| 28 June 2004 | Monday | 09 Jamadi-ul-Awwal 1425 |
It's the president who decides
Perilous sectarian divide
Corporate culture and poverty
There is a degree of euphoria based on the telephone calls between foreign ministers and prime ministers of the two countries. The President has also spoken to Indian prime minister and Mrs Sonia Gandhi. News columns in our papers are on an upbeat note. In his latest phone call to his Pakistan counterpart, the Indian foreign minister quoted Urdu poetry:
Kuch nahi to kum se kum khwab-i-sahar dekha to hai
Jis taraf dekha na tha abtak udher dekha to hai
One cannot help recalling that before the Shimla meeting, the Indian emissary, Mr.D.P. Dhar, who came to Pakistan had also quoted Faiz:
Aaiye haath uthaen hum bhi
Hum jinhe rasm-i-dua yad nahin
Hum jinhe soz-i-muhabbat ke siwa
Koi but koi khuda yad nahin
Aaiye haath uthaen ke nigar-i-hasti
Zehr-i-imroz main shirin-i-farda bharde
These sentiments should be welcomed but they are not and will not be a substitute for hard-headed negotiations. We are an emotional people and often inclined to accept shadows for substance.
Without wanting to be a Cassandra, I would like to invite attention to hard realities inherent in the position of both India and Pakistan.
Let us look at the not too distant past, when Rajiv Gandhi became prime minister, President Zia-ul-Haq pronounced at a meeting that he belonged to the post-partition generation, carried no prejudicial baggage and therefore the prospects for Indo-Pakistan relations looked brighter. The assembled "durbar" overwhelmingly agreed with Zia. The realities turned out to be otherwise, proving that national interests do not change with the change of personalities.
All the same, let us look at the personalities in India who would be directly and importantly concerned with Indo-Pakistan negotiations. They are Mrs Sonia Gandhi, president of the Congress Party, prime minister Sardar Manmohan Singh, foreign minister Natwar Singh, and the national security adviser, J.N.Dixit.
Lurking in the background will be Mr L.K.Advani, now the all-powerful figure in the B.J.P., Mr Vajpayee having been 'promoted' chairman of the Party. The latter is the architect of the framework under which future negotiations will proceed, but we know only too well that Mr Advani is a hard-liner on Indo-Pakistan relations.
As for Mrs Sonia Gandhi, the voter confidence in her notwithstanding, her political clout is weakened by her foreign origin. This is specially so when it comes to altering the status quo in the Kashmir dispute. Negotiations involve give and take; her credentials in India will always be questioned by a vocal section of the extremists when it comes to "give", no matter how insignificant. So, she will lack the confidence of Mr Vajpayee, a former member of the RSS and a man of proven capability in safeguarding India's interests vis-a-vis Pakistan.
The Indian prime minister, Sardar Manmohan Singh, a member of the Sikh community, a brilliant economist, who finds himself in a political hot seat and will be twice as cautious as Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, in entering the political minefield of discussion with Pakistan on Kashmir. He will undoubtedly be forthcoming in other issues like trade, commerce, cultural links, travel, etc.
The third personality, Mr.Natwar Singh, the foreign minister, a scion of the former ruling family of Bharatpur, a courtly, courteous erudite, former diplomat who also served as India's high commissioner in Pakistan, has so far conveyed friendly signals for better relationship. We must take him at his word and hope for the best.
The last but not least personality is Mr J.N.Dixit, national security Adviser. Like Mr Natwar Singh, he is a former diplomat, who was India's high commissioner in Pakistan, foreign secretary and has authored several books. People with political ambition should not write books because whatever they write can be held against them! I have read two of Mr Dixit's books; one about his sojourn in Pakistan titled "Anatomy of Flawed Relationship" and the other entitled "India, Pakistan in War and Peace". Both are subjective and partisan. Mr Dixit writes as a patriotic Indian, finding everything right with Indian policies and everything wrong with whatever Pakistan did or did not do.
Specifically, Mr Dixit does not acknowledge that there was a genuine uprising in Kashmir in 1989 and blames everything on Pakistan's interference in Kashmir. His is a mindset that is not flexible. Maybe Mr Dixit has mellowed with the new responsibilities and might take a different view of things. I hope he does, because he occupies a very important position enjoying close proximity to the seat of power and is in a position to influence political decisions.
