| 29 February 2004 | Sunday | 08 Muharram 1425 |
Restructuring civil services
According to a report in this newspaper (February 17), each provincial government proposed to add a department of inter-provincial coordination to deal with divisive issues. Its concerns will include matters such as the allocation of revenues by the National Finance Commission, water distribution, Kalabagh Dam, Thal Canal, and the cross-border movement of criminals. Aftab Ahmad Sherpao, federal minister for inter-provincial coordination, is said to have been the driving force behind this move. The birth of such a department in Sindh has already been announced.
Those of us who read public administration in college learned that, to begin with and in the simplest of terms, coordination meant that the "left hand knew what the right hand was doing." Having gained that knowledge, it moved the same way or, at least, refrained (more likely, was told to refrain) from acting in a manner prejudicial to the right hand's mission.
Two agencies with a common interest in a given project may voluntarily establish and maintain contact, remain out of each other's way, and indeed assist each other's endeavour. But this type of interaction, if it does materialize, is a case of cooperation, not coordination. The latter is not left to the inclination of the agencies involved: it is required by a common superior and supervised by a "coordinator." It is thus an exercise in centralization..
Let us now see what the desired coordination is expected to accomplish. We used to have an inter-provincial coordination committee during Mr Nawaz Sharif's tenure as prime minister. Whatever its accomplishments (if any) at that time, it would appear to have been moribund for almost four years. Prime Minister Jamali has now revived it and Mr Aftab Sherpao will lead it. It will include the four provincial chief ministers and any federal minister concerned with its agenda at a given time.
Mr Jamali expects this committee to bring about uniformity of outlook and policies between the federal and the provincial governments in all areas of national concern. The latter should not each go its own way and function in isolation as, according to General Musharraf, the NWFP government is doing.
Both this committee and the inter-provincial coordination departments are, in addition, expected to expedite the implementation of development projects that involve two or more provinces. Some observers suggest that this committee is being put back on display as an excuse for ignoring the council of common interests (CCI), which has not been called to meet for more than a decade.
As noted above, coordination between agencies requires a common superior. Provincial ministers are all of the same rank and status. They can meet and talk things over. In the unlikely event that their respective governments have sent them out as plenipotentiaries, they may even make mutual concessions and settle an issue over which they had been divided. But this is diplomacy, not coordination.
Why then are these departments being created? The quarrel between Punjab and Sindh over water distribution and allocation of funds collected by the federal government is becoming increasingly ugly. Opposition politicians in Sindh, including those belonging to the PPP, are organizing demonstrations, marches, and hunger strikes to denounce the Kalabagh Dam and Thal Canal projects on an ongoing basis.
The continuation of this quarrel reflects poorly upon the federal government as viewed both at home and abroad. It is not unlikely that the departments in question are intended mainly to create the appearance that something is being done to solve an apparently intractable problem, whereas in reality nothing is being done; the task being beyond the political capabilities of the present regime.
The IPCC has the mission, among others, of bringing about harmony, and uniformity of outlook and policy, within our governmental system. At first glance, harmony is surely desirable. Further reflection will reveal that while we all want harmony, we want it on our own terms. But when terms of the two sides are incompatible, harmony may have to be negotiated in which event it is, once again, a case of bargaining, not coordination.
Each of our provinces is a centre of power and so is the federation. When power centres are in close proximity, their interaction is never entirely free from a certain amount of rivalry and tension. This is true even when the law of the land has made one of them supreme over the others. Our Constitution makes the federal government predominant over the provinces. Yet there is often tension, even conflict, between the federal and the provincial governments.
There is no need to bemoan this tendency; it is the "nature of the beast" called politics. There is reason to deplore it, however, when the conflict becomes lawless as it did, for instance, when Mr Nawaz Sharif, chief minister of Punjab, mounted a revolt against the federal government headed by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto during her first term.
While harmony may be a worthy goal, why should we desire uniformity in a federal system? If uniformity were possible, we would have gone for a unitary state. That is what our ruling elite would have preferred. They were thwarted, to an extent, by the inexorable fact that the provinces of Pakistan were (and are) culturally diverse, each with a distinct identity of its own which it was not willing to submerge in a national identity that was (and is) still waiting to be born.
The provinces are bound by our Constitution. Apart from the Objectives Resolution and the Principles of Policy, which express some of our values and commitments, this document is a manual of institutional arrangements for the exercise of political power. Remaining true to the Constitution (which protects our right to diversity), the provinces should be free to preserve their cultural identity, social values, and economic interests through their own laws.
Articles 153-155 of the Constitution relate to the council of common interests to be appointed by the president. It is to consist of the four provincial chief ministers and four federal ministers, and it is to be chaired by the prime minister if he has chosen to be a member. The council is to formulate policies with respect to matters listed in Part II of the federal legislative list (mainly oil, gas, and public sector industries) and the subject of electricity in the concurrent list.
The council is obligated to implement any directions that it may receive from parliament meeting in joint session. If the federal government, or any of the provincial governments, is dissatisfied with one of its decisions, the grievant may refer the matter to a joint sitting of parliament whose decision would then be final.
If the interest of a province or federally administered area in water from any natural source of supply is likely to be jeopardized by any actual or proposed law or act, the concerned party may file a complaint with the Council which may settle the matter. Alternatively, it may request the president to appoint a commission of experts in engineering, irrigation, and other relevant subjects to consider the issue and report to the council, which will then make and record its decision. The federal and the provincial government concerned are duty bound to implement its decision. (Its decisions are made by the majority vote of its members.)
Why hasn't the president done his constitutional duty and appointed the council of common interests instead of fiddling around with instruments such as the IPCC and the inter-provincial coordination departments? What is it that the IPCC can do which the CCI cannot do? One may be tempted to think that the provinces would have more influence in the IPCC where their presence, relative to that of the federation, would be much larger than it is in CCI. This possibility should be weighed against the stark fact that the IPCC's rulings will bind no one, whereas those of the CCI must be carried out.
Some of the more volatile disputes between the provinces relate to the distribution of water, and incomes from oil, gas, and electricity. These matters belong in the CCI's jurisdiction. One may wonder why it has not been allowed to come back to life and take care of the festering disputes over the Kalabagh Dam and Thal Canal projects. It would be much too cynical to suggest that the political and bureaucratic elite, who run the federal government, simply do not want these disputes to be settled, because of the fear that they might get settled the "wrong" way. Is there another, more plausible, explanation?
The CCI is ultimately responsible to parliament. The party or coalition in power may then be able to exert some degree of influence on its deliberations and determinations. Recall also that one half of fits members must be federal ministers. But influence is not the same as control. Being a constitutionally mandated organ of the state, the council need not be subject to the president's, or the prime minister's, ongoing direction.
The idea of an organization, placed outside the hierarchical framework of government, settling important, sometime sensitive, issues, and making decisions that bind all governments in the country, may not be congenial to our ruling elite who, by long tradition and philosophical preference, are centralizers.
Provincial grievances over projects such as the Kalabagh Dam and Thal Canal arise partly from a sense of deprivation on the part of opposition politicians. These are an expression, among others, of their drive for autonomy. The federal government's persistent suppression of the CCI is of a piece with its general indifference, even hostility, towards provincial aspirations for autonomy even when they are consistent with the Constitution.
Let the Constitution be obeyed, the CCI enlivened, given a permanent secretariat, and put to work. It will have a greater prospect of settling the chronic, and constantly debilitating, inter-provincial disputes than the devices now being put in place can ever have.
The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA.
e-mail: anwarsyed@cox.net
Restructuring civil services
Unmindful of the contradictions and conflicts its local government and police systems have caused, the National Reconstruction Bureau is now set to reconstruct the civil services of the country with all their groups, cadres and grades from the federation down the line to the village.
A simple statement which needs to be made here is that the civil services world over with their laws, traditions and values evolve through centuries, and so they have in Pakistan, and cannot be invented overnight. Even if it could be done, the task is too vast and complex for the knowledge, experience and resources that vest in the Bureau.
Amusingly, the NRB wishes to bring the civil services in line with the "administrative structures raised in the wake of devolution" undeterred by the fact that the structures, if any at all raised, are shaky and have created so deep a rift that the devolution plan itself is being subjected to an extensive review.
It can be safely surmised that were the president's approval not required under the 17th amendment to the Constitution, the provinces by now would have repealed or substantially altered the Local Government Ordinance which, along with the Police Order, is the mother of devolution.
Any change in the composition of the services, if at all considered necessary, therefore, must wait till the functions and jurisdictions of the federal, provincial and distinct governments are finally determined.
The overriding consideration in the changed circumstances should be to let the initiative in all matters relating to the services rest with the parliament and the provincial assemblies. Both should first debate and agree to the principle of the change and then work through their own cabinets, parliamentary committees and independent commissions to implement it.
The Bureau should not be seen once again foisting its ideas on a political government only to add to the suspicions and dissent which its earlier plans fostered, and have since taken a heavy toll of propriety and discipline both in political and service cadres.
More than two years after the devolution plan took effect, the civil servants in the districts and at levels below do not know to whom they are responsible, who controls them and what course their careers will take. The NRB's "new framework" for the civil services, whatever its good content or justification for change, will spread that uncertainty even to higher levels. Those already in service may have no choice but to suffer its consequences but, more damagingly, the talented youth still inclined to join the government despite low remuneration and lower prestige will be altogether driven away.
The urge to reorganize the civil services is perennial and surfaces on the change of every regime but the intentions are never clear and, at worst, are selfish. Not surprisingly, therefore, the outcome of every such exercise in the past has been a fall in the standards of competence and integrity. The structures were changed, as the NRB plans doing once again in a more drastic manner, when the need was to enforce the rule of merit and discipline, and to protect the public servants from extraneous pressures and temptations within.
Every reorganization opened doors to arbitrary appointments and then to use the people thus appointed to obey the directives rather than follow the law. Those who joined on merit were, in course of time, compelled either to fall in line or to fall behind. In this grim choice most chose the former course. Incompetence and corruption, thus, became the inevitable consequence of every reorganization.
The contemplated change in the service structures is bound to cause general commotion and make many despondent, but it will not improve the delivery of services to the people if the rule of competitive merit in appointments and fair play in career placements and promotions were not to be enforced and the compliant but dishonest are preferred to the firm and honest.
The essential point to make is that there is nothing wrong with the structure of the services but everything is wrong with the way the civil servants are treated. This approach combined with the low wages the civil servants get, the declining trend in their calibre and commitment looks irreversible.
In good old days (before East Pakistan went its own way) a young civil servant - the general administrator, engineer, economist and the rest - on first appointment in the most coveted grade would get roughly one-fourth of what his friend who was lucky enough to get a job in a good commercial organization would get.
The importance of a civil servant's duties and the respect he received more than compensated for the lower salary. Today he gets one-tenth of what his friend in commerce gets and yet, in his penury, he feels insecure and unimportant.
It would not be difficult to demolish the existing structures but the point to ponder is whether the new ones erected on their rubble would prove any better if the quality of the people inhabiting them continues to fall. In facing this dilemma, the government and the people alike, based on the past experience, would have good reasons to be wary of the solutions offered by the NRB.
As the services' restructuring scheme makes the rounds of government offices hidden from the public view, some news reports suggest the NRB next would be proposing a plan to end the special status of the tribal areas. Such a plan, if present is considered the right time to contemplate it, should be mooted in open tribal jirgas and not in close bureaus. Nothing excites the imagination of our tribesmen more than a free exchange of banter and invective with their political agents and governors.