Eduard Shevardnadze’s dramatic exit

THE last time Eduard Shevardnadze resigned, the dramatic announcement was accompanied by a dire warning. The Soviet Union, its outgoing foreign minister noted, was in danger of reverting to a dictatorship. The year was 1990, and among the Soviet leadership, Shevardnadze’s international profile was second only to that of Mikhail Gorbachev.

On the world stage, “Gorby” and “Shevy” were a popular double act, perceived as joint guarantors of the new direction whereby the Warsaw Pact swore off interventions aimed at sustaining Eastern Europe’s communist regimes, while the USSR vigorously strove to negotiate arms reductions with its primary cold war rival, the United States.

By 1990 the cold war was effectively over, yet within the Soviet Union, the fate of Gorbachev’s daring reforms hung in the balance. While radicals impatiently strove for more changes at a quicker pace, conservatives were equally keen to cling on to the verities of the past — and it was feared that they may resort to force.

Shevardnadze wasn’t identified with either of these factions: he was viewed as a Gorbachev loyalist, albeit one equipped with a mind of his own. There was something ominous about his resignation. He was berated in some quarters for abandoning Gorbachev at such a crucial juncture. But his act was also interpreted as a sign of despair: an indication that a conservative backlash was more or less inevitable.

Shevardnadze’s fears weren’t misplaced. The old guard played its hand in August 1991, but was trumped by Muscovites — with the vital assistance, mind you, of the Red Army, whose officers and troops were reluctant to turn their guns on the immense crowds that spontaneously thronged the streets of the Soviet capital. Boris Yeltsin emerged as a focus of anti-coup resistance, but only after being egged on in frantic phone calls by George Bush the Elder and John Major.

Shevardnadze, too, appeared keen to defend the gains of glasnost and perestroika, and he returned to his old post of foreign minister after Gorbachev’s restoration to power. But it was too late to rescue the Soviet Union. The hardline coup paved the way for another, as Yeltsin conspired with the leaders of other Soviet republics to undermine Gorbachev’s Union Treaty. Thus it was that, a dozen years ago this month, the USSR ceased to exist. Gorby and Shevy suddenly found themselves jobless.

For Gorbachev, a career in Russian politics seemed like an unlikely proposition: the vast majority of his compatriots did not share the rest of the world’s opinion of him as an exceptionally talented, urbane and humane leader. Shevardnadze, on the other hand, was viewed with greater ambivalence by fellow Georgians. They were proud of his prestige and achievements on the global stage, but less complacent about his domestic persona.

They certainly weren’t unacquainted with him. Since 1972, Shevardnadze had been first secretary of the Communist Party in Georgia. In that capacity, he wasn’t reputed to be exceptionally cruel or corrupt, but nor was he particularly tolerant of dissent. Among other outspoken dissidents, he had imprisoned Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who became the first president of independent Georgia.

Gamsakhurdia’s presidency was short-lived, however; his inexperience translated into incompetence, and after he was ousted in 1992, Shevardnadze returned to Tbilisi and was somewhat grudgingly accepted as parliamentary speaker. In the southern parts of the former Soviet Union, the ascendancy of erstwhile Communist apparatchiks wasn’t an uncommon phenomenon. Besides, unlike Nursultan Nazarbayev and Haidar Aliyev, Shevardnadze had friends in high places throughout the West. and most of them felt comfortable with him at the helm in Georgia.

Shevardnadze — elected president in 1995 and again in 2000 — promised freedoms and prosperity to Georgians. He did not do abysmally on the first score: conditions may be far from perfect, but Georgia has a reasonably independent media, as well as a civil society that was able to mobilize last month after parliamentary elections delivered a result that was widely perceived as fraudulent. This is considerably more than can be said for most of Georgia’s Central Asian neighbours.

On the economic front, however, there has been much less room for complacency. Unemployment and underemployment are rife in the nation, amid widespread poverty. Watchdogs count Georgia among the ten most corrupt countries in the world. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have for years been calling upon Shevardnadze to take steps towards eliminating corruption. He made promises, but it appears he lacked the energy to take on this crucial fight. Eventually, even his own family reputedly became involved in dubious practices.

