| 26 July 2004 | Monday | 08 Jamadi-us-Saani 1425 |
A rough deal for Fernandes
Racist bias in Europe
Israeli expansionism cause of violence
Subsidies are a common feature in most countries and used as economic tools to improve the welfare of people. However, with growing budgetary constraints, the rationale underlying government subsidizing most social and economic services has lost its clarity, while simultaneously raising concerns about the sustainability of the strategy.
The purpose here is to focus on subsidies to higher education and present arguments in favour of and against subsidizing higher education in Pakistan.
Education is generally viewed as a public good (the total economic and social returns to society are greater than the sum of the gains of individuals) that produces a wide variety of benefits for its consumers who in turn confer a part of these gains on those not acquiring it directly themselves.
It is, therefore, argued that improving access to education, and specifically higher education, through subsidies will not only raise the national income of a country but more importantly lead to large, not fully quantifiable, social benefits.
Some of the positive spillovers include improvements in health, reduction in poverty, population growth and crime, improvements in income distribution and strengthening of democracy and civil liberties. Hence, by taxing those who receive these benefits indirectly through the provision of subsidized education, the welfare of society as a whole can be increased.
The subsidy for higher education is also advocated on the premise that it is the duty of the government to provide all citizens an equal opportunity to education, irrespective of their economic and social backgrounds.
Therefore, the modern state can use subsidies as an effective instrument to ensure equity and provide free education at all levels so as to guarantee equality of educational opportunities.
Another argument presented by many in support of public subsidies is that in developing countries imperfect capital markets prevent students from borrowing against the uncertain future returns of higher education.
For individuals the risk of not completing their programme and/or being unemployed in the future is high, which diminishes their willingness to borrow to invest in higher education. Even lenders (financial institutions like banks) may be reluctant to lend because of the uncertain future income of the debtors.
However, many argue against subsidizing higher education. Governments in developing countries are facing a resource crunch and the pie available to them to satisfy competing, and perhaps more important and immediate demands, has shrunk perceptibly. Therefore, subsidizing higher education, while basic needs such as primary education and health care are not adequately funded, may not be desirable.
Some argue that students need not be required to pay the full costs of higher education on the plea that as it is an investment that will eventually be recovered by taxing the higher incomes of the beneficiaries.
But then such logic also holds true for all types of investments in different sectors. Should the government finance these through free grants because the investments will eventually pay for themselves? One reason why such a strategy is not proposed is that there is no surety that each and every investment will eventually pay for itself. The same reason is applicable in the case of investments in higher education.
Also, we cannot give anything free to a select number of individuals from public funds. This principle can only hold if everybody benefits from the money belonging to the public.
If there are private returns, and the beneficiaries can be readily identified, the costs should be recovered from them, either immediately or over a longer period. Failure to do so will result in a small segment of society benefiting from the costs borne by others.
Recommendations for cuts in subsidies on higher education and even partial privatization of this sub-sector are justified not only to maximize returns from scarce investible resources but also for reasons of equity; those earning high private returns from higher education should bear the costs of consuming such services.
Recovering the cost of providing higher education, by making the beneficiaries pay for their future incomes, will not only force students to take their studies more seriously but also check students from entering into a heavily subsidized education stream like medicine to graduate as doctors (at the taxpayers' expense) and then become civil servants, which leads to society losing the benefit of the subsidy ostensibly provided to increase the numbers of doctors.
Hence by reducing subsidies society would be spared the cost of subsidizing children from relatively well-to-do households which, because of having received better education in private schools, provide the bulk of the student population in such government colleges/universities and pay a fraction of tuition fees compared to what they paid for their education in private schools.
Moreover, since they get highly subsidized higher education, students as consumers do not seek grievance redressal of poor service provision. As a result, in the absence of proper institutional checks and balances for ensuring proper teaching, the teacher's own conscience is the sole determinant of the performance of duties.
By bearing the costs of higher education, either immediately in the form of tuition fees or over a longer period in the form of student loans, will also make students more academically conscientious.
They will realize that by not attending classes and having a non-serious attitude towards their education, they are incurring private debts which no one else is going to pick up.
