As condoleezza Rice enters the State Department, she will face a number of pressing foreign policy problems that she cannot solve. This will not be for lack of effort or intelligence on her part.
It's just that many foreign policy crises involve the interests and activities of countries across the globe, and changing them takes time. And even then, whether it's Iran, North Korea or Darfur, there is no quick fix that Washington can impose. But there is a growing danger for the United States that needs urgent attention, that can be solved and that is almost entirely within Rice's power to handle. It's the foreign visa crisis. Left unattended, it is going to have deep and lasting effects on American security and competitiveness.
The facts are plain. US visa procedures have become far too cumbersome, and bureaucrats are turning down far more applications than ever before. One crucial result is the dramatic decline of foreign students in the United States - the first shift downward in 30 years.
Three new reports document the magnitude of this fall. Undergraduate enrolment from China dropped 20 per cent this year; from India, 9 per cent; from Japan, 14 per cent. The declines are even worse in graduate schools: applications from China have dropped 45 per cent; from India, 28 per cent.
Some Americans might say, "Good riddance, it's their loss." Actually the greater loss is America's. American universities benefit from having the best students from across the globe. But the single most deadly effect of this trend is the erosion of American capacity in science and technology.
The US economy has powered ahead in large part because of the amazing productivity of America's science and technology. Yet that research is now done largely by foreign students.
The National Science Board (NSB) documented this reality last year, finding that 38 percent of doctorate holders in America's science and engineering workforce are foreign-born.
Foreigners make up more than half of the students enrolled in science and engineering programmes. The dirty little secret about America's scientific edge is that it's largely produced by foreigners and immigrants. Americans don't do science anymore.
The NSB put out another report this year that showed the United States now ranks 17th (among developed nations) in the proportion of college students majoring in science and engineering.
In 1975 the United States ranked third. The recent decline in foreign applications is having a direct effect on science programmes. Three years ago there were 385 computer science majors at MIT. Today there are 240. The trend is similar at Stanford, Carnegie Mellon and the University of California at Berkeley.
Falling foreign enrolments will produce a broader but no less profound loss for the United States. America has spread its interests, ideas and values across the world by many means, but perhaps the single most effective one has been by educating the world's elites. For example, Western ideas about the benefits of free markets and free trade have become the global standard.
This may have much to do with Western foreign and trade policies. But surely this shift has been strengthened and facilitated by the fact that so many of the people in the ministries of finance, trade and industry in the developing world were educated at Western universities.
The hegemony of ideas is often a greater and more lasting source of power than brute force. When historians write about our times, they will certainly note that America dominated the international agenda for decades through this distinctive form of power. -Dawn/Washington Post Service
What Bush needs to do next
By Eric S. Margolis
George Bush's narrow victory over the dull John Kerry was a well-deserved personal triumph. But it would not have happened without brilliant Republican strategist Karl Rove, who achieved a narrow Bush win in spite of two failing wars abroad, a weak economy, and monster budget deficits. But the decisive vote that gave Bush victory came from what we snobbish New Yorkers call "fly-over country," that vast expanse of rural and suburban territory that lies between the sophisticated east and west coasts of America.
Here, fundamentalist Protestants voting for "moral issues" turned out in a mass jihad to vote for George W. Bush. These middle American 'Taliban' seemed to forget Bush's cascade of lies about Iraq and voted for him in huge numbers.
Now, the president must resume dealing with Afghanistan and Iraq, and the real, if overstated, threat from violent anti-American groups, which Bush terms, "the war on terrorism."
Bush again vowed to 'win' the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. By this he means staging elections that produce pliable pro-American regimes. The recent Afghan election is a prime example.
There, the US-installed figurehead, Hamid Karzai, to no surprise, won a landslide victory against a bunch of nobodies. But this election impressed only the credulous American media.
The Afghan vote, hailed by the White House and US media as "Afghanistan's first-ever elections," was, in reality, a cynical repeat of rigged elections held in 1986 and 1987 by the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan.
These votes "elected" the Kremlin's puppet ruler, Najibullah, who had been previously "appointed" Afghan leader by a rigged loya jirga manipulated by the Soviets. Karzai was "elected" in identical fashion: real opposition groups were declared "terrorists" and banned, ballots rigged, and warlords massively bribed.
Afghanistan's phony election is to be the model for US-run elections in Iraq next January. While the White House will proclaim the Iraqi vote a victory for democracy, the exercise will rightly be seen in Iraq and across the Mideast as a fraud. The winner is already known well in advance: Iraq's US-installed figurehead ruler, Iyad Allawi.
Phony elections that exclude from power Iraq's and Afghanistan's main ethnic or religious groups, that install hated minorities or stooges, and from which nationalist parties opposed to foreign occupation are banned, guarantee continued violence and instability.