There were wealth differentials during the Soviet tenure, too, but rarely were they allowed to extend to absolute poverty. The absence of anywhere to turn to must be one of the hardest changes that citizens of the former Soviet Union have had to adapt to, not least in Russia. The blow wasn’t cushioned in Georgia either. Shevardnadze has steadily been keen to impress his western friends with his commitment to economic rationalism. Pitifully, this has brought considerably less benefit to his nation than might have been expected. Georgia isn’t just minerally rich, it was once famed also for its orchards and vineyards. But the grapes have rotted on the vines, so to speak. Nor has the country been able to exploit its potential as a Black Sea tourist attraction.

Small wonder, then, that Georgians were fed up with the Shevardnadze regime by the time the November elections rolled along, and their inability to usher in a different government via the ballot box prompted outrage, followed by demonstrations.

Back in 1999, Shevardnadze is reported to have turned down a request from Yeltsin to use Georgia as a staging post for attacks on Chechen rebels. The Kremlin, apparently, has never forgiven him for this display of lese majeste, even though the Georgian leader chose his course of action after consultations with the White House.

Of late, the US had turned against him, too. A succession of recent American visitors, including former secretary of state (and loyal Bush family retainer) James Baker, had requested him to step aside. Washington, it appears, had run out of patience. It was time for a regime change. Not because Shevardnadze had suddenly turned untrustworthy, but because he had failed to deliver the stability that the US desires.

In the wake of 9/11, Shevardnadze had visited the White House to express his condolences. The US was welcome to military bases on Georgian territory, he had said. The Americans were pleased. They were aware that Georgia still had Russian bases — out of necessity rather than choice, because Moscow had refused to move out.

Georgia continues, in the view of some analysts, to be proxy cold war battlefield. That is why Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov arrived in Tbilisi amid last month’s turmoil in an effort to broker a deal between Shevardnadze and the opposition. Once he realized it was impossible, he too advised Shevardnadze to stage an exit with all the dignity he could muster.

Shevardnadze complied with the request, and it is to his credit that he did not try to stay on by force. During the crisis he had refused to take urgent calls from James Baker, perhaps because he realized what the message would be. In not particularly diplomatic statements, US ambassador Richard Miles had already made clear where his country stood. And there is at the very least a likelihood that Shevardnadze’s security chief, Tedo Dzhaparidze (a former ambassador to the US appointed to this critical post at Washington’s behest in 2001), was effectively serving two masters. When Dzhaparidze delivered a negative verdict on the November elections, it was a signal that Shevardnadze’s time was up. Miles, meanwhile, is reported to have been grooming the young, US-educated leader of the opposition, Mikhail Saakashvilli, for the succession. Presidential elections are constitutionally required to be held within 45 days of Shevardnadze’s exit — by January 8 at the latest. The likely winner? Saakashvilli.

The American interest in Georgia isn’t limited to its strategic value as a military outpost or to its significance as a post-cold war testing ground. Not surprisingly, there’s oil involved: BP, with US backing, is building a pipeline from the Caspian Sea to Turkey, which runs through Georgia, bypassing Russia as well as Iran. Hence the need for a stable Georgia, and the methods employed to achieve regime change have followed the pattern the US has experimented with elsewhere, notably in Serbia (successfully) and Belarus (no such luck).

Saakashvilli, at 35, has youth on his side — but also a reputation for nationalism bordering on xenophobia, which is likely to alarm Georgia’s minorities. It’s a shame, of course, that Shevardnadze’s career ended on such a sour note, with the “grey fox” (as he is known) being jostled out of parliament. It’ll be an even bigger shame if the new leadership proves unable to sort out the mess Georgia finds itself in — or expends more energy on pleasing the Americans than it devotes to alleviating conditions for Georgians.

e-mail: mahirali2@netscape.net

Pakistan’s new initiatives

WHAT should one make of the recent moves that have been initiated by Pakistan ((ceasefire on the LoC and unconditional resumption of overflights) and positively responded to by India? Does this mean that a genuine positive momentum has now been created which could move the two countries towards a durable and stable peace?

