The interview & after

“WE are for the United Nations Security Council resolutions, whatever it stands for. However, now we have left that aside” — are the lines in the interview President Musharraf gave to Reuters that have been the subject of much comment in the columns of leading analysts and led to almost as much headshaking in the drawing rooms of the chattering classes as it has to outrage in the Jihadi organizations and religious parties.

What seems to have been missed in the furore is the fact that this statement was followed immediately, in the interview by a reiteration of the proposal made earlier and accepted without much demur by all those now leading the charge viz. “We keep saying if we want to resolve this issue, both sides need to talk to each other with flexibility. Coming beyond stated positions, meeting half-way somewhere. Now there are a number of solutions which have been propounded. I don’t want to get involved because if we get involved in solutions without even having started a dialogue process, we are going to slide back.

“There are extremists from both sides, Indians and Pakistanis, who will not allow any flexibility. So therefore, let’s not talk of solutions, let us start the dialogue, let us then accept the centrality of Kashmir, then the third step is let us negate, eliminate through a process of elimination whatever is not acceptable to India, Pakistan and Kashmiris and finally arrive at a solution acceptable to India, Pakistan and Kashmiris.”

While this four step process was formally enunciated sometime later it had been foreshadowed by an interview President Musharraf had given to a group of foreign correspondents on June 28 ‘01 (on the eve of the Agra summit) in which according to the Washington Post, Musharraf predicted that “if both sides stick to their stated positions too rigidly, there will be no progress,” but that if both are “sincere and open-minded,” the Kashmir issue could be solved in less than a year”. Earlier he had told a Gulf newspaper that he intended showing “maximum flexibility” in his search for a solution of the Kashmir problem.

Those who now wish to interpret Musharraf’s remarks as being “out of line” etc. should have really protested earlier. What form after all could “maximum flexibility” take? What could moving from “stated positions held too rigidly” mean? How above all could one interpret the proposal for the elimination of “whatever is not acceptable to India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiris” and then arriving at an acceptable solution. Each of these formulations was a signal that Pakistan’s search for a solution would not preclude moving away from a demand for a plebiscite.

There is however much to be said for the criticism that before articulating publicly a departure from stated policy Musharraf should have sought assurances that the gesture would be reciprocated. In one sense this is correct, in another it perhaps underestimates the degree to which it poses a challenge to India and in particular to Prime Minister Vajpayee.

President Musharraf’s talk of maximum flexibility or of moving from rigid stated positions did not come out of the blue. It followed on the “musings” of Prime Minister Vajpayee who in his New Year message of 2001 had talked of “moving off the beaten track” to find solutions and to construct a new architecture of security in South Asia.

This was certainly not meant to indicate that India would move off the “beaten track” only to propose that Kashmir was and would remain an integral part of India and that the only question open for discussion was the illegal occupation by Pakistan of part of that state.

It could not even be construed as meaning no more than seeking and securing an annulment of the Indian parliament’s resolution proclaiming all of Kashmir as part of India.

It could only mean that as a visionary leader Vajpayee would move from the “atoot ang” posture, recognize the tripartite nature of the problem and look at solutions that addressed the security concerns of both countries and satisfied, in some substantive measure, the aspirations of the Kashmiri people.

Will Vajpayee now rise to the challenge that Musharraf had posed by giving concrete shape to “flexibility?

It can be argued that the emphasis on what Vajpayee said in 2001 does not take account of the subsequent hardening of his position. In his New Year message for 2003 he advised Pakistan that “it must stop cross-border terrorism and abandon its insistence on the ‘centrality’ of the Kashmir issue. Let our two countries agree to promote mutually beneficial trade and economic ties, strengthen cultural relations, and encourage greater people-to-people contacts. Once our two peoples experience the fruits of a tension-free and cooperative environment, we will be able to see the Kashmir issue in its proper dimension and arrive at an amicable and lasting solution”.

But this position was justified in the eyes of the world, only because India could argue that the gap between Indian and Pakistani positions was so great that any discussion would not only be fruitless but would be counter-productive in terms of resolving other less contentious issues. A concrete manifestation of Pakistan’s flexibility makes this less plausible and does bring greater pressure on India, in the words of the UN Secretary-General — who pointedly refused to address the question of the implementation of UN resolutions — to resolve all disputes with Pakistan “through sustained engagement and a demonstration of flexibility and creativity”.

