
Accordingly, in 1838, Auckland, the British Governor General of India, decided to dispatch his forces to Afghanistan through Sindh and Balochistan but was defeated in Afghanistan.
To rehabilitate British prestige and control the region, the English occupied Sindh in 1843 and Punjab in 1849 and established their hold in Balochistan in 1854-76. The British were able to consolidate themselves in Balochistan with a comparative ease as compared to the tribal belt in the NWFP.
The reason was that Balochs would normally follow their chiefs or 'maliks' known as tumandars. They had a common overall head, the Khan of Kalat. In 1854 an agreement was concluded between the British and the Khan who promised not to have relations with any foreign power without the approval of the English; to receive British troops when necessary; to protect merchants passing through his territory; and to prevent his followers from raiding British territory.
In return for all this he was to receive an annual subsidy of Rs 150,000. Thus a system of subsidy was introduced to purchase the loyalty of the Khan. As the control of the Khan was not very strict, arrangements did not suit the British.
With a view to further consolidate their hold, negotiations were conducted with the Khan of Kalat and a fresh treaty was signed at Jacobabad in 1876. The British succeeded in getting Quetta and surrounding area together with Bolan Pass on lease.
The agreement required the area to remain under nominal sovereignty of Kalat but to be administered by the British. A British Indian force was stationed at Quetta and Sir Robert Sandamen was appointed the first Agent to the Governor General in Balochistan.
He tactfully established contacts with the tribal chiefs and succeeded in maintaining peace in the area. The arrangement made by Sandamen is known as Sandamen System and also as Khasadar system.
It rested on the occupation of central points in Kalat and the tribal territory in considerable force, linking them together by fair-weather roads, and leaving the tribes to manage their own affairs according to their own customs and working through their chiefs and maliks.
The maliks were required to enlist levies paid by the government but regarded as tribal servants. The British achieved the objective of their own protection, keeping roads open and in case of trouble, finding out the troublemakers.
They would give monetary benefits to the tribesmen under the supervision of the maliks, in return for maintaining order in the tribe. For this cooperation, the maliks received large subsidies.
After independence, the princely states of Lasbela, Mekran and Kharan as well as Kalat acceded to Pakistan. Pakistan continued to follow the British policy of administering Balochistan through their maliks/sardars.
The government under Iskander Mirza purchased Gwadar from the Emirate of Oman and made it a part of Balochistan, which was made a full-fledged province under President Yahya Khan in 1970.
The current situation has many dimensions - political, economic and social. There is also the problem of security of national and public assets. Politically Balochistan remained at a disadvantage for a long time. It did not enjoy the status of a province for a quarter of a century after independence.
Its first provincial assembly was elected as a consequence of 1970 elections conducted under Yahya's government. During the government of Pakistan People's Party under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto it was alleged that some of Baloch sardars were activated by foreign powers mainly Soviet Russia, and arms coming for them from Iraq were captured at Islamabad airport.
Soon, a situation of confrontation between the provincial government of Balochistan and the federal government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was created as a result of latter's plans for social and political reforms in the province.
The government of Balochistan was sacked and military action was initiated in 1972. This was a setback to democratic political process. During the government of Ziaul Haq there was return to the old policy of reconciliation with sardars and peace was restored in the province.
Under Ziaul Haq, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, Balochistan experienced more or less the same political evolution as the rest of the country except that under Benazir, the Balochistan assembly was dissolved in 1988 but was revived under orders of the High Court. The dissolution of provincial assembly created a lot of resentment against the centre.
Now the federal government seems determined to develop Balochistan and about 130 billion rupees worth of projects have been sanctioned. The most prestigious project is that of Gwadar Port.
The development of rail, road and sea communication originating from Gwadar in all directions is expected to generate tremendous economic activities in the areas so far neglected.
For instance, the Makran coastal highway (653 km long) along the Makran coast starting form Sheikh Raj, approximately 105 km north of Karachi on RCD highway is ending at Gabd near Pak-Iran border.
This highway links the ports at Ormara, Pasni, Gwadar and Jiwani with Karachi. It will facilitate trade between Pakistan and Iran. The fishermen along the coast will benefit because fish is sent to Karachi by road for marketing.
So far about 30 per cent of fish is spoiled, at a loss of Rs.300 million per year as the journey by road takes two to three days from Jiwani and Gwadar. The new highway reduces the time considerably from the coastal towns to the bigger markets, hence better return to fishermen and a saving of millions of rupees every year.
The highway will also usher in new avenues of livelihood for the people of the coastal areas in the form of jobs, communication, transportation market access, etc. Another regional linkage is the Gwadar-Ratto Dero motorway (M-8) joining it with Indus highway through Turbat, Awaran and Khuzdar.
A rail link is planned to connect Gwadar to Quetta and Zahidan. The existing length of runway at Gwadar airport is being upgraded from 5,000 to 15,000 feet for operation of wide-bodied jet aircraft.
