Contempt: change in nuance?
By Shujaat Ali Khan
On a plain reading of its text, the presidential ordinance of July 10 does little more than streamline the law of contempt to facilitate its effective enforcement.
According to its preamble, the ordinance is meant further to ‘explain the contempt of court articles of the Constitution and ensure sanctity of the judiciary’. Neither its preamble nor its provisions, however, clarify, let alone justify, resort to executive legislation. No action under the ordinance has been taken so far and it is not known what circumstances prompted the government or the president to take immediate action under Article 89 of the Constitution. It will have to be submitted to parliament for enactment within four months.
The timing and certain provisions of the ordinance do lend credence to the general belief that the measure is intended to meet a contingency that might possibly be created by an intensified campaign launched by lawyers. It will also come in handy if the political opponents of the existing set-up target the judiciary for its It will also come in handy if the political opponents of the existing set-up target the judiciary for its pronouncements on the Legal Framework Order or in cases of disqualification of the madressah-qualified ‘graduates’.
The Pakistan Bar Council has already published a ‘white paper’, which does not contain much that was not known before. But a consolidated reproduction of the various PBC resolutions against the LFO provision relating to the enhancement of the retirement age of superior court judges and other controversial matters makes a greater impact. Besides, the preface and introductory remarks single out and scathingly criticize certain judges. More has been ‘promised’ by some Bar leaders at a lawyers’ convention scheduled to be held in Quetta on July 26 and the new ordinance is probably intended to warn the lawyers that enough is enough. It seems to be more preventive and pre-emptive than prospective or retrospective, though past conduct might also figure once a court decides to take cognizance.
Not surprisingly, it is in the realm of personalized criticism of judges that the new law marks a departure from the old. Such criticism could have been punished under the broad provisions of the old law, but the July 10 ordinance makes a special mention of the offence as part of ‘judicial contempt’. According to Section 2 (definitions clause) of the ordinance, judicial contempt means the scandalization of a court and includes personalized criticism of a judge while holding office. And, according to clause (f) of the section, ‘personalized criticism’ means criticism of a judge or a judgment in which improper motives are imputed. In their criticism of certain recent court orders, the Bar leaders have frequently attributed motives and insinuated ‘deals’ between the top judicial and executive functionaries .
To be fair to the framers of the new law, the provision is not entirely novel. It was first incorporated in the contempt regime as an independent section by the Contempt of Court Ordinance of October 1998. The 1998 ordinance was primarily based on the amendments made in the 1976 law by the National Assembly in November 1997 when (the then) prime minister Nawaz Sharif was in the thick of a tussle with (the then) chief justice Sajjad Ali Shah and had been charged with contempt.
The amendment, inter alia, provided for an intra-court appeal against the issuance of a show cause notice or an original order, including an interim order, passed by a bench of the Supreme Court in any case, ‘including a pending case’, to a larger bench consisting of all the remaining available judges of the court. The executive-judiciary row ended with the CJ’s ouster and the amendment never saw its fruition in the Senate. The 1998 ordinance was also allowed to expire and the 1976 Contempt of Court Act stood revived in its original form.
The July 10 ordinance, which repeals and replaces the 1976 law, dips into both the inchoate 1997 amendment and the lapsed 1998 ordinance.It classifies contempt into three categories—-civil, criminal and judicial. It also provides for an intra-court appeal against the order (not a show cause notice) made by a judge or bench of the apex court by a larger bench of its judges. More noticeably but very much like the defunct ordinance, it omits the 10 ‘defences’ or ‘exceptions’ available to an alleged contemner.
The most valid defence common to all species of contempt—-’fair comments about the general working of courts made in good faith and in the public interest and in temperate language’—-has been enacted as an independent section but evidently restricted in its scope. Embodied in Section 9 of the ordinance, it now reads: “The (sic) fair and healthy comments on a judgment involving (a)question of public importance in a case which has finally been decided and is no longer pending shall not constitute contempt; provided that it is phrased in temperate language and the integrity and impartiality of a judge is not impugned”.
Similarly, truth has been declared a valid defence subject to other provisions of the ordinance. ‘Fair reporting’ has been protected by Section 8 and ‘innocent publication’ by Section 15. Section 18 says that ‘no person shall be found guilty of contempt of court, or punished accordingly, unless the court is satisfied that the contempt is one which is substantially detrimental to the administration of justice or scandalizes the court or otherwise tends to bring the court or judge of the court into hatred or ridicule’.
The ordinance retains six months of simple imprisonment as the maximum corporeal punishment but enhances the maximum amount of fine from Rs 5,000 to Rs 100,000. Like the 1998 ordinance, it empowers the federal and provincial governments to move contempt applications through their law officers in cases of ‘criminal contempt’. Corporate liability for the offence has been extended to its directors or staff directly or indirectly responsible. An apology may now be submitted at any stage and the court may discharge an accused or remit his sentence if it is satisfied about its bona fides. The defence that an accused genuinely believes that he has not committed contempt shall not detract from the bona fides of his unqualified or unconditional apology.