Thus, students paying full costs are not likely to respond to calls for strikes by militant student groups. As a result, by not subsidizing higher education the state can not only check taxpayers' money from being wasted but also produce better educated students.
As argued above, the process of subsidizing higher education is regressive as it tends to benefit the rich more than the poor and therefore further increase income disparities between different income groups.
Education is availed of more by middle and higher-income families than lower-income ones as the latter perceive educating their wards, especially boys, to have a high opportunity factor associated with it and because the private returns on education for such households have been low to date.
They are uncertain about the future returns of educating their children and because male wards start supplementing their family's income fairly early in their lives.
Therefore, subsidizing higher education in the presence of income disparities will lead to children of middle and upper income groups having a disproportionate access to higher education, thereby maintaining their advantage over children from less affluent households.
Also, whereas the poor should be helped, the solution does not lie in continuing to subsidize higher education. The poor have no birth right not to contribute anything towards the cost of providing them education; we should not forget that a free gift is invariably misused.
The more talented among them need to be aided through scholarships while others can be assisted to acquire higher education through loans, which could be at concessional rates for those from less privileged backgrounds.
To sum ups we oppose subsidizing higher education based on the following important premises: (a) governments with limited financial resources should allocate their funds in sectors that yield the highest returns; (b) higher education mostly caters to the needs of the rich at the expense of the less affluent families; and (c) subsidizing higher education can result in low motivational levels amongst students who do not bear the full cost of attaining higher education.
Considering the scarcity of resources, the government may decide to subsidize certain disciplines based on national priorities. For instance, degrees in science and technology could be fully subsidized while those studying other subjects could be required to bear the full cost of the education imparted to them.
It could also be argued that the market would not necessarily support studying of Urdu literature or literature in regional languages, education having mainly social or cultural value.
These courses may not survive unless supported by the government. Nor will the teachers be able to make a reasonable living from the fees of students selecting such courses. Some activities need, and should, get the support of the state.
But then, given the limited resources available to the government, it will have to be, per force, highly selective in choosing the fields of education it is prepared to support.
Therefore, if the government can make a short list of disciplines, education in which needs to be subsidized (with the level of subsidy varying from subject to subject) depending on national priorities, then for subjects for which the share of subsidy is low, alternative mechanisms have to be adopted to address issues of equity, imperfect capital markets and unequal educational opportunity.
Institutions for giving concessional loans or grants to deserving students with limited financial resources could be established or strengthened. Banks could also be incentivized into developing a student loan programme.
The quota for scholarships could also be increased in professional colleges and universities to enable needy students with good academic records to attain higher qualifications.
The government could provide special grants that could be placed at the disposal of the autonomous boards of governors of these institutions to identify students deserving financial support.
Local companies could also be persuaded to sponsor students in different institutions, while the educational institutions could be allowed to retain the additional resources generated from charging students higher fees.
The latter mechanism would not only help in narrowing their revenue deficits but also enable them to utilize these funds for improving the quality of services, by recruiting better quality teachers and by providing better facilities, buildings, furniture and equipment, libraries, etc..
Admittedly, a lot of details will still have to be worked out before alternatives to subsidies are introduced in our educational set-up; however, the direction of these reforms will have to be along the lines discussed above.
A rough deal for Fernandes
Sometimes, tucked away in between huge newspaper columns of editorial matter gorged with flaccid padding, which draw on enormous resources of learning, but which nobody bothers to read, one comes across a juicy bit of news that one simply cannot ignore such as the two occasions when George Fernandes, the former defence minister of India, was allegedly stripped and searched by security personnel at Washington's Dulles International airport.
The first incident took place when as defence minister of the world's largest democracy, he was on an official visit to Washington in early 2002. And the second time this happened was when he was on a brief stop-over on his way to Brazil in 2003, the only country which retaliated against the United States' decision to finger-print foreigners by finger-printing Americans entering their country.
What added insult to injury was the fact that on the first occasion when this humiliation took place, the Indian ambassador who had come to the airport, made repeated requests that his important visitor should be accorded the courtesy normally shown to diplomats and should not be given the third degree.
