I HAVE recently reviewed a report being prepared on Pakistan by a major international financial institution. The main thrust of this document is that Pakistan has finally turned the economic corner and may now be ready to embark on a path of growth that could be sustained at a level of six per cent a year for a decade or two.

This optimism about the country’s economic future is based mostly on the assumption that sizable fiscal space has emerged as a result of the actions taken by the Musharraf government over the last couple of years. This could be used to do the things the government of Pakistan has not done for years such as make good investments in education, health, civil service reform, irrigation, technological improvements.

I share this optimism. I also believe that good times may just be round the corner. But before we settle down and begin to see these times materialize, we need to pause and reflect on something most economists pay little attention to: uncertainties produced by events the economists cannot easily control. Pakistani policy makers must take full cognizance of these uncertainties.

Economic predictions are hard to make even at the best of times. They are particularly difficult in an environment of uncertainty such as the one that prevails today. There are a number of questions one can raise about the state of the global economy today. Will the world now begin a recovery from the anemic rate of growth it has experienced over the last couple of years? Can we still find some substance in the popular belief of a few years ago that the remarkable development of information technology had permanently changed economic structures around the globe, particularly in the developed parts of the world? Or, to put it differently, are we seeing the birth of a new economy?

There are also questions about the future of the economic institutional infrastructure that has played such a prominent role in shaping the global economy over the last fifty years. Will the United States, the world’s super economic power, countenance some constraints on its sovereignty and independence in return for a rule-based international economic system? This question is particularly relevant for the future of international trade. Is America still committed to the Doha round of negotiations after receiving some adverse rulings from the World Trade Organization? Or, is it likely to opt for a global trading system structured around a series of bilateral arrangements it is negotiating with a number of its trading partners?

Then there are a number of questions about the future of global finance. Will the world continue to buy American dollars to support that country’s large trade deficit or will the dollar plunge in value bringing about a major realignment in the world’s major currencies? If that happens, will there be a challenge to the currently dominant position of the US dollar by the new European currency — the euro — or by the Chinese renmenbi? If that happens and the mighty US dollar loses its grip on the world financial system, what will be the impact of that development on global trade?

There are also enormous uncertainties now about the medium-term price of oil, the world’s most precious commodity — a subject I touched upon in this space a couple of weeks ago (Dawn, April 15, 2003). Even after the increase in oil production in Russia and Latin America, the countries of the Middle East continue to dominate the oil market. What will happen to the production of oil by these countries following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq? How will the United States define its presence in the Middle East?

America has already issued stern warnings to Syria, Iraq’s neighbour. It has demanded full cooperation from the country in Washington’s ambitions to restructure Iraq and, at the same time, obtain total security for Israel. In an interesting statement made on April 16, while visiting a munitions plant that was a major source of high-tech weapons used in Iraq, President George W. Bush made a serious declaration the world would do well to heed. He said that his country’s easy triumph over Iraq had indicated that it had now the technological ability to take out weapons, facilities for manufacturing them, institutions that underpin the regimes Washington considers unpleasant without risking the lives of many Americans and without doing grievous collateral damage to the country that was the focus of the US’s ire at a given time.

How much credence should be given to this tough talk from Washington? Will America impose its will on all the countries it believes are indulging in deviant behaviour, picking them up one by one? That appears to be the wish of the group of neo-conservatives who championed the Second Iraq War. Or will saner counsels prevail in Washington and America, at least for the moment, focus its attention on two nation-building tasks, one in Afghanistan and the other in Iraq. What kind of regimes will eventually emerge in these two countries? Will the Afghan warlords be finally subdued and brought into the fold of a democratic form of government? Will a democratic Iraq produce a regime dominated by the Shias which will then form a close alliance with the co-religionists in Iran? In view of all the uncertainties implied by these questions, it is difficult to say how the business world would react towards emerging markets. Over the last decade and a half, foreign direct investment has become the major source of capital flows to the developing world. At $250 billion a year, this type of capital movement is about five times the amount of foreign assistance provided by the rich countries to poor nations. This money is raised by some 6,000 transnational corporations (TNCs) that are now engaged in what the UNCTAD calls the international system of production. Would this trend continue or would the TNCs decide that in view of the uncertainty and risks involved, it is much safer to stay closer to their home bases?

