| 23 September 2004 | Thursday | 07 Shaban 1425 |
The roots of violence
The more it remains the same
The exit strategies of two presidents
These are times when big and small states are seeking free trade area agreements with other countries, eventually profitable for both. This is also a period in which regionalism is making a vigorous headway to combat the adverse impact of the swirling globalization.
As the old protectionist barriers come down, both tariff and non-tariff barriers, in a world eager for larger exports, regionalism is being strengthened to make the economies of the countries richer.
It is not only neighbours who are seeking free trade area agreements. Distant countries, too, are doing likewise. While the US seeks free trade agreements with some African countries, Singapore seeks the same with Pakistan and many other countries. India is hoping to achieve that through the South Asia Preferential Trade Area (Safta) within Saarc with its faltering steps.
Thailand is now seeking a free trade area agreement with distant Mexico, which is a member of the North American Free Trade Area (Nafta) comprising the US and Canada as well. Thailand hopes to send its goods into the US through Mexico. Thailand is now interested in a free trade area agreement with Pakistan as well.
As far as Pakistan is concerned, on the eastern side the Saarc has made a small headway because of the political disputes between Pakistan and India, particularly on Kashmir.
And on the western side the ECO, whose eighth summit has just concluded in Dushanbe, has made little progress despite its pious resolutions which are seldom implemented.
Its membership has increased following the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Central Asian states becoming independent, but its efficacy as a regional bloc has been minimal. But it is a useful forum for periodic meetings of Muslim leaders of the region.
So prime minister Shaukat Aziz who attended the ECO summit at Dushanbe placed all the emphasis on implementing the old decisions taken earlier by the leaders. The central point of the five-point strategy which he sought to drive home at the summit was that policies must be "result-oriented" and they should devise proper machinery for the effective implementation of major decisions taken by them.
The decisions are not utopian: They are the basic needs of the region. They are popular and there is no opposition to them. In fact, there is criticism of the leadership of the region for not implementing the decisions.
The question arises: are they not being implemented for want of financial resources for major projects or lack of political will, or both, or because they receive a low priority in the ECO states?
The ECO states have decided to have a free trade area by 2015 - 11 years from now. An ECO trade agreement has been finalized and the member states have been asked to ratify that early. Shaukat Aziz says that if the agreement is ratified the tariff and non-tariff barriers which hinder trade among the ECO states will wither away.
The summit declaration has also stressed the need for ratification and implementation of the transit transport framework agreement. Development and modernization of transport and communication systems aimed at bringing about closer economic cooperation between the member states is one of the three priority areas identified by the ECO summit.
The summit also called for early implementation of the decision to set up ECO trade and development bank. While the ECO is talking of a full free trade area in the region by the year 2015, Pakistan's Commerce Minister Humayun Akhtar talks of the customs procedures which stand in the way of smooth trade between the member states of the Organization of Islamic States. If the much older OIC would take so much time to do so little to promote trade among its members, a free trade area in the ECO region is far off.
Whenever the Muslim rulers meet they talk of increasing the trade between their countries. That is the first step towards mutual economic cooperation. And yet they take a long time to make positive moves in that direction, but then they move very slowly.
Of course, in the area of bilateral or multilateral trade the government is basically the facilitator. The private sector has to play its role and take major initiatives, except where the public sector is large enough.
Then the means of communication and transportation have to be adequate and efficient, where, too, the state has a large role. And the proposed ECO trade and development bank can play a very useful role in promoting investment and trade between member states.
But if the much senior Islamic Development Bank's operations are hemmed in by so many conditionalities and its resources are so small after decades of its existence there is not much to be hoped for from the ECO Bank, unless the ECO leaders give it a high priority, which they don't seem to.
So if the trade restrictions or irritants are still in place in the ECO countries, the transport and communications are grossly under-developed and the ECO is too small and too slow in coming up, the future of ECO is not bright at all at the moment.
Money for major projects like highways linking the ECO states and a developed communication system can come from the Asian Development Bank if the members of the ECO were earnest and come up with the right projects.
Recently the ADB had indicated it may make available 2.5 billion dollars for highways linking Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. If the ECO members are earnest in seeking mutual economic cooperation they can certainly seek ADB's financial help with the right projects and get talking straightaway. They can also ask the Islamic Development Bank to fund such projects.