There is a reference in his book on "India and Pakistan in War and Peace" to persistent and coercive international pressure on India - and I am sure the same applies to Pakistan - to resolve the Kashmir issue. The nuclear capability of the two countries, and Kashmir as a flash point, has aroused international interest in the resolution of the dispute and so long as significant elements of the international community, specially the US remain engaged, there is hope that a way out may be found out of the present impasse.
Dealing with the specifics, Mr J.N.Dixit lists solutions proposed at various times to resolve the dispute:
1. Accepting the line of control as the international border.
2. Revival of the UN Resolutions leading to a plebiscite.
3. A standstill agreement between India and Pakistan and placing the state under UN trusteeship to be followed a few years later by a referendum.
4. An independent Jammu and Kashmir.
5. The Kashmir valley may be ceded to Pakistan while India retains Ladakh, Jammu and other areas.
Mr Dixit rules out restoration of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in its original form, which gave full autonomy to Kashmir, as being unacceptable to both the BJP and the Congress.
After arguing against all the proposed solutions - barring one - he concludes, "India's approach should be to work towards meaningful autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir, bringing the people of the state into the main stream of Indian democratic process, with the line of control gradually converting itself into a permanent border between India and Pakistan. Efforts to achieve this through political discussions should be initiated, however long drawn the effort may be." And one has to concede that India has the expertise and the experience in spinning out discussions endlessly.
Quite rightly, Pakistan emphasizes that any solution must take into account the wishes of the people of Kashmir. But the flaw in this stand is that the Kashmiris are not united in what they want. They range from pro-Pakistan, to pro-independence to pro-autonomy. This split in Kashmiri approach is to India's advantage.
Pakistan will be going into negotiations with less advantage than India - after all, India is in possession of more valuable territory - and would be reluctant to alter the status quo. Pakistan has already made a major concession by agreeing to 'put aside' - not abandon - its demand of a solution of the Kashmir dispute on the basis of the UN resolutions, and has expressed willingness to explore new ideas.
Obviously both sides cannot reveal their negotiating positions in advance of the highest-level meetings. Conducting delicate negotiations in the glare of 24 hour electronic and print media is a recipe for failure, if not total disaster. So we will just have to be patient and eschew speculation when serious negotiations commence.
A half-a-century old dispute will not suddenly lend itself to a solution. Nor will it be constructive to insist that first and foremost Kashmir must be discussed to the exclusion of other subjects. A composite dialogue has often been mentioned and simultaneous negotiations can and ought to take place on all matters of mutual benefit and interest.
Several straws are in the wind. One being a statement by the Indian foreign minister that India would be willing to consider - the word consider does not commit India - the proposal about the Iranian gas being piped to India through Pakistan if international guarantees can be provided. There is also the vague possibility that a solution reached by defence secretaries of India and Pakistan on Siachen in the '90s may be revived. That agreement was aborted at the technical and military level by India.
Then there are the perennial issues of Sir creek in the Rann of Kutch and the Wullar barrage in Kashmir which will come up for review. These and issues related to commerce and industry should all be taken up in the forthcoming negotiations as of course also the Kashmir dispute, which after all is the basic issue between the countries which dominates all other issues.
Before serious negotiations ensue at the level of the president, prime minister, there may be opportunities for the two sides to take soundings in an informal setting, where advisers are not present, to explore how far each side is willing to go in search of peace in the region.
Another Agra will be worse than the last one. And this is where the role of the US will be crucial as a peace broker. Undoubtedly both India and Pakistan have their hardliners and extremists who will disagree and object to whatever compromise emerges finally, and their capacity to create obstacles should not be underestimated.
Both India and Pakistan will ultimately have to accept that "there are always two sides to a conflict and peace is possible when both sides are prepared to acknowledge this. But once you believe that you are fighting for God against His enemies, there can only be one point of view and anything that opposes this becomes monstrous and evil." (Karen Armstrong in Holy War).
In conclusion, both parties will be guided by what they deem to be in their national interest. But is national interest served by a seemingly perpetual dispute that drains valuable financial and human resources bilaterally and regionally obstructs material progress affecting the lives of millions of people.
All worthwhile agreements under Saarc await the restoration of normalcy in the Indo-Pak relations. It can hardly be justified in the national interest of India and Pakistan that millions of people be condemned to live in misery deprived of food, shelter, education and health facilities. For too long both sides have played politics with Kashmir. It is time for statesmanship to take over in the higher national and regional interest.