There are some other uncertainties we should mention, in particular those related to the pace of demographic transformation in the West that has caught most policy makers in that part of the world by surprise. It is now certain that, barring the United States, all industrial countries will begin to witness a rapid decline in their populations. This is the first time in human history that population decline will not result from war, disease and pestilence, but from behavioural change.

Family formation in Japan and western societies has gone through a fundamental change in the last two to three decades. People marry late or not marry at all. They want small families. There is also a sharp increase in the number of single-sex couples. What would be the social and economic impact of this dramatic change in behaviour?

In terms of the growth in the size of the population, America stands out since it is likely to see an increase in the number of people living in the country for another fifty years. This is almost entirely the result of large-scale migration of people to America, mostly from Latin America but also from Asia and Africa. Not only has migration kept the American population growing at a rate significantly higher than that of Europe and Japan.

The migrants have also higher rates of fertility and thus bring dynamism to the demographic situation that has been lost in other developed countries. But America’s willingness to accommodate newcomers may change as a result of the emphasis on what they call “homeland security.” What would that imply for America’s relations with the citizens of the developing world, many of whom look at the United States as a place of hope and have made the country their home?

On the other hand, if America keeps its doors open, would that be an inducement for other developed countries as well? Would they also recognize that it is in their economic interest to admit new migrants so that their economies don’t run out of the skilled workforce they need? In spite of the misgivings I recorded in an earlier article (Dawn, April 22, 2003,), there are good chances that that would happen. It is difficult for the countries that have become accustomed to a steady increase in their gross domestic products and a steady rise in the standard of living of their citizens to let demographic change produce a dramatic decline in economic dynamism. But increased migration from the developing world would produce multi-cultural and multi-religious societies in the West and Japan.

Since migrants tend to cluster in communities of their own, this would mean the proliferation of China-towns, India-towns, Pakistan-towns, little Africas, little Mexicos, little Havanas, little Venezuelas, all over the western world. Would such a world produce conflicts amongst people so diverse or would western society show that it has the capacity to absorb new cultures, new lifestyles, new religions into its own society and produce something the world has never seen before — a truly rainbow world?

No big change ever occurs without turmoil. It takes chaos to bring new structures into place and there is no reason why the transformation of global society, economy and policy that we have begun to witness will occur smoothly.

A part of the coming confusion and chaos will be the consequence of not what Professor Samuel Huntington called “the clash of civilizations” in his celebrated work. That the world of radical Islam may continue to clash with the West — in particular America — is something that cannot be discounted. But America’s easy victory over Iraq and its continued success against Al Qaeda will constraint radical Islam. I may be wrong — terribly wrong — to suggest that we have seen the worst of the Huntingtonian “civilization clash.” The Islamic world is likely to reshape itself; the second Iraq war and the changing dynamics of the half-century-old Israel-Palestine conflict, will produce a great amount of introspection within the Islamic world. This will lead to political power flowing into the hands of moderate forces that will be prepared — in fact, anxious — to work with the West.

But the clash that I see coming will be not between two opposing points of view as Huntington postulated. It will be between four sharply different economic interests — those of America, Europe, China and India. The first part of this we have already seen in terms of “Old Europe’s” reaction to America’s Iraq war. We will see more such conflicts as China, most certainly, and India, probably, gather more economic and military strength over the next quarter century. It would be helpful if we keep our eyes on this fistful of uncertainties as we begin to plan to forge ahead.

INDIAN Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s offer of talks to Pakistan to settle all outstanding bilateral issues, including Kashmir, has been warmly welcomed by the top leadership in the country.

As a gesture of goodwill, Prime Minister Jamali made a telephonic call to his Indian counterpart telling him of the acceptance of the offer and to conveying Pakistan’s willingness to hold talks with India.

It may, however, be mentioned that the Indian prime minister’s offer of talks is contingent on a complete halt to the alleged cross-border infiltration into the occupied Kashmir. The Deputy Prime Minister of India, L.K. Advani, in his recent statement, has made it plain that this condition is a prerequisite for the resumption of a dialogue with Pakistan.

The Indian allegations of infiltration across the Line of Control are the linchpin of its campaign accusing Pakistan of sponsoring cross-border terrorism and labelling the Kashmiri freedom movement as being a process instigated and sustained by Pakistan. These allegations, however, do not stand up to objective scrutiny. Being a party to the Simla Agreement, Pakistan respects the Line of Control and does not allow even the people of Azad Kashmir to cross it.

