Iran: US’s cautious approach

THE almost daily body count of US soldiers in Iraq, coupled with the storm developing over US and British misuse of intelligence on Saddam’s WMD, have averted the threat of possible American military action against Iran, at least for the time being. Though the neo-conservatives in Washington assert that students in Tehran long for liberation, even they do not support an invasion of Iran for the moment. Some Pentagon analysts regard the idea as a dangerous fantasy.

The US-Iran relations have been marked by ups and downs since September 11. Iranian special forces helped the Northern Alliance during the Afghanistan war and even provided the Americans with useful intelligence. Tehran’s role in Afghanistan’s political recording was mostly helpful and constructive. Before the American-led invasion of Iraq, Iran encouraged an Iraqi group under its influence, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq,(SCIRI) to team up with other groups being organized by the Americans into a united opposition against Saddam Hussein. Even during the war, the Iranians turned a blind eye to American violation of their airspace and coastal waters.

But the relationship underwent a sudden change after American victory in Iraq. At the beginning of 2002,Iran was accused of shipping arms to the Palestinians. Al Qaeda agents are suspected by the Americans to have had a hand in the lethal bombing in Riyadh. In Iraq itself, the Americans have detained SCIRI operatives on suspicion of attacking US forces. On June 6, Tehran’s claim that it does not seek nuclear weapons was undermined by leaks from a UN report alleging that Iran had withheld sensitive information on the nuclear issue.

There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Bush administration wants Tehran to change its policies. But for Washington’s right wing think tanks and some hawks at the Pentagon, this is not enough. They want a change of the regime. They even argue that the evidence against Iran on the nuclear issue is stronger and more reliable than the evidence that was used against Saddam Hussein.

The problems being faced by US forces in Iraq have made the policy makers in Washington somewhat wiser and more cautious. According to media reports, the earlier plans for the destabilization of the regime in Tehran by US backed forces have been shelved for the time being. It is now being argued that insurgency in support of regime change can easily escalate into a full-scale war.

The Americans are also aware that Tehran has the ability to retaliate by reactivating Hezbollah’s international terrorist capability and can also instigate the Iraqi Shias against the American forces. If Washington does try to destabilize the regime in Tehran, the latter will do all it can to undermine American authority in Iraq.

Though other powers have also interfered blatantly in the internal affairs of Iran, the Americans in particular have a long history of involvement in Iranian affairs. The Russians under the czars attempted obtrusive intrusion into the body politic of Iran in the 19th century. In the 20th century, the Soviets played the old game in Azerbaijan. The British were not far behind either; even after the end of the Second World War, they played a prominent role in the oil nationalization crisis before the ouster of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq.

The Americans took over from where the British had left off. In August 1953, Mosaddeq was ousted from office by street violence engineered by CIA operatives with the help of British counterparts. The young Shah Mohammed Reza Pehalavi, who had fled the country in the midst of violence and upheavals, was brought back and restored to the throne.

In order to understand the intricacies of US-Iranian relationship, it will be helpful to keep in mind that the father of the Iranian Revolution, Khomeini, repeatedly stressed this historical “foreign hand” theme in Iranian politics in order to accomplish his mission. His rallying cry was the condemnation of America as the “Great Satan”, Washington being the main supporter of the Shah. During the 1979 seizure of the US embassy in Tehran by the revolutionary forces, the Iranian response to the American condemnation of the act was that the US government had no right to complain because it had taken the whole of Iran hostage in 1953.

Today, the same theme continues to politically underpin the clerics’ hold on power in Tehran. Although there is evidence to support the view that many Iranians today favour a dialogue with the Americans.

The main reason for the Shah’s downfall was that, as years went by, more and more Iranians became alienated from a regime that seemed to identify with the US strategic objectives in the region and its culture at variance with Iran’s rich cultural heritage and religious traditions.