The defence minister of India wasn't carrying bombs. There is no need to search him, said Lalit Mansingh, a former Indian ambassador. But to no avail.
The Fernandes incident, as it has been referred to, is a little hard to explain. Though there is a discrepancy between his account and the version issued by the US embassy in New Delhi, of what actually happened, one can certainly understand his irritation and ire at the shabby treatment he received.
Notwithstanding his sharp-edged phrasing when discussing the problem of alleged cross-border violations by Pakistan and his predictable belligerence towards this country when he was a government minister, George Fernandes is essentially a simple, unassuming man like the majority of Indian politicians.
He is also a member of the Catholic minority which, according to the Indian writer Bhawana Somaaya, is constantly projected by Hindi cinema as a stereotype, where all characters, irrespective of their history, collect Victorian furniture, make a sign of the cross, and speak in the Bombaya Hindi dialect.
Whether in or out of power he has always had a relatively Spartan lifestyle which appealed to the former prime minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, as well as to the many left wing organizations which exist in India. In many ways, he is a man of the people.
George Fernandes could hardly be mistaken for the type of bearded, turbaned black-eyed warrior that conforms to the popular image of the terrorist who struts about airport and hotel lounges with a detonator in his mobile telephone, or who carries capsules of nitroglycerine under his belt. And he doesn't even have an identifiable Muslim name.
Though George has a nice Anglo-Saxon ring to it, every town and hamlet from Tijuana in Mexico to Tierra del Fuego off the southern coast of Argentina has its share of Fernandeses. It is a very popular Hispanic Catholic name, and anybody who disagrees should pick up a telephone directory in Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro.
The question therefore arises, why was George Fernandes given the full treatment when on a subsequent flight passengers noted that two Muslim women dressed in hijab were not even finger- printed? Was it a case of racism, routine surveillance, the sudden realization that the chap with the Mexican name was not really a Chicano, or could there have been a more compelling explanation?
Lots of theories were propounded including the delightful one that security officials at Kennedy airport were probably working on a tip off. Apparently certain members of India's defence ministry, who were earlier involved in the weapons-purchase scandal, were trying to sneak into the United States, perhaps to carry on from where they left off. And the gray-haired bespectacled man in the safari suit was their ring leader.
The more plausible story which was carried by sections of the US press is that a key in George Fernandes' pocket, undetected in a previous scan, set off a metal detector, and security officials gravitated towards the offending passenger.
This led to a sharp exchange between the Indian politician and the uniformed representatives of the American government, in which the former desperately and unsuccessfully appealed to status and protocol.
The story would have been filed and forgotten, but it erupted because Fernandes' opponents were trying to embarrass him. Even his supporters agreed it was a jolly good tale to narrate back at the Willingdon Club.
Apparently, the US government took notice. The incident prompted an apology from US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage during a visit to New Delhi two weeks ago. Armitage said he was "horrified" by the report, which was probably the first incident of its kind to have hit the current administration.
The Americans were, however, quick to point out that there are specific procedures in place for heads of state, government ministers and other foreign dignitaries to be accorded special diplomatic procedures upon entry to the United States - provided, of course, they furnish appropriate advance notice of their travel.
It is not clear if the former defence minister of India did that, or if he was a victim of bureaucratic ineptitude.Anyway, George Fernandes is so miffed by the incident that he publicly declared that he would never enter the United States again, a view that is gradually gaining currency among a lot of Muslims in the Middle East and Pakistan, because of the perceived treatment of religious minorities and the imposition of finger printing introduced by the United States for all foreigners entering their country.
Every country has a right to introduce security measures and protect its frontiers. But everything said and done, one feels sorry for the way George Fernandes was treated, not because he is a member of a minority in his own country, or because he belongs to the subcontinent, but because he is an upright citizen and a decent human being.
He belongs to a country which is over-governed and over- politicized, a unique land as Piloo Mody put it, where Charan Singh's views on Picasso count for more than M.F. Hussain's.
But it is still a nation of leaders with a cast of thousands. Some, like Vajpayee endure interminably. Others like Fernandes have their 15 minutes of fame and publicity and return to the fold, unrequited and forgotten.
