General Musharraf took over power pledging to manage the affairs of the state better than the elected governments did before him. Instead of heading straight for the goal, he chose a devious course which over his four years is littered with the debris of his plans and the hopes of the people.
Like his military forerunners - Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq - Musharraf aspired to give to the country its own brand of democracy. Unlike them, he thought the generals alone could do it all. Musharraf viewed the organized civilian cadres as a hindrance rather than help in disseminating his ideas and executing his programmes.
Alongside the debris of the hopes of the people thus also lies the debris of the institutions and cadres of the civil administration. If the economy was spared the military attention and has struggled to stand on its legs, it is not because the generals conceded that they were not competent enough to handle it but because the international creditors would not deal with them.
Leaving financial and monetary matters aside, the gamut of state activity, with constitutional amendments at one end and municipal sewers at the other, has been under the control of Musharraf's men. The abolition of the old and creation of the new be it a system, powers or procedure, was all done in-house and behind closed doors. The decisions were made before the bureaus published their drafts to sound the intelligentsia or inform the public.
The power of the president to dissolve the assemblies, the formation of a national security council and the creation of district governments became a foregone conclusion once the chief executive soon after taking over declared his irrevocable commitment to the theories of checks and balances and devolution. The bureaus and the legal advisers were required only to lay down the form and fill in the details.
The fate of the country's premier administrative service was sealed the day, and it was within weeks of the start of the military rule, General Musharraf publicly announced that the "deputy commissioner is a colonial relic" and the "commissioner does nothing" - or words to that effect. The general heading the reconstruction bureau had to prove holier than the Pope. He painted all the administrative and elective systems not just out-of-date but reactionary too.
The revenue and law and order administration with district as its pivot which was the steel-frame of the subcontinent for more than a century and a half introduced by the British but drawing liberally on the traditions and practices of the Moghul empire and the other dynasties and still occupies the centre-stage in India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka was pulled down midst glee.
The system devised to replace it through the new police and local government laws has been lurching from one obstacle to another and fails to take hold despite frequent and personal interventions by the president and the prime minister.
Instead of giving the people a voice or relief it has become a turf war in which the federal, provincial and district governments, the national and provincial assemblies and local councils are all fighting to get the largest piece in the pie of patronage and, more importantly, for control on police and other local officials.
The law and order and coordination of departmental activities in the districts both have been thrown into confusion that aggravates with every compromise made to placate the competing interests. Direction and purpose both have been lost and can be retrieved neither by the genius of the NRB nor by the authority of the president.
The remedy lies in keeping the local government, regulatory and law and order functions apart and in clearly demarcating the district (or municipal) and provincial jurisdictions in development projects and in the provision of services.
A state of affairs in which the chief minister of a province threatens to arrest the nazim of his capital city for breaching law and order when he is responsible for maintaining it (it has so happened in Balochistan) can be described only as deplorable. It becomes ludicrous when one measure contemplated to strengthen the role of the nazim in law and order is that no FIR could be registered by the police without the nazim's permission.
The chief minister, thus, may never be able to carry out his threat for the nazim could be arrested only if he authorizes the registration of a report against himself which, naturally, he wouldn't do.
It is such contradictions and ambiguities which have made law and order everybody's pet theme but no one's responsibility. Here we find the airy-fairy theories that gave birth to the district government and police safety commissions at odds with the ground realities. The theory was to devolve power and keep the police and the grass-roots administration out of politics.
The reality is both are deeply embroiled in politics and an already powerful federation has become even more powerful. Could the result of Musharraf's ideas of checks and balances and devolution and his NBR's exertions to implement them be more bizarre?
At the constitutional plane, the Legal Framework Order and the 17th amendment have given rise to new problems without resolving any of the old ones and at the same time has torn politics asunder. The lingering uncertainty about the military command of the president (fostered by the president himself and his ministers) is bound to harden into a crisis as the year nervously passes by.
The individuals deserting parties, the parties merging or splitting, supporting or opposing Musharraf, who has fallen out of favour and who is the dark horse are the questions that combine to make a power tangle in which the hope and anguish of the common man find no place.
The Waziristan campaign is the saddest illustration of a job bungled when it is done by a person to whom it doesn't belong and the one to whom it belongs is either sidelined or demoralized. After 146 deaths, more by some accounts, the hero emerging out of it is not our corps commander but a former Taliban commander Nek Mohammad who is no match for the corp's strategic prowess or firepower.
Starting on a note of "capitulation or get killed" the operation wound up in a madrassah in a truce brokered by the representatives of the religious parties who believe Musharraf betrayed and abandoned the Taliban.
There were no expulsions, no surrenders. One day Bush and Karzai, even Zalmay Khalilzad are bound to look again for 500 or 600 foreign terrorists Musharraf admitted were hiding in South Waziristan.
It is difficult to get rid of the thought that a political agent (as deputy commissioner is called in tribal area) accompanied by his own levies would have made a better deal without firing a shot. One good that can come out of this costly debacle is that musharraf withdraws his instructions to his prodigy of an NRB to arrange the immediate merger of the tribal agencies with the settled areas.
Neither political manoeuvres nor wrangling in courts but a reference to the people could put an end to this pervasive, enervating confusion. The events of the past 18 months have robbed the October 2002 elections of whatever little credibility they had.
That puts the ball in the prime minister's court. He should advise the president; at a time of his own choosing but not too far away and certainly before December 31, to dissolve the parliament and hold elections afresh. That might earn Zafarullah Jamali a place in politics and in the esteem of the people which his being a prime minister would not.