In the light of hurtful experience in post-Saddam Iraq, the policy makers in Washington appear to be rethinking their policy towards Iran. Support appears to be growing for the view that, though regime change in Tehran is inevitable, the change must come from within. Moreover, Iran is no Iraq and the regime in Tehran, despite its failures and limitations, cannot be compared with that of Saddam Hussein. Also, Iran is bigger and more populous — seventy million-plus. The Iranians, overwhelmingly Shiite, are a far more cohesive and nationalistic people than the Iraqis.

According to media reports, some analysts also point out that the Americans and the Iranians have both shared interests in seeing progress towards cohesion and stability in Afghanistan. Another factor that may ultimately bring Washington and Tehran closer to each other is the reality of American presence in Iraq and the Gulf states. This fact may force the United States and Iran to start thinking seriously about a regional focus on long-term security arrangements.

There is increasing realization in Washington that this is no time for a Mosaddeq repeat. If the US intervenes in Iran at this juncture, this will only derail the momentum for change which is already under way in that country. The current unrest and student agitation in Iran may lead to a change of regime that could eventually force the theocracy’s collapse under its own weight.

The threat of American intervention in Iran has only faded ; it has not completely disappeared. There is a danger that if the body count in Iraq continues and the American forces get bogged down in the Iraqi quagmire, Washington may be tempted to put the blame on “outside interference”, pointing an accusing finger at Tehran. The temptation for intervention will then be all the more irresistible in the run-up to next year’s presidential election.

Until now, the Bush administration has used military victory and terrorist threat with immense success against the Democrats. But if, in the coming months, the body count does not stop and the American forces get bogged down in the Iraqi quicksand, the Democrats may succeed in turning the tables on the Republicans. In that case , the danger is that Washington may be tempted to play up the Iranian threat and adopt a more jingoistic line against Tehran.

The writer is a former ambassador of Pakistan.

Measuring human progress

BY now it is fair to say that only the economists and newspaper headline writers are still in love with GNP (Gross National Product) as a way of measuring progress.

Everyone in any country that has experienced rapid economic growth, whether it be a mature economy like the United States or Sweden or an up and coming one like Taiwan or Brazil knows from their own bitter experience that it doesn’t tell you that much about a society. It gives a kind of useful bench mark of aggregate economic momentum. But, beyond that, the more one looks at it the more misleading it can become.

For most people health, security and love are the three important things in life, and how many people can put their hands on their heart and say they are sure that in their own lives these three things are eternally spoken for. Besides, income is a means not an end. It may be used for essential medicines or narcotics, for parks and green spaces or for extra wide thoroughfares and multi-storeyed car parks, for sitting in a luxury car in a traffic jam or for resting in a high speed train link as I am now, as I rush from a UN Development Programme press conference in Copenhagen on how to measure human development, convinced that the Scandinavians have come nearer this ideal than the Americans and the British.

Once a year the UNDP delivers its snapshot on human progress in an exercise pioneered by the former minister of finance in Pakistan, the late Mahbub ul Haq. He was long convinced that our attempt to measure progress by statistical aggregates and technical prowess was unpersuasive. We overlook that the main goal of life is to insure survival and, beyond that, to enable the pursuit of well being, achievement and, as the prescient American constitution (not without a great debate at the time) so aptly puts it, of happiness. (The opposition wanted the ‘pursuit of wealth’.)

This debate reaches back, in European thought at least, to the ancient Greeks and the time of Aristotle. “Wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking, for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else.”

Haq was convinced that the contemporary obsession with increased income per head blinded both observers and participants to the tremendous advances that could be made in social well being, even in quite poor countries, with only a modest rise in incomes. In today’s report the UN singles out Sri Lanka which, poor as it was in 1945, managed by 1953 to increase life expectancy by 12 years.

During the 1990s Ghana reduced the percentage of its people suffering from hunger from 35% of its population to 12%. Haq produced sophisticated tables in which countries were not ranked by income per head but on yardsticks which he considered more telling — longevity, knowledge and a decent standard of living. (Alas, he never got round to measuring love, security and happiness, although his wife with whom he spent a very fulfilled marriage, has continued his work by publishing today Pakistan’s own internal human development report.)

