THE emphasis on the continuity of the policies of the military government has now been reaffirmed by the newly elected civilian government. Any changes or any significant changes in major policy matters by the new government may not be forthcoming easily. Any initiative for a modification or change in important areas of foreign policy by the Jamali government may still be subject to approval by President Musharraf, his pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding. The strategic and ideological leaning of the new government being largely vague, a fresh debate needs to take place about the new directions which our foreign policy requires.

The big challenge before the new government is to narrow the gap between popular sentiment and current policy and, thus, make the policy more pragmatic. In the emerging regional and international contexts, the need for a new approach to Kashmir, India and the United States has become more urgent. A reinterpretation of the geopolitical imperatives which have shaped the current policy is required, and a redefinition of our long-term objectives is necessary.

There are compelling reasons to believe that President Musharraf’s performance in Agra and during the post-9/11 crisis when he agreed immediately to all the American demands was based on anxiety about the likely consequences. In Agra, it was fear of annoying the conservative-religious lobby in Pakistan which prevented President Musharraf from exploring further the possibility of a draft acceptable to both India and Pakistan.

The lessons of Shimla and Lahore were forgotten and a great opportunity wasted. While responding to the US demands, President Musharraf’s main fear was the potential threat to Pakistan’s nuclear assets and India’s emergence as America’s major strategic ally in the region. An element of statesmanship was lacking on our part in both cases. As a result of our responses, both the Americans and the Indians have adopted policies in the region that are extremely unpopular in Pakistan.

The task before Mr Jamali’s foreign minister, Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri, is, therefore, not an easy one. He will have to tell the United States that the people of Pakistan have a different view of how to fight world terrorism and that they believe that US policy, in the Middle East, which is blatantly partisan and unjust, was responsible for the 9/11 catastrophe. Unless the US is willing to balance its stance in the Middle East, an environment conducive to achieving lasting peace in the region can never be established. This is the truth that must be made known to Washington. Mr Kasuri will also have to persuade the Americans to draw a clear line between pursuing the so-called terrorists and interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan. A case in point is the recent persecution of Dr Amir Aziz which has resulted in widespread resentment all over Pakistan, specially against overzealous US operatives and their Pakistani counterparts.

Further such operations must be avoided if the right equation between Pakistan and the United States on terrorism and other issues is to be formed and maintained. This is necessary as the decision makers of the new civilian government are answerable to parliament and the people, unlike the government of Gen. Musharraf which had no such compulsions.

But the litmus test of the strength of our support for the American “war against terrorism” will come when the US launches its expected attack on Iraq in the near future, as it seems inevitable regardless of the report of the UN inspectors. So far President Musharraf has refrained from criticizing American policy in the Middle East. Mr Jamali may also choose to do so to avoid annoying the Americans. But he must be well aware of the public sentiment and the possibility of fierce parliamentary opposition to the American war moves against Iraq. It would be prudent, under the circumstances, to warn the US of the dangers of such adventurism. Americans must be told that they would risk weakening and even losing the support of a key ally for their war on terrorism if they attack Iraq. The Bush government has already started spending millions of rupees on a media campaign in Pakistan through which it is trying to portray America as a land of peace and tolerance for the Muslims who live there. This will not work, as the real issue is justice and fairness which is missing in America’s unilaterist foreign and paranoiac domestic security policies.

Perhaps the time has also come to carry out a fundamental review of our strategy to resolve the Kashmir issue. A new strategy would require a new attitude. Mr Kasuri is a seasoned politician and should know how to prepare the ground for new and courageous moves. He also knows that the Kashmir issue cannot be resolved without the support of Indian public opinion. That support was available to Pakistan when President Musharraf went to Agra and lost it because of lack of tenacity. Mr Kasuri should therefore seek to pick up the thread by initiating measures designed to cultivate Indian public opinion in favour of a dialogue and should not hesitate to broaden the whole gamut of India-Pakistan relations by moving aggressively into the sphere of economic and cultural exchanges. A clearly defined and broad-based policy towards India needs to be evolved, something which was lacking totally during the last three years. Mr Kasuri can take the first step in that direction by trying to establish a personal rapport with the Indian leadership, including opposition leaders like Sonia Gandhi. A better understanding of the Indian mind can only be gained by having an open mind ourselves. The fifty-year-old Kashmir dispute will not be resolved overnight and certainly not through the continuing war of words which has become the defining trait of our Kashmir policy. The Shimla Agreement, the Lahore Declaration and the Saarc document already define the ground rules for conduct in this sphere. Bilateralism must be the key to further progress.

The time is also ripe for a renewed emphasis on economic diplomacy. During the last decade the foreign office has been involved in perfunctory pursuits of economic opportunity with various countries without much to show in terms of success. A comprehensive review of this approach is now necessary. Initiatives to seek foreign investment must be spearheaded not by middle-level functionaries of the ministry of commerce, but by senior corporate executives and businessmen who can identify opportunities more clearly and effectively. Mr Kasuri would be well advised to use the immense talent which exists in this area.

Pakistan deserves a more dignified and respectable place in world affairs. This will be possible only when we move positively towards eliminating areas of conflict and friction with other countries. Dignity and realism must set the tone for a new direction in our foreign policy.

