WHAT should one make of the recent moves that have been initiated by Pakistan ((ceasefire on the LoC and unconditional resumption of overflights) and positively responded to by India? Does this mean that a genuine positive momentum has now been created which could move the two countries towards a durable and stable peace?

Since April, when the famous “extending the hand of friendship” speech was made in Srinagar by Prime Minister Vajpayee and warmly welcomed by President Musharraf there has been precious little concrete movement on the ground.

Diplomatic representation has been raised to high commissioner level and bus service has been restored but for the most part even the limited communication that existed before the military standoff commenced in December 2001 remained suspended.

In August the resumption of overflights was rejected by Pakistan on the ground that Pakistan needed some sort of guarantee against unilateral suspension in the future. In September Musharraf’s reiterated offer of a ceasefire along the LoC, in his speech to the UN General Assembly, was misinterpreted as being linked to a reduction in Indian repression in Occupied Kashmir and rejected by Vajpayee. At that time it seemed that having highlighted the seemingly intractable nature of their quarrel in the chambers of the United Nations the two countries had given a new fillip to tensions in South Asia.

In the last week of October, however, the Indians unveiled a whole host of proposals that would have restored, in terms of communications links, the status quo ante December 2001 and gone beyond. Pakistan responded positively to some and made the acceptance of others conditional on the resumption of a composite dialogue which Pakistan has been desperately seeking and which India has been rejecting.

In analyzing the Indian motives for making these proposals it had been my conclusion that India was responding to the international community’s urgent pleas for some steps that could ease the growing tensions following the unpleasant exchanges at the UN. There is no doubt that there has been much behind the scenes American activity to push both India and Pakistan towards measures that would initially alleviate tensions and then lead to a resumption of dialogue. The Indian response was designed to take the first step but to maintain their rejection of dialogue until their condition on the elimination of cross LoC terrorism had been met.

While the international community’s demarches were no doubt important I believe that the BJP took this step only after their strategists determined that this would have a positive, or at least no negative impact, on their election prospects in the four important states where elections have just concluded.

The BJP had used anti-Pakistan, anti-Musharraf and anti-Muslim slogans to great effect during the state elections in Gujarat. After their crushing victory in Gujarat, the BJP leadership seemed convinced that this would be the principal plank of their election campaign not only for the state elections in Himachal Pardesh (May ‘03) Madhya Pardesh, Delhi, Chattisgarh and Rajasthan (Dec’03) but also the national elections in 2004. The main question was whether it would be used as crudely as in Gujarat or camouflaged somewhat by presenting the BJP as the champion of the campaign against terrorism launched by a hostile “neighbour” and by denigrating the Congress as soft on terrorism and on terrorism’s local sympathizers.

The elections in Himachal Pardesh, where the BJP lost just as decisively as it had won in Gujarat, gave the BJP strategists a pause but did not lead to an immediate abandonment of this plank. More recently however as the elections of December drew nearer it became apparent that there was growing revulsion in the Indian electorate about the carnage in Gujarat, the part that the Narendra Modi government had played in encouraging this massacre of the Muslims, and, by implication, a rejection of the communal slogans that had led to the slaughter and to the election victory.

In the last month, as the elections campaign intensified in these four states one found BJP leaders and candidates focusing largely on the anti-incumbency factor highlighting the failure of the Congress governments in these states to deliver on economic development and the maintenance of law and order rather than on the BJP’s strong performance against externally fomented terrorism. Congress was berated for its weak performance domestically but not for being soft on terrorism or by implication on Pakistan. Pakistan, therefore, was not a factor in the election campaign in any significant way.

In these circumstances it was perhaps possible for Vajpayee, who seems to be genuinely committed to seeking a better relationship with Pakistan, to urge his party colleagues to move forward on Indo-Pakistan relations.

This does not meant, however, that the Indian proposals have yielded even an iota on the issue of Kashmir or on the issue of renewing a composite dialogue with Pakistan in which, of necessity, Kashmir would occupy an important place.

Moreover, and this was an important element in the small print of the Indian proposals, India was also seeking to ensure that none of these proposals would move forward if Pakistan did not agree to an unconditional resumption of overflights — this is of greater importance to India than to Pakistan since there are about 115 Indian flights that have to take a longer route every week as against 15 Pakistani flights that are similarly affected.

