| 24 July 2004 | Saturday | 06 Jamadi-us-Saani 1425 |
Nagaland, India's Waziristan
A challenging role for Pakistani envoy
There is enough evidence to suggest that the diplomatic freeze of the past five years has begun to thaw and that both Islamabad and New Delhi seem determined to move further along the path of normalization.
To begin with, not only the foreign ministers of the two countries have met thrice in two months and held discussions on sensitive topics like Kashmir, terrorism and infiltration, they have also scrupulously avoided rhetoric to score a point or embarrass the other side.
Another reassuring feature has been that, unlike in the past, the talks even on the most contentious issues have been held in a cordial and relaxed atmosphere. This is a hopeful sign for sustainability of the process of looking for solutions for bilateral problems through a composite dialogue.
Perhaps for the first time in the history of Indo-Pakistan dialogue, both sides are sincerely trying to understand each other's point of view and make allowances for the other side's limitations and mitigating circumstances.
For instance, even on the issue of terrorism, a major concern for India, New Delhi, according to a PTI report, "recognizes that Islamabad has limits to which it can go on cracking down on the scourge."
Pakistan has, however, assured India that it will do its best to curb cross-border terrorism and infiltration and Indian newspapers report that New Delhi "feels that Islamabad needs to be given some time."
Another significant development has been that the Congress-led government in New Delhi is conducting the dialogue with Pakistan on the basis of a compromise worked out by former prime minister Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf earlier this year in Islamabad.
Under the Islamabad Declaration, India agreed to discuss the issue of Jammu and Kashmir seriously and substantively, while Pakistan agreed not to hold the process of normalization hostage to the resolution of the Kashmir issue.
At the moment, the two sides appear to be sounding each other on the sensitive issue of Kashmir. The sustainability of the dialogue between India and Pakistan will ultimately depend on the ability of Islamabad and New Delhi to address what they consider the core issue - the Kashmir issue for Pakistan and cross-border violence for India.
There is sufficient evidence to support the view that the current process of dialogue can be maintained because both India and Pakistan seem to have realized that this is the only way to resolve their differences, and that no other option is open to them.
Both Islamabad and New Delhi took their time in reaching the above conclusion. In the wake of successful nuclear tests, there was widespread nuclear euphoria in the country that probably made Islamabad believe that the possession of nuclear weapons might compel New Delhi to make concessions on Kashmir. Perhaps this was the rationale behind the Kargil war.
But the moment of truth for Pakistan came on September 11, 2001, when an enraged United States and a shocked world community obliged the country to dismantle an important pillar of its security policy - support for the Taliban, and, by extension, the Al Qaeda.
An inescapable corollary of 9/11 was the end of the distinction between "freedom fighters" and "terrorists" which made it increasingly difficult for Pakistan to carry on its support for the armed freedom struggle inside India-held Kashmir.
But travelling on the arduous road has not been confined to Pakistan. India, too, has learnt bitter lessons. The massive army mobilization by India along the Pakistani border, following the December 13 attack on its parliament, proved a complete fiasco.
It did not achieve any of its objectives. It failed to compel Pakistan to surrender any of the 20 wanted fugitives or stop support for cross-border infiltration. The army mobilization against Pakistan was, however, not without a salutary effect.
It made the Indians realize, more acutely, that Pakistan had sufficient conventional strength to deter an Indian attack. In any case, the Indian army lacked the strength and equipment to chastise Pakistan. And then, the danger of crossing the nuclear threshold was always there.
After five decades of repressive rule and atrocities committed on a wide scale, India has not been able to root out the Kashmir struggle. During the recent Lok Sabha election, Dr Farooq Abdullah who used to advocate war with Pakistan at his rallies, was speaking a different language.
He praised President Pervez Musharraf, and decried India for having betrayed the Kashmiris. A former minister in the Vajpayee government and New Delhi's interlocutor, Omar Farooq, led the funeral prayers of Rafiq Ahmed Lidri, operation chief of the pro-Pakistan Al-Umar Mujahideen on February 6.