Since April, when the famous “extending the hand of friendship” speech was made in Srinagar by Prime Minister Vajpayee and warmly welcomed by President Musharraf there has been precious little concrete movement on the ground.

Diplomatic representation has been raised to high commissioner level and bus service has been restored but for the most part even the limited communication that existed before the military standoff commenced in December 2001 remained suspended.

In August the resumption of overflights was rejected by Pakistan on the ground that Pakistan needed some sort of guarantee against unilateral suspension in the future. In September Musharraf’s reiterated offer of a ceasefire along the LoC, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, was misinterpreted as being linked to a reduction in Indian repression in Occupied Kashmir and rejected by Vajpayee. At that time it seemed that having highlighted the seemingly intractable nature of their quarrel in the chambers of the United Nations the two countries had given a new fillip to tensions in South Asia.

In the last week of October, however, the Indians unveiled a whole host of proposals that would have restored, in terms of communications links, the status quo ante December 2001 and gone beyond. Pakistan responded positively to some and made the acceptance of others conditional on the resumption of a composite dialogue which Pakistan has been desperately seeking and which India has been rejecting.

In analyzing the Indian motives for making these proposals it had been my conclusion that India was responding to the international community’s urgent pleas for some steps that could ease the growing tensions following the unpleasant exchanges at the UN. There is no doubt that there has been much behind the scenes American activity to push both India and Pakistan towards measures that would initially alleviate tensions and then lead to a resumption of dialogue. The Indian response was designed to take the first step but to maintain their rejection of dialogue until their condition on the elimination of cross LoC terrorism had been met.

While the international community’s demarches were no doubt important I believe that the BJP took this step only after their strategists determined that this would have a positive, or at least no negative impact, on their election prospects in the four important states where elections have just concluded.

The BJP had used anti-Pakistan, anti-Musharraf and anti-Muslim slogans to great effect during the state elections in Gujarat. After their crushing victory in Gujarat, the BJP leadership seemed convinced that this would be the principal plank of their election campaign not only for the state elections in Himachal Pardesh (May ‘03) Madhya Pardesh, Delhi, Chattisgarh and Rajasthan (Dec’03) but also the national elections in 2004. The main question was whether it would be used as crudely as in Gujarat or camouflaged somewhat by presenting the BJP as the champion of the campaign against terrorism launched by a hostile “neighbour” and by denigrating the Congress as soft on terrorism and on terrorism’s local sympathizers.

The elections in Himachal Pardesh, where the BJP lost just as decisively as it had won in Gujarat, gave the BJP strategists a pause but did not lead to an immediate abandonment of this plank. More recently however as the elections of December drew nearer it became apparent that there was growing revulsion in the Indian electorate about the carnage in Gujarat, the part that the Narendra Modi government had played in encouraging this massacre of the Muslims, and, by implication, a rejection of the communal slogans that had led to the slaughter and to the election victory.

In the last month, as the elections campaign intensified in these four states one found BJP leaders and candidates focusing largely on the anti-incumbency factor highlighting the failure of the Congress governments in these states to deliver on economic development and the maintenance of law and order rather than on the BJP’s strong performance against externally fomented terrorism. Congress was berated for its weak performance domestically but not for being soft on terrorism or by implication on Pakistan. Pakistan, therefore, was not a factor in the election campaign in any significant way.

In these circumstances it was perhaps possible for Vajpayee, who seems to be genuinely committed to seeking a better relationship with Pakistan, to urge his party colleagues to move forward on Indo-Pakistan relations.

This does not meant, however, that the Indian proposals have yielded even an iota on the issue of Kashmir or on the issue of renewing a composite dialogue with Pakistan in which, of necessity, Kashmir would occupy an important place.

