The occupier's dilemma

In a fable The Lion, the Fox, and the Beasts, written by the 5th century BC Greek writer Aesop, the lion asks why the fox did not pay him a visit to his cave. "I beg your Majesty's pardon," replied the fox, "but I noticed the track of the animals that have already come to you; and while I see many hoof-marks going in, I see none coming out." The moral of the story, according to Aesop: "it is easier to get into the enemy's toils than out again".

The United States, as it struggles to deal with the situation in Iraq, will certainly testify to the authenticity of Aesop's wisdom. It was not too long ago that the US experienced this in Vietnam.

But as the memory of that conflict faded and subsequent American administrations seemed to regain their confidence, with interventions in Grenada and Panama, with victory in the first Gulf war, and lately with partial success in Afghanistan (driving out the Taliban), the temptation for the present government to overlook the lesson of history was high.

Comedian Dana Carvey, who used to impersonate senior President Bush on the "Saturday Night Live" show, once said in one of his "Oval Office" speeches that America had learned a lesson from Vietnam. And that is, never ever fight with the Vietnamese.

The circumstances leading to the US invasion of Iraq, and its aftermath, makes one wonder if members of George W. Bush's administration seriously believed in what was supposed to be a mere satire.

First, the US invaded Iraq with dubious justifications, and then appeared surprisingly unprepared to handle the post-war situation, not only to the detriment of the people whom it supposedly helped but also to the detriment of its own interests.

Perhaps there was an indication of the things to come when immediately after the demise of the Iraqi government common Iraqis went on a looting spree and the occupying authority did nothing to stop it.

What appeared to be American unwillingness at that time to impose law and order inside Iraq, now seems to be part of a bigger issue. That is, in its haste to "rid the world" of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) the United States did not clearly foresee the nature of events that were to unfold after the Iraqi army was defeated.

Nor does it seem to have estimated the complexity of the disengagement process. As a result, violence still continues and about 2000 Iraqis and over 500 Americans have died since May 2003 when the US commander-in-chief, under a banner "Mission Accomplished," naively declared that "major combat operations in Iraq have ended."

Hence, within the US, the administration faces mounting criticism for, among other things, not having developed a viable strategy to exit from the enemy's land. Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John Kerry, who had supported the Congressional resolution to wage war against Iraq, now laments that for the US troops in Iraq there is "no exit in sight." Needless to say, he holds Bush responsible for the situation.

Whether the present situation resulted from the lack of an exit strategy or the failure of a planned one, hardly matters now. It simply confirms that while entering into an adventure such as this is a matter of choice, getting out is not necessarily so. In May 1964, when the Vietnam war was still in its initial stage and large American buildup in Indo-China had not yet begun, President Lyndon B. Johnson told his national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, according to declassified telephone tapes, that the war was "the biggest damn mess I ever saw." He then added, "I don't think it's worth fighting for, and I don't think we can get out."

Johnson's successor, Richard Nixon, came to the White House in 1969 with a "secret plan" to terminate the war, but to implement his exit strategy he ended up escalating the conflict to neutral Cambodia and Laos.

In 1972, when he ordered the mining of Haiphong harbour in the Gulf of Tonkin, he said the purpose was to "keep the weapons of war out of the hands of the international outlaws of North Vietnam." Though Nixon claimed that ending the war was his "first priority", the last American troops were not able to leave Vietnam until 1973.

When the United States undertook the first major military operation since Vietnam in the first Gulf war in 1991, it could have easily fallen into the same quagmire that it now finds itself in.

The US had successfully expelled the Iraqi army from Kuwait and could have proceeded to Baghdad to remove Saddam Hussein from power. It did not have the mandate to do that but it was nevertheless in a position to use the opportunity to attain that goal, since in its war against Iraq it already enjoyed the support of a genuine international coalition, unlike the crumbling "coalition of the willing" that the present administration commands.

But the senior Bush decided against that action. Many in America at that time and until recently regretted that Bush had quit the operation too soon, "without finishing the job." Finishing the job meant taking the road to Baghdad and toppling Saddam Hussein in the manner the present administration did.