Gwadar Port located at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, some 460 km from Karachi, has immense geo-strategic significance on many counts. It provides the shortest and cost-effective access to the landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics and the country in turn would immensely gain from the project.
Besides, with a number of other development projects such as Saindak project, Mirani and a number of other small dams, extension of Kirthar and Kachchi canal, etc. enormous economic benefits will accrue to Pakistan in general and the people of Balochistan in particular.
Socially, the tumandari system and the hold of tumandars entrenched since centuries could not be terminated overnight, but it could not be allowed to perpetuate indefinitely.
Pakistan has to survive in twenty-first century and follow the internationally accepted norms. The masses are to be given basic necessities of life, i.e. education, health care, jobs, etc. Hopefully the economic development in the province will give birth to a middle class and feudalism will fade away gradually.
As for the grievances of Balochistan, these must be addressed politically and economically. There is a persistent security problem in Balochistan. Recently about 450 rockets were fired on national and public assets in Sui gas plant and pipelines, besides numerous bomb blasts elsewhere in the province.
The recent rockets are reported to have been fired from a distance of about 20/30 miles from the direction of Dera Bugti. A considerable time and effort was required to repair the damage caused to the plant.
It affected the production and cost of production in industries. This is a security problem though it may have political and economic undertones. It raises several questions. From where these bombs and rockets are acquired and who are keeping these illegal weapons.
What should be done to ensure peace and security, which is vital for Balochistan's development and welfare of its people? It requires a two-pronged strategy. First, as an immediate measure, the writ of the civil government should be established.
The criminals who are guilty of rape, murder, attacking public property and damaging government installations must be dealt with. Second, as a permanent measure, the genuine political, economic or social grievances must be seriously addressed.
Local issues cannot be seen in isolation from larger issues of centre-province relations and the system of government and institutions in the country. Similarly, the economic, social and political issues are inter linked and should not be looked at in isolation from each other.
It seems the government is following both strategies. What is required and should be ensured is that actions taken to meet the situation are well considered and within the parameters of the law of the land.
Talking to the prime minister
His sincerity touches you. He is so transparent. Even after being in politics for some 12 years, he remains unsoiled. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reminds you of the biblical saying that the meek will inherit the earth.
I met him to request him not to raise the limit of 26 per cent in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the print media. Hardly had I begun to advance arguments against the hike, he said that there was "no such proposal before the government." I did not pursue the matter.
The room in which the prime minister met me was the same one where I had interviewed former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee many a time before. There was not much of a change in the decor except that there were two straight chairs in place of sofas. The prime minister sat on one and I occupied the other.
It was not a regular interview, just a chit-chit. Since the talk on the FDI did not last beyond a couple of minutes, I utilized the opportunity to discuss India-Pakistan relations and Kashmir.
He was gushing with sentiments for the best of equation between the two countries. He wanted them to be the closest neighbours like America and Canada, with easy travel facilities. Whatever he could do to normalize relations, he was prepared to do.
"We have so many things in common and I told this to President General Pervez Musharraf who agreed with me," said Manmohan Singh. "I told him that both of us were not politicians and have come from outside.
We should be able to find a solution to the problems the countries face." The prime minister wanted a settlement quickly, without losing further time. Manmohan Singh sounded like a person whose biggest ambition was to make India and Pakistan tick.
Strange, when I met Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri last month at his office in Islamabad, he gave me the impression as if the earnestness that he found in the Vajpayee set-up was lacking in the Manmohan Singh government. I saw no such trace while talking to the prime minister.
Instead, he prayed the solution should come about during his tenure of prime minister ship. He talked feelingly about the closeness which had eluded them. He sounded somewhat helpless in not being able to span the distance between the two countries and wished he could do more.
Asked if former Prime Minister Vajpayee had left any papers on the initiative he had taken, Manmohan Singh said there was none. In that connection, he had met Vajpayee who said that there was nothing except 'baat se baat chaleey' (talks lead to further talks).
These words from a couplet of Faiz Ahmed Faiz, a revolutionary Urdu poet from Pakistan, were first used by Inder Gujral when he, as prime minister, met the then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at Male to discuss the steps to repair relations between India and Pakistan. When Sharif asked Gujral, what next, the latter said: "baat se baat chaleey"
Manmohan Singh said that he conveyed to President Musharraf that India was keen on settling all the problems the two countries faced. Both met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly at New York in September last.
This was a one-to-one meeting lasting for an hour. Manmohan Singh said that his impression was that President Musharraf was equally keen on settling the problems.
Probably, the failure of talks over the Baglihar power project was on his mind when Manmohan Singh said that the Indus Treaty apart, he was prepared for joint consultations on such things so that the two countries worked in harmony for the common good.
They could together develop the two countries economically because the leaders on both sides owed it to their people. On Kashmir, he said he told President Musharraf that he could not redraw the boundaries because such an authority vested in parliament.
In any case, Jammu wanted to be one of the states in India and Ladakh a union territory. Any division of the state on the basis of religion would revive the communal divide of the days gone by.