In those early tables Japan came out top, followed by Canada, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden. Later he factored in the status of women and produced an even more accurate profile of well being. Sweden and Norway came out top with Denmark not far behind. Japan fell to 17th place.

Then he did the same exercise for Third World countries. Barbados came out first a triumph that Africa should look to. It was followed by Hong Kong, Cyprus, Uruguay, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and South Korea. They, poor until relatively recently, have dramatically lowered infant mortality rates that used to be at present day African rates and assured life spans, only two generations ago 50 years or less, that today are up to the levels of the richest countries.

In 15 years not much in the pecking order has changed. Those that used to do well still do very well. Those that did particularly badly are still on the downward slope. But in the middle ground some things have changed. India and China and other parts of East Asia that account for nearly 75% of the Third World’s population have made rapid strides forward in the human development index.—Copyright

The Islamic factor and the world order

BY a remarkable coincidence, currently, several public affairs groups, including friends of the Muslim world, international think-tank specialists and human rights activists, subscribe to the view that there is greater need at this stage than perhaps at any other time since the end of World War II for the Islamic factor to rank (along with prevailing cultural influences, socio-economic doctrines and political ideologies) as a contributor in shaping the affairs of the world.

From any perspective, the relevance of the Islamic factor to the scheme of things expected to come about pursuant to the American moves to destroy their perceived axis of evil, and to create a new world order by exporting democracy — resulting inevitably in the obliteration of some power blocs, the alteration of others and the emergence of new ones — cannot be underrated. These moves will undoubtedly have great impact on the Muslim world.

However, a prerequisite for the successful induction of the Islamic factor in this scenario is the existence of a significant Islamic entity (other than the ineffectual OIC) that is capable of assuming such a responsibility. To generate interest in this context, some suggestions for the proposed structure of such an entity are considered hereunder.

The project should be centred on an institution that should be set up for interpreting Islam and formulating an authoritative body of opinion based on consensus or ijma on Islamic approaches to all aspects of life. To achieve these objectives effectively, the institution should secure requisite recognition of the Muslim ummah in particular, and of the leading international powers in general. The first precondition entails acceptance of the institution’s role in dealing with fundamental Islamic issues not only by the majority of the Muslims but also by prominent Muslim countries. The second, for acknowledgement of its institutional status by the powers that count.

This is unquestionably a daunting task on both grounds. However history recounts notable instances of the success of nascent movements faced with heavy odds, even in circumstances where the struggle for survival had lasted several decades. Relatively recent instances include the setting up of the United Nations and the formation of the European Union, the creation of the states of Pakistan and Israel, and the realization of the aspirations of Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela. In the case of the United Nations, the commitment to establish an international organization (as the successor to the failed League of Nations) was made in 1941 in the Atlantic Charter by President Roosevelt of the US and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain. This was followed first by the Declaration by United Nations signed by representatives of 26 nations in 1942 and, thereafter a 1943 conference in Moscow when the USSR, Great Britain, China and the US signed a declaration recognizing the need to establish “a general international organization... to banish the scourge and terror of war.”

Today it is well-nigh impossible to consider a world order without reference to the United Nations. Moreover, almost all matters of international import have some nexus with the United Nations.

The formation of the European Union is another instance of ‘the phoenix arising from ashes’ saga in a continent in which wars between states had raged for several hundred years on conflicts concerning territory, trade, religion, etc. World War II (1939 - 1945) had devastated the economy of Europe. The idea of a unified Europe was undermined by the beginning of the cold war and the lingering suspicions of Germany. Two French officials, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, proposed that France and Germany might forgo their long-running antagonism if given economic incentives for cooperation. This led to the Treaty of Paris signed in 1951 by West Germany, France and four other countries; the Treaties of Rome in 1957; and the emergence of the European Community (EC) in 1967.

Because of the success of the EC, by 1972, even nay-saying countries like Great Britain became members. Reconstituted finally in 1991 as the European Union (EU), today it symbolizes a desire for peace and cooperation among European states, and with increased cooperation and growth, it is set to become a major economic rival to the US and Asia, and a contender for world leadership.