Moreover, and this was an important element in the small print of the Indian proposals, India was also seeking to ensure that none of these proposals would move forward if Pakistan did not agree to an unconditional resumption of overflights — this is of greater importance to India than to Pakistan since there are about 115 Indian flights that have to take a longer route every week as against 15 Pakistani flights that are similarly affected.

The ball, at this stage was in Pakistan’s court. It was clear that India had already earned kudos internationally for having made the proposals. It was also clear that if the talks on the overflight issue failed India would place the blame squarely on Pakistan and would probably have the sympathy of the world in doing so.

Further, it could be seen that as these initiatives moved forward there would only be a peripheral or no association with the main issue — Kashmir. Lastly it could also be seen that even while these initiatives would ensure that the Saarc summit went ahead as scheduled there was little prospect of any discussion, leave alone substantive discussion on bilateral issues between Pakistani and Indian leaders on the sidelines of the summit.

Prime Minister Jamali’s speech on November 23 in which he announced Pakistan’s intention to observe a unilateral ceasefire on the LoC from Eid day and offered a more positive perspective on such proposals as the bus service between Srinagar and Muzzaffarabad etc, was meant, I believe to ensure that Kashmir did become part of the evolving tension-alleviating exercise and to create an ambience in which it would be churlish on the part of the Indian delegation to the Saarc summit meeting to evade a bilateral discussion.

While Pakistan had possibly received assurances, through intermediaries, that the ceasefire proposal in particular would elicit a positive response from India, I am not sure that the Pakistanis were warned in advance that the Indians in accepting the ceasefire would also propose its extension to the Siachen region. In Siachen the Pakistanis have always felt that since the Indians paid a much higher price for maintaining battle readiness than the Pakistanis, any ceasefire in that area would work to India’s advantage.

On this as on the question of overflights it could be argued that India was trying to take advantage of Pakistan’s desire for a forward movement.

From Pakistan’s perspective this was clearly understood. But given what I believe was the rationale for the Jamali speech it was only right that Pakistan should take the logical step of accepting the Indian proposal for the extension of the LoC ceasefire to the Siachen region and to make a gesture on the overflights question as part of a rather spectacular grand standing public relations exercise speech by President Musharraf to a visiting Indian delegation.

The last information received from New Delhi is that agreement has been reached on the resumption of overflights and air links from January 1, and there appears to be some discussion on increasing both the frequency of flights and the number of cities to be connected.

It can be assumed that the next step will be the resumption of the Samjhota Express and possibly an increase in the frequency of the service. There may thereafter be some movement before the Saarc summit on other elements including perhaps the working out of modalities for the Mumbai-Karachi ferry service, the Khokhrapar rail service and possibly the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus service.

There may even be talks on increasing the size of the diplomatic missions of the two countries.

But what will all this mean for the over-all relationship and more immediately what does it portend for the dialogue that may now take place during the Saarc summit? I think it would be best to be realistic.

A positive momentum will have been created by January. It will ensure that Vajpayee will be at his courteous best and the Pakistanis will be offering a level of hospitality that will rival the reception accorded to Musharraf in Agra.

There will be a meeting on the margin and more particularly during the “retreat” when the Saarc leaders will be interacting without the presence of advisers and aides. Indo-Pakistan relations will be discussed both because the two leaders will want to

do so but also because the other South Asians will urge them to arrive at some understanding that can remove the obstacles to greater intra-South Asian cooperation.

It would be naive however to expect that Vajpayee will, in such discussions, embrace the Musharraf formula eloquently re-articulated to the Indian business delegation about a substantive dialogue between India and Pakistan. Vajpayee, I anticipate, will concede that Kashmir needs to be discussed and may propose that as the atmosphere improves further a composite dialogue on this and other Indo-Pakistan issues can commence at a “suitable” level even if India’s demands on a complete cessation of terrorism have not been met. Not satisfactory but perhaps the best that one can get at this time.

The writer is a former foreign secretary of Pakistan.

Caring about Lahore

LIVING in the rarefied atmosphere of Islamabad I hardly ever visit Lahore. I do not even go for Basant the annual bash that is fast becoming an international event, though how it will be celebrated next February with the government’s restriction on flying kites, is beyond my ken.