In domestic terms, a noted Indian analyst former foreign secretary Dixit told Reuters that President Musharraf’s offer was an “important shift in policy and that “we should be able to respond with flexibility and see if we can find a middle ground.”

Vajpayee apparently called a cabinet meeting to consider the import of Musharraf’s statement. The statement made by the Indian foreign minister after this meeting was not viewed by Pakistani analysts as very helpful or indicative of an Indian desire to match the Pakistani concretization of its negotiating stance. This pessimism may well be justified and perhaps it would be wrong to read in Sinha’s assertion, “We have always suggested flexibility,” a readiness to move forward but it cannot be ruled out.

The point, however, is not what the initial Indian reaction has been but whether after further thought and after further prodding from other sources, domestic and foreign, Vajpayee will be inclined to live up to the promise contained in his musings of 2001.

The task that lies ahead for Pakistani diplomacy is not to suggest that what Musharraf said is being misinterpreted but to press Indian public opinion and the international community to secure a similar forward movement by India. If India has, as Foreign Minister Sinha says always been flexible then this is the time to put that flexibility on the table. India has acquired a new international status but even so it has been told repeatedly that it cannot realize its full potential or play the role it seeks in international affairs until it settles its problems with Pakistan and until it can shed the image of the oppressor of the Kashmiri people.

It is not a forlorn hope that the international community, which has welcomed Musharraf’s offer as “constructive”, will suggest to India that it too needs to make such concrete changes in its stance as would advance the prospects for a fruitful even if extended Indo-Pak dialogue on Kashmir.

Whether Vajpayee will have something to offer in this regard during his visit to Pakistan for the SAARC summit is to my mind an open question. If he is able to prevail on his party it may happen but even if it does not happen then — and one must acknowledge that time is short — there will within a reasonable time frame be some movement.

Musharraf’s offer may break the logjam and perhaps even bring about a resumption of the “composite dialogue”. There should however be no illusions entertained about the rate at which progress will be registered on the Kashmir issue. It will be slow, painfully slow and enormous diplomatic effort will be required to prevent a breakdown. Equally importantly there must be an understanding that the snail’s pace at which this element of the dialogue proceeds must not be allowed to affect the progress on other issues.

There is much to be gained by both countries through an agreement on the Sir Creek and the consequent demarcation of the maritime boundaries which would facilitate the exploitation of the underwater energy resources that reportedly abound in the region.

There is much to be gained from the demilitarization of Siachen. Many problems of divided families will be solved by the expansion of communication facilities.

And if we look at the region and at the benefits Pakistan’s economy can derive from its “strategic location” then we should be pushing for gas and oil pipelines from Iran and Turkmenistan to serve both the Pakistani and Indian market and for our highways to be developed to carry goods to and from European and Central Asian markets.

Let me end with just one more thought. Kashmir and India have dominated our security and foreign policy calculations. Their importance is undeniable but at this juncture perhaps we should be paying greater attention to our western border. At this stage our game plan must call for taking all measures necessary to ensure that our eastern borders and our relations with our eastern neighbour remain relatively tension-free so that we can devote our energies to resolving the problems in the west.

It is the continued unrest and turmoil in Afghanistan that will foster the extremism we have now identified as the most serious threat to Pakistan’s integrity. It is the Afghanistan border through which will flow the smuggled goods that damage the industrial fabric of our country and the opium that will, along with extremism, subvert our human resource potential and destroy the fabric of our fragile society.

The writer is former foreign secretary of Pakistan.

Keeping children in school

UNESCO recently released its annual Education for All: Monitoring Report and in it Pakistan unfortunately doesn’t emerge in a very good light. The six millennium goals laid down at the education forum in Dakar in 2000 were 1) the attainment of universal primary education; 2) gender equality; 3) improvement in literacy rate; 4) boosting quality of education; 5) increasing life skills; and 6) introducing early childhood learning programmes. The deadline for these goals was set for 2015.

Governments deemed it important to strive for these goals because they have now come to recognize the significance of education for the development of an individual in terms of training for economically-productive skills, improved quality of life, better health and personal self-fulfilment.

It has also been recognized that education serves no purpose if it lacks quality and relevance and is not imparted for a reasonable length of time. Five years of primary schooling is generally considered enough to impart the basic education necessary to serve as the foundation for building technical skills and knowledge — whether it is for further education or improving economic productivity.

