NEW DELHI’s reiteration that it will stick to its policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons should help defuse some of the tension that continues to mark relations between Pakistan and India. However, the Indian defence minister’s boast that India has an adequate strike-back capacity to use in the event of a nuclear attack against it rules out that possibility.

Whether the defence minister’s statement was meant as a veiled threat to Pakistan or for domestic consumption can only be a matter of speculation but it is least likely to have any effect on the state of relations between the two countries.

In any case, as a report carried by this paper on Tuesday said, according to strategy analysts in India Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent has neutralized India’s conventional superiority in military terms and “India would no longer dare to go to war with Pakistan.” This is perhaps why having kept a large part of its troops massed on the border with Pakistan for some ten months, India decided to put an end to the military standoff. In this the pressure exerted lately by the US and other major western powers has also been an important factor.

It must be realized that any talk of ‘unconventional war’ or ‘massive retaliation’, regardless of what is meant in specific terms, inevitably conjures up the spectre of a nuclear conflict. Although President Musharraf’s reference to the possibility of ‘unconventional war’ has been amply clarified, it is important to recognize that such clarifications often leave room for scepticism and misunderstanding.

As against this, Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes’ declaration that Pakistan would be wiped out if India in the event of a nuclear attack from Pakistan was unabashedly hawkish. He perhaps believes that in the midst of the prevailing Hindutva-ridden environment in India his loyalty to the BJP-led government will ultimately be judged by his crude anti-Pakistani tirades.

There has always been an element of the clandestine in India’s nuclear weapons strategy. Although the BJP-led government came to power on the basis of a manifesto which had provided for nuclearization of India, it managed to keep its real intentions carefully masked. To hide its nuclear intentions, it categorically rejected the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

A month before it conducted its May 11, 1998 tests, it misled a high-level US delegation, mandated to make an assessment of India’s nuclear policy, into believing that the Vajpayee government was not “about to do anything dramatic and alarming.”

Yet, the tests were conducted on May 11 and 13, 1998, when the Vajpayee government was barely seven weeks in office. These were followed by an intense propaganda campaign and hawkish anti-Pakistan statements by several ministers justifying the tests.

There were barely veiled threats aimed at Pakistan and China. At least two of the ministers, Lal Krishna Advani and George Fernandes, even declared that India must “recapture” Azad Kashmir, ignoring the fact that any such act would be in violation of the Simla Agreement which specifically provides that the status quo in the disputed state would not be unilaterally altered by India or Pakistan. Pakistan inevitably came under pressure and carried out its own nuclear tests later that month.

Two Indian authors, Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, both committed to the cause of peace in South Asia and founder-members of the Movement in India for Nuclear Disarmament, in their voluminous work South Asia On A Short Fuse, contend that after India’s Pokhran explosions Pakistan was still inclined to exercise restraint but its then chief of army staff, Gen Jahangir Karamat, when asked to give a professional assessment of the strategic environment, specially with reference to Kashmir, was of the view that the troops’ morale would collapse unless Pakistan too “conducted retaliatory tests and equalized with India.”

India thus bears the responsibility for the nuclear weaponization of the subcontinent. After that country’s first nuclear test in 1974, Pakistan had accepted New Delhi’s contention that its nuclear programme was for ‘peaceful’ purposes. However, after 1998, the open threats and blackmail of the hawks in the BJP-led government left Pakistan with no option but to develop its own nuclear capability.

Even in recent weeks, following the decision to withdraw its forces from the border, New Delhi has tested its missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons into the heart of Pakistan. It has also revealed its plan to build even longer-range missiles.

It is virtually impossible to visualize that either India or Pakistan, under the present circumstances, would roll back or freeze its nuclear weapons programme. A survey conducted some time ago by the American University of Notre Dame, indicated that an overwhelming majority of the educated class in Pakistan believed that nuclear weapons could be renounced only if the Kashmir dispute was satisfactorily resolved.

In India there has always been a strong anti-bomb lobby but the Indian ruling elite, particularly its ultra-nationalist section with expansionist ambitions, has always been strongly opposed to any idea of even partial disarmament or denuclearization.

