| 10 January 2005 | Monday | 28 Ziqa'ad 1425 |
Syrian presence in Lebanon
Whatever happened to Osama?
Neocons gunning for Iran
There were no surprises at the end of the latest round of India-Pakistan foreign secretary-level talks in Islamabad. As expected, nothing of significance resulted from the discussions on the two major issues on their agenda, namely, peace and security, including CBMs, and Jammu and Kashmir.
While the two sides did claim some progress in narrowing their differences on the draft agreement for prior notification of each other's ballistic missile tests, it is clear from all accounts made public so far that there was no forward movement at all on Kashmir.
According to some reports, the session on "Jammu and Kashmir" on the second day of the talks lasted less than an hour with the two sides merely exchanging their "stated positions" without engaging in any "substantive" discussion on the issue.
Apparently, neither side ventured into the "option" game. The only positive thing visibly emerging from the talks was the decision to "carry forward" the process of composite dialogue in the light of the joint statement issued after the meeting between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New York on September 24, 2004.
In their press briefings at the end of the talks, the two foreign secretaries had different perspectives on the outcome of their discussions and made no secret of the fact that their countries' positions remained far apart.
Pakistan, according to our foreign secretary, had not only reiterated to the Indian side the centrality of the Kashmir issue but also clearly told them that India's repeated assertions of Kashmir being an integral part of that country were not helpful to the process of a "purposeful and result-oriented" dialogue.
He also acknowledged that "the two sides had yet to scratch the surface on Kashmir" and that "we are still on the periphery and haven't yet grappled with the real issue."
In the current process of engagement, he saw a desire on both sides "to maintain close contacts at high political levels, which would help in removing impediments to carrying forward a fruitful and purposeful dialogue on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute."
This was a diplomatic way of acknowledging the "constraints and limitations" of the bureaucratic levels in addressing the complex issue of Kashmir. India's foreign secretary, on the other hand, described Kashmir as "a very complex issue" which will have to be dealt with "as a process rather than as an event."
Elaborating his point, he said that India appreciated the fact that there is a difference (on this issue) between the two countries but instead of "restating their positions" they should find "some areas of convergence" on which they can work together to take the process forward.
He was obviously alluding to what apparently had happened in the session on Kashmir during the Islamabad talks. He spared no effort to make the point that the process of engagement between the two countries over Kashmir will only move "step by step.
He repeatedly stressed that "Pakistan needed to do more to prevent cross-border infiltration from the territory under its control" and recalled in this connection its commitment under the January 6, 2004, statement.
All this notwithstanding, both New Delhi and Islamabad continue to wear a positive face on the dialogue process appearing to be "pragmatic and practical" in pursuit of better relations.
In his recent address to the nation President Pervez Musharraf reiterated his resolve to seek improvement of relations with India on the basis of "sovereign equality." He also hoped that the Kashmir issue would be resolved "with the active involvement of the Kashmiris."
In reality, however, both countries seem to remain fixated on their basic positions which they keep restating now and then. Pakistan has not formally given up its traditional and "principled" stand on Kashmir but has offered to be flexible if India reciprocates in full measure.
It wants progress on Kashmir and confidence building to move in tandem. For Pakistan, a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute is the "biggest CBM" that will promote sustainable cooperation between India and Pakistan and durable peace in the region.
In public, India has yet to match President Musharraf's unprecedented "softening and flexibility." Its leaders keep repeating the claim that Kashmir is an integral part of India and have ruled out any "redrawing of boundaries" on the basis of religion.
They insist a solution to the dispute has to be found within the Indian constitution. India's External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh has also been showing keenness to apply Sino-Indian model to peace talks with Pakistan.
While Pakistan wants "simultaneity" of progress on Kashmir and normalization of relations, India urges patience on the Pakistani side suggesting that "this is a long-drawn process" which should not hold up the normalization of relations, particularly economic and trade relations. Better economic ties, in India's view, would facilitate the whole range of bilateral relations.
With these paradoxical positions and cosmetic stances to minimize their negative impact, public opinion on both sides is getting confused. People in both countries are puzzled over what their governments are telling them on the prospect of peace between the two countries and what they are saying to each other both in public and in their negotiations. They just cannot draw the line between the real and the surreal in this whole process.
At least in Pakistan, this was amply reflected in the discussions at different seminars held recently in major cities as part of a government-sponsored public debate on "possible options for a Kashmir solution."