In fact, like the Commonwealth meetings, ECO summits are proving more useful for bilateral contacts between the leaders and the initiatives they propose. Shaukat Aziz, for example, talked to the Iranian leaders about the gas pipeline from Iran passing to India via Pakistan which can also draw gas from the pipeline for its own use.
He spoke to the Tajik leaders about importing electricity from Tajikistan which has a vast surplus of electricity. He also talked to the Turkmenistan leaders about another gas pipeline project passing by Pakistan to India. But these projects, like the ECO summit decisions, are very old and have yet to become a reality.
Pakistan needs the gas and power from the region whichever is more economic. The current 6.6 per cent economic growth and planned growth of 8 per cent next year and then the dream target of 10 per cent growth cannot become a reality unless the country has enough power, or gas to produce that power.
Investors, both foreign and domestic, would want to be certain of the power supply at a reasonable price before they make a large investment. Otherwise they will avoid making large commitments, as has been happening in recent times.
Getting 1,000 MW of powers from Tajikistan is a deal spoken of as early as ten years ago or more when Nawaz Sharif was prime minister. And yet nothing has happened so far, while Afghanistan, through which the power mains have to pass stays disturbed.
And the gas pipeline from Iran is far from becoming a reality although it has been discussed for years. What that means is that projects suggested through bilateral talks between ECO leaders too make as little headway as the multilateral decisions taken at ECO summits.
What is significant about the ECO, and the larger OIC, is that they are the only organizations in the world bound together by religion - Islam. And despite all the talk about the unity of the Ummah or the urgent need for it there is so little evident in action, unlike in regional blocs formed on the basis of economic cooperation.
Now Shaukat Aziz talks of the Central Asian states making full use of Gwadar for their trade with the Far East or East Asia. He has also offered the ECO a developed infrastructure so that the goods can flow from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean or the Arabian Sea, beginning with the Gulf states.
It is time the Muslim world shows its positive side to the world and becomes known as a community of achievers. That is the way the young people of Muslim countries can be engaged in developmental activities instead of staying unemployed or taking to crimes, and eventually to terrorism.
But non-implementation of major decisions or projects is not a malady of Muslim organizations alone. That is a feature common to most-Muslim states as well where major development projects are not implemented or their execution delayed, and some of the money wasted as corruption steps in.
Clearly non-implementation of major decisions or the altogether slow implementation and waste of the funds sanctioned, is a major problem in Pakistan as well. Hence Shaukat Aziz is urging his colleagues to take result-oriented decisions and set up the right implementation machinery for each major project. One of his own remedies is calling for quarterly reports of progress, and then removing the bottlenecks if any.
The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank describe that as lack of capacity to use large funds and achieve targets in time. So they have come up with funds to develop the necessary institutional capacity for development and use the development funds most economically and effectively.
If in the past adequate development could not take place for want of funds, now the development is slow despite the vast funds available because of institutional inadequacies.
The weakness of the member states is then transferred to regional organizations like ECO and OIC which keep on crawling while it ought to be jumping ahead in view of the acute poverty in many of the member states and under-development, all around.
But the poor and the unemployed in these countries cannot assert themselves and prevail over their leaders as strong armed men rule there without the restraining influence of democracy. So if the people at the bottom are helpless, the organizations of the rulers at the top are equally ineffective, and make slow headway for the good of the people.
The roots of violence
Three years have passed since the tragic events of 9/11 took place but the retaliatory so-called war against terrorism continues without any substantial results. These days "terrorism" is perhaps the most widely used word. It is often used without reflecting on its meaning.
Its definition smacks of a certain mindset insofar as it refers to violence, intimidation and coercion. But like revolution - a closely linked word - terrorism can perhaps never be defined in an objective way.
The modern world's stance on violence is rather intriguing. The fact is that the western nation state was itself was born out of violence. The first genocide in modern history was committed by European immigrants on the native Americans. Colonial wars were considered necessary to civilize Africans and Asians. International law was framed by the Europeans to sanctify European conquests.
The Europeans arrived in Tasmania in 1803. The very next year, the first massacre of natives occurred. The last original inhabitant died in 1869. If a sizable section of natives had survived to take up arms against the colonists, what would they be called - nationalists or terrorists? Why should the perpetrators of violence be seen as many cultural renegades or moral perverts.