Why did the United States in 1991 decide not to go to Baghdad? There may be several reasons. Some are offered by the senior Bush and his National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft in their book, A World Transformed (1998).

They state that in order to remove Saddam Hussein "we would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well.

Under those circumstances, there was no viable 'exit strategy' we could see.... Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land."

The national security coterie in the George W. Bush's administration does not seem to have envisioned such a scenario. It was going into the war with hardly any significant international support.

Losing allies, therefore, was not one of its main worries. Nor did it expect Iraq to be a hostile land. In Vice President Cheney's view, US soldiers in Iraq were to be "greeted as liberators" - the assumption being that the decade long economic sanctions that hurt the Iraqis severely, or occasional US bombing of the country, had only served to enhance a positive image of the US in the area.

The United States thus appeared obsessed with the idea of invasion, miscalculating the cost of the action to itself or to the Iraqis. In the months preceding the war, it opposed giving UN inspectors more time to verify their suspicion about the weapons.

In his speech before the Security Council in February 2003, General Colin Powell said, "the issue before us is... how much longer are we willing to put up with Iraq's non-compliance before we as a Council, we as the United Nations, say enough, enough."

The administration now blames faulty intelligence for its inability to find weapons of mass destruction, but the fact is that more than the intelligence failure it was the failure to honestly make an effort to ascertain whether Iraq had the weapons.

The view that the issue of WMDs was a mere excuse to wage war or, as Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, let it slip in his Vanity Fair interview, a "bureaucratic" justification, is credible.

In its rush to war, the administration was not alone. It had the blessing of the Congress which had already swiftly passed a joint resolution in October 2002 supporting a preemptive war against Iraq with or without the United Nations authorization.

The House spent a total of three days in debating the resolution. The Senate, which had spent five days discussing the issue, cleared the joint resolution within 10 hours after receiving it from the House.

Public approval for the war was not lacking either. In April 2003, according to a poll, 76 per cent Americans believed that it was worth going to war with Iraq. In May 2004, faced with a situation they had not anticipated, only 42 per cent said that the war was worth it.

The United States now seeks to transfer the Iraq issue to the United Nations, the organization Bush had considered "irrelevant" when it refused to approve the invasion. The UN, according to the administration, will oversee Iraq's transition to becoming sovereign on June 30 and the political process towards establishing a fully elected government thereafter.

The full implementation of the plan, whose details are not yet clear, is in doubt for two reasons. First, the US administrator, Paul Bremer, has already indicated that the Iraqi forces will not be ready to take charge of the security by the desired date.

Second, the UN may have its own reservations about assuming a wide role in Iraq. It remains to be seen how far the organization would go in accepting that responsibility. The date June 30, therefore, does not provide an easy exit.

Efforts by the two sides are likely to continue for a while: by the United States, how to disengage while, at the same time, allowing Iraq only limited sovereignty; and, by the Iraqis, how to liberate themselves from the liberators.

Containing spread of WMDs

The UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted a resolution (1540) on April 28, which, inter alia, asks all states to refrain from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.

The resolution also requires all states to adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws to implement this resolution. The resolution further seeks to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by establishing appropriate control over related materials and border controls and law enforcement efforts to prevent illicit trafficking and brokering in these items through appropriate legislation and, when necessary, through international cooperation.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) already enjoins each nuclear-weapon-state party to the treaty not to transfer, to any recipient whatsoever, nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist a non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices. Each non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty is also required to support the nuclear non-proliferation regime in all its aspects.

Thus, the NPT was an effective instrument to attain the goals set forth in the UNSC resolution 1540. However, Pakistan, being a member of the Council, and in full agreement with the stated objective of the resolution and its provisions, supported its adoption to present a united stand, on behalf of the august world body, against the spread of nuclear and other WMDS.

It may, however, be pertinent to mention that Pakistan and India are the only two nuclear-weapon states who have not yet acceded to the NPT and are not willing to do so unless they are formally recognized as nuclear powers.