With very little clarity on the horizon, the debate remained focused on India's intransigence with overwhelming opinion showing no enthusiasm for President Musharraf's "extra-mile journey" in search of "an achievable" Kashmir solution.
Pakistan's readiness to forego the internationally acclaimed imperative of plebiscite as an option was seen as an abandonment of its principled stand which would give India an advantage on the negotiating table.
Special reservations were expressed with regard to any proposals that could entail a redrawing of the map of Pakistan or affect its geo-political standing in the region.
In this context, it was particularly emphasized that for strategic reasons the options of independence, condominium and joint control were not in Pakistan's interest, and no change in the status of AJK or Northern Areas should be acceptable to Pakistan.
At the end of the day, if the government was seeking a public endorsement of its "positive and flexible" approach, it is just the opposite that came out from the debate on Kashmir options.
If the government thought an officially choreographed public debate in hotel lounges and banquet halls would help bring about a "national consensus" on its Kashmir "rethinking", it was the wrong choice of venue. Such debate would have been best suited to the floor of the parliament or its committee rooms.
National consensus on an issue of supreme importance for Pakistan would require domestic confidence building through a genuine national effort involving "debate and discourse" in the parliament, and with all major political stakeholders in the country.
All will have to rise above their differences converging on a single platform and developing a consensus on how to adapt Pakistan's traditional policy to the current regional and global dynamics.
If the government is genuinely convinced that it has the "will and the power" to reach an "honourable and enforceable" peace with India on the basis of a just and fair settlement of the Kashmir issue in conformity with the aspirations of the people of Kashmir, it must take all political forces in the country into confidence.
The support of major political parties would only strengthen the government's negotiating position in its policy of "dialogue and conflict-resolution" with India.
Both India and Pakistan, on their part, also need to take a fresh look at their 'modus operandi' in conducting their "composite" dialogue. By now they should have learnt that the media was not the appropriate channel of communication with each other.
They must mutually agree on managing and coordinating their media postures, especially with regard to the Kashmir dispute which arouses emotional sensitivities on both sides of the border.
As to the possible options for a solution there is no denying the fact that beyond the UN resolutions, which both India and Pakistan, as the principal parties to the dispute, had accepted to honour, there is no other compact formula or tailor-made solution available for addressing the Kashmir issue.
Plebiscite under UN auspices is the only way to ascertain the wishes of the Kashmiri people on the final disposition of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The status quo or legitimization of the Line of Control, as far as Pakistan is concerned, is not a solution.
Similarly, for well-known geo-strategic reasons, there are serious questions on the viability of an independent Kashmir, commonly known as the "third option." Condominium or joint control by India and Pakistan over an "autonomous" Kashmir is a non-starter.
Those who have been drawing rosy pictures of this inconceivable scenario seem to be oblivious to regional realities including the India-Pakistan legacy of deep-rooted suspicion and mistrust.
Similarly, the option of UN trusteeship over a volatile and strategic region is not workable. Given today's global complexities, the UN is no more an effective or credible "peacemaker or peacekeeper."
There have also been suggestions that in view of the complexities involved, the Kashmir issue may be put on the back burner. Meanwhile, the process of India-Pakistan normalization can move ahead in all areas, especially trade, tourism, people-to-people contacts and friendly exchanges.
This has been the Indian preference. We have tried this approach in the 80s. It did not work then, but might work now with some calibrated "linkage and sequencing" in the progress in all areas, including Kashmir.
Meanwhile, the "composite" dialogue may be utilized for confidence-building measures on issues of peace and security, including mutual restraint in the nuclear and conventional fields, and those that will improve the human rights and humanitarian situation of the Kashmiri people.
If both countries are ready to move beyond their respective stated positions in pursuit of a final solution which, as they have agreed, is "equitable, feasible and implementable," they must take a fresh look at the proposals that they have been discussing at the early stages of the dispute under UN-sponsored negotiations or high-level bilateral talks.
Both India and Pakistan were then prepared to accept less than their basic positions and might now find some common ground that could lead them to a mutually acceptable arrangement which would also take into account the legitimate interests of the Kashmiri people.
What should be clear to them by now is that in today's world, there will be no military solution to their problems, nor would militancy bring oppressed people any closer to freedom.
If recent global events, particularly the Iraq war, have any relevance, the lesson is that wars aggravate, not eliminate problems. They do not promote peace, nor secure people's rights. India must also understand that a negotiated peace with Pakistan has never had a better chance than now.