So it appears that New Delhi has at last realized that there is a problem in Kashmir and that the strategy of excluding Pakistan from its solution has failed. The Vajpayee government, towards the fag end of its rule, seemed to have realized that disputes like Kashmir cannot be resolved unilaterally and hence its willingness to sign the Islamabad Declaration of January 6.
Mr Natwar Singh has made it clear that his government stands by the Islamabad Declaration. During his recent visit to Islamabad, he declared that his presence in Pakistan and meetings with the Pakistani leadership should be read as the Indian government's willingness to show flexibility and boldness.
The 25th session of the Saarc Council of Ministers, which recently concluded in Islamabad on a positive note, is likely to boost all-round collaboration amongst member countries.
Some of the important decisions taken by the Saarc ministers were: strengthening of cooperation in the areas of telecommunications and information technology; approval of the plan of action recommended by the working group on energy and authorization of a meeting of Saarc energy ministers to consider recommendations of the working group, and the establishment of a Saarc forestry centre in Bhutan.
In an interesting development, China has shown interest in a productive engagement with Saarc. That was the background to the Council of Ministers resolving that it would look into the "modalities for establishing dialogue partnership with other regional bodies and states outside the region, taking into account the experience of other regional organizations like Asean".
It may be recalled that at the 12th Saarc Summit in January last, the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, sent a formal message of greeting which former prime minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali did not read but referred to in his opening address at the summit.
In the Islamabad Declaration, the South Asian leaders agreed to establish "dialogue partnership with other regional bodies and with states outside the region, interested in Saarc activities."
In April this year, Saarc Secretary General Mr Rahim visited Beijing at the Invitation of the Chinese government. During his visit, the Chinese leaders expressed their desire for a productive engagement with Saarc. Prime Minister Shujaat Hussain, during his inaugural address at the Saarc Council of Ministers, welcomed China's interest in a productive engagement with Saarc.
The question is not whether China should be associated with Saarc or not but how gracefully it is admitted into it. Chinese participation will mean that the world's third largest economy will be productively engaged with the economy of South Asia which will benefit the entire region.
But there may be some misgivings among the traditionalists in India because preventing China from expanding its influence in the subcontinent has been a major strategic objective of India. But in India itself, there has been a significant change of attitude towards China. New Delhi is negotiating a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement with Beijing. Sino-Indian total trade is likely to touch $ 10 billion this year. Both China and India are working out separate free trade arrangements with Asean.
So why should there be any opposition to a free trade treaty between China and Saarc? As a matter of fact, China's productive engagement with Saarc will be helpful in overcoming opposition to economic integration in South Asia.
Utmost care should, however, be taken by Saarc countries so that their move to welcome China in Saarc is not misunderstood by India. It may be recalled that soon after the establishment of Saarc, India was apprehensive that the organization could be used by its smaller neighbours as a platform to lessen its importance and exert pressure on New Delhi on issues dear to them.
The reasons for welcoming China in Saarc should be purely economic as Chinese participation will promote the economic growth of South Asia. Politics should have nothing to do with it. The primary objective of Saarc is economic cooperation which should take precedence over everything else.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Nagaland, India's Waziristan
Many, many years ago, an old woman walked wearily over a long distance to Delhi to complain to the emperor that his writ did not run where she lived. The emperor said that the place was too far. Before trudging back, she told him that if he could not administer a distant territory, why didn't he give it up?
No passage of time has changed the situation. It is as real in Nagaland today as it was then. The government is there only on paper. The real ruler is the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), the underground Nagas. They levy their own taxes, post their own men to keep an eye on the subjects and punish or even kill those who dare to defy.
Ministers and officials in the state see to it that they stay in their good books. In fact, the government comes to their rescue whenever the "underground" are chased by the Indian army, more to register its presence than to chastize them.
Not long ago, the state director-general of police (DGP), an Indian Police Service officer from Delhi, caught one "underground" red-handed with several lakhs of rupees which he had robbed. But the DGP had to release him because the car in which he rode was that of a minister.
Since independence there have been a series of talks between New Delhi and the "underground" who surface and disappear at their will. The cease-fire is effected during negotiations. The current one is the seventh in the series.
