May 26, 2003	Monday	Rabi-ul-Awwal 23,1424

WASHINGTON: China is pursuing a deliberate course of military modernization, but is at least two decades behind the United States in terms of military technology and capability, says a report by an independent task force on China.

Formed by the Council on Foreign Relations, the task force was led by a former US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown and a retired admiral of the US Navy, Joseph Prueher.

“If the United States continues to dedicate significant resources to improving its military forces, as expected, the balance between the United States and China, both globally and in Asia, is likely to remain decisively in America’s favor beyond the next 20 years,” the task force concluded.

It acknowledged China as a growing regional power and said that if Japan continues to eschew a role as a major regional military power, China will become the predominant military power in East Asia. China’s current force structure provides effective defence against any effort to invade and seize Chinese territory.

The Task Force notes, however, that while China will have the enduring advantage of proximity to Asia, it is the maritime, aerospace, and technological dimensions of military power in which Beijing has traditionally been the weakest and the United States traditionally the strongest.

Consequently, a continued robust US naval and air presence can offset the ability of Beijing to leverage future military capabilities into real advantage against U.S. and allied interests in the Asia-Pacific region over the next twenty years, if not longer.

The task force, comprised of a diverse group of former government officials, China experts, and other scholars, hopes that its findings will minimize in discussions about China the frequent alarmism and occasional triumphalism that characterized American debates about the Soviet-American military balance during the Cold War.

The report thus issues a double warning: first, don’t overreact to the large-scale modernization programme of China’s military; second, don’t under-react based on the relative backwardness of the People’s Liberation Army compared to US military power.

Attributing capabilities to the People’s Liberation Army it does not have and will not attain for many years might risk the misallocation of scarce US resources. Overreaction could lead the United States to adopt policies and undertake actions that become a self-fulfilling prophecy, provoking an otherwise avoidable antagonistic relationship with China that would not serve long-term US interests. Under-reaction, on the other hand, might allow China someday to catch unaware the United States or its allies in Asia.

The one area of near-term concern, the report concludes, is in the Taiwan Strait. Here, China is more likely to use new technologies and asymmetric strategies, not to invade Taiwan outright, but rather to achieve political goals such as forcing the resumption of political dialogue between the two sides on the mainland’s terms. While US forces would ultimately prevail in a military crisis or conflict, Beijing might be able to impose serious costs on the US military if the United States concluded that it was necessary to commit air and naval forces to battle with China in defence of Taiwan.

The Task Force emphasizes that China’s military modernization takes place against the backdrop of much broader changes in China’s economy, society, and politics. In technology, although China has emerged in recent years as an increasingly powerful competitor in global markets, converting economic into military power will proceed more slowly. Chinese capabilities to develop, produce, and, in particular, integrate indigenously sophisticated military systems are limited. While China is trying to offset this weakness by purchasing advanced technologies from other countries, the Task Force judges that these purchases will fall short of fully compensating for domestic shortfalls.

The report finds that, for the foreseeable future, China will be preoccupied with domestic problems, political succession, public health issues, non-performing loans and a potential banking crisis, rising unemployment, growing inequality, and corruption. To address these domestic concerns, China’s leaders need a peaceful international environment in general and good relations with the United States in particular.

The Task Force believes that in spite of the impressive growth rate in military spending over many years, the likelihood of ever-increasing demands for government funding in areas other than military development will in the long term constrain the pace of military modernization.

Improving China’s armed forces must compete alongside the challenges posed by social security, education, Sars, AIDS and other public health needs, science and technology, and large-scale public work projects for resources and attention. While improving, the ability of the central government to collect fiscal revenue still is limited. With growing resource demands, any economic downturn would sharpen the competition between military and non-military spending.

Influencing the political future of Taiwan is a focal point of Chinese military development and will remain so for the next decade. If there are major shifts away from China’s current modernization priorities, the Task Force finds that America’s present rate of force buildup and maintenance of a robust forward presence in Asia would allow the United States to respond to any potential problems that may arise. The continued dedication of significant resources to the US military ensures that US capabilities do not stand still, and thus that the military balance with China will remain in America’s favour.

Established in 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations is a think tank, dedicated to increasing America’s understanding of the world and contributing ideas to US foreign policy.