What has emerged clearly from the various exercises that Unesco has undertaken in this field is that the length of time a child spends in school determines the benefit he actually derives from his education. A few years ago the key yardstick of progress in the field of education was the school enrolment ratio. The higher the proportion of children in the primary age bracket (5-9 years) who were actually admitted to school the more impressive was a country’s performance deemed to be. It was supposed to ensure a greater spread of education and literacy.

But it was soon realized that children who were enrolled but failed to complete five years of schooling did not benefit from their exposure to education. Some experts even believe that children who have learnt to read and write in school but remain there for less than five years lapse into illiteracy. In fact enrolling children in school and failing to retain them there makes the entire exercise not only futile but also expensive. The child gains nothing from his brief stint in school while the government virtually throws its money down the drain by opening schools which are under-utilized.

Therefore, Unesco has developed the concepts of ‘survival’ and ‘completion’ rates. These are actually sophisticated terms put more positively for what was described in the good old days as the drop-out rate. A country’s education system is said to be functioning well if a large proportion of the children enrolled in school complete their primary classes.

The problem with Pakistan’s public sector education is that it is unable to retain the children who are enrolled at the entry level. The Unesco report gives some interesting information while it also fails to disclose some basic statistics which are indicative of the malaise in the system here. The gross intake rate in primary education (that is, admission to class I) in the year 2000 was 80.5 per cent. The gross enrolment ratio in the five classes of primary school was 70.5 per cent while the net enrolment ratio (that is after calculating the drop-out rate) was only 60.1 per cent. Since the figures for ‘school life expectancy’ for Pakistan are not shown — probably they are not available — one can only guess the drop-out rates from the declining ratios at every level.

With 7.7 million children out of school, one can safely infer that quite a substantial number of children who are enrolled do not remain for long in school. The highly publicized campaigns undertaken every year on universal literacy day on September 8 are obviously a publicity stunt. Probably most of the children brought into the school system on such occasions are not retained there.

It would therefore be wiser if the education authorities were to concentrate their energies on analyzing why these children who are brought in cannot be persuaded to stay on. The challenge is not so much to enrol the children as it is to retain them. In India the World Bank funded a field study to determine the factors that contribute towards or impede successful primary school completion among children living in diverse poverty conditions.

The most significant aspect of this research was that it adopted an integrated approach and focused on physical development as well as the psycho-social factors which impact on the children’s ability to complete their education. The study which was of an exploratory nature studied not just the child but also the family, the community, and the local health and education services which had a direct bearing on the child.

The findings of the researchers, Vimala Ramachandran, Kameshwari Jandhyala and Aarti Sairjee (as published in the Economic and Political Weekly of Bombay (Nov 23, 2003) are extremely instructive. First of all, it is clear that poverty affects the health status of children. They lack nutrition and clean water, which accounts for their poor health and acts as impediments to their schooling. Chronic illness and malnutrition keep children away from school or affect their capacity to learn. It is also important that the community is mobilized to send its children to school. Once it becomes the norm, most families want their children to be enrolled in schools. Peer pressure also becomes a factor for parents to send their children to school.

But in the final analysis it is the quality of education that is offered, which makes a decisive difference. Teacher absenteeism, curricula that are irrelevant to the life of the children, inadequate physical facilities in school staffed by teachers who are not motivated and are callous cumulatively create an environment which drives the children out of school.

It is not poverty per se which keeps children out of the education system, especially when schooling, textbooks and uniforms are free. All these factors combine to affect school enrolment. It is important that the government should take note of these in planning for universal primary education which is its aim under the Dakar millennium goals.

It requires a holistic approach to health and education to achieve this aim. A small but significant example of how the two interact with each other is the case of the Garage School run by Shabina in Karachi. It is a small venture with 80 children on its rolls. It began four years ago with 15 children from low income families. What is important is the fact that only nine out of eighty have dropped out of the school. Five left when their families moved out of the neighbourhood where the garage is located which houses the school. They joined other schools nearer home. Four were asked to leave because they could not adjust to the school discipline. Even the children who have been admitted to regular schools continue to keep their link with the Garage School.

How has Shabina managed to keep such a high ‘survival’ rate? Because she provides the children with other facilities which they could otherwise never dream of. They receive excellent medical care if they fall ill. Two had surgery for ruptured ear-drums, a girl was operated for her tonsils, another had her gall bladder removed. A child was treated for his detached retina. Moreover the children also receive nutrition in the shape of milk and eggs.

In India, it has been found that in schools where children are served a hot meal at lunch time everyday, their drop-out rate is relatively low. It is important that such incentives are provided in public sector schools to attract students and retain them there.