Depending on the progress attained on Kashmir and on mutual confidence and nuclear restraint, they could explore a "no-war treaty" with a mutually agreed mechanism for "future" conflict prevention, conflict resolution and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
Durable peace between India and Pakistan would not only be a factor of regional and global stability but would also enable the two countries to divert their resources to improving the lives of their peoples and eradicating poverty from the region.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
Syrian presence in Lebanon
Never before has it happened in Lebanon. Since the Syrian army entered the country in 1976 - just a year after the start of the 15-year Lebanese civil war and at the request of Lebanese Christian Maronites - there has been no public debate about the presence of thousands of Syrian troops here, nor the suffocating political grip which Damascus has maintained over the Beirut government.
But last year's United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country - and an aggressive US state department policy towards Syria has suddenly released a tide of resentment and debate.
Even Walid Jumblatt, the Druze Leader and a hitherto reliable ally of Syria, now says that Lebanon is the last satellite country on earth. The Lebanese are stunned.
They know that the regional tour of the US neo-conservative deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage - demanding a Syrian withdrawal and the disarmament of the anti-Israeli Hizballah militia - is part of Israel's agenda and a weakened Syria, along with a pliant Lebanon without any anti-Israeli forces on its border, is almost as pleasant for Washington and its Israeli friends as an emasculated, American-dominated Iraq - another aim of Mr Armitage.
Syria's supposed support for the Iraqi insurgency - another of Mr Armitage's grief's - has a special irony. It was Lebanese rebel General Michel Aoun's alliance with Saddam Hussein in 1990 which originally inspired the United States to support Syria's destruction of Aoun's statelet. But Syria's control of Lebanon has become as tired and as blatant as the Soviet Union's domination of the Warsaw pact. The successful attempt of pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud to add three years to his presidency, courtesy of the Lebanese parliament, was too much.
Lebanese newspapers which had hitherto confined their criticism of Syria to news agency dispatches written in Europe or America suddenly editorialized their suspicions of Damascus in a way that must have shocked Syria as much as their readers. "Damascus must review its policies on Lebanon - immediately," demanded the Daily Star.
On December 13 the so-called 'Democratic Forum' including Christian and left-wing groups and Jumblatt's Druze party denounced the interference "of the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services which have transformed Lebanon into a police state."
Almost immediately, offices of the Syrian Mukhabrat intelligence services were closed in Beirut and Syrian forces in the mountains above the city were re deployed.
There were rumours that the Syrians had approached the British Embassy in Damascus offering to reduce their estimated 14,000 troops in Lebanon to a mere 3,000 - tasked to protect Syrian anti-aircraft radar scanners in the Lebanese Bekka Valley. Damascus was allegedly told that the scanners needed only 300 soldiers to defend them.
Syria's presence has never been as pernicious as Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon, which ended in 2000, but the Christian Maronite community which failed to oppose Israel's 1978 and 1982 invasions - has always claimed to lead Lebanon's opposition to Syrian tutelage.
Syria's constant demand that Israel abide by the UN's resolutions - most notably 242 which demands an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip makes the current crisis all the more dangerous.
Can Syria insist on Israel's abidance by UN resolutions while ignoring 1559? There are those here who believe that the young president, Bashar Assad, has failed to grasp how serious is the Lebanese demand - and the UN resolution - for Syrian withdrawal.
Christian Maronites suspect that real Syrian power in Lebanon is exercised by the head of Syrian military intelligence, General Rustom Ghazali, rather than the Syrian president Ghazali's predecessor, Brigadier General Ghazi Kenaan, now minister of interior in Damascus, charged with the country's sensitive Iraqi file.
Syrian intelligence agents move easily among the one million Syrian "guest workers in Lebanon" but the Lebanese have long memories. Walid Jumblatt's father, Kamal, resisted Syria's overtures at the start of the civil war and was assassinated in the Chouf Mountains.
Jumblatt's close aide and friend, Marwan Hamade was the target of a car bomb last November. Leaving his home near the seafront, he swapped places with his bodyguard only seconds before the detonation.
The bodyguard died. Hamade survived. Lebanese politics may appear Byzantine, even boring, but they can be deadly to the participants. - (c) The Independent
Whatever happened to Osama?
By now every householder in Karachi who owns a DVD player has probably seen Michael Moore's controversial documentary 'Fahrenheit 9/11' and formed his own opinion on who was behind the attack on the Twin Towers.
However, not many of them could have read or heard of Craig Unger's highly readable treatise 'House of Bush, House of Saud', which uncovers a nest-egg of little known facts about the intimate relationship between members of the Bush family and their political collaborators with Saudi Arabia's elite, which probably provided the intellectual stimulus for Moore's film.