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, costing a least $6.5 billion monthly, are, at best stalemated; at worst, lost. The aim of war is to achieve political goals. Both interventions have failed on the strategic level since US political goals have not been realized in either nation.
If the US withdraws its troops from Iraq or Afghanistan, the regimes it installed will be swept away in short order. But half the US army is tied down in these stalemated, hugely expensive colonial wars.
So Bush must decide to continue these un-winnable conflicts, or find some face-saving way out. The president must also deal with terrorism. Killing Osama bin Laden will not eliminate the anti-American hatred surging across the Muslim world, where the US is facing a spreading insurgency against its political and economic domination. Americans have yet to understand this fact.
Military responses to direct threats against the US are certainly in order, but there will be no end to the so-called war on terrorism until political solutions are found to its leading causes.
President Bush has shown plenty of stick in his first term. Now, he needs to offer some carrot. Freed in his second term from having to appease powerful supporters of Greater Israel and their Protestant fundamentalist allies, Bush now has a splendid opportunity to resolve the basic cause of anti-American terrorism: Palestine - as Britain's PM Tony Blair rightly noted this week.
By imposing a just peace on Israel and Palestinians, Bush could eliminate the primary incubator of anti-US hatred across the Muslim and non-Muslim world. Step two: pull US troops out of no-win wars in Iraq and Afghanistan - particularly after horrifying charges just made by highly reputable US and British academic analysts that US forces have killed an estimated 100,000 Iraqi civilians since 2003.
Step three: foster real democracy in the Muslim world. This means reforming US-backed authoritarian, anti-democratic regimes in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and, yes, even Pakistan.
That is how President Bush can help minimize terrorism, strengthen world order, and regain the world wide admiration, respect, and support for America that was lost during his first awkward, bellicose term. -Copyright Eric S. Margolis 2004
A nuclear case against Iran?
By Dr Iffat Idris
Does Iran have nuclear weapons? Is it trying to make nuclear weapons? Should it be stopped? What is the best way of doing so? Are we seeing history (the invasion of Iraq) being repeated? These questions pretty much sum up the crisis with Iran's nuclear programme that has been blowing hot and cold for so many weeks.
Iran does not officially possess nuclear weapons: under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty this would be illegal. Most experts believe that Iran does not unofficially possess them either.
Iran does have a civilian nuclear power programme - to generate energy - but that is all. It has received Russian support for this, and recently took control of the fuel cycle, which meant that uranium enrichment was in Iranian hands - one of the reasons why the international community is so concerned.
Iran does not have nuclear weapons, but is it trying to get them? The evidence could be interpreted either way. On the "pro-nuclear" side, there is the fact that Iran took over uranium enrichment, and that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials have found traces of weapons-grade uranium in Iranian plants.
On the "no weapons" side, there is the Iranian claim that it bought equipment from the black market that was already contaminated, and the fact that it does have legitimate nuclear power needs.
Also, Iran's record of (seen overall) cooperation with the IAEA. The general consensus is that either it is trying to build its own bomb, or that it is deliberately giving that impression.
It is not hard to guess why Tehran would want to have nuclear weapons, or to give the impression that it does. It has witnessed the first Bush administration attack and occupy two countries in its vicinity.
It has also seen the same "WMD pose an unacceptable threat" administration do nothing against North Korea, which has a nuclear weapons programme (and quite possibly weapons too). Iran's ayatollahs have probably figured out the paradox that if you pose a real threat to the US, you will not be attacked.
Russia, Pakistan and China - the first two immediate and the third a close neighbour - all have WMD. And then there is Israel: a country which definitely has nuclear weapons but which no one says a word about (poor Mordechai Vanunu tried but look where it got him).
Israel has already used its bombs against Iran: it has missiles that can reach the country. Thanks to the green light provided by 9/11 and the neocon-dominated Bush administration, Ariel Sharon is operating outside any controls. Tehran could quite justifiably claim that nuclear weapons are essential for its protection.
That, however, is a debate the Iranians are not choosing to engage in. They are officially sticking to the position that they simply have a civilian-use nuclear power programme. Many in the international community do not believe them: many believe Iran has a military programme. How should it be stopped?
The Bush administrations - first and now second - have been taking their habitual approach of beating a stick and making threatening noises. Iran has not taken kindly to those threats.
Those against whom they have been carried out in the past - Afghanistan and Iraq - are hardly role models of the "stick approach". Afghanistan teeters on the brink of another civil war, while Iraq is a war zone.
Global security has most definitely not been promoted by America's entry into Afghanistan and Iraq. There is nothing to suggest that an Iran adventure would be any different: and much to suggest that it would be worse. Iran is a united country with a strong sense of nationhood and a strong determination to defend it. Subduing it would not be an easy proposition.
