After several anxious days, when the future of the recently launched India-Pakistan peace process appeared to be in jeopardy, the prospects of the resumption of the dialogue between Pakistan and India is once again being seen as promising.
The Indian foreign minister, Mr Natwar Singh, has clarified that the talks would adhere to the original schedule and would not be confined to the rigid framework of the Shimla Agreement.
If, in the first place, in a previous statement, he had not made observations which cast a shadow of uncertainty over the peace dialogue, both countries would have been saved their moments of anxiety.
Mr Natwar Singh, in a statement on May 30, had suggested somewhat categorically that "India will pursue talks with its western neighbour" on the basis of the Shimla Agreement of 1972.
As a seasoned diplomat having dealt with India-Pakistan problems over a long period, he can be expected to remember that the Shimla Agreement was not negotiated in the happiest of circumstances from Pakistan's point of view.
But for the statesmanship which the late Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto demonstrated at the time, Pakistan would not have come out of the Shimla talks with its dignity intact.
India had militarily intervened in the crisis created by General Yahya Khan aggressiveness and the intransigence of the Bengali leadership in the then East Pakistan, which led to the latter's secession. Mr Bhutto secured a reasonable deal. It is reassuring that Mr Natwar Singh believes that India and Pakistan should not remain prisoners of their past.
More importantly, about the same time when Mr Natwar Singh made his earlier remarks, the Indian prime minister, Mr Manmohan Singh, assured Prime Minister Zafrullah Khan Jamali in their telephone conversation that India was firm in its commitment to move forward and pave the way for resolving all outstanding bilateral issues including that of Kashmir.
Mr Natwar Singh, in an exclusive interview to the widely circulated Hindustan Times, has given the assurance of "frank discussions" on all bilateral issues including Kashmir.
India has also since conveyed to Pakistan its acceptance of the schedule for the talks on nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs) and the meeting between the foreign secretaries of the two governments.
The Indian foreign secretary has also confirmed that the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan would have a meeting in August, as already scheduled, and the basis of the bilateral talks would be not only the Shimla Agreement but also all subsequent agreements and understandings between India and Pakistan.
A section of the press has reported that Mr Natwar Singh has said that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government had "no fundamental differences" (on the India-Pakistan peace process) with the erstwhile administration of Vajpayee "who had built a warm rapport with General Musharraf."
As a Gulf newspaper has observed "the war of words" between the two countries which had started with Mr Natwar Singh's earlier controversial statement now appears to have ended.
It is unfortunate that the Indian foreign minister should have evoked the painful memory of the Shimla Agreement and also speculated that perhaps a resolution of the Kashmir question could be found on the basis in which New Delhi resolved its border dispute with China.
Not unexpectedly, in a sharp rejoinder, the Pakistan foreign minister has stressed that unlike the India-China dispute, Kashmir was not a mere territorial dispute but an international dispute which could not be settled without addressing the aspirations of the Kashmiri people.
It is reassuring that following the acrimonious exchange between the two foreign ministers, both Islamabad and New Delhi now seem to agree that all such contentious issues should be dealt with in the course of the bilateral talks which have already started. As Mr Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri has said, "the search for peace and stability is imperative for both Pakistan and India."
Perhaps, the most important aspect of the bilateral talks which will recommence later his month is the schedule for the official level talks on the nuclear CBMs slated for June 19-20 and the foreign secretary level talks proposed for June 27-28.
This would be the first time that the two governments would be getting down to discussing the issue in a serious businesslike way. However, it would unrealistic to presume that the discussion would enter a decisive stage in this first encounter between the two neighbours on a matter which touches upon their very survival.
It has to be recognized in both countries that the common people demonstrate a sense of euphoria because of the knowledge that their security arsenals are now equipped with nuclear weapons. The delivery systems in both countries have also been developed to a fairly high level of technology.
While in India the ultimate decision to use or not use a nuclear weapon will apparently lie with the political authority, in Pakistan this decision will be the prerogative of the defence or security apparatus.