The writer is a former foreign secretary.
It's the president who decides
The demonstration of support that was shown by members of the treasury benches as well as the opposition in the National Assembly to Zafarullah Jamali is something he must have greatly relished. Of course, it was not an endorsement of faith in him. It was just a temporary display of defiance designed to send a message to the military brass that the government would like to hang on to its system, in spite of its many imperfections.
What is, however, unfortunate, is that unlike western democracies, prime ministers in Pakistan have always operated with the Sword of Damocles hanging over their head. The rot which set in when Ghulam Mohammed dismissed Khwaja Nazimuddin, opened a number of wounds which festered years later when Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Farooq Leghari took turns to toss out democratically elected prime ministers, often with a smile of satisfied malice on their lips.
It was almost as if the two unelected presidents followed some kind of archaic code which dictated that no prime minister should be allowed to stay in harness for more than a specified period, irrespective of how effective he or she might be. This was done to ensure that the only permanent feature in national politics, which is the perpetuation of a constant state of temporariness and uncertainty, should be prosecuted at all costs.
The principle apparently applied equally to the two elected prime ministers who live in exile, and were accused of having put their fingers in the national till, as well as to Mohammed Khan Junejo, who though unelected and foisted on the nation, was publicly perceived as a good man who, if nothing else, at least curbed the rapacious appetites of members of the bureaucracy, and might have survived a little longer, had he not asked for an enquiry to be conducted into the Ojhri Camp disaster.
There was a temporary respite when Nawaz Sharif's party swept the polls. He turned the tables on the system and pushed aside Article 86 of the Constitution. But the euphoria was short- lived. There were too many things wrong with Nawaz Sharif, even though he belonged to the majority province and had a right wing outlook. To start with, he was a businessman, who conjugated the rigours of his calling a little too often.
Unfortunately, he chose to do business with the Koreans instead of the Americans, and one wonders what might have happened if the highway between Lahore and Islamabad had been built by a firm located in Dallas, Texas, instead of Seoul, and if the yellow taxis had been provided by General Motors instead of Daewoo.
Now in a political system like that of Pakistan, which is inundated with retrogressive feudal elements who speak on behalf of down-trodden peasants, and obscurantist forces, which want to take the country back to the Stone Age, and where the selfish pursuit of power is all too readily confused with real achievement, there is no place for people with progressive schemes, however grandiose and ambitious the ideas might seem. Nawaz Sharif was a fish out of water and had to be eliminated. He had a good lawyer and a friendly judge and made a dramatic comeback. But he had an atrocious sense of timing, which eventually led to his downfall.
Under a parliamentary system of government, which Pakistan purports to have, the president is supposed to be a titular head who, in addition to certain perfunctory duties, looks after ceremonial functions. It is the prime minister who wields the staff and has the clout. But under the present system which operates in Pakistan, it is the president who pulls the strings that make the marionettes dance, and the office of the prime minister has lost all executive authority and has been turned into something of an anachronism.
Now that the roles have been reversed and President Musharraf has acquired all executive powers, the status of Prime Minister Jamali has been reduced to that of a nominal head of the government. In the process, he has lost not only considerable prestige, but also some of his ceremonial powers.
Christina Rocca, US assistant secretary of state for south Asian affairs, after praising Pakistan's efforts in the war on terror, with characteristic understatement normally reserved for British statesmen, informed the US Congress that a return to full democracy was central to Pakistan's long term stability and noted that after a prolonged impasse, parliament is beginning to function and a devolution programme has begun to revitalize local government. One wonders what Talullah Bankhead, a US movie star of the 1930s would have said had she been still around. Perhaps she would have repeated the line that is often quoted and which she is fondly remembered for: "there is less to this than meets the eye."
The Pakistani nation has watched with disbelief and bewilderment how in 57 years 13 prime ministers have been humiliated, insulted and unceremoniously turfed out of power. They have seen how the official Muslim League, which is the mainstay of the reactionary government, was, through manipulation and stealth, crafted out of the debris of Punjab's largest party, how the controversial LFO was pushed through the parliament , and how the military has been given a permanent place in the affairs of state.
This latest action was performed in the mistaken belief that power would eventually shift from an authoritarian set-up to a democratic dispensation. But it was not to be. And now an elected prime minister, who has no executive power, is being hauled over the coals for not delivering the goods.