The endless talks are meant to determine the "relationship" between India and Nagaland. Strange, this should be a topic when Nagaland is one of the states of the Indian Union. Every five years Nagaland elects its assembly through the Central Election Commission.
The turnover of voters over the years has averaged 60 per cent. Seldom the polls have been boycotted or disturbed. The state has two parliament members, one sitting in the Lok Sabha and the other in the Rajya Sabha. Still both the Indian government and the underground Nagas go over the exercise to reach a "settlement" every now and then.
In a way, Nagaland may well be India's Waziristan, an unruly part of Pakistan's north-west area. The problems are similar: too many guns, too many mixed-up bureaucrats, too many foreigners and too many central agencies to disburse money. New Delhi, like Islamabad, is happy that its flag flies. But all those who rise against the established authority play the same hide-and-seek game.
Pakistan calls the territory by the name of "autonomous tribal areas." India has the satisfaction of listing Nagaland as one of its states. The question the two countries have to ask themselves is: Are the areas over which they claim their sovereignty have ever been their part? Does their writ really run? Why is there insurgency all the time?
Islamabad pursues the policy to let the sleeping dogs lie. But New Delhi has asserted its authority through a common minimum programme (CMP) which the new government has enunciated "for maintaining the territorial integrity" of the "existing" north-east states.
This has led to a tiff between the NSCN's two top leaders, Issac Chesi Swu and Thungaland Muivah (I-M), conducting the talks and interlocutor K. Padmanabhiah, representing New Delhi's point of view. The I-M reportedly told him that the Indian army, already stretched from China's border to Kashmir, was in no position to fight their 5,000-strong cadre.
They want New Delhi to define what "the territorial integrity" means. It goes counter to their initial demand for a "Greater Nagaland," incorporating Naga-dominated areas of Manipur and Assam. The NSCN regards the CMP's declaration as the rejection of its demand.
New Delhi is in the midst of formulating a reply because the cease-fire ends on July 31. Some high-ups believe that the demand can be considered by the States Reorganization Commission which the new government contemplates to appoint to consider the claim for separate states like the Telengana, part of Andhra Pradesh, and Vidarbha, part of Maharashtra.
The appointment of another States Reorganization Commission may give an indication of New Delhi's procrastination. It does not want any confrontation with the underground Nagas. But the fact it does not want to face is that the NSCN is not yet accepting India's total sovereignty over Nagaland.
True, any government has to reckon with the well-trained and well-armed men that the NSCN commands, besides the links it has with Myanmar, China and the ISI operating from Bangladesh. The fallout can be protracted guerilla warfare, not a savoury situation. Yet, New Delhi cannot allow the NSCN to be over ground and underground at the same time.
A cease-fire is any day preferable to hostilities, limited or large. But the government has to ensure that the cease-fire is not used to collect arms, have fresh recruitment and force the opponents to submission. The NSCN has done all this. On the other hand, the Nagas want to lead a normal life. They are sick of the underground's parallel rule of duplicity and dictation.
Some defiance against the NSCN is beginning to take shape. For the first time, some 5,000 people celebrated at the centre of Kohima, the capital of Nagaland, the 100th birth anniversary of A.Z. Phizo, the most respected Naga leader. The "underground" threatened to wipe them out but they still assembled. Two bombs exploded at the venue but none left the meeting which continued for three hours.
A few among them travelled to Delhi to tell all - like the old lady appealing to the emperor. No leader met them, neither from the Congress nor from the BJP. For some time, both parties have developed a cozy relationship with the NSCN.
When Issac and Muivah came to Delhi one and a half years ago, the two parties were on the best of their behaviour as if the country was beholden to their peace efforts. The fact is that New Delhi does not want to face the ever-smouldering situation.
What may give the opening to New Delhi is the reason why the NSCN was opposed to the celebrations of Phizo's birth anniversary? There can be two: one, the NSCN does not want anyone else to claim his mantle.
Those who held the celebrations at Kohima must be posing a challenge to the NSCN. Two, Phizo had come to the end of the road before his death and told his colleagues that the Nagas must find a solution within India.
I was India's high commissioner in London when Phizo died. Khodao-Yanthan, his old comrade-in-arms, met me. Since the days of the insurgency in Nagaland, both of them had been staying in the UK.