The hawks in India talk of wiping out Pakistan from the world map. Their counterparts in Pakistan are insensitive to the fact that even a bomb like the one dropped on Hiroshima could kill as many as 700,000 people, say, in Bombay. To quote a Pakistani expert associated with Princeton University, keeping the nuclear option open means maintaining the capability to kill millions of innocent civilians; it exacts more than a moral toll and dehumanizes the user. He also maintains that in 1995 some 500 workers at a site in Pakistan, where uranium mining and processing operation was carried out, went on strike “demanding compensation to the heirs of the employees who died or became handicapped during their duty.”

He also point out that the US which has achieved much sophistication in the manufacture of nuclear weapons “is still struggling to come to terms with the waste from its uranium enrichment programme.” He believes that no one really knows how many lives have been lost or irreparably damaged and what environmental contamination has occurred from the search for nuclear security.

It was once believed that by achieving a nuclear weapons capability, a government could reduce its spending on conventional forces. This is not quite so. Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik have argued that India with its ambition to match China in its fire power would need to raise its already very high spending on defence “by 20 to 50 per cent per year depending on how fast a so-called ‘minimum deterrent’ can be put in place.” For nuclear armed countries like India and Pakistan adequate resources would perhaps never be available for social development if the defence spending continues at the present levels.

There seems no option for the South Asian neighbours but to come to terms with nuclear disarmament in some form or other. India has persistently refused to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) because it “explicitly believes in a global dimension to its nuclear weapons.” Pakistan will not roll back its nuclear weapons programme so long as India is not prepared to do the same.

Ironically, there is no guarantee that nuclear weapons can be effective even as a deterrent, except perhaps in terms of their first use. Excessive defence spending by Russia in the cold war ultimately proved its undoing. It is unrealistic to believe that Pakistan can “bleed” India endlessly and bring it to its knees, or for India to think that it can browbeat and threaten Pakistan into submission.

Curiously, the US state department’s head of policy planning, Richard Haass, who visited South Asia recently, pontificated a great deal on the need for India and Pakistan to work towards the goal of mutual nuclear disarmament in order “to build a more normal relationship with one another.”

POLITICS is said to consist of seizing fleeting opportunities, accepting calculated risks, and taking timely decisions. This game has to be played with foresight and finesse. As against this, two-time prime minister Nawaz Sharif acted in haste and paid the price. His miscalculation catapulted General Pervez Musharraf from his known field of soldiering into the unfamiliar and turning pitch of politics.

The general exuberantly announced that a genuine democratic order would replace Pakistan’s ‘sham democracy.’ He then declared that democracy would be ‘tailored’ to meet national needs. The controversial Legal Framework Order reflected ‘national needs’ and it ‘tailored’ the Constitution to meet the desired end. The country is currently muddling through this process.

The referendum preceding elections — flawed and controversial — drew public anger. Elections-2002 resulted in split mandate at the national and provincial levels with no single party winning majority seats in any assembly. A new political culture emerged. Coalition governments were formed at national and provincial levels. This development required all parties to face ground realities, review their election manifestoes, avoid rhetoric and display tolerance and accommodation in promoting democratic order. The parliament, national and provincial governments, cabinets and the opposition share this responsibility. The nation expects them to rise to the occasion and prove their worth.

Regretfully, the turnout of voters has consistently declined since the general elections held in 1970. At the national level, the voter turnout decreased from 63.42 per cent in 1970 to 53.69 per cent in 1985; and to 41.68 per cent in 2002. A similar pattern has emerged at the provincial level. The causes for decline and steps needed to reverse this trend deserve an in-depth study. The emergence of splinter groups in the assemblies, and the speed and style in which they surfaced or were induced to surface, has set an unhealthy precedent.

Political wheeling-dealing delayed the formation of governments and holding of elections for the Senate. Those abandoning their old political parties were richly compensated with attractive cabinet posts. This may disappoint those party loyalists who remained steadfast in their party allegiance. Politics is a murky business and Pakistani politicians excel in extracting full price for the services rendered by them. The ding-dong played with the anti-defection clause of Article 63(A) in the Constitution was absurd. Political compulsions and politics of expediency needed for managing the fractured House were blows to the growth of democracy. The immediate gainer was the prime minister who got the vote of confidence he needed.

Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan says that the ARD will not destabilize the Jamali government. Benazir Bhutto’s PPP has also issued a conciliatory statement. This creates hope that the Jamali government may get a reasonable period of time to govern without facing any serious problem affecting the unity of the coalition. That will strengthen the growth of coalition culture.

As is well known there is no free lunch in politics. The opposition’s decision is based on its own self-interest. At present, it lacks voting strength to form a government. And an immediate re-election is unacceptable to any party because of the heavy expenditure involved. Vision, good governance and political tolerance in handling the affairs of the state will determine the future of the federal government.

Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali has listed the priorities of his government as developing a “political culture based on honesty, elimination of poverty, speedy access to justice and all round development effort.” This list can be beefed up with subjects like improving law and order, promoting education at all levels, safeguarding national security, and strengthening national cohesion. In its own interest, the government should implement its agenda speedily.

One remembers that Mr Bhutto made an immediate impact as head of government and launched his plans with a bang. His successors in office — Mohammad Khan Junejo, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif — acted with speed, particularly during the early months of their tenure. It is necessary to set a fast pace early. Mr Jamali’s leisurely style is a contrast.

To be fair to him, however, it is worth mentioning that Bhutto, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif became prime ministers after leading their respective parties to electoral success, with manifestoes prepared in advance. Mr Jamali falls in the category of Mr Junejo who, like him, worked with an already sitting and constitutionally powerful president. Besides, Jamali emerged at the top position as a compromise candidate, perhaps unprepared with an immediate plan of action. But by now he has had enough time to firm up his road map for governing the country.

The jumbo-sized federal and provincial cabinets are a burden on the country caught in a debt trap and struggling to get its foreign debts rescheduled. The situation will aggravate when the anticipated cabinet expansion takes place. Large cabinets are not an indication of good governance. It may be prudent to constitutionally limit the cabinet size to a maximum of 15 and 12 (ministers and ministers of state) at both the federal and provincial levels. But who will bell the cat?

The modified system of local government, despite its handicaps, deserves a fair chance to work and succeed. Interference in the working of this system by the members of federal and provincial assemblies would have to be checked. The responsibilities of members of the federal and provincial assemblies are clearly defined in the Constitution. They are expected to devote themselves to the task of law-making, overseeing the performance of administration, and running the assemblies in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

For reasons easy to comprehend, a vast majority of these members wish to control the affairs of local bodies, where the budget lies. The Jamali government has allocated a handsome amount of public money to all MNAs and MPAs for use in their respective constituencies. This is corruption, pure and simple. The judiciary should prevent allocation of funds to unauthorized recipients who will spend public money beyond their constitutionally mandated responsibility.

The Legal Framework Order, already a part of the Constitution, is under attack. Criticism is particularly directed on three counts — (1) amendments made in the Constitution by the president; (2) the formation of the National Security Council; and (3) the president continuing as COAS. A full discussion on these issues ought to be held in parliament. No man-made constitution is ever perfect. Why waste energy on quibbling and trivial issues? Our effort should be to develop and strengthen institutions. Political vision demands that a mutually acceptable compromise be evolved in parliament. A national consensus or near consensus on constitutional issues is the need of the hour.

Good luck to the judges of the superior courts whose retirement age has been raised from 65 to 68 years under unclear circumstances. If generosity is necessary on the superannuation issue, then civic servants and members of the defence services should also be given similar benefits.

Pakistan is in the process of developing a democratic culture suited to the needs of the times. This route is difficult, but it is the only path that will give the country internal peace and stability, which, in turn, will pave the way for greater development, further progress and enhanced security. This task is achievable. Every country, Pakistan included, faces challenges. Such difficulties do not disappear either by adopting an ostrich-like approach or being overawed by the complexity of the challenges. Given leadership and good governance, we should emerge as a stable and democratic middle power.

Prime Minister Jamali has assumed national leadership at a time when internal and external difficulties hover around Pakistan. All political parties must play constructive roles in making his task easier. They should show realism and avoid an emotional approach. Coexistence suits the government and the opposition alike. The government must deliver and show magnanimity. Misadventures against the government run the risk of pushing the opposition in deeper straits. The political system must work.

The writer is a retired general of the Pakistan army.