One cannot but help feel sorry for Jamali, who represents a minority province and is a decent man. He is an obvious scapegoat. However, it is one thing for the president to publicly express his disenchantment, because he feels he has let him down in the implementation of his reforms. But it is quite another for people in the same party to intrigue against him.
This article was written before Mr Jamali's resignation.
Perilous sectarian divide
For decade after its establishment in 1947, Pakistan remained immune to sectarian violence. However, over the years, this menace steadily came to the surface and a handful of extremists deprived it of this distinction.
Regrettably, Pakistan, which witnessed the sectarian violence and bloodshed for nearly two decades or so, is now perceived as one of the most notable examples of sectarian divide.
The recent escalation in sectarian violence in the country, which has surpassed all previous records, is indeed a cause of serious concern to all people of conscience. An inquest into the causes and motivations behind this dangerous upsurge in sectarian violence is, therefore, called for so that the issue could be addressed not only to prevent more violence and bloodshed on this account but also to eradicate, once for all, this menace.
The Islamic revolution in Iran, in 1979, was an extraordinary event. A powerful despot, backed by the West, was removed through a mass movement as a result of which the authoritarian regimes all over the Islamic world, including Pakistan, also felt threatened. The religious leaders in Iran, instead of first consolidating the gains of the revolution within Iran itself, declared to export it to the rest of the Islamic world. These pronouncements aggravated the situation even further.
In Pakistan, the sympathy with the Iranian revolution was discernible and, therefore, the authoritarian regime that was in the saddle at that time, feared that the people of Pakistan, particularly the downtrodden and deprived ones may draw inspiration from the success of the revolution in Iran and pose a threat to it. In order to forestall that possibility an orchestrated effort was made by the government of the day to portray the revolution in Iran a domestic affair or, at best, a Shia phenomenon.
Moreover, the government as part of its overall strategy to counter the Iranian leaders declared intent to export the revolution to other Islamic countries, also considered it expedient to drive a wedge between the two main sects of the country. It did not, however, realize that the rift, once created between the two sects, will not be an ephemeral phenomenon that would fade away with the passage of time.
The continued fratricidal conflict between the Sunnis and Shias in the country, which manifests itself from time to time, confirms this assertion. Regrettably, some unscrupulous elements in the country, including a number of clerics, supported the government's policy on Iran and thus contributed to the ominous sectarian rise in the country.
These collaborators were adequately rewarded by the regime as a result of which they became very strong, politically as well as economically, and emerged as a force to be reckoned with. The successive governments in Pakistan, taking advantage of the rising tide of the Islamic fervour, in the wake of the revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, also relied heavily, for political support, on these religious and sectarian outfits that had spawned in the country particularly during the Afghan war.
During the Afghan war, from 1979 to 1989, Pakistan was flooded with the most sophisticated weapons but the government did nothing to prevent the militarization of the religious and sectarian groups and parties. The people of Pakistan continue to suffer the agonies as a result of that terrible blunder. Government's inability to protect the precious lives of the citizens of Pakistan, which the constitution of the country has assigned to it, was a grave dereliction of duty.
However, to deflect attention from their failure on this account the successive governments in the country not only downplayed the incidents of violence but, most of the time, they put the blame for the same on external forces, hostile to Pakistan. This deliberate ostrich-like approach about the sectarian violence in the country, however, proved counter- productive as, for obvious reasons, it encouraged the sectarian extremists to carry on acts of violence.
In the wake of 9/11, President Pervez Musharraf banned several sectarian organizations, in January, 2002. However, most of these outlawed outfits either resurfaced with new names or merged with other like-minded groups and parties which, though engaged in undesirable sectarian activities, operate in a rather subtle manner. It is, however, quite evident that the sectarian organizations, no matter under which name and banner, continue to indulge in sectarian terrorism which, lately, has become accentuated.
However, it appears that the sectarian outfits in the country have changed their tactics and modus operandi. They now want to play safe. For instance, the high profile members of society, such as doctors, engineers, professors, businessmen and intellectuals etc., of the two sects, are now targeted by them and hit men are hired for this purpose. Moreover, the mosques and imambargahs, which, by virtue of their religious sanctity, are considered to be the safer place to operate, have now become the prime targets for terrorist attacks. Similarly, the suicide bombing, which is strictly forbidden in Islam, has also, lately, been introduced by the master-minds behind the sectarian violence with a view to concealing their identity to escape punishment.