Khodao-Yanthan said that Phizo had "changed" and wanted "to settle the Nagaland question with the Indian leaders." But he did not live long enough. However, before dying, Phizo advised his friends in Nagaland "to give up violence and seek a solution within the framework of a united India."
My meeting with Khodao-Yanthan was a friendly one. I was confident that he would be a moderating force on the extremists. I informed New Delhi about his visit. Unfortunately, the V.P. Singh government fell a few days later. New Delhi should have established contact with Khodao-Yanthan.
The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.
A challenging role for Pakistani envoy
One of Pakistan's most distinguished diplomats, Ashraf Jahangir Qazi, has now been named the UN secretary-general's special envoy for Iraq and is expected to take up his new responsibilities sometimes in August. Speculation in our press about the motives for his selection is, to my mind, unwarranted.
He has the experience, the talent, the linguistic skills and the intimate knowledge of Islam that makes him a good choice irrespective of his nationality and irrespective of what expectations the Iraqi interim government may entertain about the availability of assistance from his country of origin.
That said, one must acknowledge that Ashraf or anyone else in his place would have his work cut out for him and unfortunately, that the prospects of success are remote, even if his task is defined, narrowly, as being to ensure a smooth election beginning 2005 and the restoration by end-2005 of full Iraqi sovereignty under a democratic dispensation.
The current security situation is dismaying. After an initial lull following the transfer of power to the Iraqi interim government, the attacks on American and Iraqi targets have acquired a new ferocity.
The suicide bomb attack on the checkpoint for entry into the heavily fortified green zone - now known as the international zone which houses the American embassy and other American installations on July 14 - a holiday in Iraq to mark the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy - killed at least 10 Iraqis. An attack in Mosul on the same day killed the Iraqi governor of Nineveh province.
On the July 17 - marked for the last 45 years as the anniversary of the Baathist takeover - the justice minister survived a suicide bomb attack but four of his bodyguards died, while in nearby Mahmoudiyah another suicide bomber drove his explosives laden car into a crowd of 50 Iraqis lining up for recruitment into the Iraqi security forces, killing at least one and injuring 25. It was obvious that the insurgents were targeting members of the regime or those who were collaborating.
They are not the only targets. The Americans had worked towards creating through elections of sorts a city government in Baghdad. Neighbourhood gatherings elected representatives who in turn elected from amongst them a representative for one of the 12 district councils.
These councils then elected the city council. Heavily influenced by the American guiding hand the councils nevertheless provided a semblance of grassroots democracy. How effective they were in solving the problems of the people has become now less important than the fact they too have become targets for the insurgents. Of the roughly 750 councillors 61 have been killed last year and six have been assassinated in the last two weeks.
Much hope was created by the relative calm which followed the transfer of power that the Iraqi nationalists among the militants were prepared to give the new regime a chance to put a truly Iraqi face on the administration and were even prepared to take action against the foreign insurgents who did not accept this.
Much was made of the announcements by some obscure nationalist groups condemning Zarqawi and his fighters and promising to hunt them down. Unfortunately, this hope has been belied by the resumption of violence and the absence of any tangible evidence that there has in fact been a rift between foreign insurgents and local fighters.
Will these "elected" officials or ordinary Iraqis want to expose themselves to further wrath by "consulting" ambassador Qazi? Will the security situation improve enough to enable Qazi to establish, and move into, headquarters in Baghdad shifting quickly from the temporary offices in New York, Amman and Kuwait?
Will the Americans provide the security that the Iraqi forces are just not equipped to do yet? Will there be enough countries volunteering forces to protect this headquarter and the regional offices that the UN must of necessity set up if it is to play the expected role in voter registration and the conduct of the elections? The tragedy that befell the UN office of Sergio D'Mello must weigh heavily in determining the level of security needed.
The American embassy has adopted a low public profile. Ambassador Negreponte held his first press conference only on the July 17 more than a fortnight after he assumed office. But the American embassy has a 1000 American officers, advisers in all the key ministries and four consulates dotted around the country.
