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| March 12, 2003 | Wednesday | Muharram 8, 1424 |
French, Russian envoys discuss Pakistan’s stance
ISLAMABAD, March 11: How will Pakistan vote on the second US-UK resolution on Iraq in the UN Security Council and what repercussions will it face in each of the three options available?
This question was raised here on Monday by the ambassadors from two veto-power countries, France and Russia, the deputy chef de mission of the third, China, and an ambassador from a non-veto-power state but a very important European country, Germany, while talking to a group of editors and senior newsmen.
German Ambassador Dr Christoph Brimmer had invited his French counterpart Yanick Gerard, Russian envoy Edward S. Shevchenko and Chinese Ambassador Zhang Chunxiang to his residence to meet a group of Pakistani media persons for an “off-and-on-the record” discussion lasting over three hours on America’s designs and Pakistan’s anxiety to come out of the crisis unscathed.
As the Chinese ambassador was out of town, he was represented at the meeting by his deputy, Counsellor Song Deheng.
The host and his diplomatic colleagues wanted to know from their guests as to how Pakistan was likely to vote and what would happen to Pakistan if it voted against or for the US resolution or if it decided to abstain.
The journalist on the other hand were interested more in finding out what would the veto-wielding powers do if the US went ahead with war plans after its resolution was vetoed.
Some at the get-together thought the best option available to Pakistan was to abstain from voting. But many thought an abstention would invite the wrath of the US and at the same time it would be considered at home as a capitulation on the part of Pakistan.
The consensus among the media persons was that a negative vote, while it would win overnight popularity for the Islamabad regime at home and abroad, could cause the US to withdraw its economic aid and also push Washington more quickly into the lap of India in the region and perhaps even firm up their strategic partnership against Pakistan.
Most media persons also seemed to agree that a vote in favour of the resolution would cause Pakistan to lose face in the world, make it extremely unpopular in the Muslim world, and the government would face a heavy political backlash at home.
The host and his diplomatic colleagues appeared to have come to the conclusion that Pakistan’s vote would play a decisive role and therefore they would like Islamabad to vote against the resolution because otherwise they said the US would not even bother about the veto and go ahead with its attack plans.
They appeared to believe that once that happened, the world would not be the same again, with the UN losing its logic and the US adopting the doctrine of preemptive attacks without any let or hindrance.
They seemed to believe that Iraq was just a decoy and that the US had some other plans up its sleeve for the world and that this could be stopped only if Pakistan voted against the resolution.
Someone from the guests reminded the gathering about the way Pakistan acted during the Suez crisis in the early 1950s when the then prime minister, Mr Hussein Shaheed Shurawardy aligned Pakistan with the aggressor and as a consequence the country lost face in the whole Muslim world. There was also a serious political backlash inside the country.
The ambassadors were not prepared to spell out what exactly they feared would happen if the US actually went to war against Iraq and they would also not speculate about whether the US intransigence would be met just with UN sanctions against it or would the veto powers do something more to stop Washington from carrying out its threat.
The diplomats, however, tried to play down the expected damage to Pakistan’s economic and political interests if it voted against the resolution, arguing that in the first place the US had relatively limited voting rights in the multilateral aid agencies as compared to the voting rights of the Europeans and, secondly, Pakistan’s past experience had demonstrated more than once that the US was not always a reliable friend.
Someone from amongst the ambassadors also pointed out that Pakistan did not seem to have extracted any price from the US for its services if it decided to vote for the resolution. But there was no response when another guest asked how much would the Europeans pay for the Pakistani vote.
Clearly, the representatives of the three permanent members of the Security Council appeared to be rather reluctant to actually use the veto. They even seemed to have convinced themselves that the US would not go ahead and attack Iraq if the resolution was not passed in the UNSC. That is why perhaps they believe that if Pakistan voted against the resolution, they would not have to take the difficult decision of vetoing the resolution.
They seem to want to believe that the US is only bluffing when it threatens to go ahead even if the resolution was vetoed. On the other hand, they themselves seem to be bluffing when they threaten to veto the resolution. They seem to fear that such a veto would really destroy the UN and that they do not want to see that happen.
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