But Lahore is my home town and supposedly the cultural capital of Pakistan and I am deeply interested in its welfare. So when I heard some time ago that a body called Care About Lahore (CAL) had been formed for the protection of old buildings within the walled city and was actually functioning, my interest was instantly aroused.

Caring citizens had also joined hands some ten years ago and set up the Lahore Conservation Society to make efforts for the preservation of old structures in the walled city. It was not to interfere, except to make pertinent suggestions, with the work of the Archaeological Department which concerns itself with protected historical monuments but to take up the task of looking after private buildings. I wonder what happened to it.

Such bodies owe their existence usually to the enthusiasm of one person who inspires and goads others to join him. Maybe the moving spirit of the Conservation Society is no longer around. Maybe he was disappointed by the lack of matching enthusiasm in his companions or a discouraging response from the authorities. Whatever the reason, the society has not been heard of for a long time, or perhaps I don’t know that it still works.

Now probably to keep alive the hopes of people who love the walled city this new body has come into being, though its formation does not seem to be a recent occurrence. The avowed aim of CAL’s members — all volunteers — is to help preserve buildings in the oldest part of Lahore, as also to address the many problems that plague the sprawling provincial metropolis. I hope CAL is associating with the good work it has undertaken those who were active in the Lahore Conservation Society of old.

It may sound bizarre but the best person to contact in this connection is the Aga Khan Prize winning architect Nayyar Ali Dada, who was sent to jail by the Punjab administration four years ago for the collapse of the roof of Alhamra Auditorium. Regrettably this shabby treatment had come from Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif who had otherwise done so much for Lahore.

As far as I can recall, Nayyar Ali Dada was not the main person behind the Lahore Conservation Society but he was certainly one of its founders. He should be able to guide CAL about the more enthusiastic members of the now moribund society, including some bright young people who were then students of the National College of Arts and did some fine practical work in the walled city like drawing up a list of buildings to be preserved and dividing them into categories. That is, if Nayyar is not already associated with CAL too.

Lahore is in urgent need of care if it is to survive the ravages of a rapidly growing population (mainly due to urbanisation) and increasing pollution (mostly due to dusty roads and automobile exhaust fumes) and the juggernaut of modern development that rides roughshod over valuable old buildings and is absolutely devoid of sensibilities. This attitude is a horror in Karachi and the biggest hurdle before the good people who, like CAL, have taken upon themselves the duty to preserve that city’s old structures.

According to a newspaper write-up, volunteers of Care About Lahore hope to resurrect the walled city encircled by its thirteen gates (not seven as the comment suggested) and develop it as a major tourist attraction.

Given the unique architecture and embellishments of the houses and havelis lining the narrow alleys in this part of Lahore, this is a most commendable, though formidable plan. This badly neglected portion

of the city is in dire need of rescue because of the crumbling woodwork and the ever-growing encroachments that have already destroyed substantial segments of a valuable heritage.

Mention of tourism in this connection takes my mind back to some forty years ago. As an officer of the Public Relations Department I was deputed to take two female state guests from Europe around Lahore who were in Pakistan for an international conference. The two ladies did not care for The Mall, in fact they rejected it out of hand as modern, and were barely tolerant of Anarkali which they characterised as a conversion of the picturesque old into the garish new, and wanted me to take them inside the walled city. I readily agreed.

Once there, they were simply enchanted by its old-world charm and didn’t want to come away. For there was so much of the quaint to see and admire, including the life style of the denizens.

They were particularly fascinated by the aspect of hawker shopping in which housewives let a basket go down by a long string from an upstairs window or balcony and pull it up again with the desired goods. I had almost to drag them away from the magical influence of old Lahore by reminding them of their engagements in the evening.

The newspaper comment on the aims and objects of CAL had pointed out that the interest evoked by its formation suggested the existence of a large body of enlightened men and women and private organizations who were keen to involve themselves in anything that would promote the national culture and draw tourists from aboard.

