By the time this article appears, Kenneth Bigley could be dead. Eugene Armstrong and Jack Hensley, the two Americans captured with him were killed days ago. Their deaths took to 27 the number of foreign hostages beheaded/shot in Iraq.
The deadline for the release of all Iraqi women prisoners (the demand made by Bigley's captors) has come and gone many times. The group believed to be holding him is headed by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, among the most ruthless of the terror elite. If Kenneth Bigley does indeed survive it will be a miracle.
Kenneth Bigley has been the most prominent captive in the news, but he is by no means alone. The fate of some others captured before him is still unknown. Four employees of an Egyptian telecommunications company - two Egyptians and two Iraqis - have been seized since Bigley. The total number of foreigners taken hostage there since March 2003 exceeds 100.
The terror provoked by such hostage-taking - the kind that more often than not ends in decapitation - has a unique intensity. The heart-wrenching appeals made by the hostages on grainy videos, the utter desperation and fear on their faces, the agonizing wait for families back home in America, France, Pakistan (two of the dead were ours), Italy and so on, and the knowledge that there is nothing anyone can do - makes for a uniquely terrifying and sad situation.
Watching the familiar chronology unfold, one can't help thinking it would have been better to have fought back initially (when being captured) and been killed, than spend one's last days so awfully.
Better a quick, no-time-to-think death, than the agony of reflecting on family, friends, places, activities - knowing they will never be seen or experienced again. A hostage death in Iraq is a truly awful way to go.
Some of the hostages taken in Iraq were charity workers, others journalists. Bigley and his American associates were engineers, working on electricity and other projects. The French pleaded for their journalists' freedom on the grounds that France opposed the Iraq war, the Italians that their two women (subsequently released) were helping ordinary Iraqis.
All the families have appealed on humanitarian grounds for the freedom of their loved ones. Such appeals can all expect a sympathetic response, but the appeal that Armstrong, Bigley and other civilian contractors were in Iraq to "help the Iraqi people" beggars belief. Paid upwards of $1,000/day, civilian contractors in particular should not be trumpeting their "services" for the Iraqi people.
There is another question that can be asked specifically of those foreigners in Iraq to make a quick buck: why are they crazy enough to be working in Iraq? Haven't they seen the fate of so many of their colleagues? Don't they know that the risks are real? Do they think the rewards of contracting in Iraq are worth the risk? The same people who yesterday accepted lucrative work offers in Iraq, would today give anything to be free. Crudely put: if you are willing to take the gamble, be ready to face the consequences when you lose.
Sympathy for the hostages, certainly, but what of the other victims? Dozens of Iraqis are killed everyday - by American bombing and firing, by anti-American (resistance/militant) bombing and firing, and by the overall hardships and suffering that they face everyday: lack of food, clean water, medical care, and so on. No one remarks on those daily deaths.
No one prays that they will survive for one more day. Their fate - death or survival - is not news. How then can you expect them to sympathize with Bigley and others in his situation?
There is another big difference between these Iraqi deaths and those of the hostages. Foreigners in Iraq chose to be there (this applies to contractors, charity workers, journalists and troops - American soldiers might be desperate to leave now, but when they enlisted in the US Armed Forces they implicitly accepted they could be deployed anywhere, even Iraq).
The Iraqi people did not choose to live in the hell that is currently their homeland. The former had some control over their fate, the latter none. George Bush and Tony Blair are quick to condemn the barbarity of the hostage-killers.
They are firm in their resolve not to give in to the demands of terrorists like Zarqawi. In this they are quite right. Beheading or shooting helpless hostages is an act that has to be unreservedly condemned. National policies can never be made according to the dictates of terrorist executioners. But again there is more to the story than meets the eye. Bush and Blair offer condolences to the families of American and British dead (in the latter's case all victims of war and violence - no hostage dead yet).
But they make no mention of their own contribution to those deaths. For what is happening in Iraq today - Armstrong's execution at the hands of Zarqawi, for example - is a direct consequence of decisions made months ago in London and Washington.