My man with the gun

WHENEVER I pass in front of the National Assembly building in Islamabad, I am reminded of a newspaper photograph of some years ago. It showed 15 fierce-looking men standing in a row outside the building. Most of them were bearded, with flowing locks under huge turbans and wearing baggy shalwars. They were there to protect their tribe’s chief, Nawab Muhammad Akbar Khan Bugti, who was then a member of the NA.

The fifteen were armed to the teeth (as they say) though their teeth were not visible in the photograph. The arms were obviously automatic rifles, for what would security guards be doing these days without modern weapons? Somehow the number reminded me of the pirates’ chorus in Treasure Island whose refrain was, “Fifteen men on a dead man’s chest. Yo ho ho and a bottle of rum.”

There was nothing surprising in the posse accompanying Nawab Sahib for he has many tribal enemies at home, and they might be justified in thinking that he would be a sitting duck in Islamabad. But you must have noticed that nowadays even maulvis in politics, claiming to epitomise Islam’s message of peace in their person, are invariably accompanied by heavily armed guards. What are they afraid of? The real Islam?

These protectors of the famous sometimes give rise to funny stories. The funniest that I recall was reported some years ago from Lahore. Humayun Akhtar Khan, now a federal minister and then only an MNA, created a fright among women who were walking in the Race Course park one morning. They thought he was being chased by an armed thug, and some of them let off screams, as women usually do.

There was nothing to be frightened about. The young politician was jogging for pleasure, but since he took his armed guard everywhere with him, the poor fellow had to jog behind him. The man didn’t look very pleased about it and seemed to be running for dear life. Now that Humayun Akhtar Khan is a minister maybe he is now chased by a posse instead of one “gunman” when he jogs in Islamabad’s Fatima Jinnah Park. I have put the word gunman in inverted commas, because I continue to be intrigued by its use in Pakistan as a synonym for bodyguard. I have looked up the word in many dictionaries. Every one of them describes gunman as “armed robber.” Actually the gunman (it is up to you to take the word in its Pakistani sense or its dictionary meaning) is there only for show. He is a decoration piece, a status symbol. Although, to tell you the truth, VIPs would look much more manly and excite greater attention, and even admiration, if they wore a cartridge belt with an automatic in a holster, like the cowboys of the Wild West. The fierce qualities of the gunman would then be transferred to their own personality. What a macho image they would make!

No self-respecting politician with a feudal background wants to be seen these days without a gunman or two. Very likely the chaps can’t hit a buffalo from ten feet. And if they are a half a dozen or more, and are retaliating in a shooting attack on their boss, they are likely to injure or maim, or even kill, some of their own companions. Or the boss himself if he doesn’t duck in time. Maulana Azam Tariq had a whole troop of armed fellows with him but could not escape his assassins.

But as things are in Pakistan these days, the presence of armed guards behind these personages is a must. Had that great apostle of non-violence, Mahatma Gandhi, been a Pakistani politician of today, he too would have been accompanied by such armed protectors. At the same time he would be saying at every step, “Life and death are in the hands of the Almighty; nothing can avail when one’s time is up,” as do our VIPs, though that doesn’t stop them from taking precautions.

As for most of the feudal johnnies who go about with gunmen, please don’t ever say to them that chances of their being subjected to violence in the federal capital are next to nil. As it is, they would have to think very hard indeed to come up with the name of a mortal enemy, and the only thing they can say to justify the armed guard is, “You never know these days.”

You will perhaps remark cynically, “Who is worried about murderous attacks and possible assailants? The gunman and his weapons are for show only. It is pure and simple exhibitionism and only denote a certain vanity and prestige. Everyone is not Nawab Akbar Bugti who always has a number of vendettas dogging his footsteps.” You may be right or you may be wrong, but how else can a political leader or a religious divine or a public personality declare his importance (in his own eyes) other than being surrounded by his hatchet men? Pajeros and Land Cruisers are no longer enough. Otherwise everybody knows that a determined or committed assassin cannot be stopped. There is the classic example of Rajiv Gandhi. He had the same security as the Indian prime minister, and look what happened to him. Got by a woman feigning to garland him.

Some forty years ago, posted in Peshawar, I had a peon called Sharbat Khan assigned to me. He was an Afridi tribesman and always carried a pistol slung over his shoulder. Once he came with me to Lahore for my sister’s wedding. He was the cause of my being the butt of many jokes by my friends because of his formidable appearance. In those days a gun-toting man was a rare sight in Lahore.