It has to be acknowledged that while the political elite in India is normally not hysterical, where nuclear weapons are concerned it has proved itself to be hasty and even mindless by carrying out the nuclear tests in May 1998 which left Pakistan with no option but to follow suit.
To make matters worse, the Indian leadership which was in power in New Delhi at the time daunted Pakistan in the short interval when Pakistan had not quite decided to go for its blasts by asserting that Pakistan should note "the change in South Asia's strategic environment."
Both countries have since been engaged in a mindless pursuit of nuclear weaponry and its delivery system. The late Dr Eqbal Ahmad had aptly remarked: India's mindless rightwing leaders who started it all and then proceeded to goad Pakistan into baring its nuclear capabilities may never acknowledge that "they have committed a crime against India and its neighbours, and that not one good - strategic or tactical, political or economic - can accrue from the blunder."
However, the right-wing (Vajpayee, Advani et al) are now no longer in power but it is doubtful that the Congress, which even though if it has come to power mainly with the support of the left wing i.e. the two communist parties, has the moral courage to bring about a radical policy change to neutralize the consequences of India's nuclear adventure.
The redeeming feature is that the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) whose support is crucial to the survival of Manmohan Singh's government has always been strongly opposed to the Bharatiya Janata Party government's nuclear policy.
In a statement issued after India's nuclear blasts in May 1998, it demanded de-nuclearization of the region. The party's Polit Bureau called upon the New Delhi government to declare that "it would not induct nuclear weapons and build a nuclear arsenal triggering a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent."
The Polit Bureau also called upon "all peace-loving patriots" to carry forward India's long cherished desire "to rid this planet of all nuclear weapons" and force the government to adopt positions which would help preserve peace and security in the region and strengthen good-neighbourly relations."
With its strong presence in the Lok Sabha and its indispensability to the survival of Manmohan Sindh's government, the CPM can be expected to pressure the Congress and its allies into adopting the same policy towards the nuclearization of the regions.
If a dialogue by India is sustained with Pakistan and some degree of normalization is achieved in other areas of India-Pakistan relations, a movement towards nuclear disarmament may also become a possibility. It will certainly not happen soon but over a period of time it may actually come about.
President Gen Pervez Musharraf's decision to telephone Ms Sonia Gandhi and invite her to visit Pakistan was a gracious gesture. It appears that she would be happy to visit Pakistan.
The Indian foreign minister himself has said: "Soniaji has been invited to Pakistan and I hope a programme would be chalked out for her visit...she would certainly receive a big welcome from its (Pakistan's) people.
It cannot be said that the late Ms Indira Gandhi was always well disposed towards Pakistan. Let us hope her daughter-in-law will show a more congenial disposition in her dealings with Pakistan.
A paradigm for nuclear security
By Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali
At last some sanity has prevailed over the dark clouds of Indo-Pakistan acrimony. The Islamabad Declaration holds the promise of a genuine rapprochement. I recently saw a great groundswell for peace in New Delhi.
Lahore too opened its heart to Indian visitors. It's a fair tale of two great cities. Only fools now dream of hoisting the green flag on the Red Fort, or of repasting at the Lahore Gymkhana.
There is an air of hope. The people of the subcontinent have spoken. Will the leaders listen and heed? Will they show wisdom or will they squander this opportunity for peace which history has presented?
The stunning results of the Indian elections have sent Vajpayee and his alliance home. This need not be bad for the Indo-Pakistan peace process. If Sonia Gandhi wishes to move forward, as she has said, the BJP, far from opposing, will seek credit for it as the outcome of its own initiative.
The Congress allies, especially the communists, will be supportive of the peace process. Normalization must follow leading to conflict resolution and good relations.
Talks must move forward on all issues with substantive progress on all fronts. India must not shy away from addressing the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. The final solution will take time - who does not know that? But in the meantime, India must deliver on the human and legal rights of the Kashmiri people.