What are the terrorists - in their admittedly sick way - trying to achieve? Their actions are not always rational: taking French hostages when France so actively opposed the war, for example.
Their demands might be outrageous: expecting the French government to reverse its headscarf ban in schools simply to save the lives of two journalists. The results of their deeds are often counter-productive: Iraqi terror victims far exceed foreign ones. But there is an underlying reason to their madness: ridding Iraq of American and allied occupation.
Apologists for the war have a habit of conceding that things might have been done wrong in the past, but 'what's done is done'. This ability to merrily divorce past actions from present consequences is truly infuriating. The tendency to shift self-created problems on to others - the UN and international community in this case - is glib in the extreme.
It is something they cannot be allowed to get away with. Any international support for "fixing" Iraq has to start with an open and full admission of guilt by those responsible: Washington (and London). Solutions to the hostage-taking crisis in Baghdad cannot be found without facing up to the root causes.
But that is far far down the line. What of tomorrow? What will become of Bigley and the other hostages? - And the many others likely to join them in captivity? The sad fact is that, even with the best will in the world Iraq will still take years and years to fix.
The mess there is so complex that right now it is impossible to see even how one would start clearing it up. Hostage taking is the new weapon of choice for insurgents in Iraq.
There are, by definition, no quick solutions (giving in to their demands might release one hostage but it would cause many more to be taken). The outlook for those held captive in Iraq can therefore only be bleak.
Kenneth Bigley appealed to the British Prime Minister to save his life. He is too late. The appeals that could have made a difference to his fate should have been made before Blair and Bush went to war in Iraq. Today, all the British prime minister can do is join Bigley's family in prayer.
New threat to civil liberties
By Kate Martin
Momentum is growing for efforts to dramatically reorganize the US intelligence community in the few weeks before Congress adjourns for the elections. But while there has been much arcane debate on budgetary authorities, one important aspect of the reform proposals has gone largely unnoticed: the serious threat they pose to civil liberties.
While the Sept. 11 commission rejected a proposal to establish a domestic intelligence agency along the lines of Britain's MI5 agency, many of the current proposals would create a back-door domestic spy agency.
The proposed intelligence agency restructuring would, in columnist William Safire's words, marry the law officer and the spy by placing the FBI's domestic counter terrorism activities and counter terrorism operations by the CIA and Defence Department under the authority of one spy master.
Foreign and domestic intelligence activities are now in different agencies reporting to separate masters because intelligence methods used overseas - dis-information campaigns, secret kidnappings, etc. - are fundamentally different from those allowed in the United States. Here, the FBI can engage in secret surveillance, but it must arrest and charge individuals in ways consistent with due process.
FBI domestic operations are also subject to public scrutiny, because they are ultimately answerable to the courts in a way that is not true of such CIA activities as secret interrogations in unknown prisons overseas.
Under the proposals being considered, there would be no protection against the reappearance of covert operations targeting Americans by the CIA and the Pentagon. There are no legal prohibitions against the CIA or defence intelligence agencies conducting covert campaigns against Americans.
Although the National Security Act excludes the CIA from law enforcement and internal security, it has never been read to prohibit domestic covert operations done for a "foreign intelligence purpose."
Indeed, President Ronald Reagan granted such authority to the CIA in a 1982 executive order that remains in place. The only protection against such operations has been bureaucratic arrangements and the CIA's under standing that its primary mission lies overseas.
Those bureaucratic protections would disappear with the establishment of a new intelligence director with the power to turn to the CIA or Defence Department and order domestic covert operations in the name of counter terrorism.
These proposals also threaten to transform the FBI's counter terrorism operations by putting an intelligence czar, rather than the attorney general, in charge. Despite civil libertarians' many criticisms of the FBI, it operates with much greater accountability than the CIA, because the line of command goes to the Justice Department, which has an institutional responsibility for the protection of constitutional rights.
The pending bills call for the creation of a national information-sharing network. (This is not part of the intelligence agency restructuring.) Congress would require building the technological capability for an FBI or CIA officer sitting at his desk to access all information about any American in any existing database.
