| 28 September 2004 | Tuesday | 12 Shaban 1425 |
Partial democracy won't do
Iraq elections remain uncertain
Constitution, oath and the uniform
Pakistan has the world's sixth largest population. Its population is also the youngest among the countries with more than a hundred million people. The youth in Pakistan are being exposed to influences that, left unchecked and unattended, could send the country on a perilous course. That is the reason why generational politics must be treated as an issue of overwhelming importance.
In the article last week, I identified four Pakistani generations that make up the vast majority of today's population. According to the arithmetic used the people who belong to these four generations were born in 25 year intervals - between 1925 and 1950, 1950 and 1975 and 1975 and 2000.
The fourth generation, made up of those born since 2000, although still in the process of being formed, already constitutes an incredible 14 per cent of the population. Pakistan's population, in other words, is getting younger with each passing day. There are not many people living who were born before 1925.
Even the first generation is declining rapidly in numbers. It has no more than 10 million people still living and their median age is 65 years. General Pervez Musharraf is a member of this generation. Even in the sixth decade of its existence as an independent state, a member of the first generation is still governing Pakistan.
With the remnants of the first generation accounting for only six per cent of the current population and the second generation providing another 22 per cent, the bulk of the population - about 55 per cent - already belongs to the third generation.
The demographic preponderance of the third generation has already begun to influence the country's economy. It will soon begin to affect its social and political development as well.
This demographic development raises a number of important questions that should be addressed. Who will lead the country's third generation? From which generation will this leadership come? Would people who will bring Pakistan closer to the rest of the world lead the third generation or would these leaders follow the course advocated with increasing vehemence by some radical Islamists.
Before, answering these questions, it would be appropriate to say a word about the history of the transfer of power in Pakistan from one generation to another. For nearly a quarter century, Pakistan found its rulers from among the members of the pre-Pakistan generations.
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Ghulam Muhammad, Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan, and Ziaul Haq. All of them were born before 1925. Up until now only two members of the first generation - Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf - have ruled Pakistan. Of these two the first governed for only six years.
Zia snatched power from Bhutto by way of a military coup and dominated Pakistan for 11 years. After his departure, the leaders from the second generation assumed political authority.
This transfer of power could have been a momentous and positive event in Pakistan's history had the new leaders arrived with a set of values that translated into good governance. Instead, it proved to be wrenching experience for the country.
Had Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif not misgoverned in such a spectacular way, Pakistan would have continued to be ruled by the members of the second generation. However, with the military take over of October 1999, political power flowed back to a representative of the first generation.
Was it a quirk of history that the man who leads the country today belongs to the first Pakistani generation? The second generation political longevity proved to be so short for the simple reason that its value system and mode of governance was seriously out of tune with the demands of time.
I also suggested in last week's article that generational attitudes are shaped by leaders as well as the environment in which people belonging to a particular generation grow up and mature. For the first generation, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was an aspiring figure.
He stood for a combination of Muslim and Pakistani nationalism - two beliefs he was not able to translate into enduring state policies. His death only a year after Pakistan's birth, opened a period of political turbulence within which durable institutions could not be built.
Jinnah's personality and his beliefs were one set of formative influences for the first generation to live in Pakistan. The other was the intense rivalry with India as well as fear of that country's intentions with respect to Pakistan.
These were the main features of the environment in which the members of this generation were nurtured. Some of General Pervez Musharraf's basic instincts can be traced back to these influences.
In several statements made soon after assuming office, Pakistan's fourth military president frequently referred to what he considered to be Jinnah's legacy. He said it was his ambition to achieve Jinnah's dreams and rebuild Pakistan into the type of country and society the founding founder had originally envisaged. And reflecting another lasting impression left on the minds of the members of the first generation, Musharraf, in spite of the recent warming of Indo-Pakistan relations, continues to be suspicious of India's long-term aims in South Asia and towards his country in particular.
For the second generation, born between 1950 and 1975, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was to become the dominant political presence. That need not have been the case since President Ayub Khan, who focused his energies on economic development and nation building, could have occupied that position.
Unfortunately, Pakistan's first military leader clashed with India. After the 1965 war with India, Ayub Khan's base of power eroded, as did his image as a strong leader.