Mobilization of private effort toward such causes needs to be encouraged by the government which is handicapped by lack of both trained personnel and adequate resources to take up a task of this scale on its own. Actually, interested and committed private individuals can do much more in this area then government officers, even when the latter armed with sufficient funds.

What can be further stressed in this context is that Lahore is not the only ancient city in the country, or in Punjab, that needs intimate attention of conservationists. Multan is equally full of relics of old times and abounds in beautiful buildings hundreds of years of age. The magnificent mausoleum of Hazrat Bahauddin Zakriya has already received aid from UNESCO. There are also small towns like Bhera and Chiniot which are an antiquarian’s paradise. So is the old city of Hyderabad, the rich repository of Sindh’s turbulent history and the relics of its pre-British rulers. They are all waiting for saviours.

But the sad fact remains that the feeling for antiquity comes from a western education, making one conscious of culture as a life-giving need. To the average local citizen uninitiated in love for something called the heritage (it is simply not there in the national psyche) old buildings have nothing precious about them and should be torn down to make way for plazas and shopping arcades. What is to be done about this attitude? Who will, and who can, educate a whole nation?

Being proud of one’s history

THE address of British High Commissioner, Mark Lyall Grant, to the English Speaking Union in Karachi on the November 13, 2003, was heart-warming for his friendly sentiments including description of his many family links with Pakistan.

He recounted how numerous members of his family had served in many of the areas now constituting the state of Pakistan in pre- independence days and how a few had served even after the establishment of Pakistan. The high commissioner came across as a man of warmth and empathy, which should stand him in good stead in his mission here.

Commenting on the changes he had noticed on his return to Pakistan after twenty years, he said that he found Pakistan more secure in respect of the perceived threat from India and with regard to internal dissident elements. He found the press refreshingly free. In the economic sphere, he mentioned the positive assessment of the British business community here about prospects for development, in some spheres even more favourable than in India or China. One of his comments was, however, hurtful, only because it was true. He expressed surprise that a number of Pakistanis seemed to take no pride in their country, which he felt, was unwarranted.

Although there are many sources of understandable disillusionment with the state of national affairs, an appreciation of the unprecedented challenges faced by Pakistan, compared to most of the newly independent countries since 1945, would put the situation in a truer perspective. The circumstances of Pakistan’s birth involving the bitter hostility of our larger neighbour, which burdened us with heavy defence responsibilities, the bleeding wound of Kashmir, the influx of millions of refugees, the early demise of our founding fathers and the immense inherited advantage with which India started off, are not convenient alibis but facts of life which certainly impeded Pakistan’s potential for faster growth.

Prof Ralph Braibanti, professor emeritus at the Duke University, had, inter alia, this to say in the Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Fall, 1996), “Pakistan has been pummelled by external events to a degree which no other state, established since 1945, has suffered. The enormity and persistence of the challenges faced by Pakistan and the resilience of the nation in surviving them evoke awe and admiration”.

While noted intellectual, Arthur Kennedy, has described Pakistan as “one of the world’s seven pivotal states” (Foreign Affairs Quarterly), this very characteristic of being ‘the geo- political pivot of history’ has cast Pakistan more than once into the eye of the storm in global and regional crises, including the war against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the US war against Afghanistan.

It is regrettable that the Pakistan-bashing which goes on in the columns of Pakistan’s English language print media (even more than in the high commissioner’s own country where the term was first coined) does not confine itself to criticism of the government of the day, (current or past), which would be legitimate but often extends to sweeping and disproportionate indictment of Pakistan’s entire history and all national stereotypes, cultural, social and political.

Magnified versions of our sins of omission and commission are given. Unfair comparisons are made with other countries, particularly India, with known, significant failures of the latter glossed over and achievements highlighted. Such writings radiate a wide array of negative impulses to the detriment of Pakistan.