The LoC is sealed. It is time for India to send a signal of good intentions to the Valley. Equally, Pakistan must not shy away from trade, the solution of lesser issues, and more CBMs.
A staggered simultaneity on all issues is a reasonable and viable approach. Peace will need to be knit, strand by strand, into the fabric of solutions. This is the only way to the cherished tapestry of friendship.
It is well that both countries recognize the dangers of a nuclear war and have agreed to talk soon on possible nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs). At many levels, both India and Pakistan need to take a unified stand multilaterally.
The CTBT and the NPT are fast becoming irrelevant in the face of India and Pakistan acquiring de facto status as declared nuclear states. Both countries must jointly endeavour for de jure recognition of their nuclear status as a fait accompli.
This must not be seen as a dangerous precedent because all other near-nuclear states have signed the NPT and are under IAEA inspection. The only other exceptions are Israel, a non-declared nuclear state, and North Korea.
The P-5 should be expanded to include India and Pakistan, and made P-7 under the NPT, provided both states agree to sign the NPT. Israel and North Korea could be given associate member status provided they agree to the full IAEA regulatory regime.
Though a covert nuclear power, Iran is under vigorous IAEA inspections and cannot qualify for associate status. Both India and Pakistan can jointly mount a worldwide campaign for reform of the NPT.
They could also cooperate in the fissile material cut-off treaty in its negotiations in the UN disarmament committee in Geneva. Both countries need to work out joint strategies for total global nuclear disarmament as a contingent to nuclear non-proliferation.
Both India and Pakistan need to take a high moral position on the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world. Nuclear weapons, as all WMDs, are bad for the whole world. India and Pakistan must declare so.
This is the only moral position all peace-loving countries can take while promoting the principle of universal nuclear disarmament and elimination. Bilateral nuclear talks scheduled for June must address these multilateral interests of both countries. But a heavy responsibility rests upon them to make South Asia a safer place. There are serious dangers of an accidental nuclear exchange given the 3 1/2 to five minutes' response time.
In the event of war, the losing side will be tempted to make a strategic or tactical nuclear strike to avert a conventional defeat. A potential Armageddon looms large on the subcontinent's horizon.
This threat must be wisely managed. It is of no use for India to play games with its nuclear card. Its proposed treaty on nuclear non-first strike cannot be conceptually accepted by Pakistan.
This is seen here as a ploy to subvert our nuclear parity and to relegate us to conventional arms inferiority to India's advantage. On the other hand, given the security environment, it is unrealistic for Pakistan to expect India to agree to nuclear disarmament.
India has a contradictory position on nuclear disarmament. It has one standard for the P-5 to whom it sermonizes on the virtues of disarmament. To Pakistan's quest for nuclear disarmament in the region, it cites the supposed security threat from China as an argument against it.
We must understand that states are seldom consistent in pursuing their interest and will use any opportunistic argument to push them. I think the time has come for India and Pakistan to evolve mature policies to avert the dangers of nuclear war. The nuclear paradigm must be based on risk management and security. Some proposals, which could be mutually acceptable, are:
FIRST: a treaty for non-nuclear strike on demographic and economic targets: this will protect the cities, towns and population centres of both countries. It will also ensure the protection of economic assets like dams, irrigation systems, major industries, nuclear sites, etc. This treaty can become the most significant nuclear CBM.
SECOND: a treaty for the non-use of strategic nuclear weapons: both countries can agree not to use mega-ton weapons against one another. Consequently, in the event of war, the use of only tactical or theatre nuclear weapons will be notionally permissible.
THIRD: a treaty on nuclear security. Both countries will need to put into place a strong monitoring regime to avert an accidental nuclear exchange. This may mean two things.
First, they will need to exchange information on numbers, forward deployment, and tonnage of nuclear devices possessed by each. Ambiguity, which served well for two decades, has now become a dangerous factor in the Indo-Pakistan nuclear equation.
Second, to prevent an accidental nuclear war, a joint command, control and communication system needs to be put into place for nuclear risk management. Our monitors can sit in the control room of the C-3 system in New Delhi, and theirs in Islamabad.