Negreponte's aides are also stationed at the central and regional headquarters of the 140,000 American troops now in Iraq. Much as the ambassador would like to emphasize the independence of the new interim government, there can be no doubt about who will be calling the shots on every issue of substance.
What will be the objective of the American embassy and the American forces? They would work towards restoring security by strengthening the fledgling Iraqi army, intelligence, police and the whole gamut of administrative forces.
How far will this be done bearing the ethnic and sectarian factors in mind and will this process be overly influenced by the Iraqi exiles that the Americans have perforce relied upon in the past? How far will the former army officers and other officers from the Baath regime be incorporated in the new administration given the fact that the majority of trained administrators were willing or unwilling members of the Baath?
Will Qazi be allowed to have a say in this process bearing in mind that the UN's neutral and pragmatic approach may not suit those currently in the interim government. Past experience is not a happy guide.
Lakdar Brahimi's eminently sensible suggestion of inducting for a six month period a government of technocrats - all of whom would be required to renounce political ambitions and focus on conducting free and fair elections was initially welcomed by the Americans but collapsed when the wholly American appointed interim council refused to accept such a marginalization of their own role.
Will Qazi then be forced to place his and the UN's imprimatur on an administration in the shaping of which he played little or no role? This was of course what happened to Mr. Brahimi.
Will other leaders - tribal and religious - wish to meet him when they know that little of what they had to say influenced the decisions ultimately made on the recommendations of Qazi's predecessor Lakdar Brahimi?
What role can the secretary-general's envoy play in creating the federal structure desired by the Kurds and in determining the limits of the Kurdish region - the inclusion or exclusion of oil-rich Kirkuk - and the degree of autonomy this area will enjoy?
Will this lead to a demand for a Sunni region with a similar degree of autonomy? The sensible thing would be for all parties to agree that the 5-6 month period left for the elections or even the 18 month period left for the full "democratization" is not sufficient to tackle this question and that this should be left for later.
Unlike Afghanistan, Qazi and his team will start with an advantage on the voter registration issue. More than 60 per cent of the population in Saddam's Iraq was dependent on UN food handouts and was therefore fully documented.
In certain measure even the demarcation of constituencies has already been completed. The question that arises is why in these circumstances elections were not scheduled earlier.
If the answer lay in the fact that the members of the current administration felt they needed more time to build a base of support for themselves after their long years in exile, this factor may weigh once again and create difficulty in getting full government cooperation for the completion of the voter registration and the demarcation of the constituencies.
The foregoing is only a small sampling of the formidable difficulties that will confront Qazi. He will need all his skills, and they are considerable, to overcome them. But he also has some things going for him. Pakistanis, by and large, are well regarded by the Iraqi people.
We have always heard that Iraq as a country had never stood by us but the fact is that since 1968 Iraq was ruled by a regime that had its own world view - a view that I know from personal experience in Iraq the Iraqi people did not share.
Second, a beleaguered Bush administration is much more amenable to "internationalism" in Iraq than it has been in the past. The latest poll shows that a majority of Americans (51 per cent) believe that America should have stayed out of Iraq and 62 per cent believe that the war was not worth the American lives lost.
This is not to say that the Americans are going to withdraw their troops from Iraq. Far from it. But what it does mean, one hopes, is that they will allow the UN a far more substantive role in determining the future dispensation of Iraq than has hitherto been the case.
Third, even while the insurgency seems to have gathered force there are indications that the common people desire for peace is now such that the insurgency will wither if political events are seen to be moving in the right direction.
The Iraqis resent the occupation but they also are beginning to resent the use of their territory by foreigners. If Ashraf Jahangir Qazi can become the instrument for positive political developments there may well develop a groundswell of support that engulfs and drowns out the dissidents.
What should Pakistan do? It now has a request for troops from the Iraqi interim government. We have raised no questions about the credentials of this government. Presumably we have also received a similar request from the UN secretary-general.
In effect, therefore, the conditions we had set for participation in any UN operation in Iraq have been met. There are of course questions about the degree of authority the UN will have and what its exact mandate will be. More important, there are questions about the prevailing mood in the country.
The writer in former foreign secretary.