This would make it possible, for instance, to generate complete dossiers on all political protesters in Seattle or all Arab Americans in Michigan. Instead of building one massive central database, this proposal envisions a system whereby thousands of government officials would have instantaneous access to multiple databases.
No laws currently restrict such dossier-building or limit the government from using such information against anyone for any purpose. Only the lack of capacity stops the government from putting this into practice today.
The proposals do contain references to privacy and civil liberties protections, but they abdicate Congress's constitutional responsibility to enact such protections.
Instead, they direct the White House to write privacy guidelines for the new information network. Neither administration guidelines nor the proposed civil liberties board is an adequate substitute for public debate and congressional legislation on the complex issues posed by such a massive new information-gathering programme.
What is to be done? As CIA Director Porter Goss has recognized, we urgently need a national debate on the domestic spy powers of any new intelligence director before such powers are given to him. If there is to be a new national intelligence director, domestic covert operations should be outlawed.
While a new intelligence director should ensure that foreign and domestic information is shared and that agencies operating at home and abroad coordinate their efforts, the FBI should remain under the direction and control of the attorney general.
Before Congress gives its blessing to the largest-ever surveillance information network, it should conduct a serious examination of the need for such government capability. It should then look closely at the implications for individual privacy and liberty in concentrating such power in the government. Only then, if it determines that such a capability is needed, should it authorize its construction and write the laws necessary to protect individual rights.
In the end, there will be an added security benefit from respecting civil liberties because limited government resources will be focused on actual terrorists and not on American Muslims or political dissidents. The writer is director of the Centre for National Security Studies, a civil liberties organization. -Dawn/Washington Post Service
The enigma of promises
By M. Ziauddin
When on December 24, 2003, President Musharraf announced that he would take off his uniform by December 31, 2004, it appeared as if the promise had been forcibly wrested out of him by the MMA.
It also appeared as if it was a fair trade-off, with the religious alliance in return for providing him with their votes for the two-thirds majority which he needed to get the 17th amendment passed by parliament.
In retrospect, however, it appears as if both Gen Musharraf and the MMA were reinforcing each other with some high quality but under-the-table help. The former, by appearing to be submitting to the MMA's pressure, had actually bestowed on the alliance a level of credibility that it had required to sell to the public its image as the real opposition inside and outside parliament.
And the latter, by providing President Musharraf with enough constitutional room in the 17th amendment to continue to head the elected parliament in uniform, enabled him to keep the post of the COAS for as long as he believed it was in the national interest.
Without going into a debate as to whether or not the relevant clauses in the 17th amendment bind the president to keep his promise by the due date, one can say without the fear of contradiction that the MMA, by helping to make these clauses part of the Constitution, has in fact legalized the notion of a uniformed president heading an elected parliament. But then this notion was given constitutional sanction in the eighth amendment which had mentioned President General Muhammad Ziaul Haq by name in the Constitution and allowed him to head the elected parliament of 1985 for the next five years.
If General Zia had not died in a plane crash, he would certainly have remained the constitutional head of the country for the residual two years if not more, without of course giving up his uniform.
What Gen Musharraf has actually done is he picked up on October 12, 1999, the baton that General Zia had let go on August 17, 1988. And the MMA seems to have helped him restore the constitutional continuity of a uniformed president in return for allowing them to rule one full province and be a coalition partner in another even though, as Gen Musharraf himself used to say before the 2002 elections, that they had never won more than two to three per cent of seats in past parliaments.
They must also be beholden to President Musharraf for looking the other way while the Supreme Court continues to keep its ruling reserved on the position of those parliamentarians who were allowed to contest the elections on the basis of sanads (degrees) issued by non-statutory wafaqul madaressahs.
So, if the military-mullah alliance was moving in sync and helping each other to consolidate their respective political and constitutional positions and pre-eminence with the passage of the 17th amendment, where was the need for the president to create the impression in his December 24, 2003, speech that he was bound by the relevant clauses in the amendment to take off his uniform by December 31, 2004?