It is a hard fact that the colonized man liberates himself by resorting to violence. Ariel Sharon, the prime minister of Israel, never stops saying that the only language the occupied people of Palestine understand is that of force.
But the language of arms that the occupied people of Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Kashmir choose has been incidentally provided to them by the settlers/occupiers. It is the native who now affirms that the colonist/occupier understands nothing but force.
The history of apartheid in South Africa proves that it was not simply greed, or the desire to hold on to the fruits of conquest, but the fear, the possibility of genocide, that prompted white South Africans to try and continue their hold on power. The same fear haunts the survivors of the holocaust in Israel. The victims of yesterday have become the perpetrators of today.
The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates stated in his memoirs "From the Shadows" that American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahideen in Afghanistan six months before the Soviet intervention.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security advisor to president Carter, said that CIA aid to Mujahideen began during 1980 but it was on July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.
Osama bin Laden trained by the CIA and wanted by FBI was the United State's ally in the Afghan war. Madani in his book "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim; America, the cold war and the roots of terror" says, "No one has been inspired by bin Laden for religious reasons.
Bin Laden is a politician, not a theologian. Those who embrace him do so politically. Both Bush and Osama bin Laden employ a religious language, the language of good and evil, the language of no compromise. You are either with us or against us. Both deny the possibility of a third response."
Saddam Hussain, a "good Muslim" when he invaded Iran in 1980 with American support, was a "bad Muslim" when he attacked Kuwait. Nicholas D. Krisof of the New York Times reported "The United States shipped seven strains of anthrax to Iraq form 1978 to 1988."
A report in the February 2003 issue of "Foreign Policy" says the United States provided Iraq satellite imagery of Kurdish militia and Iranian troops so that the Iraqis could target both effectively.
Reagan courted Saddam through Donald Rumsfeld, who as Reagan's envoy, met Saddam in December 1983 and Tariq Aziz, the then foreign minister on March 24, 1984. The very next day the UN released its report on Iraq's use of poison gas against Iranian troops. By now the two reasons used for justification of war on Iraq, the presence of weapons of mass destruction and a link to Bin Laden have proved to be blatant lies.
It is necessary to distinguish between political movements, carried out in the name of religion, the religious movements that seek revival of the faith in its pristine form. The question that is left out in most western discourse is why political Islam, born in colonial times, turned to guns in the late cold war period.
The root to terrorism lies in a specific environment in which there is deep festering resentment at grave wrongs. Political terror gets popular support. The only way to deny it such support requires addressing grievances. Unlike crime, terror has to be fought politically not militarily.
Terrorism has grown because the US has used terrorism for its own ends. The sole superpower rejects the rule of law, but uses the United Nations as an instrument of its will to give legitimacy to its crimes in Iraq and elsewhere. Terrorism could not have grown if the US had not created an environment in which it was seen to have connived at, indeed used, terrorism for its selfish ends.
The United States made an effort to assure the Muslims that the war on terror launched by the United States after 9/11 was not a crusade against Islam or the Muslims.
But Bush administration's mandarins advocate that rather than wait for the good Muslims to triumph over the "bad" Muslims, they should hasten to unleash a civil war against Muslims. So in Iraq, they brought about a regime change to liberate the good Muslims from the political yoke of the bad ones.
The United States continues to use military means to achieve whatever objectives it has set for itself. The US accounts for 40-45 per cent of the total global defence spending. On land, the United States has 9,000 MI Abrams tanks.
At sea, the United States possesses nine "super carrier" battle groups. In the air, the United States has three different kinds of undetectable stealth aircraft. The United States is also far ahead in the production of ('smart') missiles and pilot less high-altitude "drones".
Paul Kennedy, author of "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers", wrote in 1990: "The real problem, it seems, was not the force-projection capacities of the current 'Number One', but its failure to recognise that the long-term wealth, health and strength of the country depends on the non-military dimensions of national power."
Niall Ferguson writes: "The decline and fall of American's undeclared empire may be due not to terrorists at the gates or to the rogue regimes that sponsor them. The US staying power will be tested in the countries it has ruined - Afghanistan and Iraq."