Accounts of the creation of Pakistan and Israel are too recent to warrant repetition, except to reaffirm that today both states represent national conceptions once envisioned by their founders. As for the dream and the vision of Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela respectively, the colour bar is no larger part of US public policy, and South Africa is finally free of apartheid, once regarded as fundamental to the survival of the white-ruled state.

Drawing on experiences gleaned from these events and inspired by the pioneering spirit of their promoters, the proposed project on Islamic entity must be premised on the belief that the time has come to promote the Muslim cause by the establishment of an institution described above, no matter how long it takes, and even if the establishment constitutes but the starting point of a movement that may take several years to attain permanent institutional status.

Efforts in this direction should focus on two broad-based programmes which should provide for the adoption of measures that will bring about an Islamic renaissance encompassing the spiritual and worldly aspirations of the majority of the Muslim ummah and also facilitate general acceptance of the institution’s role as a key consultative body on matters of international significance.

However, the launching of this movement calls for a promoter of sufficient international stature to undertake the following steps:

(i) Assembling a team of specialists to develop the concept into a viable project and prepare the project report.

(ii) Enlisting support for the project of leading Muslim statesmen and public figures believing in the principle of harmony in the diversity in Islam (as opposed to the singular unilateralist points of view of extremist factions) ranging from personalities such as Dr. Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, from King Abdullah of Jordan to Prince Karim aga Khan and from President Muhammad Khatami of Iran to President Bouteflika of Algeria.

(iii) Enlisting additional support for the project from leading Muslim religious and academic personalities drawn from Eastern and Western sources.

(iv) Inducting a multinational working team comprising statesmen, scholars, religious figures, business persons, financiers and notable personalities selected mainly for their ability to implement the project objectives.

(v) Securing essential financing for the project and finding an appropriate site for the location of the institution.

(vi) Notifying leading international bodies, opinion-makers and world powers of the project particulars and enlisting their support.

(vii) Preserving the pan-Islamic character of the project by launching it under the joint sponsorship of those amongst the personalities listed in (ii) and (iii) above who agree to be associated as founder members of the movement.

Pakistanis must play their part in this programme. There are several reasons why there should be significant Pakistani involvement in such a movement. Pakistan is the first state in the world to have been created in the name of Islam. Its religious content is essentially a synthesis of different schools of thought. It is geopolitically well-positioned amidst the Middle East, the South East and the Central Asian Republics to be associated with such an undertaking. Additionally, Pakistan has espoused Muslim causes throughout its history.

This is indeed a major undertaking but growing worldwide wariness of confrontational Islam and the possibility of the polarization of the world into two civilizational moulds, as envisaged by Samuel Huntington, necessitate steps of the type outlined here before events overtake human affairs resulting in wars and destruction with disastrous consequences for the world. It is time therefore for the diverse Islamic interests in the world to come together on a scheme of this kind.

As for the reaction of the sole superpower to such a development, it is conceivable that the project will run more in concurrence than in conflict with the US programmed new world order. For Washington to ignore or misrepresent the Islamic reality would result in a flawed world order. To facilitate its admission among the forces that will contribute to the development of the world, would be more realistic and sensible.

At all times however, the effort to promote this movement must be tempered with the awareness that the outcome envisaged here will only come to pass if sustained by the active, committed and continuous support of Muslim internationalists with the vision, resources and political muscle needed to underwrite the project. Furthermore, the catalyst for the project must be an outstanding public figure or a combination of public figures with the resolve to see it through because the launching of such a scheme calls for a well thought-out objective approach rather than impassioned moves generated by populism.

Without such a resolve the Muslim cause will either fall prey to militant extremism fuelled by sectarian disunity or continue to languish in the obscurity that overcame it seven centuries ago, and the Muslim entity, instead of contributing to the shaping of world affairs, will be at the receiving end of whatever others plan for it.

The writer is a barrister-at-law and lecturer in legal studies.