Also, if one went back to the year 2003 to see if anything of significance had happened then to persuade Gen Musharraf to take off his uniform in a year's time, one comes back with the impression that except for the stage-managed agitation by the MMA on the uniform issue, there was not even one single domestic event which one could regard as having made it impossible for the president to keep his uniform for more than a year.
If anything, there were events that took place in that year which he could have easily used to justify his continuation in uniform for at least a couple of years more.
He had escaped two deadly attacks on his person in December 24, 2003. And both of these incidents had taken place in the most secure place in the country - the vicinity in which the GHQ is located in Rawalpindi.
Also, it was in the later part of 2003 that the IAEA and the US had started putting pressure on Pakistan on the issue of nuclear proliferation and KRL's connection with world nuclear black market had become known. The crisis in Waziristan too had started rearing its head with full force in 2003.
In fact, if one compares the happenings of the current year with that of last year's, one feels that the situation has greatly changed for the better. Except for the attack on the person of the prime minister in August in Attock during his election, campaign, there has not been any serious Al Qaeda activity in the country so far. Many of their operatives, instead, have been either killed or rounded up in the last nine months.
The Wana operation is a combined responsibility of Pakistan and the US as President Musharraf himself said recently. The US has to deliver on the Afghanistan side for Pakistan to be able to flush out foreigners from Wana.
What is happening in Balochistan has been actually instigated by the federation itself. If tomorrow the prime minister were to announce that he has taken back the decision to build cantonments in the heart of Balochistan, things would perhaps improve overnight in that hapless province.
So, we come back to the same question again. If he was under no real pressure from the MMA and the on ground realities in 2003 seemed to be dictating that he continue to keep the uniform for at least some more years, what was it then that forced him to make the promise that he is finding it extremely difficult to wriggle out from today?
Well, through a process of elimination, it is not very difficult to reach a plausible explanation. In June 2003, at Camp David, President Bush had promised Pakistan a generous five-year aid package of three billion dollars subject to the approval on a yearly basis by the US Congress which, being a democratic body itself, always feels obliged to ask searching questions about the state of democracy in the recipient country before doling out its taxpayers' money.
Next, both the Commonwealth and the European Union was in no mood in 2003 to give any relief to Pakistan unless it showed some significant progress on the democratic front.
But within months of the announcement that he would take off the uniform by December 31, 2004, the EU had ratified the third generation agreement which it had signed with Pakistan way back in 1999. Next, the Commonwealth re-admitted Pakistan into its fold and the US Congress approved $600 million dollars from the aid package for the year 2004-2005.
Now that all these things have happened in accordance with his wishes, Gen Musharraf may feel that he can now put off his promise. He knows that the Commonwealth would not expel Pakistan again if he does not take off his uniform by the due date and neither would the EU withdraw its ratification of the third generation agreement.
As for the US Congress, he has at least about nine months to come up with a plausible excuse to get it to vote for next year's aid tranche. So, he is home with his uniform and the presidency both.
However, in the process he seems to have divided the federation. With Punjab and Sindh provincial assemblies voting in favour of the uniform and the NWFP (by voting against) and Balochistan (by withdrawing a favourable resolution) assemblies disagreeing, we see the sad spectacle of a nation divided right in the middle. And for what? Not for the sake of dams or on the issue of distribution of financial or water resources, but on the matter of the president's uniform.
Also, by saying that 96 per cent of the population supports him on the uniform issue, Gen Musharraf seems to have made the post of COAS an elective one for all practical purposes.
What would stop the next COAS to make the same claim and refuse to leave his post after the completion of his service tenure? One wonders why he did not take the issue to the NSC instead of asking the provincial assemblies to vote on the uniform.
Going by his own claims about the NSC, this is an institution with the ability to tackle issues which threaten the unity of the nation. With four of his services colleagues sitting on the 13-member council along with two military-friendly politicians (the NWFP chief minister and the leader of the opposition), it would have been very easy for him to have got a majority vote in the NSC to keep the uniform.
But, of course, this would have exposed the mullahs, reducing their ability to help him get out from other corners which he might find himself in at some future point in time. Also, perhaps he did not want to test the loyalty of the two about-to-retire generals.