But I wish I had Sharbat Khan with me today. Only now he would be carrying a Klashnikov instead of an ordinary pistol. Everybody would ask, “I say, who is that distinguished looking guy over there with a bodyguard?”

“Don’t you know him? Its Hafizur Rahman, the newspaper columnist.” This would elicit the query, “Oh really, what is he afraid of that he keeps a gunman?” The reply could well be, “I don’t know. Maybe he’s afraid of other columnists!”

Election sets Russia back

PRESIDENT Vladimir V. Putin’s claim that Russia’s parliamentary elections brought democracy closer cannot be believed. The balloting represented a lamentable step back toward authoritarian rule.

Putin’s allies in the state Duma, led by the United Russia party, appear set to gain a two-thirds majority. Putin will almost certainly win election to a second four-year term in March, given the absence of meaningful opposition. More ominously, he might have the support to change the constitution and run for a third term if he so wishes. It is an alluring prospect that he should resist.

The defeat of the Communists, the main opposition party, is little cause for tears except that it dims an alternative voice. The trouncing of two political parties supportive of democracy and a free-market economy is greater cause for worry.

Putin has given his rule the trappings of democracy by allowing opposition parties to criticize his government and by not interfering directly with elections.— Los Angeles Times

Neighbours, not enemies

JANUARY is bound to be a busy month in Indo-Pakistan relations, what with air and rail links set to resume, and Atal Behari Vajpayee due in Islamabad for a Saarc summit. At the weekend it was still unclear whether there would be any meaningful encounters between him and Pervez Musharraf. But following the latter’s apparent concession on the question of a Kashmiri plebiscite, it would be surprising if the two of them limit their interaction to the occasional handshake.

Neither of them could possibly be unaware, after all, that the momentum towards a settlement signalled in recent weeks by a series of conciliatory moves needs to be maintained. In the convoluted context of subcontinental politics, it doesn’t take much for things to go wrong.

The assassination attempt on Musharraf was an ominous reminder of how easily Pakistan can descend into chaos. It is extremely unlikely that the reshuffle in the military hierarchy that followed shortly afterwards was purely coincidental.

Dissent within the army, particularly if it happens to be of the Islamist variety, poses a bigger threat to Musharraf than the existing civilian opposition. The president may gain a veneer of legitimacy if the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal joins the PML-Q in voting for the parliamentary bill based on the Legal Framework Order when the National Assembly meets later this week.

Yet the hybrid dispensation will continue to be problematic. Even if Musharraf eventually sheds his uniform, he will effectively still be serving at the army’s pleasure. And he will almost certainly serve no longer should he incur the displeasure of powerful factions within the armed forces. What then? Will the military high command insist upon naming a replacement?

There is no way of telling how Musharraf’s change of tack on Kashmir has gone down among fellow officers. Elsewhere, the reaction has been fairly predictable. Although evidently taken by surprise, the Jamali government has been trying to defend the move. The opposition has been inclined to condemn it as a sell-out.

Feelings among Kashmiri organizations are mixed: the All Parties Hurriyat Conference’s chairman, for example, has expressed the wish that New Delhi will reciprocate in kind, while the less moderate Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen has suggested the move could “sink both Kashmir and Pakistan”.

The United States was quick off the mark with a favourable evaluation of Musharraf’s initiative, and appeared not to have been taken by surprise. At the United Nations, Secretary-General Kofi Annan offered a more measured positive response. India was slower off the mark, and noncommittal to boot. “If there is any change or modification in Pakistan’s position,” opined Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha, “that is something India will always be ready to welcome.”

That just about qualifies as conditional approval. And Sinha could have put it more coherently. A move towards greater belligerence would also be a change in Pakistan’s position, and it is unlikely India would be willing to welcome it. However, reports that Vajpayee has been consulting his cabinet on the matter suggest that Musharraf’s latest overture is being taken seriously.

One can only wonder, meanwhile, what the Indians will make of Khurshid Kasuri’s statement to the effect that Musharraf’s remark on the plebiscite in an interview to Reuters does not really signal any change in Pakistan’s policy. According to the foreign minister, when the general said “we have left that aside” with reference to the UN resolutions on Kashmir, all he meant was that those resolutions have not been implemented.