The state response to the phenomenal rise in the sectarian violence is not only inadequate but even incoherent. It is not enough to denounce the sectarian violence, whenever it occurs, or indulge in other empty rhetorics. To eradicate the perilous menace of sectarianism, which had assumed alarming proportions and has brought the country close to disaster, deterrent measures are called for against the sponsors as well as the perpetrators of the sectarian violence.
However, it seems the government fails to address the real causes that lay at the root of this problem. Apparently, for reasons of expediency, it has turned a blind eye to the religious and sectarian extremists who are spreading heretical beliefs in the mosques and seminaries, under their control, which leads to the sectarian violence. Unfortunately, these mosques and seminaries have become breeding grounds for intolerance and hatred.
It is high time that the government wakes up to the fact that the country has to be cleaned of the sectarianism which basically is a politically motivated crime as it runs counter to the true essence of the Islamic teachings and also violates the law of the land.
However, to win the war against this menace, a strong determination and an iron will is necessary, on the part of the government. At the same time, every citizen of Pakistan, regardless of his political and religious affiliations, should also join the fight against terrorism by creating public awareness of the threat posed by it to the very fabric of the society, besides harming other vital national interests.
The writer is a former ambassador.
Corporate culture and poverty
There are more poor people in Pakistan than any other kind. Of these, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization, 32.6 per cent or one-third of the population fell below the poverty line in 2003. Furthermore, employed labourers are generally under-paid, earning less than the monthly minimum wage of Rs. 3,000 fixed by the ministry of labour and manpower, while women and children in upcountry labour markets earn less than Rs. 1,500.
These figures appear pitifully insignificant in the light of a recent joint study by the ministry, specialist NGOs and private labour unions. According to the study, a family of six, including two children and parents, requires a minimum of Rs. 12,000 per month for essential needs excluding expenses incurred on household rent, fares, marriages, funerals, etc. In real terms therefore, even if the breadwinner earns Rs. 3,000, a shortfall of Rs. 9,000 will remain between actual earnings and the cost of basic needs.
In terms of income share, the poor 20 per cent of the population earn eight per cent of the gross annual income, whereas the rich 20 per cent earn 47 per cent of the gross annual income. Of the rich 20 per cent, the affairs of state and all major enterprises are controlled by a mere five per cent.
This unit includes the feudal, military, commercial, bureaucratic, religious and criminal elements, who have held centre stage since the formation of Pakistan, and are therefore responsible in varying degrees for the socio-economic and political developments affecting the state.
As the leader of the unit, the military will lay claim to 22 per cent of the 2004-2005 budget. With debt servicing taking up 30 per cent and the civil administration taking 17 per cent, only 31 per cent is left for other sectors. Contrary to President Musharraf's claim that defence expenditure has not increased during he past four years, the present budget has risen from Rs. 131.6 billion in 2000-2001 to Rs. 193.2 billion in the 2004-2005 budget.
Al-though information on the defence budget particulars is classified, evidence abounds of non-combat expenditure in the perks, plots and privileges granted to military personnel to ensure their financial well-being in and out of service.
The military ethos is all-pervasive, extending from the lion's share of the budget to a burgeoning share in the civil public and private sectors. It is an ever-increasing phenomenon comparable to the expansionist agenda of multinational corporations which is premised on controlling international affairs alongside the wealthiest and most powerful forces in the world.
In similar fashion, the indigenous military ethos has morphed into a corporate interest operating within the structure of the state, that is predisposed to controlling the support structure without which its existence as a corporate entity would be imperilled. Thus, retaining power within the state becomes imperative. One consequence of the retention of power without accountability is accessibility to the resources of the state for the perpetuation of the corporate entity in preference to other priorities such as poverty alleviation.
Next in the pecking order for budgetary allocations comes the civil bureaucracy which, apart from political appointees, comprises a staggering four million employees in the federal, provincial and local governments who are low in productivity and high on red tape.
The financial implications of the bureaucracy are best illustrated by the half a billion rupees annual cost of maintaining the 100 frontline civil servants. The remuneration package of the imperious Grade 22 civil servant, inclusive of salary, housing, related utilities, etc. amounts to Rs. 400,000 per month plus, of course, the 15 per cent increase granted by the new budget. No wonder, Pakistan's bureaucracy is regarded as the top heaviest and the costliest of the Third World. Whatever else it may be, it is definitely not citizen-friendly.