The writer is a retired major general.
The more it remains the same
Remember Afghanistan? The country that shot into the international spotlight in the immediate aftermath of 9/11; the first battle zone in the 'war on terror'; the first (according to George Bush) victory in that war - remember?
One could not be blamed for having forgotten it. The war on terror has moved on: Iraq, Indonesia, the Middle East - these new fronts have eclipsed it from international consciousness. Afghanistan, in the words of one commentator, is the day before yesterday's story.
But Afghanistan is suddenly back in the headlines. Elections for the office of president are to be held on October 9. Incumbent Hamid Karzai is standing with 17 other hopefuls - one of them a woman.
Millions of Afghans have registered to vote - including many women. After decades of war and misrule, the country stands poised on the brink of democratic government. Little wonder George Bush has suddenly remembered it.
Whatever the outcome of October poll, one can be sure that Bush (and co-warrior Blair) will be trumpeting their role in bringing democracy to the long-deprived Afghans.
The very fact that an election is being held - in which people can register, vote, express their wishes - will be bandied about as a supreme achievement of the war on terror.
'This could never happen under the Taliban', we will be told, and 'Afghanistan has been brought into the free world.' With US presidential elections around the corner, boasting about Afghanistan is a dead certainly.
The world forgot Afghanistan: its attention shifted elsewhere. Had it not, it would know that Afghanistan has not been following the golden democratic path George Bush and the Republicans would have us believe. Had it not, it would know that the Afghanistan story is far from reaching a happy ending.
What has been happening in that country? Elections are to be held: - the next stage in the establishment of a fully Afghan, democratic government (earlier stages being the Loya Jirga and the interim administration of Hamid Karzai). Millions of voters have indeed registered. But there is a wider context that belies the rosy picture painted by these 'facts'.
The wider context is that the Karzai government, 'currently ruling' Afghanistan, is doing practically nothing. The writ of that government does not extend beyond the capital Kabul. The president depends on Americans for his personal security.
His first attempt in almost two years to leave the capital and visit the provinces, including Gardez where he escaped an assassination attempt, almost became his last in this world. Karzai's is a government on props: held up by the US and its allies because it is far better to maintain a facade of Afghan 'central rule' than admit the truth.
What is the truth? That Afghanistan has reverted to pre-Taliban warlordism: the country has become a collection of fiefdoms run by the likes of Abdur Rashid Dostum, Ismail Khan and (sitting in Kabul itself) Muhammed Fahim. They are the ones with the armies and weapons - not the 'central government'.
They are the ones with the money (millions from drugs, smuggling and crime) - not the cash-strapped central government. 'Liberated' Afghanistan has regained its position as the world's leading opium producer. The warlord's gun is once again the law of the land.
The first casualty in such a government-less, lawless environment is always security. 'Liberated' Afghanistan is a far more dangerous place than it was under the Taliban.
True, you won't get beaten for not having a beard or not wearing a burqa - but given the heightened risks of murder, robbery and rape, you could well feel short-changed. For a country in which women are 'free' there are an awful lot still covering their faces - not for Islam but to escape predatory stares.
America had landed its troops to oust the Taliban. It has troops to continue the futile (so far) search for Osama bin Laden along the border with Pakistan. It has 130,000 troops in Iraq.
But neither Washington nor the rest of the world has troops to provide security to the people of Afghanistan: to protect them from the terror of the warlords. For the Bush administration those warlords are allies - 'co-fighters' against the Taliban.
They are also an easy solution to the problem of how to fill the post-Taliban power vacuum. Small details like the thousands they have killed or the abuses they continue to perpetrate can be ignored.
Medecins Sans Frontieres managed to work in Afghanistan for 24 years: through the long civil war, through the Taliban government. But this year MSF pulled out - the murder of five of its workers made staying impossible. Many other NGOs and aid agencies have done the same. 'Liberated' Afghanistan is a dangerous place to be helping the needy.
Those 'needy' are numerous. When the war on terror moved on and forgot Afghanistan, it forgot the promised billions in international reconstruction assistance. Now the aid agencies have all but gone; the 'central government' has nothing - and the people of Afghanistan can only reflect on more broken promises.