But though he had a raw deal, one would like to believe he must have relished the way he hogged the limelight, however briefly, and got a superpower to utter two of the most difficult words in the dictionary. And in this the United States demonstrated that it still has certain cherished values.
Racist bias in Europe
Two headlines last week showed just how racist western Europeans are. One, quoting a Commission for Racial Equality survey, revealed that 90 per cent of white people in Britain have few or no non-white friends.
The other was Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's blunt statement that "we see the spread of the wildest anti-Semitism (in France)....If I had to advise our brothers in France, I'd tell them one thing: move to Israel as soon as possible. I say that to Jews all around the world, but there (in France) I think it's a must, and they have to move immediately."
There is no doubt that anti-Semitic incidents are on the rise in France: from 593 reported attacks or threats against France's 600,000 Jews in 2003 to 510 in only the first six months of this year.
There's not much doubt that racism flourishes in the United Kingdom, either: in last month's elections for the European Parliament, British voters sent eleven members of the upstart UK Independence Party, whose rhetoric includes a lot of coded racism, to represent the country in Brussels. And yet...
Yet, this picture seems much too stark and simple to me. I have lived in London for a long time (though I am not British), and while I know that things are different in rural parts of England and in some post-industrial urban slums up north, what I see in my own streets is a society that is pretty much at ease with racial diversity and (especially in the younger age-groups) happy to party together. More like Toronto than Chicago, if that means anything to you.
We spend a lot of time in France, too. Some of it is in Paris, looking after my wife's almost-bag-lady aunt, who lives in the rougher part of town and is now pretty much alone in the world.
She's an unashamed racist - she's in her late seventies, and she lost her husband in the Algerian war - but people of every race in the neighbourhood are very good about looking after her. She tolerates it, and they tolerate her tolerating it. It doesn't feel like a racist hell.
So how to explain the gulf between these personal observations and those alarmist headlines? Start with this wave of anti-Semitism in France. Even Ariel Sharon conceded that this is not a revival of traditional Christian anti-Semitism.
"In France today, about 10 per cent of the population are Muslims," he explained, and "that gets a different kind of anti-Semitism, based on anti-Israeli feelings and propaganda."
Fair enough, though the real figure for France is 6 per cent Muslim - but in that case why is there no similar wave of anti-Semitism in Britain, where at least 3 or 4 percent of the population is Muslim and the Jewish population is second only to France's in Europe? The answer, obviously, is that most Muslims in France are Arabs, who feel strongly about Israel, while most Muslims in Britain are from non-Arab countries, principally Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Turkey, where the Arab-Israeli dispute is much further down the local agenda.
What has been happening in France is ugly. In the low-cost, high-rise tracts of housing that ring the big French cities, gangs of poor immigrant kids have begun to harass poor Jewish families that live in the same vicinity. They are not exclusively Arab gangs.
They will usually include Turks, East Europeans, West Africans, and Afro-Caribbeans, as well as white French working-class kids whose families have been dumped in the same high-rises.
But all these kids have adopted the stone-throwing Palestinian children of the intifada as their model of defiance to 'the power' that marginalizes them. French Jews, redefined as honorary Israelis, then become the targets of their wrath.
Only one French Jew in a thousand has reported a threat or an actual attack this year. President Jacques Chirac has launched a national appeal for racial and religious tolerance in France, and the number of French Jews who will actually leave for Israel this year is estimated to be around 2,500 - less than half of one per cent of the French Jewish community. -Copyright
Israeli expansionism cause of violence
In the midst of all the violence and hatred boiling over in the Middle East, at the sight of blood being senselessly shed and lives being lost in futility, one often wonders what the root cause of this conflict actually is. What was it that ignited such a rancorous dispute in the first place, and fuelled it for over eight decades?
Certain observers simply put it down to mutual spite in either community for the other, ingrained in their respective theologies. However, a careful scrutiny negates this assumption.
There is no history of anti-Semitism in Islamic theology. In fact, if anything, Islam views Jews and Christians more favourably as "people of the book" as compared to "infidels".
Moreover, the Islamic empire of Umar, the second Caliph, is perhaps the only one to have granted equal rights of life and worship to the Jewish populace upon the conquest of Jerusalem in the seventh century.