The ball, at this stage was in Pakistan’s court. It was clear that India had already earned kudos internationally for having made the proposals. It was also clear that if the talks on the overflight issue failed India would place the blame squarely on Pakistan and would probably have the sympathy of the world in doing so.

Further, it could be seen that as these initiatives moved forward there would only be a peripheral or no association with the main issue — Kashmir. Lastly it could also be seen that even while these initiatives would ensure that the Saarc summit went ahead as scheduled there was little prospect of any discussion, leave alone substantive discussion on bilateral issues between Pakistani and Indian leaders on the sidelines of the summit.

Prime Minister Jamali’s speech on November 23 in which he announced Pakistan’s intention to observe a unilateral ceasefire on the LoC from Eid day and offered a more positive perspective on such proposals as the bus service between Srinagar and Muzzaffarabad etc, was meant, I believe to ensure that Kashmir did become part of the evolving tension-alleviating exercise and to create an ambience in which it would be churlish on the part of the Indian delegation to the Saarc summit meeting to evade a bilateral discussion.

While Pakistan had possibly received assurances, through intermediaries, that the ceasefire proposal in particular would elicit a positive response from India, I am not sure that the Pakistanis were warned in advance that the Indians in accepting the ceasefire would also propose its extension to the Siachen region. In Siachen the Pakistanis have always felt that since the Indians paid a much higher price for maintaining battle readiness than the Pakistanis, any ceasefire in that area would work to India’s advantage.

On this as on the question of overflights it could be argued that India was trying to take advantage of Pakistan’s desire for a forward movement.

From Pakistan’s perspective this was clearly understood. But given what I believe was the rationale for the Jamali speech it was only right that Pakistan should take the logical step of accepting the Indian proposal for the extension of the LoC ceasefire to the Siachen region and to make a gesture on the overflights question as part of a rather spectacular grand standing public relations exercise speech by President Musharraf to a visiting Indian delegation.

The last information received from New Delhi is that agreement has been reached on the resumption of overflights and air links from January 1, and there appears to be some discussion on increasing both the frequency of flights and the number of cities to be connected.

It can be assumed that the next step will be the resumption of the Samjhota Express and possibly an increase in the frequency of the service. There may thereafter be some movement before the Saarc summit on other elements including perhaps the working out of modalities for the Mumbai-Karachi ferry service, the Khokhrapar rail service and possibly the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus service.

There may even be talks on increasing the size of the diplomatic missions of the two countries.

But what will all this mean for the over-all relationship and more immediately what does it portend for the dialogue that may now take place during the Saarc summit? I think it would be best to be realistic.

A positive momentum will have been created by January. It will ensure that Vajpayee will be at his courteous best and the Pakistanis will be offering a level of hospitality that will rival the reception accorded to Musharraf in Agra.

There will be a meeting on the margin and more particularly during the “retreat” when the Saarc leaders will be interacting without the presence of advisers and aides. Indo-Pakistan relations will be discussed both because the two leaders will want to

do so but also because the other South Asians will urge them to arrive at some understanding that can remove the obstacles to greater intra-South Asian cooperation.

It would be naive however to expect that Vajpayee will, in such discussions, embrace the Musharraf formula eloquently re-articulated to the Indian business delegation about a substantive dialogue between India and Pakistan. Vajpayee, I anticipate, will concede that Kashmir needs to be discussed and may propose that as the atmosphere improves further a composite dialogue on this and other Indo-Pakistan issues can commence at a “suitable” level even if India’s demands on a complete cessation of terrorism have not been met. Not satisfactory but perhaps the best that one can get at this time.

The writer is a former foreign secretary of Pakistan.

THE address of British High Commissioner, Mark Lyall Grant, to the English Speaking Union in Karachi on the November 13, 2003, was heart-warming for his friendly sentiments including description of his many family links with Pakistan.

He recounted how numerous members of his family had served in many of the areas now constituting the state of Pakistan in pre- independence days and how a few had served even after the establishment of Pakistan. The high commissioner came across as a man of warmth and empathy, which should stand him in good stead in his mission here.

Commenting on the changes he had noticed on his return to Pakistan after twenty years, he said that he found Pakistan more secure in respect of the perceived threat from India and with regard to internal dissident elements. He found the press refreshingly free. In the economic sphere, he mentioned the positive assessment of the British business community here about prospects for development, in some spheres even more favourable than in India or China. One of his comments was, however, hurtful, only because it was true. He expressed surprise that a number of Pakistanis seemed to take no pride in their country, which he felt, was unwarranted.