Bhutto took full advantage of Ayub Khan's bad stumble and manoeuvred himself onto the centre stage of politics. From that position, he practised the politics of opportunism, expediency and cynicism. These were to become the principle features of the environment in which the second generation grew up and developed its approach towards state craft.
Has the second generation, as a result of its system of values and its record of governance, forfeited its right to govern Pakistan? Would it ever reacquire the political power it once possessed? Would the inevitable passing of the first generation bring back the second generation into prominence once again? Or, would the first generation tarry on the political scene long enough to allow the third generation to ascend to power, thus completely bypassing the second generation?
The answers to these questions would depend on a number of things. The second generation has a better chance to lead the country once again if it throws up new leaders who subscribe to a new set of values and have a different view of the world.
It would also depend on the ability of the second generation leaders to reformulate their ambition for Pakistan in light of the experiences of the people belonging to the third generation. The crucible in which the third generation was formed is very different from the one that shaped the previous generation.
The third generation, the one that dominates today's Pakistani society, reached maturity in the "nineties." Their environment was not shaped by strong personalities - there was no Jinnah or Bhutto who would leave a lasting impression on them - but by some earth-shaking events, in particular the advance of globalization and the rise of Islamic extremism.
Globalization is a process characterized not only by the easy flow of copious amounts of capital and technological know-how across national frontiers and the large increase in international commerce. It is also marked by the rapid exchange of information about world events. The news of what happens in one part of the globe is transmitted instantaneously to all other parts.
This shrinking of the globe would not have mattered as much for Pakistan had it not been accompanied by another development - the rise of Islamic extremism.The seeds of this second phenomenon were planted by a combination of cynical and short-term policies followed by all actors in the first Afghan drama.
The Pakistani leadership of that period considered to be in its strategic interests to support the involvement of the United States in the war to liberate Afghanistan from the Soviet Union's occupation and to support also the Saudi Arabian desire to export radical Islam to other parts of the Muslim world.
The Americans pursued with single mindedness their objective to evict the Soviet Union invaders from Afghanistan. They waged a no-holds- barred campaign to achieve their goal, including the use of the Islamic madressahs to indoctrinate and train the mujahideen to do battle against the Soviet occupation forces.
Since the invaders had come well equipped with modern weaponry, the resistance fought back with extreme ferocity that can only be the product of religious zealotry. This largely cynical approach on the part of the Pakistani leadership towards advancing perceived strategic interests without paying attention to their long-term consequences continued after the departure of the United States from the scene.
Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States, a succession of second generation Pakistani leaders were content to use strategic objectives - creating a pliant regime in Afghanistan and righting the wrong that was done in Kashmir at the time of the unclean partition of British India - to create both internal and external alliances. But a heavy price was to be paid by the country for the adoption of this approach. The support provided to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the jihadi groups within the country's own borders was to result, in the words of two French analysts, in the "Pakistanization of Al Qaeda."
This is the environment in which the third generation grew up in Pakistan. It saw the near collapse of the Pakistani state and the attendant government inability to deliver basic social services.
It witnessed the increasing role of Islamic madressahs in the sector of education. It saw the involvement of various jihadi groups in the pursuit of various Islamic causes around the globe. And it witnessed the growing - and from the perspective of the leaders of radical Islam, entirely unwelcome - assertiveness of the United States in the affairs of the Muslim world.
Un reconciled with Pakistan's long-term strategic interests, these influences on the members of the third generation have the potential to wreck the country. Who could prevent that from happening - the leaders of the first or second generations or a new breed of leaders who would be beholden to interests of the radical elements within the third generation?
The only comfort that can be drawn from the current situation in Pakistan is that radical elements in the country are still without a leader who could bring under one roof the diverse groups into which the adherents of these beliefs remain splintered?
The second generation, still dominated by failed leaders, has as yet to bring forth new people who could command the respect of the majority in Pakistan as well as that of the international community.
Therefore, by default, it appears that for some time to come the first generation of leaders will have to shoulder the enormous burden represented by Pakistan's difficult situation.