In this connection, it would be pertinent to recall an exchange on the subject, during a seminar on South Asia some years back at the Staff College, Quetta. At the dinner attended by the faculty and students, I asked High Commissioner, Mr. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, then in New Delhi, whether the Indians indulged in the same type of self-denigration which we did. His reply was most instructive. He said that as far as criticism of governments in power was concerned, the Indians indulged in it even more than Pakistanis did. But he had never heard any Indian running down his country. This is not something that we can say for many of our own people.

After pointing out that Pakistan was a nuclear power and had the eighth largest military force, the British High Commissioner noted that Pakistanis were in the habit of describing their state as a small country, when in fact it was the sixth largest country in the world. [The perception of Pakistan as a small country may be understood in the comparative context of our neighbourhood, which includes three of the largest countries in the world]. The high commissioner also lauded President Musharraf’s call for ‘enlightened moderation’, which, he said, was the most effective way to promote Pakistan’s development.

Not may nations have been more conscious of the fundamental importance of national morale and hence of national pride than the British as their history clearly shows. There is the telling comment of reputed American historian, Barbara Tuchman, “No people have ever written a military history of such verbal nobility as the British. Disasters are recorded with pride and care and become transmuted into things of beauty. Other people attempt but never quite achieve the same self-esteem!” (March of Folly).

It was the historical self-esteem of the Muslims of undivided India which provided the momentum and the drive for the Pakistan movement. But for a sense of pride in their thousand-year history in the sub-continent, Pakistan would never have become a reality. Excessive and unfair self-denigration kills not only pride and morale; it kills the soul within a nation.

It is hoped that the strong assurances held out recently by both the president and the prime minister for an understanding with the parliamentary opposition would soon be fulfilled. However, during elections in Pakistan, the test of character has never been the foremost concern of the electorate; character in the sense of integrity in its wider, political context which is to accord priority to collective, social, national objectives in clear preference to personal, party or group considerations. The highest task for the future is to educate the electorate to recognize and reward integrity in candidates for office without which both our national interests and national image would go by default.

Modernization of economy and polity is linked to the fight against all forms of extremism and terrorism. Pakistan must stay the course on President Musharraf’s liberal reform agenda and on creating political space for economic development through continued efforts to establish durable peace in South Asia. Efforts to reach a settlement with India, if possible through the good offices of the US and the world community, should be steadily pursued.

Uprising in Georgia

EDUARD Shevardnadze, the statesman who did much to ensure that the collapse and transformation of the former Soviet bloc was peaceful, has now seen his own career as president of his native Georgia ended by a popular uprising.

It’s a sad end to a historic political career: Mr. Shevardnadze was forced out by mass protests after he tried to reverse the victory of opposition parties in a parliamentary election by ratifying blatantly fraudulent results. Yet the “revolution of roses,” as some are calling last weekend’s events in that small but strategically important Caucasian country, was good news for Georgia and its supporters in the West, including the Bush administration.

First, Mr. Shevardnadze left peacefully — a last good deed from the Soviet foreign minister who helped manage the fall of the Berlin Wall — and there was no violence in the streets of his impoverished and unstable nation. The new government is made up of pro-Western democrats, the legitimate winners of this month’s elections, and they have pledged to hold new votes for both president and parliament in 45 days.

Much of the earlier fraud was organized by a thuggish regional leader with close ties to Russia, who induced Mr. Shevardnadze to accept a political alliance that could have compromised Georgia’s independence as well as its political system. He has been forced into retreat. The Bush administration, which has been trumpeting its commitment to promote democracy around the world, now has a chance to follow through in a country strategically placed on the edge of the greater Middle East.

To its credit, the administration has already done much to encourage democracy in Georgia. Last summer it dispatched former Secretary of State James A. Baker III to persuade Mr. Shevardnadze to sign an election agreement allowing for exit polls and parallel vote counts by international observers — actions that ended up exposing the fraud and lending legitimacy to the popular rebellion.

After the elections, the administration denounced the fraud and distanced itself from Mr. Shevardnadze — in contrast to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who repeatedly phoned the president even as senior aides huddled with Moscow’s ally, the regional autocrat, smuggler and vote-stealer Aslan Abashidze.

—The Washington Post