The much vaunted elections are to take place in this shattered, landscape. It is no surprise that they have become tainted by it: 30 election workers have already been killed (part of the 1,000 killed in the past twelve months).
Voting will take place in villages and towns far from Kabul, controlled by the warlords where both the 'central government' and international observers fear to tread. The Taliban - growing stronger by the day - are using blatant intimidation tactics to undermine the poll. Can anyone honestly call this an exercise in democracy? Can anyone honestly feel optimistic about the future?
The irony of all ironies, the Taliban are coming back. The war on terror has failed to find Osama or to curb Al Qaeda's killing frenzy. But it has even failed to crush the Taliban. Amid the bloodshed and killing by the warlords, one also sees the bloodshed and killing of the Taliban - with ordinary Afghans the victims of both.
Read the story of today's Afghanistan and you will find much that is familiar: much that reminds one of Afghanistan in the early 1990s. That Afghanistan was also forgotten by the international community - also after a period in the limelight (the Soviet occupation).
That Afghanistan was also blighted by warlordism, crime and drugs. That Afghanistan was also desperate and impoverished. That Afghanistan became a breeding ground for terrorism. Is today's Afghanistan really any different?
iffatidris2000@yahoo.co.uk.
The exit strategies of two presidents
When George Bush and Pervez Musharraf meet in Washington this week they will have plenty to share the predicaments they find themselves in. Indeed, the fortunes of both seem to be closely tied, with the downfall of the former almost certainly likely to affect the fate of the latter.
On the other hand, Mr Bush desperately needs General Musharraf to pull out of his commando's beret the rabbit ("dead or alive") in the shape of Osama bin Laden or at least of El Zawahry before November 2 to make doubly sure that he wins the election. As a reward, of course, the general will be assured of an extension of his tenure by at least four years, perhaps for life.
But at present both presidents find themselves in a pretty mess they have created for their countries and the world at large. Both have sharply polarized the public opinion in their countries and have created a psychosis on the basis of the presumption of their indispensability in the fight against terror and religious extremism.
They have both become presidents through questionable means, although the general's methods are far more suspect than the US president's, the latter being encumbered by a legitimate political opposition and the rights of political expression enshrined in the US constitution.
Nevertheless, the atmosphere of fear created in the US is no less disquieting than that in Pakistan. What is more the general is his own Rumsfeld and has not allowed any Abu Ghraib-type scandals about the Pakistani military's indiscretions, except in the case of Dr A. Q. Khan, to tarnish his and his comrades' reputation. Even in the latter case he was remarkably successful in limiting the damage and in putting a firewall to save the military from sharing its rightful blame.
Most of all, the two presidents face a similar dilemma - the finding of an exit strategy from the disastrous and unchanging paths that both have set for themselves. Mr Bush needs an exit strategy to get out of Iraq and get back to the domestic agenda of jobs, health, energy and environment.
General Musharraf needs an exit strategy to get out of his military uniform (which has become a symbol for the demand for the military to go back to barracks) and allow a reasonable vision of democratic polity, social justice and economic growth to take the place of military confrontation, both with external and domestic forces.
Both are reacting by taking a more aggressive stance and by adopting Goebbelian techniques towards their opponents, instead of engaging in a serious dialogue with them. Both are known to represent powerful oligarchies in their countries.
There are many other similarities, but the analogy can't be taken too far, because of the fundamental differences in the character of the two regimes, which are bound by a patron-client relationship, rather than by the values they profess to share.
Pakistan has been ruled by an elite oligarchy comprising the main feudal families, the civil service, the military and some elements of modern bourgeoisie. This close-knit group has done everything possible to perpetuate its existence and short-change the people of their basic rights.
In more recent years, especially since 1999, the military has played a dominant role, not only in governing the country but also in laying out the "road map" of democracy in more contoured detail than before.
In the past, the military has generally reneged on its promise to restore democratic institutions within a specified timeframe. General Ziaul Haq's repeated promise of returning the country to democracy in three months became a standing joke in his 11-year rule and his acronym CMLA came to signify 'Cancel My Last Announcement.'
Gen. Musharraf has chosen to follow right into his footsteps by announcing, after a well orchestrated chorus of approval, the annulment of a deal with the politicians to give up his uniform or presidency before the end of the year. One may well be witnessing the beginnings of a Peronist era in Pakistan's politics.