Partial democracy won't do
Sometimes there's a tricky, twisty moment when a party goes on too long. You're tired, you're aching, you really have to go. So you edge to the door and look vaguely round for mine host. Sorry, it's been wonderful, but it's a way long home and my mother isn't on top form and I promised ... mumble, mumble.
But thank you very, very much for a lovely time. And you scurry for the stairs as the words ring hollow on your lips. And you sound like Donald Rumsfeld. Hey Donald! We thought you were in Iraq for as long as it took to see perfect democracy reign, until Baghdad was a Swiss-style model of purity for the Middle East? But now you cough and look around and head for the fire exit.
Well, what is perfection? "We had something like 200 or 300 or 400 people killed in the major cities of America last year and is that perfectly peaceful? No. What's the difference? We just didn't see every homicide in every major city in the United States on television every night."
Thank you and good night. The secretary of defence is talking about the moment when Iraq seems calm enough to quit. He is also talking about what kind of an election next January lets the Pentagon leave the party early.
For there's a new tale in town, one eddying back and forth across a chorus of lips. Perhaps it began in Baghdad itself a couple of weeks ago when ministers started to say openly that not everywhere in Iraq needed to vote to make January a legitimate election.
After all, in the US or the UK, a 50 per cent turn-out - or even 40 per cent, come to that - was deemed viable enough to build an administration on. Why set the Baghdad bar higher?
Or perhaps the script was basically written further away, in a back office of Washington DC: for it was also a variation on the theme that George Bush and Iraq's caretaker prime minister, Ayad Allawi, chanted on the White House lawn recently.
Was there trouble in Iraq? Not on any national scale, they crooned. Maybe in no more than two or three provinces out of 18. Which turned out, on examination, to be the same number of provinces too prospectively unruly to vote next January if push comes to violent shove.
Up to a point, that slipped by when they first sang their verses: inevitable but small omissions from the electoral roll call, minor glitches to be remedied later. But look now, coldly at what's involved. Welcome to the Sunni triangle, continuing heartland of resistance, rebellion and terrorism.
It stretches, you'll remember, from Baghdad in the east to Ramadi in the west, and pokes north to Tikrit, Saddam's hometown; and never, of course, forget Fallujah, boiling away in the middle.
These aren't small, insignificant spots. Fallujah has upwards of a quarter of a million population, Ramadi is touching 400,000 - and the Sunni areas of Baghdad run into millions.
Now, how would Blair fare if he announced that the Hampstead triangle - from the Heath to Luton to Oxford and back - was too wild to vote next May, but that Islington, Chelmsford and Abingdon could go ahead as per normal? How would Bush deal with the loss of his Stetson square, otherwise Dallas, Houston, San Antonio and Austin? Yet that, in broadly proportionate terms and with all due seriousness, is what's being suggested for Iraq.
Any election, apparently, is better than none. A PR voting system based on nation wide party lists apparently makes it easier to leave Fallujah or Ramadi out. Fifteen semi-peaceful provinces, at least, can do their own thing and confer a certain legitimacy on the rulers they choose. Apparently.
Mr Rumsfeld says that three-quarters of an election is better than none. But, of course, it's nonsense - and nonsense made worse by that national voting system. How many millions of Sunnis would be denied their chance at the polls and thus their full, legitimate stake in the regime that follows Allawi? What use is a block vote if the blocks are knocked away? Where, when that happens, lies any hope of democratic acceptance and reconciliation?
There is no legitimate government waiting down that road. There is only a greater Shia Muslim hegemony founded on an exclusion that makes the 60 per cent Shia majority more powerful yet. After our own dear boroughs comes the triangle. Why on earth suppose otherwise?
Because the bind is tighter and more desperate than ever. Because Mr Allawi, hanging on and bolstering his White House leader, needs something he can call a mandate. Because the Shias are (rightly) restive. Because western public opinion (full of voters itself) has been told to hail Iraqi democracy in a torrent of jargon about crucibles and epicentres.
The real debate, as usual, seems to sit between the Pentagon and state department. Richard Armitage, Colin Powell's outspoken point man, tells a congressional committee that "we're going to have those elections in all parts of the country" and "open to all citizens".