That’s a fairly disingenuous explanation, and if one accepts Kasuri’s advice of looking at the president’s remarks “in their entire context”, Musharraf’s statement is reasonably unambiguous. Despite its support for the UN resolutions, he suggested, Pakistan is prepared to consider alternative means of settling the Kashmir issue.

This has been interpreted, with some justification, as a bold step. It clearly does amount to a significant innovation in policy, given that Islamabad has in the past consistently — and somewhat doggedly — insisted on the 1949 resolutions as a basis for any settlement.

That stance did not pay too many dividends. There may be no expiry date on Security Council resolutions, but that does not make them timeless. Not everything has changed in the past 55 years, but nor has everything remained the same.

In his Reuters interview, Musharraf stressed the importance of flexibility on both sides. In this he was echoed almost verbatim by Kasuri. Yet the latter gave the impression that he was defending the president’s utterances without conviction — possibly without even a proper briefing.

Musharraf’s announcement apparently came as a surprise to everyone (with the possible exception of the US State Department). It seems the general decided on the policy change without consultations. Fellow high-ranking military officers may have been sounded out, but the courtesy evidently wasn’t extended to Mr Zafarullah Khan Jamali or any of his ministers.

Such arrogance is of a piece with Musharraf’s true status: he is, after all, a dictator, and his military rank means he is accustomed to giving orders that he expects unquestioningly to be followed.

In his aspirational guise as a popularly chosen leader, he may have given consultations a thought and decided against them on the grounds that his initiative wouldn’t stand much of a chance if thrown open to discussion. He may have assumed, perhaps correctly, that presenting the government’s civilian wing with a fait accompli was the best way of achieving his goal.

In matters such as Kashmir, which tend to excite an over-emotional response (thanks in large part to decades of frenzied official or semi-official propaganda), breakthroughs do indeed require bold, decisive leadership. But slipping in a surprise such as this has its drawbacks. It is, for one, strongly redolent of a coup.

There are important differences between military and political leadership. The former, for example, involves making the right decision and being equipped with sufficient authority to guarantee that subordinates treat your word as their command. Good political leadership, on the other hand, involves providing guidance and exercising your powers of persuasion.

It is Pakistan’s misfortune that in this country the two roles have too often been conflated. In the present context, a side effect of this predicament could be a disinclination on India’s part to take Musharraf at his word. The flexible new approach would have made more of an impression had it been accompanied by evidence that the general has engineered a consensual shift in Pakistan’s policy. The almost off-hand comment to Reuters bears greater resemblance to a trial balloon.

That said, the concession is a sensible one. Although there can be little question that the fate of Kashmir should ultimately be decided by the Kashmiris, and a referendum of some sort ought to be central to any settlement, there is a perfectly reasonable case to be made for not treating the old UN resolutions as immutable.

Musharraf’s initiative cannot, of course, lead very far without Indian reciprocity. New Delhi has thus far responded positively to all of Islamabad’s gestures, including the unilateral declaration of a ceasefire along the Line of Control. The trend is now likely to be reinforced.

India and Pakistan have been under a great deal of pressure from Washington to overcome the mutual hostility that has clouded their relations since Partition. That helps to explain why they are engaged in a conciliatory contest — and Musharraf has thus far managed to stay ahead of the competition.

The US has its own reasons for seeking a trouble-free subcontinent, and although there is often good cause to question Washington’s motives, in this case some of the ends it favours are on the face of it compatible with the interests of all Indians and Pakistanis of goodwill.

The decades of reciprocal suspicions and antagonism have brought no gains, least of all to the Kashmiris. Protracted bellicosity has proved to be a dead-end street at best. The worst is too horrible to contemplate.

India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons that neither of them needs. A nuclear-free subcontinent would be a safer place. But as long as the warheads and missiles exist, it is vital that they must not be used — and an Indo-Pakistan thaw that may even lead one day to friendship offers the best guarantee that the weapons of mass destruction will stay in their silos.

The progress towards an atmosphere conducive to long-term peaceful existence is welcome because of what it promises. The source of the impetus is a secondary matter — and should Washington lose interest in subcontinental affairs, it must be hoped that India and Pakistan will independently build upon the momentum that has already been acquired instead of reverting to the destructive follies of old.

This year is drawing to a close on a hopeful note, and January promises to be a milestone. It’s too soon to rejoice. One stupidity could suffice to bring the whole edifice crumbling down. Let’s cherish the hope that has tentatively bloomed in a harsh environment. Let’s nurture it as if our future depended on it. Because it does.

e-mail: mahirali2@netscape.net