Not all the facts or observations in Unger's book are true, which prompted Amazon to withhold distribution of the book in Britain, in spite of the fact that some sections had been removed from the UK edition.
The narrative is, nevertheless, full of information and sensational disclosures and provides answers to some searching questions that members of the thinking public have been asking during the last few years.
Like, why did the Bush administration in July 2003 not declassify 28 pages of the 900-page US Congressional report on 9/11 that referred to the Saudis? And why does the capture of Osama bin Laden no longer figure as top priority in the objectives of the American military?
According to Unger, in the weeks or so following the 9/11 attack on New York and Washington, a number of flights took off from various airports in the United States crammed with members of the Saudi royal family and two dozen members of the Bin Laden family and their entourage.
After an exhaustive analysis of arcane deals and policy decisions spread over twenty years, Unger suggests that the Bush family and its close political collaborators benefited to the tune of $1.4 billion from their special connection with the elite of Saudi Arabia - hardly a figure to be scoffed at.
It is a well-known fact that following the spiralling of oil prices in 1974, the Saudis became huge investors in the United States. The Bush family, along with Dick Cheney at Halliburton, James Baker, the president's close friend and confidante, John Connolly, the former Texas governor and others were supposed to have earned millions of dollars from the Arab money flowing into Houston.
The country as a whole also benefited from the relationship, as more than $850 billion of oil money was invested in the American economy.Some of the strategic and carefully selected investments made by the Saudis poured into companies connected with the Bush family. These included Harken Energy, the huge Carlyle Group, and a number of smaller enterprises.
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International, the brainchild of the late Agha Hassan Abidi, was also exhumed in the book. It was demonstrated how Connolly was inveigled into acting as a front man for Saudi investment in the Carlyle Group, through BCCI.
This has been seen as one of the many ways in which the Saudis expressed their gratitude to the senior George Bush for defending their country in the first Gulf War against Saddam Hussein.
The section on BCCI is not very flattering. The highly successful institution, which provided lucrative jobs to Pakistani bankers in a hostile western environment, was frequently criticized for its unorthodox banking practices and the fact that there never appeared to be any sense of urgency in getting the accounts audited.
The bank came in for some severe editorial drubbing in 1981 in a dramatic expose spread over three articles in The Spectator, a respected British weekly, in which the writer described, among other things, money laundering and how wealthy Arab investors arriving at Heathrow airport were whisked away by uniformed and peak-capped chauffeurs in Rolls Royce limousines to the flesh spots of London.
It was believed that South African and Jewish financiers were behind the attack. Though the journal was sued, resulting in an unconditional apology by the publisher and the editor being relieved of his duties, the damage was done.
And when the international financier Gaith Pharon decided to pull out his share of the investment, cracks began to appear in the bank's operations. The collapse of BCCI was unfortunate, especially as the activities of the bank were no different from those of the other financial institutions operating in Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and the Cayman Islands, which managed to survive.
The foregoing details are common knowledge and are known to intelligence networks and bankers around the globe. What many people do not know, however - unless they have read Unger's book or ploughed through Bill Clinton's exceptionally long autobiography - is that when Clinton tried to take action against Osama bin Laden in the rugged fastness of Afghanistan, he was repeatedly thwarted by the Bush camp. This detail pops up in more than one place in the memoirs.
Instead of scouring the Hindu Kush Mountains in an attempt to capture the Saudi rebel who was accused in graphic detail by the international media of having masterminded 9/11, Bush suddenly and inexplicably diverted world attention from Afghanistan to Iraq, with deadly long-term consequences for US foreign policy.
Few people today seriously believe that Osama bin Laden, who operated from a cave at the time, apparently without the aid of instruments of modern communication, and whose videos mysteriously surfaced in Qatar and were aired on the Al-Jazeera television network, was the architect of the devastating attacks on the Twin Towers.
Or that Saddam Hussein had anything to do with the Al Qaeda network. It is a little late to ponder over this issue, after so many people, unconnected with the Baathist regime, have been killed.
The question that is agitating the minds of critics in this part of the world is: could the American hawks have known before the US unleashed its devastating air strikes on Baghdad, that the reports supplied by British intelligence about Iraq having weapons of mass destruction, were perhaps erroneous and based on pure conjecture?
If the answer to this query is that the hawks did know, and the findings were really quite irrelevant, it then becomes increasingly obvious that in wanting to continue its role as the world's policeman, the US is simply following the imperialist policy enunciated by past American presidents.