The Indian defence minister, George Fernandes, has recently declared that the Indian army is quite capable of monitoring every inch of the Line of Control. This belies the Indian propaganda that the freedom struggle in occupied Kashmir is being sustained through cross-border infiltration. The Indian leadership has publicly admitted that the on-going freedom struggle in the occupied Kashmir is indigenous.

During the last fifty years or so, the people of Kashmir have been fighting for their rights in accordance with the principles of international law, the UN Charter and specific UN Security Council resolutions on the mode of resolving the Kashmir dispute. Regrettably, India portrays the freedom fighters as terrorists.

By no stretch of the imagination can the freedom struggle in Kashmir be equated with terrorism. Being a party to the conflict and committed to a peaceful settlement of the dispute, Pakistan only extends its political, diplomatic and moral support to the Kashmiris.

Mr Vajpayee and BJP’s hardliners have, from time to time, declared that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and that Kashmir could be talked about but was not open to negotiations. This leads one to believe that Mr Vajpayee’s latest offer to hold talks with Pakistan is only a stratagem and cannot be taken as a change in India’s policy on Kashmir.

It seems that notwithstanding the international pressure and its own diplomatic and strategic interests, India is still not willing to settle the Kashmir dispute in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people who are against any solution within the framework of the Indian constitution. Therefore, unless New Delhi gives up its narrow and myopic attitude and adopts a pragmatic and realistic approach, no useful purpose is likely to be served by holding talks with it.

During the last many years India has been making strenuous efforts to get Pakistan declared a terrorist state in order to harm its strategic assets and get rid of the Kashmir problem. President Pervez Musharraf’s decision to join the US-led anti- terrorism coalition fortunately frustrated the Indian designs but there is no evidence to suggest that it has given up its anti- Pakistan stance. In fact, India’s external Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha, very recently threatened Pakistan with a pre- emptive strike by drawing a parallel between Iraq and Pakistan.

India is well aware that highly motivated Kashmiri militants, on its side of the Line of Control, are carrying on their freedom struggle and infiltration into the occupied territory that might have taken place in the past, has either ended or reduced to a mere trickle. In view of this, India’s offer of talks to Pakistan seems designed to project itself as a pacifist nuclear power in the region and to portray Pakistan as a recalcitrant entity which is responsible for the promotion of terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere in the region.

Unfortunately, Pakistan’s past experience of its bilateral talks with India has not been very encouraging because of the latter’s uncompromising, rather intransigent, stance on the Kashmir dispute. India also imposed unacceptable conditions for the resumption of negotiations, as Mr Vajpayee has done while making his latest offer of talks to Pakistan. India should not have attached any conditions for holding talks with Pakistan to resolve all outstanding issues between the two countries. That would have established the bona fides of its offer.

Despite the imponderables surrounding this and the earlier Indian offers of a dialogue, Pakistan should continue to press for meaningful and result-oriented negotiations on all outstanding disputes and differences between the two countries, including Kashmir, to ensure durable and lasting peace in South Asia. Needless to say, the sincerity of purpose, on both sides, is a sine qua non for the success in such efforts.

It is generally believed that the Indian prime minister has made the offer of talks to Pakistan under international pressure, particularly the United States. Senior State Department officials have confirmed that heading off any open conflict between Pakistan and India was “a major diplomatic priority for the United States”.

The US is building up India as a “strategic partner” to promote and protect its vital interests in the region. However, India can play its desired role only by resolving its differences with its smaller neighbours, especially its dispute with Pakistan on Kashmir.

Washington should, therefore, play a proactive and meaningful role in obtaining an equitable settlement of the thorny problem of Kashmir which is the core issue between Pakistan and India. If allowed to linger on for an indefinite period, that problem could prove catastrophic in consequences.

The writer is a former ambassador.

ART BUCHWALD began his career as a columnist with the Paris- based International Herald Tribune 53 years ago. The York Times, in an unfriendly takeover, has purchased the International Herald Tribune and has cancelled Buchwald’s column.

It couldn’t be because he has lost his touch. He continues to be devastatingly funny and as good as he has ever been. Buchwald does not make us privy to why the column was cancelled. One can only guess that the new owners, in the new climate of aggressive patriotism, did not wish to be seen as consorting with someone who made fun of such deadly (in both senses of the word) serious subjects as the war in Iraq.