Europe has taken a different approach - what it calls "constructive engagement". In simple terms that means "carrot and stick", with the carrot being waved more.
Europe has offered to supply light-water reactors for Iran's civilian nuclear power programme, as well as increased trade and millions in investment - if Iran gives up uranium enrichment. This week Tehran did just that (or to be precise, suspended it). The evidence in favour of the European "carrot approach" is pretty overwhelming.
Even as Iran announced its suspension of uranium enrichment, the Americans were complaining about Iranian actions and intentions. Outgoing secretary of state, Colin Powell shot one last salvo against Tehran, accusing it of developing long-range missiles. The US has consistently drawn the worst possible conclusion from anything coming out of Iran: "Iran has/is trying to get nuclear weapons - it must be stopped".
It is no secret that Washington does not support the European approach, no secret that it would like Iran referred to the Security Council for violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty - a move that would lead to sanctions and quite possibly (should Iran not comply with UN demands) be the prelude to military action.
Sound familiar? Remember how Washington built the case for Iraqi WMD, how it asserted that Saddam's Iraq was defying the UN and had to be punished, how it went to war to find Saddam's weapons.
We now know, of course, that there were no WMD; that Iraq was cooperating with the UN; and that the Bush administration had had its eye on Iraq long before 9/11. We know, in short, that the invasion of Iraq was decided first and the reason for doing it worked out later. Rumsfeld, Cheney, Rice and co. would love nothing better than to bring about "regime change" in Tehran.
However there are differences between Iraq and Iran that mitigate against US military action. Apart from the very real fact that Iran would present a much stronger foe than Iraq, there are the lessons of Iraq to consider. The disaster still underway in that country will make even the most gung-ho neocon think long and hard before setting off on a military adventure in Iran.
Ironically, both Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the limitations of the "sole superpower's" power. Then there is the international community: it stood by once as the US ploughed into Iraq. At the time many opposed the war, but many others believed that it would succeed.
Now that the latter have been categorically proven wrong, no one will support another "war on terror". This time the international community and the UN will not let Washington wreak whatever havoc it wills: this time they will speak out.
Iran's ayatollahs can therefore relax. In this face-off between David and Goliath, Goliath might be making lots of noise but it is David who is in the stronger position.
iffatidris2000@yahoo.co.uk.
Kashmir options: an appraisal
By Ghayoor Ahmed
Since 1947, the Kashmir dispute has remained at the heart of rivalry between Pakistan and India and a source of festering threat to the stability of the region and maintenance of international peace and security. The dispute sparked two wars between the two countries and cost thousands of Kashmiri lives.
Regrettably, the UN Security Council (UNSC) could not get its own resolutions on Kashmir implemented to resolve the conflict and despite the recognition of the dangers inherent in this situation, Pakistan and India also failed to hammer out a mutually acceptable solution bilaterally as the positions adopted by hem for the resolution of the dispute remained inflexible and irreconcilable. The international community, which could have played a helping role in this regard, also remained a passive observer of the situation.
Under the circumstances, there was just one ray of resolving the dispute if the parties concerned showed greater pragmatism and instead of clinging persistently to their stated positions sought a solution to the thorny problem by exploring some other viable means of minimizing their basic differences over it.
Despite the fact that both the countries hold diametrically opposite positions on Kashmir, a way forward can be found by showing flexibility if the two sides are indeed keen to address this long-standing problem. President Musharraf's recent initiative, which raised a range of options to resolve the 57- year old dispute, must be seen in this context.
The president was very explicit that he was not making any proposal out only desired a realistic public debate on various options that could be considered to resolve the Kashmir problem. Yet, certain elements in the country have dubbed his initiative a volte-face on Pakistan's policy on Kashmir, since independence.
The main thrust of their criticism is that by floating his new ideas the president has bypassed the UNSC resolutions, which stipulate that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take place in accordance with the wishes of its people.
It seems that theses critics have either read too much into what the president said or have deliberately indulged in polemics rather than substance on an issue of great national importance.
For obvious reasons, the only option for Pakistan would be the one that would be acceptable to the Kashmiri people. In other words, Pakistan would be supporting meaningful self-determination for the Kashmiri people in conformity with the spirit of the UNSC resolutions.
By taking his bold initiative the president has showed pragmatism and political acumen. By no stretch of the imagination can an upright approach be construed as an abandonment of the Kashmiri people's right to self-determination as embodied in the UNSC resolutions.
India's official reaction to President Musharraf's initiative was restrained and focused more on the procedure. The spokesman of the Indian external affairs ministry said that the on-going composite dialogue process between the two counties is the only correct forum to raise any such proposals or suggestions since Jammu and Kashmir is one of the subjects of the agenda.