The recent remarks made by a senior State Department official, John Wolf, that the United States remains committed to universal adherence to the NPT and the steps taken by his country recently to strengthen relations with both these countries to advance its regional goals, enhance the fight against terrorism and to secure their cooperation on nuclear material export controls should not be taken to suggest that it has accepted the status of either country as a nuclear weapon state, under the NPT, are self-explanatory and quite significant.

These remarks, however, completely ignore the reality of the existence of nuclear weapons in South Asia and lead one to believe that the UNSC resolution of April 28 was actually designed to rope Pakistan and India into the process of nuclear non-proliferation, without conceding to their demand for nuclear status.

The adoption of the resolution in question under Chapter VII, making its provisions a binding obligation, was also a deliberate move to give the UNSC the power to enforce it, if necessary, by use of force against delinquent states.

The United States and other permanent members of the UNSC should, however, take a realistic view of the situation and recognize both Pakistan and India as de jure nuclear states to enable them to fulfil their obligations, stipulated under Article I of the NPT.

The argument that the acceptance of these countries as de jure nuclear states may prompt many other states to withdraw from the NPT to become nuclear states does not stand to reason.

As a matter of fact, a continued de facto nuclear status held by Pakistan and India, with no compulsion to honour the NPT obligations, holds more attraction to countries wanting to fulfil their nuclear ambition.

The text of resolution 1540 was ostensibly restricted to address proliferation by non-state actors and does not encompass other aspects of the nuclear disarmament. It is, however, feared that in the course of time the scope of this resolution may be enlarged to encompass those beyond non-state actors and terrorists.

Both, Islamabad and New Delhi, therefore, have reason to worry about the arbitrary manner in which the nuclear order is intended to be transformed and enforced by the five permanent members of the UNSC.

It should, however, be realized that the NPT is not an end in itself but a means and a step in the process towards global nuclear disarmament which is the only way to ensure international peace, security and stability.

The nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are, thus, mutually complementary. Unless the nuclear-weapon states fulfil their commitment relating to nuclear disarmament, as required by UN Article VI of the NPT, all efforts to attain the goal of complete elimination of nuclear arsenal shall remain an illusion.

Regrettably, an indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, at the instance of the United States, without specifying any deadline for fulfilling the treaty commitment by the five recognized nuclear states, was aimed at legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons and their retention in perpetuity.

This runs counter to their advocacy for the treaty's universal adherence. It is bound to frustrate all efforts aimed at achieving global nuclear disarmament.

The nuclearization of South Asia has created regional stability and both, Pakistan and India, have ultimately realized that an open-ended estrangement between them was detrimental to their national interests.

Both have already embarked upon a process of normalizing their relations and have seemingly made impressive strides towards this end. It is hardly necessary to mention that their nuclear-deterrence relationship has been the driving force behind the peace move initiated by their leaders.

It, therefore, seems unlikely that Pakistan and India would be willing to renounce their nuclear capabilities at the present juncture.

However, in future, the two countries, following the pattern of regional nuclear free zones, already established in Latin America, Southeast Asia, South Pacific region and Africa may, through mutual understanding and consent, establish a similar zone in South Asia.

The NPT recognizes the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the elimination of nuclear weapons from their respective territories with a view to maintaining peace and stability there, in the spirit of peaceful co-existence and mutual understanding and cooperation, as embodied in the UN Charter and various other declarations.

The writer is a former ambassador.

Two episodes to learn from

Recently, two separate incidents of the media blowing the whistle on and tearing apart the shroud of secrecy around military operations came to light. These have lessons for Pakistan.

In the first instance, the media splashed reports and pictures of the torture and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The horrific reports and graphic pictures of torture led to a public apology by President Bush, the congressional grilling of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and a universal, unprecedented outpouring of scorn and hatred for the perpetrators of the crimes. This has weakened the staying and fighting power of the US in Iraq.

In the second episode, the Indian media exposed the falsehood of some claimed encounters in the Siachen glaciers last year. The Indian military had been routinely claiming encounters with the "enemy troops" in the snow-covered peaks of Siachen and the "killing" of the Pakistani troops.

To lend credence to its claims, videos had been made of the fake encounters and killings. But the media penetrated the shroud of secrecy and revealed that the videos were fake and tampered with.