Between the end of the Spanish-American war and the dawn of the Great Depression, the United States had sent its troops to Latin American countries 32 times. To justify these interventions, it used the Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.
In the corollary, Teddy Roosevelt proclaimed that the United States, because it was a "civilized nation," had the right to stop "chronic wrongdoing" throughout the western hemisphere. John Kennedy had widened the spectrum to include Viet Nam and the two Bushes had extended the doctrine to the Middle East.
"Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship," Teddy Roosevelt said. "Chronic wrongdoing, however, may force the United States to exercise an international police power."
There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein was a chronic wrongdoer who needed to be removed. It is the methods that the US has employed in ousting him that have been condemned by world opinion.
Why couldn't the marines have opted for a swift, efficient, surgical Mossad-like operation, instead of killing over a hundred thousand civilians who had no connection whatsoever with the Baathist regime?
Some letter writers have wondered how long it will be before the US labels Pakistanis as being chronic wrongdoers. Pakistan did not figure at all well in the US list of free democracies that grant political rights and civil liberties to their citizens.
On a scale of one to 10, where the higher the number the worse the assessment, the country scored a six for political rights and a five for civil liberties. The issue of Dawn dated Jan 7 carried a story that naturalized Americans could be deported to their country of origin if involved in anti-state activities.
This must have sent a shiver down the spine of the hundreds of thousands Pakistani Americans, many of whom are fiercely law-abiding, but because of 9/11, feel more vulnerable than other immigrants.
As it is, they couldn't be very happy with President Bush's nominee for attorney general, Alberto Gonzales, who faced blistering criticism at a Senate confirmation hearing for his role in formulating policies that led to the torture of terror suspects, many of them Pakistanis.
Neocons gunning for Iran
After his stunning electoral victory, President Bush enters his next term with a large dose of political adrenaline. The White House has been cleared of the 'black sheep' who dared cross him, and filled with 'yes-men and -women' - Condoleezza Rice, Alberto Gonzalez, Thomas Hadley, Porter Goss - all tested sycophants who would readily bend over backwards to please their master.
As a New York Times editorial observed, "In recent weeks, President Bush has appointed members of his inner circle to cabinet positions, giving the appearance that he wants departments headed by yes-men and -women."
In charge now are the neocons, the same lot that coaxed Bush into an adventure which has already earned the sobriquet of a quagmire. Yet, the president looks around and gloats over his conquests like a conqueror of olden days. Afghanistan already lies at his feet. After about a month Iraq will follow suit.
War proved the most effective recipe for sustaining the first term. People forgot the theft of the White House and lent him their fullest support, so Bush proudly proclaimed himself as 'war president.'
The same prescription is therefore being contemplated again. Drunk on succes fou the neo conservative hawks are thumping for military action. Advance planning is being made so that action may be launched as soon as possible after the swearing-in.
Of the two likely targets - North Korea and Iran - the latter appears more tempting for a number of reasons. For example, first, it is more convenient. It can be attacked from the same bases that were used for invading Iraq. Most of the logistics including manpower and materiel are already in place. So, mobilization will cost less.
Two, Iran does not have a China at its back, like North Korea does. Three, Israel's close proximity to Iran offers another significant advantage. Four, the US has a long history of bitterness against Iran, so there is a compulsion to settle scores.
Five, the geography. Look at the map. Iraq and Afghanistan on Iran's west and east respectively, have already been subjugated. Pakistan, also on its east, is America's trusted ally.
Iran is the only missing link. Fill this void and you get the mind-boggling picture of the US sitting over the world's largest oil reserves. The prize is so fabulous that it would make even the driest mouth water, and, for the authors of the New American Century, it is worth starting a war.
Peter Beaumont offers yet another explanation for America's pressure on Iran, namely, that "in July the Israeli Knesset was presented with an annual intelligence assessment that said Iran is its greatest threat."
An action replay of the Iraq drama is therefore being rehearsed. Appropriately, a recent CIA report proclaimed, "The United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, in contradiction to its obligations as a party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty."
Even the outgoing Secretary of State Colin Powell refreshed his past record of lies to tell reporters that "US intelligence had seen hard evidence that Iran was close to putting a nuclear weapon on a long-range weapons system."
What if the lie was exposed by the Washington Post promptly disclosing that the "information had come from a single, unverified, 'walk-in' source" and dismissed even by State Department officials.