Donald Rumsfeld, meanwhile, observes that big American cities had hundreds of murders a year, so many that television did not always get round to reporting them. But does that mean America can't vote on November 2? No way, says Don. Turn out and beat the assault weapon ban. And there, in the distance, you can hear the theme swell. George Bush talking down 9/11. After all, 47 out 50 states were totally unaffected. George Bush hailing the defeat of terrorism - at least in America, if not Indonesia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Madrid and points east.
Here's the solution we've been hungering for through the years, the ultimate miracle of half-full not half empty. Call it the 50 per cent solution, turned sunny side up. -Dawn/ The Guardian Service
Iraq elections remain uncertain
Even the last-ditch argument that Iraq is a better place without Saddam Hussain is beginning to wear thin. The invasion of Iraq has been an unmitigated disaster and it could have been foretold.
Indeed, it transpires that Jack Straw who has stood shoulder to shoulder with Tony Blair had actually warned that there was no post-war plan. From the smoking gun in the form of a mushroom cloud to George Bush's speech at the United Nations General Assembly calling for greater international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq is not quite the modern equivalent of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow but is a tacit admission that there are limits to unilateralism and to the arrogance of power.
There is less of the cockiness as 'precision' air strikes on Fallujah end up killing innocent Iraqi men, women and children and hostage-taking is becoming an industry.
Kofi Annan went round and round the mulberry bush before a tenacious BBC reporter had him finally admit that the war in Iraq was illegal. This is a damning indictment coming as it does from the Secretary General of the United Nations.
John Howard, the prime minister of Australia, the third musketeer, Bush and Blair being the other two, says that he had consulted his law ministry which seems to be as efficient as his intelligence agencies who were convinced that Saddam Hussain had weapons of mass destruction. One lie leads to another lie and which leads to that tangled web we weave "when first we practise to deceive."
If the war in Iraq is illegal, it raises the intriguing question: What is the status of the coalition armies who are running the roost in Iraq? Illegal combatants?
There are, it would seem, two wars that are being fought. One that is being won and one that is being lost. Iyad Allawi, the interim prime minister addressed a joint session of the US Congress and his speech was punctuated with prolonged applause as he held out the assurance that the elections would be held on schedule and contrary to the headlines, the enemy defined as terrorists, was being put to flight.
He shared the optimism of the neocons that Iraq would become a beacon of democracy. I caught a glimpse of Paul Wolfowitz in the audience intently listening to the words that seemed to flow like milk and honey. He may well have been the author of the speech.
Allawi seemed to hit all the right notes. For the sake of the Iraqi people, I hope he is right for the present blood-letting can't go on forever and not withstanding Allawi's cheery optimism it would be hard to see how minds and hearts are being won besides, of course, those of Allawi and his cabinet and whose writ doesn't run beyond the Green Zone in Baghdad.
But the war on terror just keeps rolling, not just in Iraq and Afghanistan which have become battle-zones but in the psyche of petty officials who feel empowered by the flag-waving, not only to make an ass of themselves but to discredit the serious intent of making the United States a safer place.
The ex-pop singer Cat Stevens who became a Muslim three decades ago was deported to Britain after being denied entry into the United States because his activities could be" linked to terrorism. "
Cat Stevens took the name Yusuf Islam when he converted. His Washington DC bound flight was diverted to Maine for "security reasons," and from there he was flown back to Britain.
There is a quality of the absurd about this, a re-affirmation of my own quote I had used to describe a particular person, a bumptious and comical figure who would stumble over his self-importance: "Give a petty man power and he will show you how petty he is".
A Homeland Security official said United Airlines employees missed Yusuf Islam's name on the "watch-list" in Britain and that the plane was in flight when officials found a match from the advanced passenger information sent by the airline.
Homeland Security spokesman Brian Doyle explained:" Why is he on the watch list? Because of his activities that could be potentially linked to terrorism. The intelligence community has come into possession of additional information that further raises our concern (about Islam)."
It raises an interesting point. If Yusuf Islam (Cat Stevens) was linked to terrorism, why was he not detained? Why was he just put on a flight back to Britain? This was too much even for Jack Straw and he has personally complained to Colin Powell.
Homeland Security seems to have authority without responsibility and seems to be fighting its own war on terror armed with a rulebook that gives them no discretion and makes them robots.