Although there are many sources of understandable disillusionment with the state of national affairs, an appreciation of the unprecedented challenges faced by Pakistan, compared to most of the newly independent countries since 1945, would put the situation in a truer perspective. The circumstances of Pakistan’s birth involving the bitter hostility of our larger neighbour, which burdened us with heavy defence responsibilities, the bleeding wound of Kashmir, the influx of millions of refugees, the early demise of our founding fathers and the immense inherited advantage with which India started off, are not convenient alibis but facts of life which certainly impeded Pakistan’s potential for faster growth.

Prof Ralph Braibanti, professor emeritus at the Duke University, had, inter alia, this to say in the Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Fall, 1996), “Pakistan has been pummelled by external events to a degree which no other state, established since 1945, has suffered. The enormity and persistence of the challenges faced by Pakistan and the resilience of the nation in surviving them evoke awe and admiration”.

While noted intellectual, Arthur Kennedy, has described Pakistan as “one of the world’s seven pivotal states” (Foreign Affairs Quarterly), this very characteristic of being ‘the geo- political pivot of history’ has cast Pakistan more than once into the eye of the storm in global and regional crises, including the war against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the US war against Afghanistan.

It is regrettable that the Pakistan-bashing which goes on in the columns of Pakistan’s English language print media (even more than in the high commissioner’s own country where the term was first coined) does not confine itself to criticism of the government of the day, (current or past), which would be legitimate but often extends to sweeping and disproportionate indictment of Pakistan’s entire history and all national stereotypes, cultural, social and political.

Magnified versions of our sins of omission and commission are given. Unfair comparisons are made with other countries, particularly India, with known, significant failures of the latter glossed over and achievements highlighted. Such writings radiate a wide array of negative impulses to the detriment of Pakistan.

In this connection, it would be pertinent to recall an exchange on the subject, during a seminar on South Asia some years back at the Staff College, Quetta. At the dinner attended by the faculty and students, I asked High Commissioner, Mr. Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, then in New Delhi, whether the Indians indulged in the same type of self-denigration which we did. His reply was most instructive. He said that as far as criticism of governments in power was concerned, the Indians indulged in it even more than Pakistanis did. But he had never heard any Indian running down his country. This is not something that we can say for many of our own people.

After pointing out that Pakistan was a nuclear power and had the eighth largest military force, the British High Commissioner noted that Pakistanis were in the habit of describing their state as a small country, when in fact it was the sixth largest country in the world. [The perception of Pakistan as a small country may be understood in the comparative context of our neighbourhood, which includes three of the largest countries in the world]. The high commissioner also lauded President Musharraf’s call for ‘enlightened moderation’, which, he said, was the most effective way to promote Pakistan’s development.

Not may nations have been more conscious of the fundamental importance of national morale and hence of national pride than the British as their history clearly shows. There is the telling comment of reputed American historian, Barbara Tuchman, “No people have ever written a military history of such verbal nobility as the British. Disasters are recorded with pride and care and become transmuted into things of beauty. Other people attempt but never quite achieve the same self-esteem!” (March of Folly).

It was the historical self-esteem of the Muslims of undivided India which provided the momentum and the drive for the Pakistan movement. But for a sense of pride in their thousand-year history in the sub-continent, Pakistan would never have become a reality. Excessive and unfair self-denigration kills not only pride and morale; it kills the soul within a nation.

It is hoped that the strong assurances held out recently by both the president and the prime minister for an understanding with the parliamentary opposition would soon be fulfilled. However, during elections in Pakistan, the test of character has never been the foremost concern of the electorate; character in the sense of integrity in its wider, political context which is to accord priority to collective, social, national objectives in clear preference to personal, party or group considerations. The highest task for the future is to educate the electorate to recognize and reward integrity in candidates for office without which both our national interests and national image would go by default.

Modernization of economy and polity is linked to the fight against all forms of extremism and terrorism. Pakistan must stay the course on President Musharraf’s liberal reform agenda and on creating political space for economic development through continued efforts to establish durable peace in South Asia. Efforts to reach a settlement with India, if possible through the good offices of the US and the world community, should be steadily pursued.