I could be wrong and the reason could be something as mundane as the need for economy. Let me hope that it is and there is no unofficial blacklist of those who choose to exercise their right of freedom of expression. If one went by Fox News, sending such men and women to Guantanamo Bay would be too good for them. I have some inkling of such a climate of self-righteousness.

I was a student at the University of Southern California during the McCarthy years. Indeed, it was at USC that I got to know Art Buchwald. He was a senior in the School of Journalism and putting himself through college with a G.I.Bill of Rights scholarship. He served as a marine during World War II. Indeed there were hundreds of other war veterans and they brought a certain maturity to the student body.

I did not know him well enough to claim that he was a buddy but he knew who I was and I knew who he was. He was the managing editor of a humorous magazine called Wampus that the School of Journalism brought out.

When I wrote my first article for the magazine, I delivered it to Art Buchwald who read it in my presence and told me: “Great. We’ll run it.”

It was during about this time that the Korean war had broken out. General MacArthur had claimed that he would have the “boys” home by Christmas. The war had gone badly. One morning, I found Art Buchwald sitting behind table near the entrance of the Student Union, collecting signatures for a petition he was going to send to the president of the United States demanding that MacArthur should be sent home by Christmas.

He was, instinctively an anti-establishment man. It was not that he was disrespectful of authority but he was a free spirit, a non-conformist and I suppose a rugged individualist in the best sense of the phrase. I am not sure whether he graduated but a kind of folk hero legend grew that he had upped roots and gone to Paris on a one-way ticket.

When I got to London and was at a loose end, I wrote to him in Paris asking him if there was any chance of my working for the Herald Tribune. He wrote me a warm letter, telling me that there was no chance of working for the Herald Tribune but to come over to Paris anyway. I have had no contact with him since but I remain an ardent fan.

The America that I would like to remember was made up of people like him. And in my book As Time Goes By, I have written about a decent, caring America. At the University, there were students that held extremist, right-wing views of the sort held by the neo-conservatives. But there were also students who held what were then called ‘liberal’ views. A liberal was not a radical, was not a dogmatic ideologue on the other extreme. They would have comfortably passed McCarthy’s severest tests of not being or ever having been a member of the communist party, that they had never sought to overthrow the American government except through the ballot box.

I had not been unaware that the Afro-Americans had been kept out of the mainstream and South of the Mason-Dixon line, there was a vicious sort of apartheid and that these former slaves who had been forcibly abducted and brought to the United States had yet to be emancipated. They represented a stain on American democracy. But I had been hopeful about their future.

I had an Afro-American friend, Chet Carter and we would ‘hang’ out together, along with some white friends. He did not carry any chips on his shoulder though I would imagine that his American dream was more restricted. His mother was a cook in one of the Sorority houses and Chet and I graduated together and his mother invited us to tea. She gave me a gold tie-pin as a graduation present. I didn’t make much of the fact we had our tea in the kitchen and had entered the Sorority House, not from the front door but through the back entrance.

I went back to the United States many times but my picture of the country remained that of the days at the University of Southern California, happy days among a decent people. To this day, I retain those fond memories.

But America has changed and something else has taken its place. It would be too simple to say that 9/11 brought about a sudden transformation. The fears must have been there buried in the sub-conscious. McCarthyism had revealed how fragile democracy can be. It requires only a shift of emphasis and a certain kind of paranoia surfaces.

The Middle East is awash with anti-Americanism, as are many other parts of the world. It is not because these people are envious as seems to be the rationalization. It is for the Americans to do their own agonising reappraisal and determine why they have lost the trust of so many people of the world. It should worry America that it is being seen as a bully. And it should worry the American people that its own media should be churning out a standard line.

The invasion of Iraq is being projected as “liberation” of the Iraqi people. Did the Iraqi people ask to be “liberated?” The Americans (and the compliant British) say that they are bringing democracy to Iraq. What sort of democracy? Fifteen Iraqis were killed and scores injured when US troops fired on protesters in Fallujah last week.

The Americans say that they were acting in self-defence and were fired on first. In that case there should have been some American casualties.

The firing would have had to be intense for such a savage response that shot dead 15 Iraqis. These are the kind of incidents that trouble us.

IT HAS now been over six months since the election of the present National Assembly. The return to democracy, coming after three years of military rule, was heralded with a rekindled hope for a new beginning. All eyes were set on the world’s first graduate assembly having a very high percentage of young and fresh parliamentarians, an unprecedented representation of the religious parties, all heads of the smaller parties as well as a relatively muted representation of the two earlier mainstream parties.