The general has stated that 96 per cent of the people support him. (If this is the quality of intelligence that he provides to Washington, no wonder Osama bin Laden remains elusive).
He is trying to become a populist leader and one of his senior ministers, a former military man and a PPP renegade, has even gone to the extent of comparing him with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's inimitable populist leader, whose ghost the military is unable to exorcise. These delusions are definitive pointers to the general's long-term aims.
President Bush's "with us or against us" ultimatum after 9/11 gave General Musharraf's military government a golden opportunity to turn its necessity for legitimacy and external support into the virtue of being a champion against fundamentalism and a leading ally of the US in the war on terror.
In return, the US provided massive financial assistance, and not only forgave a substantial part of the country's debt but also overlooked the regime's democratic deficit, which is far larger in relative magnitude than the ballooning fiscal and trade deficit of the Bush regime.
However, this entailed the collateral cost of becoming a front-line state, notwithstanding the steady rise in foreign exchange reserves and some improvement in economic fundamentals, if the latter are defined to exclude poverty reduction.
The country became vulnerable not only to a fundamentalist backlash, but also to the fleeing Taliban and Al Qaeda elements who found refuge in the border areas, which had always provided safe haven to them. The hot pursuit by the US and Pakistani forces drove them deep into the heartland.
General Musharraf succeeded not only in bringing them to the country's doorsteps but also for them to acquire safe haven in Pakistan. According to a Senator from the NWFP, "Safe passage was provided to some terrorists for reaching Waziristan from the mountains of Tora Bora".
The law and order situation which the military had cited as one of the reasons for taking over the reins of the government has become much worse and more complicated, with key military and civilian personnel, including the president himself, becoming prime targets of terrorism.
The new government in Islamabad is a motley collection of politicians inherited from the past, largely comprising turncoats from the Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif governments.
While the two principals have been virtually excommunicated from the political scene, their second and third rank deputies have become the military regime's main plank of support.
Some of the more important ministers have connections with the military, including a former head of ISI with pro-Taliban sympathies (who oddly enough has been given the education portfolio) and sons of General Ziaul Haq and of his colleague who was also killed with the latter in the mystery-ridden plane crash.
Also debuting in the cabinet is a grandson of General Ayub Khan, who laid the foundation of the military's entry into Pakistani politics four decades ago. The son-in-law of a former Army Chief of Staff has been inducted as an adviser on finance with a ministerial rank.
The feudal-military alliance, which has effectively ruled the country since 1958, has been further consolidated. The new prime minister, Shaukat Aziz, a former international banker groomed by the US and Saudi financiers, has been brought in to provide a credible civilian face acceptable to those on whom the regime depends heavily for support, both domestically and abroad, including the affluent diaspora.
The military is fast becoming a state within a state and is answerable only to itself. It has strenuously avoided even the most minimal oversight from civilian authority.
While it has established a National Accountability Bureau, headed by army generals, to prosecute selected politicians and bureaucrats (some of whom have got their reprieve by joining the cabinet), it has refused to institute a similar body to investigate the rampant corruption within the armed services, whose serving officers often get handsome kick-backs on military contracts and whose retired oficers are engaged in the lucrative real estate and land grab business by establishing housing societies.
It has failed to reveal the detailed breakdown of its expenditure and sources of its financing. Its hegemony over civilian institutions is not only stifling democracy, but also thwarting the country's future development.
The government is so preoccupied with fighting the war against terrorism, rather than against poverty, that it is unable to mobilize the human and financial resources necessary to reverse the country's retarted development.
It is inconceivable that a regime which has so egregiously deviated from the path of democratic polity and has imposed the military's supremacy over civilian rule can become an instrument of any forward-looking change.
Both President Bush and President Musharraf have misused the name of national interest and national security to protect and promote the interests of the small groups they represent in their countries.
Despite the mess he has created, President Bush might still win the election, but if he fails to find a suitable exit strategy from Iraq, the ghost of Vietnam, whose invocation may have cost his rival dearly, will haunt him in his second term and his fate may not be much better than Johnson's or Nixon's.
As for Gen Musharraf, like his predecessors, he too does not have an exist strategy providing for full transfer of power to a civilian set-up.
sm_naseem@hotmail.com.