FOURTH: a treaty on banning the development of second-strike capability. India and Pakistan will be plunged into a second nuclear arms race if one of them develops the second-strike nuclear capability.
India's bid to achieve superiority in radar technology and develop anti-missile missile defences will be counter-productive. Recent history has shown Pakistan has matched Indian superiority in nuclear weapons and missiles.
All this will do is to divert scant resources from development and progress. If India wishes to develop ICBMs, it is India's prerogative and does not affect Pakistan. But advanced radar, second-strike nuclear capability and anti-missile missile systems do.
FIFTH: a treaty on mutual inspection of unsafeguarded nuclear installations and facilities. There must be mutual inspection of unsafeguarded and safeguarded nuclear facilities to ensure their non-use for aggressive purposes against one another.
SIXTH: Further strengthening of the bilateral nuclear agreements signed between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto in 1989. Risk management and security must be the underlying Indo-Pakistan paradigm strategy in evolving nuclear CBMs.
But each country will determine its own perception of security. India's security arrangements will be bifocal - China-centric and Pakistan-centric. Pakistan's will be India-centric. Wisdom will lie in each state finding the space for peace.
Inevitably, that space will be small to begin with. But if the process is kept alive and nurtured, the area of peace can override suspicion and animosity. If India did not shine in its elections, let both countries now endeavour for the feel-good subcontinent.
The writer is a former foreign minister.
Many new faces in Iraqi cabinet
By Michael Howard
Iraq's new administration of 26 ministers and five junior ministers announced on June 1 contains many new faces, but still reflects the ethnic and sectarian character of its predecessor, the much-derided governing council, and is still dominated by former exiles.
The UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi had said he wanted the interim government to be composed mainly of apolitical technocrats, whose prime task would be to organize elections in January.
But one Kurdish official said recently that "given the mutual distrust that existed between Kurds and Arabs, Sunni and Shia as a result of Saddam, it really is hard to leave all that behind for now".
The president, Sheikh Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, is a Sunni Arab, while his two vice-presidents are a Shia Arab and a Kurd respectively: Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a popular Shia politician and former governing council member, and Roj Nuri Shuways, the speaker of the Kurdish parliament in Arbil.
Ayed Allawi, the prime minister, is a secular Shia, while his deputy, Barham Salih, is a Kurd who has been prime minister of the Kurdish regional government in Sulaimaniya for four years. The government also has ministers from the Christian and Turkomen communities.
Aides to Mr Allawi have said that "security is the number one priority, and that is reflected in the new government". Barham Salih, the new deputy premier who has good relations with the state department and the Pentagon, is in charge of national security. Iraqi officials said the other day that this meant overseeing the work of the defence and interior ministries in the crucial months prior to next January's elections.
Mr Salih, a British-educated civil engineer and a popular figure in Iraqi Kurdistan, is also expected to coordinate the rebuilding of Iraqi security forces for the eventual withdrawal of coalition soldiers.
Another new face is Iraqi defence minister Hazim al-Shalaan. He is from the southern, Shia-dominated province of Diwaniyah and took a leading role in the ill-fated uprising against Saddam Hussein in 1991.
Mr Shalaan then spent years in exile in London before returning to Iraq after the US invasion and becoming governor of Diwaniyah. The other key security post is interior, which goes to Falah al-Naqib, a Sunni Arab who is the governor of Saleheddin, in the heart of the Sunni triangle.
There are no guarantees that the new cabinet will be regarded as any more legitimate than the former governing council, which dissolved itself. With this in mind, Mr Allawi is said to be keen to increase the powers of his government after the June 30 hand-over.
He has dispatched Hoshyar Zebari, the reappointed foreign minister (a Kurd), to the UN to lobby the Security Council on the US and British draft resolution on Iraq. Iraqi leaders want more say in security matters, more control over oil revenues, and a clearer statement about the status of the interim constitution, which the proposed resolution ignores. - Dawn/The Guardian News Service