The immigration officials would have to be saints to get it right every time and when they get it wrong, it's all in a good cause. Homeland Security recently revoked the visa of Professor Tariq Ramadan who was due to begin teaching at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana.
The official explanation was that it was a bureaucratic foul-up and his name was mixed up with someone else on the list. Do Muslim names sound so alike that they are being constantly mixed up?
Are there any other names besides those of Muslims on that sacred list? Of gun-runners and drugs dealers or paedophiles? May be Muslim countries should issue a travel advisory of their own recommending that travel to the United States should be avoided.
It would certainly make the lives of the Homeland Security officials more bearable and without them the war on terror cannot be won. I trust the songs of Cat Stevens have been banned as an additional security measure.
Constitution, oath and the uniform
After long parleys, a written agreement was reached between the ruling party and the MMA on December 23, 2003, in Islamabad. On behalf of the ruling party, it was signed by Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, President, Pakistan Muslim League and eminent lawyer Senator S. M. Zafar, while on behalf of the MMA Maulana Fazlur Rehman, Liaquat Baloch and Hafiz Hussain Ahmad signed the document.
According to the agreement, the 17th amendment bill was passed by the National Assembly on December 24, 2003, and later by the Senate. Having the support of MMA parliamentarians, the bill was approved with two-thirds majority. The bill provided constitutional protection to the agreement.
In spite of certain reservations, the MMA agreed only to pull the country out of the political crisis so that the parliament could work smoothly. It was expected that the ruling party would sincerely stick to the pledge given.
The year 2003 was wasted in the crisis. Because of protest by the joint opposition against the Legal Framework Order (LFO), no business could be undertaken by the Assembly and the Senate. Parliament remained practically suspended. Within the country, a general state of protest continued at all levels.
Other than the ruling party, the entire opposition, the lawyer community and the nation at large, were in agreement that a single person had no right or authority to introduce amendments to the Constitution; that the LFO was not part of the Constitution; that the 29 amendments made by General Pervez Musharraf in August and October 2002, should either be withdrawn or approved by parliament as per the Constitution. The unilateral non-constitutional amendments had upset the whole fabric of the Constitution.
Contrary to all this, General Pervez Musharraf insisted that the LFO had become an integral part of the Constitution and that there was no question of withdrawing it. He said that the Supreme Court had authorized him to make such amendments.
Misinterpreting the Supreme Court decision, the ruling party supported the general's viewpoint en bloc. Mir Zararullah Khan Jamali, the then prime minister, said that the LFO was part of the Constitution. No matter what the opposition said, the matter would not be opened for discussion.
A ruling was given by Chaudhry Amir Hussain, speaker, National Assembly, that the LFO had become part of the Constitution.Federal ministers and government functionaries supported this view. Punjab chief minister, Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, also strongly supported this view.
Radio and television devoted themselves to the purpose. General Pervez Musharraf and his team were making all efforts in favour of the LFO, because after surrendering the charge of chief executive, he would then be able to constitutionally hold the dual charge of president and army chief. Without the amendment, there was no way for it in the Constitution.
The year long countrywide protest in and outside parliament, compelled the ruling party to initiate a dialogue with the opposition. The ruling party agreed to our demand that the LFO was not part of the Constitution and that amendments covered under the order should be approved by parliament in the manner provided for in the Constitution.
The MMA, on its part, agreed that General Pervez Musharraf could retain the dual charge of president and army chief till December 2004. After that, Article 63 (1) (d) of the Constitution would come into force, and he would relinquish the charge of army chief.
Agreeing to that, General Musharraf himself made a statement that having seriously considered the matter and to make the political environment pleasant, he had decided to abandon his uniform before December 31, 2004. However, the exact date would be decided by him within that period.
This agreement was a laudable success for the MMA. Matters then cooled down. Leaving protest aside, parliament took up its normal business. However, the ARD - the other opposition group - started criticizing the MMA for the agreement.
The lawyer community and political analysts also rejected it and termed it as a "mullah-military alliance". They felt that the MMA had imposed on the country a dictatorial rule and had legitimized the military dictatorship by accepting General Musharraf as president.