While making this observation, the Indian spokesman evidently overlooked that President Musharraf did not proffer any proposal to India. He merely asked the Pakistani opinion-makers to suggest realistic ideas for a solution of the Kashmir dispute.
It is believed that the top leadership in Pakistan and India has already reached a tacit understanding to explore various options to resolve the Kashmir imbroglio. President Musharraf's initiative to hold a public debate in Pakistan on this issue should not, therefore, be misunderstood by New Delhi and should be seen in its correct perspective.
India need not fear that a pre-conceived blue print would be thrust upon it by Pakistan for the resolution of the dispute. Needless to say, only negotiations and compromise among the parties concerned would ultimately produce solution acceptable to all the three parties. There are no shortcuts to attain this goal.
Various options have been suggested from time to time for the resolution of the Kashmir problem. The principal among them are enumerated below, briefly discussing the prospects of their acceptability or otherwise by the concerned parties - Pakistan, India and the Kashmiri people.
Such an exercise is necessary to evaluate President Musharraf's seemingly innovative and thought-provoking Kashmir formula and to see the chances of their acceptance by the parties concerned or some other viable solutions have to be found.
It may be emphasized, however, that however creative option one may suggest for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, it could prove a non-starter if the contending parties have no political will to resolve the conflict and fail to show flexibility and the spirit of accommodation needed.
One option is plebiscite. In 1947 both Pakistan and India agreed that the final accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or India would be decided by a plebiscite to be held under the auspices of the United Nations.
The demand for a plebiscite is, therefore, considered by a large number of people in Pakistan and Kashmir to be the only legal basis for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. India has, however, rejected this option categorically. As such, to place too much reliance on this option seems to be pointless and only a forlorn hope.
ii. Permanency of the LoC: In 1972, under the Shimla agreement the ceasefire line was renamed the Line of Control (LoC). India, which claims the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir to be its integral part has, however, been prepared to convert the LoC, with minor adjustments, into a permanent soft border with Pakistan permitting free movement between the two sides.
Pakistan has consistently refused to accept this suggestion as it would bestow legitimacy to the status quo and also tacitly acknowledge the legality of Kashmir's accession to India in 1947.
A number of other arguments can also be made against the conversion of the LoC into a permanent border but the most compelling one is that the predominantly Muslim valley in Kashmir whose inhabitants are fighting for their right to self-determination since 1947, would be retained permanently by India. This could run counter to the aspirations of the Kashmiri Muslims. For this very reason the conversion of the LoC has been classed as the least acceptable option.
iii. Political autonomy: Some Indian and Kashmiri leaders continue to support the devolution of maximum administrative, financial and legislative powers to Srinagar notwithstanding the fact that Article 370 of the Indian constitution granting a special status to the State of Jammu and Kashmir has virtually been rescinded following the strong opposition in India to the grant of such a status to a state which is claimed to be an integral part of the country. In view of this, the desirability of political autonomy for Kashmir already stands discounted.
iv. Independent Kashmir: The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) demands the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir should become independent. This demand is, however, untenable since the Indian Independence Act of 1947 gave only two options to the princely states of the subcontinent: either join Pakistan or India.
There was no third option for these states to claim independence. The demand for independence is unequivocally opposed by Pakistan and India, as both of them would lose territory.
It would also encourage sub-national tendencies in their respective countries. China is also opposed to an independent Kashmir as it may give a boost to Tibet's demand for independence.
v. Condominium: Another option establishing a shared sovereignty by Pakistan and India over the whole or part of Kashmir seems to be a creative proposition. However, the proposed condominium may face endless problems and hurdles.
Given the historical mistrust between the two countries, it is hard to believe that Pakistan and India would be able to exercise joint control over the disputed territory that would endure for a significant length of time.
vi. Musharraf's formula: On October 25, President General Pervez Musharraf floated the idea to break he impasse on Kashmir. He identified seven geographical, linguistic or religious entities in the disputed territory and proposed that either the settlement of all these regions could be discussed between Pakistan and India or only one of them, evidently meaning thereby the Kashmir valley.
It is reassuring that the political analysts in and outside the country have evinced great interest in the president's initiative and a lively debate on the subject is taking place these days in the media.
As regards President Musharraf's specific proposal, mentioned above, it may be said that out of seven regions identified by him, two are already under the control of Pakistan, namely Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas, and the remaining five are under the Indian control.
The division of the state which President Musharraf has in mind is not only a viable option to resolve the Kashmir dispute on permanent basis, but is also in conformity with the very rationale of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947.
Incidentally, some Indian opinion makers have also suggested that it may be best for New Delhi to cede the valley to Pakistan and retain the rest of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir with it.