Similarly, there seems to be no particular venom directed towards Muslims in ancient Jewish culture either. Therefore, claims relating the current mutual detestation of the two communities to religion hold no water.
A number of analysts blame it on the maximalists on both sides of the fence, bent upon eradicating the other community through the use of brutality. However, such spectators are to be reminded that there must have existed circumstances inciting extremism from both quarters. Just as no individual is born a fanatic, no situation exists as a problem per se from its very inception.
The real origin of the Palestine problem can be traced back to a declaration approved by the British cabinet in October 1917. It is called the Balfour Declaration, named after Sir Arthur James Balfour, the then British foreign secretary and among the foremost advocates of the document. It states:-
"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."
For a fair analysis of the above document, certain facts must be stated. Around 1915, an epistolary correspondence transpired between Sir Henry McMahon, the then British high commissioner to Egypt, and Sharif Hussain, the Emir of Makkah representing the entire Arab community.
McMahon sought active Arab support against the Axis in the World War. In return, he promised the independence of Arabs in all regions, including Palestine, upon culmination of the conflict.
This correspondence was particularly active at the time when the Balfour Declaration was approved by the British government. In a message on behalf of the British government, McMahon wrote: "...so far as Palestine is concerned, we are determined that no people shall be subject to another." January 4, 1918.
At that time, the country had a population of around 700,000, out of which 90 per cent (around 600,000) was Muslim Arab, which also owned 97 per cent of the land, while the remaining 10 per cent (almost 70,000) largely comprised Jews.
The Balfour Declaration was the fruition of the interminable efforts of the Zionist organization, an establishment with the concrete aim of Der JudenStaat, a Jewish state in Palestine. As Theodore Herzl, founder of the Zionist movement, wrote: "The Idea which I have developed...... is a very old one: it is the restoration of the Jewish State." Der Judenstaat, 1896.
Thus, the British government, through the Balfour Declaration, had effectively agreed to patronise the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine and all measures required therein, including unlimited Jewish immigration.
For the indigenous overwhelmingly Muslim population of Palestine, this was a harrowing development but for the fact that it was deviously kept concealed from them until its public proclamation in Palestine in 1920.
The Balfour Declaration itself was patently invalid for three main reasons. First, it was in stark contrast to the assurances of independence that had been pledged to the Arabs in the McMahon-Hussain correspondence. In light of the promises made to solicit Arab support for the war, the declaration was nothing short of the proverbial stab in the back.
Secondly, the declaration had been drafted in close consultation with an organization whose avowed aim was the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine through the forcible immigration of non-Palestinians to the country.
This in itself was a gross violation of Palestinian rights and also went contrary to the resolve of the victorious powers (United States, France and Britain) to uphold the fundamental right to self-determination of the local inhabitants of the conquered regions.
Lastly, and significantly, the declaration was issued when Palestine was officially still part of the Ottoman empire. The British had no right to enforce a declaration regarding a region which was not even under its governance. For that reason, the declaration stands legally void.
It is also important to note that the designs of the Zionist movement were not supported by Jews all over the world. When it was approbated by the British cabinet, the Balfour Declaration was bitterly opposed by Sir Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State to India and, incidentally, a Jew.
Nonetheless, despite all the incongruities painfully obvious therein, the Balfour Declaration was incorporated into the Palestinian Mandate, according to which the British government was to act as an adviser to the country.
The Zionist Organization was thus given a free hand to indulge in large-scale immigration of Jews from all over the world, artificially altering the distribution of population in Palestine.
Land holdings also changed dramatically and brought about economic discontent amongst the local Arab community, amplified by the Zionist policy of denial of employment to Palestinian Arabs.
By 1947, the Jewish population had increased to 600,000, one-third of the total population of Palestine, an increase of 725 per cent. Such is the root cause of the Palestine problem; British myopia coupled with a brazen disregard for the wishes of the local people.
However, it is imperative for a solution of the issue at hand that each side recognizes and accepts the presence of the other. Only then can the bloodshed cease, only then can peace endure.
The writer is a professor of political science at California State University, Los Angeles, US.