We tolerated all this unwarranted criticism with great patience and refrained from responding in the same tone. The agreement was not at all made to impose dictatorship, but to get rid of it. It had rather been agreed that the president would vacate the seat of army chief by December 31, 2004.
We never thought that General Musharraf would not honour his pledge. A third of the current year still remains. But the general has started asserting that things have changed in the country; and that accordingly, he was reviewing his promise to abandon his uniform, and that the majority of the people wished him to retain it.
As in the case of the LFO, the entire ruling party is again zealously supporting him in the uniform issue. Important federal ministers have demanded that the president retain it.
Punjab chief minister, Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi, gave approving statements, and a resolution was passed in the provincial assembly in favour of the uniform. Same was the case in the Sindh Assembly.
A similar resolution was presented in the Balochistan Assembly, but later withdrawn. After that, the NWFP Assembly passed a resolution opposing the pro-uniform move, and asked the president to remove the uniform.
A crisis is building up again in the whole country. Instead of showing solidarity, the nation stands divided and confused. General Musharraf came into power by holding the Constitution in abeyance.
He now wishes to retain the seat of army chief in total disregard of the Constitution and his personal pledge. In an unwise move, his supporters are also advising him that the situation in and around Pakistan and the country's long-term interests demand that he keep both posts.
The new minister for parliamentary affairs, Dr Sher Afgan Khan Niazi, has made an absurd statement that the Constitution has no such provision that bars the retention of dual charge.
The more sane and careful functionaries of the ruling party are proposing that some legislation was required for the purpose and that there was room for that in the Constitution.
Other than our agreement and the demands of the Constitution, General Pervez Musharraf, as a member of the Pakistan Army, has solemnly taken the following constitutional oath:
"I, Pervez Musharraf, do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and uphold the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embodies the will of the people, that I will not engage myself in any political activities whatsoever and that I will honestly and faithfully serve Pakistan in the Pakistan Army (or Navy or Air Force) as required by and under the law. (May Allah Almighty help and guide me. A'meen)."
After the Constitution is wholly restored, (the president's) retention of the post of army chief will be in total breach of the oath and an unpardonable offence. Even his position as president after that will be against the Constitution.
Article 41 (2) of the Constitution provides that being president of Pakistan was possible only for a person who was eligible to become a member of the Assembly. Article 63 (1) (d) says that a person would not be eligible to become a member of parliament if: "he is holding a properly paid post in the service of Pakistan".
The post of army chief being gainful, the general becomes non-eligible for the position of president. Currently, he is holding two posts because Article 63(1)(d) stands suspended. Our agreement provided an addition in Article 41(7)(b) that "Article 63(I)(d) will come into force from December 31, 2004".
At the expiry of this date the president's holding the post of army chief will be unconstitutional and against the agreement reached. The idea of legislation to allow the president to remain army chief, takes benefit of certain words of the Article 63, which are as follows:
"A person will be non-eligible to be elected or selected and to remain member of the parliament, if he holds gainful employment in the service of Pakistan, except for (holding) a post which has legally been declared such that its holder was not ineligible". But as any student of the Constitution and the law knows that there can never be legislation contrary to the Constitution. Concerning the president the text of Article 43(I) of the Constitution is as follows:
"The President shall not hold any office of profit in the service of Pakistan or occupy any other position carrying the right to remuneration for the rendering of services."
The parliament cannot pass a law that contradicts the Constitution. It would be better for the ruling party to stop attempting to seek ways of deviation by misinterpreting the Constitution.
General Pervez Musharraf should not betray his oath. He should keep his pledge, and go strictly by the Constitution. He should avoid earning a bad name in the history of Pakistan by breaking his oath and disregarding the constitutional pledge.
The masses are victims of inflation, unemployment and lawlessness. The country is faced with internal and external dangers. The uniform is not important. It is the oath, the Constitution and the solemn promise that carry weight. But if the general remains stubborn, there will be protests in and outside parliament, which the country can hardly afford. It would be better not to subject the country to crisis and anxiety for the sake of position. Someone else was holding the reins until yesterday and these will be held by yet another person tomorrow. It is best not to betray pledges and the Constitution.
The writer is a member of the Senate and a leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami.