| 25 January 2004 | Sunday | 02 Zilhaj 1424 |
Ministers without work
Too predictable
A school of thought in Pakistan maintains that we should replace our parliamentary system with a presidential one. The great majority of politicians in the country do not want it. Other political forces believe that, even while retaining the parliamentary system, we should enhance the president's functions and powers. I do not subscribe to either of these views but, as a first step to further reasoning, I should like to present a brief review of how the office of the president is situated in some of the contemporary parliamentary systems.
Written constitutions and established tradition usually have it that the president symbolizes the sovereignty, majesty, unity, and integrity of the state. In some cases he is also said to be the guardian of the country's constitution. But it is only in situations of grave crisis, when other designated organs of the state have been rendered ineffective, that the president's implicit authority to act independently may come into play.
Normally, while many of the more important decisions and actions of a government in its day-to-day working are made, and taken, in the president's name, he is not their actual author or agent.
Let us first take a few relatively uncomplicated cases from amongst both unitary and federal states. The functions of the head of state in most of the monarchies and republics in western Europe are essentially the same as those of the British queen. She/he may also be head of the government in terms of constitutional formalities.
She/he is commander-in-chief of the armed forces, summons and prorogues the legislature, signs bills before they can become law, appoints persons to a great number of civil and military posts, accepts the credentials of foreign emissaries, appoints as prime minister a person who commands majority support in the lower house of the legislature and, on her/his advice, appoints other persons as members of his council of ministers, grants pardons to convicted persons or remits their sentences. But note that in all of this, she/he acts on the advice of the prime minister.
Among federal unions the functions of the presidents of Germany and India, and those of the Governor-General of Canada (who represents the Queen), are essentially the same as those outlined above. The president in India is further reduced by a constitutional provision (Article 53) that authorizes parliament to confer any of his powers and functions on another agency or functionary of the state.
The presidency in Switzerland, a federal union of 23 "cantons," rotates on an annual basis among seven members of the "Federal Council," which is a collegiate executive elected by the lower house of parliament. The president chairs the meetings of this council and that appears to be his only function beyond the ceremonial ones.
We now turn to a few cases in which the president's situation is a bit different. The president of Ireland does have a modest amount of discretionary authority. After consulting the Council of State (an advisory body), he may refer any bill to the supreme court to determine its constitutional validity. At the request of a majority of the upper, and one-third of the lower house of parliament he may place an issue of great national interest, implicit in a proposed bill, in a referendum to ascertain the people's will.
He may decline the prime minister's request to dissolve the lower house of parliament if the latter has lost majority support in that house. It is probably because of this discretionary authority vesting in him that he is elected directly by the people for a seven-year term.
The people of Austria, a federal union, elect their president. If no candidate secures at least 50 per cent of the votes cast, the two with the largest number of votes contest in a second round. He appoints the chancellor, and dismisses him if he loses a vote of confidence in the lower house. Normally, the president's decisions must be counter-signed by the chancellor (prime minister). But he seems to have independent authority to conclude certain specified types of treaties and agreements with foreign governments.
Quite a few Pakistani observers are fascinated by the rather peculiar example of a "strong" president in a parliamentary system, namely, the president of France. Beyond the symbolic functions that go with his office, the French constitution (Article 5) requires him to ensure, by his arbitration, that public authorities function according to its provisions. He appoints the prime minister and, on the latter's advice, members of his council of ministers.
In order to be valid, the president's decisions must be counter-signed by the prime minister, but this requirement does not apply to the decisions he makes, or the actions he takes, under Articles 8, 11, 12, 16, 18, 54, 56, and 61 of the constitution. The more notable of the subjects appear below.
(1) He may dissolve the national assembly for reasons that he deems good after consulting the prime minister and the presidents of the two houses of parliament: Charles de Gaulle did so twice (1962 and 1968), and so did Francois Mitterrand (1981 and 1988). (2) After consulting the same three functionaries and the constitutional council (highest constitutional court), the president may declare a state of emergency and take appropriate measures to ensure that governmental authorities have "the means of fulfilling their duties within the shortest possible time."
(3) He may send a bill or a treaty to the constitutional council for its opinion as to whether it is repugnant to the constitution. (4) He appoints three persons to the nine-member constitutional council and names its president who has a casting vote. (5) He may call parliament to special sessions to receive his messages.
He presides over meetings of the council of ministers, higher defence councils and committees, and the high council of the Judiciary. He may refer a bill to the people in a referendum.
Article 52 says the president "shall negotiate and ratify treaties," and he is to be kept informed of the negotiations concerning treaties or agreements that do not require his ratification. (All agreements that involve any kind of financial commitment on the part of the state do need his approval.) It should be emphasized that this provision calls upon him to negotiate, not merely ratify, agreements with foreign governments. Thus, it makes much of the conduct of the country's foreign relations his special preserve.
The president is elected directly by the people for a seven-year term. If no candidate obtains an absolute majority (more than 50 per cent) of the total number of votes cast, the two candidates with the most votes contest in a second round.
The above survey tells us, first, that normally the president in a parliamentary system has no independent executive or legislative authority of his own, and that he acts on the advice of the prime minister, whom he cannot dismiss for any reason whatsoever (personal or professional).
In Ireland and Austria the president's modest scope for independent initiative is circumscribed by the requirement to consult other organs of the state. The French president does have a larger measure of independent authority, notably in foreign affairs. Elsewhere he must consult other officials and organs before taking action.
He derives much of his influence (as distinguished from authority and power) from the fact that he presides over meetings of the council of ministers and defence-related higher councils and committees. One may assume that his mere presence assures him respectful attention and thus the opportunity to influence decisions on issues that he cares to address in these meetings.
The French have given their prime minister and his cabinet by far the larger part of the executive power, but they have given a small, yet significant, portion of it to their president. In return they have required him to go through a popular election and assume the responsibilities of a representative of the people. They have not made him preponderant in their system of governance. The balance of power tilts in favour of the prime minister, his cabinet, and parliament.
The second parliamentary regime in Pakistan (1973-77) did not suffer political instability. If Mr Bhutto had been a bit more civil in dealing with his political opponents, and if the elections of March 1977 had not been rigged on the scale they were, the system would have gone on and become firmly grounded in our political culture. Its overthrow on July 5, 1977, had nothing to do with the president being limited to ceremonial functions and the prime minister being the effective repository of executive power.
The parliamentary system is one in which the chosen representatives of the people, assembled in a parliament, govern. They make laws and they oversee the exercise of executive power that they have delegated to a committee of their own members (cabinet) and its designated head (prime minister). This committee remains answerable to them for the quality of its stewardship and may be discharged by them if found wanting.
There is no reason to think that we are inherently incapable of operating this system. It is working reasonably well next door in India whose political culture is fairly similar to our own. If we cannot maintain parliamentary government, who can say that we will be able to handle the complexities of the separation of powers and checks and balances of a democratic (not authoritarian) presidential system?
It is not clear why the president in Pakistan should have more than a ceremonial role. But if we must give him substantive functions (that is, give him a portion of the executive power) as the French have done, then let us - like the French, the Austrians, and the Irish - require candidates for this office to present themselves before the eligible voters in the country in a direct election and thus become accountable to them as are the prime minister, his cabinet, and members of parliament.
The writer is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA.
E-mail: anwarsyed@cox.net
Ministers without work
The role of the government and appreciation for what it does is fast declining but its size has been growing irrepressibly. The drive for the growth comes not from the public need but from the urge of the leaders to appease the diverse political interests.
The systems introduced by President Musharraf in the name of good governance and devolution have given only further impetus to expanding governments in defiance of the rule, by now universally acknowledged, that smaller the government the better.
The new system has created a government in every district investing in it most functions which were previously performed by the provincial government yet, ironically, the government of every province too has become larger. Almost every provincial department is now replicated in the districts. The result is not just extra cost which is considerable but duplication of work and overlapping authority which all combined inevitably cause delay, corruption and harassment to the public.
Amazing is the number of ministers and advisers the provinces have chosen to appoint. Punjab has 50, Sindh 38, Balochistan 29. NWFP by contrast has niggardly 12. Though even that is one too many, the number may soon go up as the MMA leadership of the province recruits more ministers to save the alliance from desertions.
Compare all that with West Pakistan's One-Unit government in the sixties which had just 13 ministers - may be one more or less. Leaving aside the political and economic objections to the merger of the four provinces into one, its administration per se was far more effective and frugal than of any government today.
Particularly amazing, and unjustified, is the large number of ministers appointed in Punjab which has a single-party majority government and, unlike the other provinces, wasn't compelled to keep the coalition together through ministerial bait. The motive could be none other than cronyism and, at the same time, procuring support for the coalition at the centre. Punjab's first cabinet which had to contend with the influx of refugees and a myriad other problems with few resources, perhaps, had seven ministers and Sindh contending with even bigger problems just five.
A minister with his personal staff and expenses which go with the office costs the public exchequer up to one million rupees a month - an amount enough to employ 300 primary school teachers. That shows the horrendous proportion of the expense to administer a subject like "tourism" which is non-existent in a province or "power" which is a preserve of the Wapda and private companies overseen by a federal ministry. The provincial government figures nowhere. Then, "agriculture" is one subject but has been given three ministers.
The expense proliferates when every minister expects to have a secretary for his department, however small. The secretary, in turn, must head a hierarchy of his own. Balochistan, thus, has already got as many secretaries as ministers i.e. 29 where one-fourth of that number should have sufficed.
Economy in expenditure by itself is a reason strong enough for keeping the number of ministers and officials (not forgetting the special assistants and parliamentary secretaries) within the limits their work requires, but of greater concern should be the confusion and friction the multitudes of them cause in their dealings with the district governments which besides the nazims, their deputies and councillors have their own hordes of officials. A district now has 10 or more departments each headed by an official of the same rank and pay as a deputy commissioner they have displaced.
The dispute over jurisdiction, conflict of authority and clash of personality between the nazim and minister and between their officials is a matter of everyday occurrence. Here only a few instances may be recounted:
The nazim of Jacobabad is resisting the allotment of a municipal plot of a land to a minister's man. While the minister has gone protesting to the chief minister, the nazim has complained to the federal government. The nazims of Lahore and Peshawar both have protested that the elective setup is ineffective and the officials hold the sway.
The nazim of Karachi transferred some water and sewerage officials; the local government minister cancelled the order; the nazim refused to budge; the chief secretary intervened to support the minister obviously with the approval of the chief minister; the nazim now, perhaps, would go complaining to the president.
The Karachi fishermen's cooperative society has accused the fisheries minister of appointing 350 of his men in the society. (In the good old days when this writer along with poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz and Ghulam Rasul Kehar was on the board of the society it had no more than 50 employees in all and its official supervisor was a deputy registrar who hardly even intervened). The minister had no authority nor the society needed his men. They were all paid at the cost of the welfare of the fishermen.
On a wider public plain, the clash of authority and ego between the provincial government and city government has stalled the introduction of fleet bus service in Karachi for almost two years now. Scores of interested operators waited all the while only to walk away in frustration. The suffering remains the lot of the commuters. Both governments nurse their ambitions of the future and plan mammoth projects but neither shows concern for the deteriorating municipal services.
The president has won a vote of confidence from the parliament and provincial assemblies. Bush and Vajpayee and other world leaders have also learnt to trust him. But he has yet to win the confidence and trust of his own people by relieving them of the oppression of governments made larger and extravagant by his devolution plan.
Too predictable
Like many who listened to the President Bush's new proposal on immigration reform this month, we had a lot of questions. Since then, more have arisen.
Although the principles the president enunciated are good, and the idea of temporary worker visas is the right direction, the president's proposal is fuzzy in the extreme, with important details left "to be determined" or "up to Congress." How would such visas be monitored, particularly if they are, as the White House claims, not to be tied to particular jobs? What will the Mexican government be asked to contribute in the way of border patrol and security clearance systems? Will increased penalties be applied to those who continue to break the rules?
The Democratic presidential candidates might have been expected to ask more concrete questions about the president's proposal. Instead, they have decided not to take it seriously. Former Vermont Gov. Howard Dean called the president's plan a "cynical gesture in an election year," stating that the plan will "help big corporations who currently employ undocumented workers."
Sen. Joseph Lieberman said he preferred an "earned right of legalization for undocumented immigrants." Sen. John Kerry said the policy "rewards business over immigrants by providing them with a permanent pool of disenfranchised temporary workers." Mr. Kerry, Rep. Richard Gephardt and Sen. John Edwards all support "earned legalization" as well. None have gone into much detail about what that means. To many people, it just sounds like another amnesty: Let anyone who's here and working have a green card.
While we share some of the candidates' skepticism about Mr. Bush's proposal, their unanimity helps explain why the president felt it was politically possible to make it. It can't lose him the anti-immigration Republicans, since they have nowhere else to go.
But the Democratic response is also disappointing because it has given the president sole possession of the middle ground in a debate that is easily polarized. On one side are those in both parties who prefer drastic reduction of immigration on economic, law-and-order or even racist grounds. On the other side are those in both parties who take an open-border, green-cards-for-all position, again on economic, law-and-order or even pro-Mexican grounds.
Between the two groups, there is considerable space. The president's attempt to occupy that space - to find a compromise that would at least give the nation the semblance of an honest immigration policy - is clearly the right way to think about this issue, and it's the right place for his opponents to be heading as well.
Given the divisive nature of the subject, it is also the only way that is politically feasible. Public opinion polls consistently put most Americans in the anti-immigration camp. -The Washington Post