The media questioned as to how enemy soldiers had been killed from a distance of over one kilometre by troops not trained to use sniper rifles. It questioned whether an air defence bunker claimed to have been destroyed was actually a Pakistani bunker.

As it turned out, the Indian troops had built the bunker on their side of the glacier and destroyed it themselves with rockets and mortars, while falsely claiming that a Pakistani bunker had been destroyed. Fictitious claims had been made by Indian troops apparently to win coveted gallantry awards.

The revelations by the media sent the Indian military establishment into a tailspin. It ordered an inquiry and was prompt in admitting the faked encounters with "enemy personnel" in the Siachen glacier last year. Action has been ordered against a colonel and two majors.

These two incidents in the span of a week hold important lessons for us. One is the courage of the media to investigate military related events and installations and its refusal to be intimidated by either the Pentagon or the Indian defence ministry into admitting that its forays into their domain was tantamount to endangering national security.

If the media were to go by the Pentagon's definition of national security, the world would have never known of the Abu Ghraib shame which would have continued even today.

If the Indian media had not challenged the defence ministry's concept of national security and not investigated the Siachen "encounters", vested interests on both sides of the border would have exploited fake claims of a hot war amongst the icy peaks to keep the pot boiling, asked for more military spending and covered up the military's misadventures elsewhere.

Our response to the two events is quite predictable. Public opinion has condemned the US for abusing Iraqi prisoners. We are also likely to sneer at the false claims of encounters in the Siachen glacier by the Indian troops. But in doing so, we are likely to miss the point where we ourselves are concerned.

It goes to the credit of the democratic systems in the US and India that the journalists who broke the stories were not picked up by the agencies for a thrashing and a subsequent trial for treason.

When the whistle was blown and the chips were down, the Indian army, within hours, came out clean with the episode. It neither made excuses nor demanded that the Army Act be applied to news reporters and civilians. The same can be said for the US and Britain for the way their institutions and societies reacted to the outrageous acts.

We can choose to smirk at or draw appropriate lessons from the way the two establishments responded to these events. We must recognize that it is less of a shame for an army to have faked encounters with the enemy than to refuse to admit its mistakes to the people.

We must learn to be open and transparent and not sweep ugly events or facts under the carpet on the pretext that national security would be compromised secrecy were not maintained.

In this respect, our record, unfortunately, is most dismal. Military spending is never brought before parliament for discussion because an open discussion is perceived as endangering national security.

The country's weapons systems are not questioned nor are security theories openly debated because only the military establishment (and not civil society) is considered as the sole repository of truth and wisdom in such matters.

The press in Pakistan has done fairly well under the circumstances. If it has not been able to ask questions it is not because it has not wanted to but because there is no freedom of information law in place yet which would give it the statutory right to ask questions and seek information. Even the toothless and ineffective freedom of information ordinance promulgated two years ago has not yet been enforced.

Parliament is a forum where different mechanisms are available to tear apart the shroud of secrecy around the doings of the establishment. But parliament has also been rendered ineffective as questions are not allowed to be raised and motions and resolutions killed in the chamber on the pretext that the issues that need discussion are "sensitive" and involve matters of "national security".

For instance why should parliament not be permitted to discuss the 1999 Kargil conflict or the Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report so as to draw appropriate lessons from them and recommend ways to strengthen national defence capabilities? Or, why should a bipartisan parliamentary commission not be formed to look into the allegations of nuclear exports and recommend appropriate measures for preventing nuclear sales in the future?

Similarly, why should a simple question as to whether any inquiry was held in the wake of the Kargil incident, and if so whether and when a report would be released, be disallowed for being "secret and of sensitive nature".

Or why should a question as to whether there is any law on the statute under which intelligence agencies/ISI conducted raids, detained and interrogated suspects and if there was any why it should not be allowed to be placed before the house for reasons of sensitivity and national security?

Yet this is what has been happening on many occasions to the question and motions sought to be raised by the opposition in the Senate. There are lessons in the events of Abu Ghraib and the faked Siachen encounters for all in Pakistan - the establishment, the media and parliament.

The writer is a member of the Senate.