However, after six months there is not much to show in terms of political or democratic achievements or public deliverance. The legislative business has been almost non-existent; the parliamentary committee system is still not in place and the writ of the democratic government struggling to be established. Most importantly the parliament has not, so far, been able to deliver any relief to the common man caught in a vicious web of poverty, unemployment and rising inflation.

The recently prorogued session has witnessed the agenda of the assembly, mostly tabled by the opposition, being forcefully sabotaged through managed chaos, the only achievement being the rhythmic finetuning of the deafening desk-thumping chorus by the opposition benches which obliterated any meaningful progress in the assembly.

All progress today is stalled at the altar of a single overriding issue — the LFO.

It is ironic that the document, which gave birth to and shaped the present state of democracy, is also proving to be its worst enemy. The inter-party negotiation process, spearheaded and strategically controlled by the “old” political class, has now dragged on for six months without making any headway. If anything, it has forced the negotiating parties to get entrenched more deeply into their respective positions.

The nascent return to democracy remains perilously deadlocked. Thus, while the search is frantically on for an elusive “compromise formula” on the LFO, it would be opportune to view the divergent positions (sceptics and proponents) on the contentious LFO clauses to seek and propose a possible middle path for meaningful progress:

* Clause 58-2(b): This clause is viewed as the “draconian sword” hanging over democracy by the sceptics while the proponents present it as the requisite “safety valve” for ensuring the smooth functioning of democracy. The clause has been around since 1985 and has been frequently used (or abused) and, quite ironically, more by democratically elected presidents than by uniformed ones.

There is certainly merit in reshaping or refining it in light of these frequent abuses. The available middle ground on this clause seems to be the dilution of powers of the president to be restricted to the dissolution of the sitting government (prime minister and cabinet) instead of the whole parliament. Such a compromise would allow the requisite “check” on the functioning of the government while, at the same time, avoiding the complete derailment of democracy.

* National Security Council: This idea has also been around for some time and has, most recently, cropped up under the LFO as a civil-military combined consultative body. Even in this form, the sceptics view it as a direct threat to the supremacy of the parliament. Its proponents, on the other hand, see it as an effective means of institutionalized inclusion and involvement of the armed forces in the affairs of the government.

This, it is argued, is better than the informal influence and authority that they have always enjoyed in the country. Considering the fact that this is a totally new experiment, it might be opportune to make it a “time-bound” exercise to be constitutionally confirmed after an initial trial period of, say, two years. This should allow an enhanced comfort level among the sceptics while allowing the proponents time to prove its worth.

* Devolution Plan: This has turned into a contentious issue owing to the constitutional cover it has been extended by including it in the sixth schedule under the LFO. This ensures that it cannot be changed without the president’s prior approval. The proponents term this plan as the “silent revolution” which is providing enhanced accessibility to the common man as well as demonstrably solving grass-root problems while delivering appropriate demand-driven social services.

The sceptics, however, rightfully point out that these merits have been far outweighed by the weaknesses in the plan’s implementation. The check and balance system, as envisioned in the local government ordinance through district ombudsmen, public safety commissions and citizen community boards, is practically absent or operationally ineffective. This has led to rampant and unchecked corruption and a system of biased and politically weighted justice.

Moreover, the system has failed to adjust to the reality of parliamentary democracy and institutional coordination between the two systems is totally absent. The sceptics apparently have a strong case on this issue and at the least a realistic appraisal of this plan is urgently required. This could include, for instance, the involvement of parliamentary public representatives in “District Ombudsman Committees” as well as “District Development Committees”. Going a step further, such a plan readjustment could be best achieved by taking this out of the sixth schedule and allowing the respective provincial governments to debate and deal with this issue.

* The president’s uniform: This is, undoubtedly, the most contentious issue and ironically the issue with the least realistic flexibility under the present circumstances. The issue is linked not to the constitutional position of the president as much as it is to the personality of President General Pervez Musharraf. Thus, proposing any objective position on the issue has to be weighed against the three-year performance of the Musharraf regime in light of an insightful reflection on the recent political history of Pakistan.