The subcontinent had paid a heavy price. India's ethos was secular. It could not deviate from it. There were 150 million Muslims in the country. Any settlement that was based on religious considerations could disturb things beyond anyone's imagination or control. The prime minister believed that the Pakistan President understood his point of view.
Manmohan Singh wanted to have talks with separatists and others. But he was disappointed. The last time when he was in Srinagar, he waited for the Hurriyat leaders but they did not turn up. (The information at this end was that Islamabad had exerted pressure on them not to meet the prime minister. Similarly, Pakistan's Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, who visited Delhi earlier, too reportedly told them not to meet Indian government leaders.).
I informed Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that according to my sources, the Hurriyat leaders did not meet him in Srinagar because they were hurt over his statement that small minds had come to occupy high positions.
He clarified that his remark was never directed towards them. He was talking about things generally when he uttered those words. He said his doors were still open for them to come and talk to him.
He repeated former Prime Minister Narasimha Raos words that "sky is the limit." (One of the Hurriyat leaders has said that they could not talk to New Delhi on the basis of autonomy. When Manmohan Singh has not put any condition for talks, why the Hurriyat was trying to dictate terms?)
When I proposed to the prime minister that India should allow the Kashmiris living in the part under Pakistan to come to Delhi to talk to Kashmiris on our side, Manmohan Singh said he was not averse to such meetings and the Kashmiris discussing among themselves their problems.
He said he allowed one similar exercise at Kathmandu and was not opposed to more meetings of that kind. It was apparent that he was not too happy with the difficulties the intelligence agencies and the mindset bureaucrats created on both sides.
As I left the room, I came back with the impression that here was one person who would go to any length to sort out things with Pakistan and the separatists in Kashmir.
My worry was that steeped as Pakistan and the Hurriyat leaders were in their strategies and tactics, they would waste the opportunity that Manmohan Singh's prime minister ship offered. They should open up before a person who was so open, so transparent and so willing to clear the decks.
The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.
Rice's European tests
Condoleezza Rice will find consensus with America's European partners on certain issues on her first trip abroad as President Bush's chief diplomat. There is suddenly an opportunity for her to engage in and catalyze Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts.
Her willingness to meet Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas should reduce US-European tensions, as will Iraq's successful elections. Iran, however, is becoming the source of important new strains within the Atlantic alliance.
These understandings will be starting points - at most, atmosphere changers - and not end-results. Rice's week-long visit to Europe and the Middle East and Bush's European trip later this month are quests for a second-term foreign policy strategy that still has to be elaborated.
Rice's most important task as Colin Powell's successor will be to consolidate and channel the shock waves of change that the Bush team sent through the Middle East, Central Asia and Europe by going on the offensive after September 11, 2001.
She must convince a world frequently dismayed by US actions that she can implement and manage the consequences of the grand visions that Bush relentlessly conjures.
Improving relations with Europe by engaging in the Middle East has become, by design as well as circumstance, Rice's first test. She steps into a minefield that exploded around an unprepared Powell in his first days in office and from which he never escaped.
That lesson seems not to have been lost on Rice. Her quiet consultations with European diplomats on possible agenda-setting trips by her and Bush began soon after the US election.
More recently, the president's telephone conversations and meetings with foreign leaders have suggested that the Middle East could possibly bring Europeans and Americans closer after provoking sharp divisions between them for three years.
Bush has not had a sudden conversion on the Middle East - or on Europe, for that matter. Instead, in the view of one leader who talked with him, Bush has come to accept, however reluctantly, the reality that virtually all his major second-term foreign policy goals will be directly influenced by how he handles the opportunity that Yasser Arafat's death and Ariel Sharon's determination to withdraw from Gaza have created for US diplomacy.
Rice plans to meet with the Israeli prime minister early next week and then, if calm prevails, travel to Ramallah to end the Bush boycott of Palestinian leaders by seeing Abbas. Her contacts would visibly set the stage for the Sharon-Abbas meeting that has been scheduled for Tuesday.
Her most important talks will be with Sharon, not with the Europeans or with Abbas. While there is some evidence that the White House has come to see a peace agreement between Israel and a Palestinian state as a strategic goal for the second term, Sharon has yet to endorse that expansive view.
He still insists that the Palestinians must end all terrorist attacks and achieve accountable, democratic government before final-status negotiations can begin. Sharon's Gaza disengagement plan, the continuing construction of a security fence around the West Bank and his other tactical moves to create change short of a final settlement are as far ahead as he wants to look.
Rice will need to bridge these two strategic gaps, first with the Europeans, who want the United States to lean on Sharon for concessions that lead to a quick final settlement, and then with Israelis who are already nervous that she and Bush will go too far in buying transatlantic harmony.
She should use the trip to begin to turn the tactical into the strategic: Sharon should be supported and if necessary prodded by Bush to disengage from Gaza and remove four West Bank settlements as promised by year's end or earlier. Sharon's Gaza plan gives Bush and Rice a valuable opening toward the two-state solution they have outlined. -Dawn/Washington Post Service