Yet, as before, Bush remained unfazed. Speaking on the sides of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum meeting in Santiago, he was quoted as saying, "It is very important for the Iran government to hear that we are concerned about their desires and we're concerned about reports that show that, before a certain international meeting, they're willing to speed up the processing of materials that could lead to a nuclear weapon."
The assertion was typical Bush. Last June the NYT quoted him saying to a reporter, "The reason I keep insisting that there was a relationship between Iraq and Saddam and Al Qaeda" is "because there was a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda." (NYT 18 June).
Analysts have been quick to note the parallels. Two of them, an Atlantic apart - Peter Beaumont of the Observer (London) and David Ignatius of the Washington Post - called it deja vu.
"There is a sense of deja vu about all this: Bush, unembarrassed by the fact that the intelligence used to justify the case for war against Saddam was cooked up, is playing the same game again." Ignatius was brief. "It is a case of "deja vu all over again," he said.
From Bush's viewpoint Iran is one-third of his axis of evil. He perceives Iran as a hostile, terror-sponsoring state on the verge of acquiring weapons with which it could target Tel Aviv. And, he has already promulgated a virtual divine right to wage preemptive war.
However, there are some sane voices, pleading for dialogue and close inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. For example, David Kay, the one who finally uncovered the truth about Iraq's weapons programme that it had been dismantled long ago, said recently at a Brookings Institution seminar, "We need to engage."
He also emphasized the regime of inspection. Columnist Ignatius, in his op-ed 'Engage Iran' even recalls an historic parallel with China: "If ever there was an analogy to China in the years before Henry Kissinger's famous secret diplomacy, this is it."
Europe also favours engagement. On November 7 Iran signed a deal with France, Germany and the UK in Vienna under the IAEA auspices, agreeing to suspend uranium enrichment from November 25. But it declared it would carry on with 20 centrifuges.
After further talks Iran finally agreed to freeze its programme and on November 29, the board of the IAEA approved a resolution welcoming Iran's 'suspension of sensitive nuclear activities.'
However, Iran made its stand on the issue clear vis-a-vis the freeze. AFP cited Iran's top national security official Hassan Rowhani telling a news conference following the IAEA resolution, "...the Islamic republic has not renounced the nuclear fuel cycle, will never renounce it and will use it."
The European trio (France, Germany and Britain) promised to begin talks in December on a package of rewards in lieu. However, wary of being short changed, Rowhani warned, "The suspension will only last as long as the negotiations.
It should be a question of months and not years. Their duration must be reasonable, should not be prolonged, and we should not feel during the negotiations that they are trying to gain time" in order to extend the duration of the freeze.
True, uranium enrichment is the key process using centrifuges, to make fuel for nuclear reactors, or the explosive core of atomic bombs. But Iran claims its nuclear programme is a peaceful, civilian effort.
So what is needed is inspection. Europe favours letting the IAEA do the inspections. Yet, Washington sticks to its claim that it is a covert weapons plan and seems hell-bent on reporting Iran to the UN even unilaterally and to impose sanctions, as the first step.
Nevertheless Iran, also, has a point with regard to its nuclear pursuit. Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen in his oped, 'How to defuse Iran', explains it in this way: "If you ask an American why he keeps a gun, he'll say it's a dangerous world out there. If you ask the average Iranian why his country should have a nuclear weapon, he'll tell you the same thing."
Among Iran's compulsions are: first, it is surrounded by nations that have at one time or another been its enemies. For example, Russia; at the end of World War II, the Soviet Union had to be pressured to vacate its occupation of the northern part of Iran. The same applies to Iraq.
The memories of the 1980 invasion are yet fresh. That invasion had full US backing. Though relations with Russia are friendly today, and Iraq is under US occupation, an Iranian might argue, "What happened once could happen again."
Nor have the Iranians forgotten the US role in their internal affairs. In 1953 the CIA mounted a coup in which Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq was ousted and the Shah was restored to his throne. Mossadeq was put under house arrest, but some of his aides, including the foreign minister, were executed.
So the ransacking of the US embassy in Tehran and taking of hostages, after the Shah was ultimately toppled, was not entirely an episode without a context. Second, if its neighbour Pakistan can be a certified member of the nuclear club and can have a bomb, why cannot Iran? And besides, there is also Israel, with its nuclear arsenal as well as a perceived threat to Iran.
Answers to these questions should be found through engagement. War, as is universally accepted, should be the last resort. Also, before taking any reckless step, Mr Bush should better heed Richard Cohen's warning: "It's Iran."