Although “politics has a short memory” it is, nevertheless, necessary to look back on Pakistan’s political calendar and retrace the situation at the time of the military takeover in October 1999. On that fateful evening, an unwilling army was sucked into taking over the reigns of power from an, apparently, well entrenched prime minister. Quite surprisingly the “heavy mandated” popularity of the previous regime vanished into thin air within the span of just a few fateful hours. There was no cry for democracy, no street demonstrations, no dissenting public protests. If anything, the whole nation heaved a sigh of relief over the removal of yet another corrupt and inept democratic government. The unequivocal and resounding cry was for even-handed, across-the-board and unbiased accountability of the nations’ plunderers.

The state of democratic despondency had grown out of the disappointing conduct of the listless legislators who had put the country on the brink of a political and economic abyss. The two-year parliamentary performance from 1997 to 1999 was a tale of sycophantic and submissive silence as the inept rulers endeavoured to turn democracy into fascism. The principled patriotism, surprisingly, did not flutter when draconian constitutional amendments were unanimously passed to create a crony assembly blindly following the dictates of a self-created “Ameer-ul-momineen”.

The public apathy towards the derailment of democracy in 1999 was a reflection of the public disillusionment with the “historic mandate” which was selfishly abused to stifle the law, crush institutional independence, moulded and bulldozed to protect individual egos and unabashedly utilized to undertake state-sponsored hooliganism on the Supreme Judiciary.

On that fateful evening, the above feelings of despondency and apathy were matched by a faint hope for a brighter future. The hope was placed in an “accidental” leader who was expected to rise to the occasion, to place national interest above his narrow self-interest and to try and turn this opportunity into a new beginning for a rudderless country.

If we reminisce about the past three-year performance, there are lots of factors which give credence to a continued sustenance of that hope of October 1999. On the economic front, Pakistan has turned around from near default to a position of enviably sound macro-economic footing. The disciplined accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, at an all-time high today, bears testimony to the selfless intentions of the regime. After all, it does not take much to splurge and squander at the expense of the national exchequer — especially if you enjoy absolute control in Pakistan. With the help of good management of the post-9/11 scenario, the debt write-offs, loan restructurings and rising foreign remittances, the country has acquired a solid macro-economic base and a lifeline to move forward

On the corruption front, the regime has not only institutionalized the drive against corruption but also halted the nefarious practice at higher government levels. The three-year government has, more or less, survived unscathed as far as allegations of personal corruption go. This, in itself, is no mean achievement, especially against the backdrop of the ruthless loot and plunder that was becoming the norm for governments of the day in Pakistan.

The international image of Pakistan as a responsible global participant has been considerably enhanced. A strong and aggressive stand on the Kashmir issue has accelerated recovery of national self-esteem and created an environment of equitable diplomatic engagement with India. The recent moves for a resumption of talks bear testimony to this fact.

On the other hand, the gross mismanagement of the presidential referendum as well as a spate of unwarranted political compromises stand out as the glaring weaknesses of the Musharraf regime. However, the bold public admission of these failings by the president is an unprecedented act in Pakistan and amounts to a silver lining.

The general’s performance, thus, may not have scored a “perfect ten” but it clearly stands out in stark contrast with the dismal performance of the self-serving political leadership of the past two decades. Without doubt, a president in uniform goes against the essence of puritan democratic norms. However, as we pass through a delicate transition to democracy, it would be apt to extend the “benefit of the doubt” to our president in uniform for deciding the optimum time for taking the uniform off. As stated above, he has proven his dedication and commitment to Pakistan more than the democratically elected leaders of our recent chequered political history.

While the unending debate on the LFO goes on, the people of Pakistan are becoming increasingly frustrated with the continued non-performance of the elected bodies and eagerly await a logical conclusion. It does not matter to them whether you are wearing a hat or a turban or a military cap on your head. What matters to the public is delivery of justice, creation of jobs, a check on the rampant inflation and an easing out of their daily sustenance. Our present economic condition is providing us a narrow but rare window of opportunity to capitalize on and effectively deliver to the public. It would, indeed, be a pity if we were to waste it at the altar of the LFO.

As analyzed above, a logical middle ground is clearly available on the LFO but attaining it requires a rational and responsible attitude on both sides of the political divide. Fortunately, the transitional bridge is not new to Pakistani democracy and has been crossed before. This is the time for displaying pragmatic political will and not emotionalized obstinacy, otherwise the deadlocked democracy could easily slide towards another instance of derailment.

The writer is a PML-Q member of the National Assembly.