Next come the elected representatives, those overpaid incumbents of dysfunctional assemblies whose numbers have risen from 227 to 342 in the National Assembly and to 728 in the provincial assemblies making a total of 1070, and whose salaries have also doubled. Expanded assemblies mean expanded cabinets and inevitably higher remuneration for ministers.
The political scenario also promotes a particularly pernicious practice of annual grants of development funds amounting to Rs. 10 million per head to MNAs and senators, and Rs. 5 million per head to MPAs, together aggregating Rs. 8 billion, for project development in their respective constituencies.
Part of the grant is usually deployed by the grantees to finance sketchily devised welfare projects such as schools, medical centres etc. most of which are foredoomed for want of feasibility and requisite planning, while the remainder is expendable for further development at the grantee's discretion. It takes little imagination to envisage the most likely use of such funds.
One way of stemming the rot is by reactivating the Social Action Programme within the functionality of the recently elected local government bodies. Such a step would justify switching the development funds from the MNAs and MPAs to elected local government bodies. Such a step would justify switching the development funds from the MNAs and MPAs to elected local bodies will grassroots support in local constituencies. The move while depriving the MNA / MPA contingent of spending power, would benefit their constituents immensely.
The activities of the remaining power brokers representing four private sector interests, including the feudal, the commercial, the religious and the criminal, also have budgetary implications. All four are adept at prioritizing their interests at the expense of common man, and at securing them by recourse to legal - or when considered necessary - illegal, measures for the accretion of money and power.
Their achievements include bonafide industrial, commercial, cultural, educational and philanthropic successes, on the one hand, and malafide financial scams, land grabbing, tax evasion, smuggling and corrupt and criminal practices, on the other.
Given the existing money and power culture, Francois Bourguignon, vice-president and chief economist of the World Bank is of the opinion that growth alone as depicted in our budget, and also in the "shining" Indian budget is no panacea for poverty alleviation unless accompanied by a redistribution of assets and income to enable the poor to accumulate finance and human capital, which usually takes place in exceptional circumstances often involving political violence.
If this happens, the primary responsibility would lie with the government because there are two striking features about the administration of financial and welfare services affecting the poor. The first, according to a well-known financial specialist, betrays an absence of pro-poor orientation in the framing and execution of budgetary policies, for despite the availability of resources there is still insufficient emphasis on development expenditure which facilitates the creation of assets and a future flow of income. In contrast, there are few cuts in current or non-productive expenditure which tends to be consumptive. Thus, poverty continues to increase unabated despite the glittering new budget.
The second feature is culpable mismanagement in several activities impinging on poverty alleviation. A primary example is the causus belli of the pre-budget wrangling between the provinces and the federal government over the division for the next fiscal year of the three major resources comprising, the National Finance Commission award, water distribution and wheat procurement.
According to a recent report, the uncompromising attitudes of the claimants "must surely have something to do with the shortage of resources relative to demand." The truth is that "every province is feeling the crunch" because there are not enough resources to go around owing to the failure of successive governments to improve the country's resource situation to meet growing demands. The inevitable negative fallout has impacted hardest on those at the bottom of the pecking order.
The remedies for all these problems are well known to the informed citizens of the state. Yet, ironically, they are not rectified because of fault lines in the system which the powers concerned are reluctant to address. Faults that time has magnified to the extent that they threaten the viability of the state.
Heading the list is the calamitous failure of governance giving way to ad hoc authoritarianism propelled by the whims and fancies of individuals or of independent power blocs operating within the ambit of ideological or localized scenarios. Next, there is the failure of the institutions of state and society either during to the lack of proper maintenance or to their inability to withstand incursions made to restructure them according to the agenda of the ascendant power. Next, we have the failure of civil society to promote civilized values including the rights of all citizens. Finally, there is the failure of the religious order to promote an enlightened understanding of Islam.
This catalogue of failures has resulted in a surreal situation in which we exist in limbo from day to day awaiting, in the short term, the sound and fury of the mob of which we had a foretaste in the month of May, and in the long term, the dissolution and disappearance of the state, in which case the corporate interest of the military, the agendas of the special interest groups and the politicized jihad of the militant fundamentalists, along with the genuine interests of the citizens of the state, will all come to nought. But does anybody care?
The writer is a barrister-at-law and lecturer in legal studies.