NOT a soldier, not a tank on road, not even the picture of General Pervez Musharraf beams from street corners. Pakistan looks like a country where the military does not have to do anything except to manage the ‘elected’ leaders to stay in power.

A 14-crore nation is resigned to the khaki domination which it believes it cannot change on its own. Even seminars, much less demonstrations, to register their protest, are absent. Yet people ventilate their anger whenever they get an opportunity. The referendum which Musharraf held to get an approval of his rule was boycotted by some 90 per cent Pakistanis despite the persuasion and pressure used. Even in the recent rigged elections, the majority voted for the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which they consider some shades better than the others.

The military not only blessed the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid), called the king’s party, but also partially helped deeni (religious) parties to depress the pro-democracy vote. Defection and division were also effected in the anti-Musharraf combinations to demoralize them.

Still all is not well with the Zafarullah Khan Jamali’s government which Musharraf has revetted by poaching small political parties and even individual members from their age-old allies. The shaky government survived the no-confidence motion a few days ago. But it is an open secret that behind the scenes the military won, not Jamali. I was in Islamabad when the arm-twisting of members was going on. Some should have made money because the asking rate per member was two crore rupees.

“It is a vote of confidence in my favour”, the prime minister corrected me when I said how serene he looked two days before the no-confidence motion. Indeed, he did not have to work. Musharraf’s men did all. But this has exposed the government further; it has been proved again that Musharraf is its saviour.

Jamali does not even claim to be his own master. During the interview, he made it clear that the Constitution, amended as it was, gave Musharraf powers (General Sahib, as he refers to him) which the prime minister must uphold. “There is no conflict”, Jamali said when I emphasized that a parallel authority could lead to problems.

Jamali left me in no doubt that Musharraf was the boss. The prime minister did not see anything wrong in Musharraf combining the two positions: the President’s and that of the chief of army staff. “It is up to him to decide,” Jamali said. Musharraf has the presidium of Corps Commanders where all affairs of the state are discussed and decided. The National Security Council, the apex body which has the prime minister as a member, is only a formality.

Will the obedient Jamali last? If self-effacement and humility are the criteria, he should since he ideally combines the two. But it will depend on political pressures which Musharraf faces at a particular time. The National Assembly, as it has emerged after the polls, is not to his liking. He had planned the PML(Q) to get a majority. Both the PPP and the Muttahida-Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a combination of six religious parties, won too many seats for his comfort. He cannot unscramble the situation although he has the power to dissolve the National Assembly. This is what makes Jamali insecure. If and when pressured, Musharraf may bring in someone else.

Even Benazir Bhutto is not ruled out. The release of her husband, Zardari, on parole, is significant. She is reportedly willing to accept the pre-eminence of military provided it withdraws the cases of corruption against her and her husband. Nawaz Sharif has practically no chance because Musharraf considers him his ‘personal enemy’. The hatred is mutual, according to the people who have met Nawaz Sharif in Saudi Arabia. They, however, feel encouraged by Sharif’s reported remark that “the contracted period of his banishment is over”.

New Delhi is probably aware of all this. Therefore, its attitude towards Jamali is that of indifference. It knows he cannot deliver the goods on his own. This was reflected in the congratulatory message prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee sent to Jamali. Vajpayee used the word ‘appointment’ on his assumption of prime ministership. Islamabad feels cut up. If the matter was confined to proving that Jamali was a rubber stamp, New Delhi would have been probably justified in its behaviour.

But the real problem is that the Jamali government, however restricted, represents the tooti phooti (broken) democracy, as a top Pakistan analyst puts it. A country which has gone through one martial law after another for more than four decades, and which has no independent institution, is looking for a respite from military rulers.

New Delhi should be adopting measures to help the democratic forces in Pakistan to gain strength. America, representing democracy, could have had some impact. But it is seen as Musharraf’s ally. Although people are conscious that Washington has bailed them out economically by writing off part of the country’s debt and by giving Pakistan straight aid, the anti-US feeling is very strong. The general belief is that Pakistan is the next target after Iraq.

Jamali’s government has come through a process, even though managed and manipulated. True, it is Musharraf’s creation. But should India be putting it more in Musharraf’s lap? The fissure, however small, can embarrass him when he is telling the world that he has restored democracy in Pakistan. Besides, the Jamali government has some able and liberal people. Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri has been part of Track 2, which has been working towards building people-to-people contact.

By not taking any notice of them or by not even recognizing the shape of the National Assembly, New Delhi may be showing its toughness but not farsightedness. Dealing visibly and frequently with the Jamali government may be one way to make Musharraf realize that the democratically elected government, though not up to the mark, is far more acceptable to India than a purely military set-up.

Democracy is going to be a long haul for people in Pakistan. The military is unpopular but looks as if it cannot be pushed out. It is not prepared to vacate the territory it has come to occupy. And it is using the space with a vengeance. Most of the top civilian jobs are with the military. The perks for service officers are numerous. For example, a major-general gets 50 acres of land as soon as he is promoted to the rank of lt-general. Orderlies are available to all military officers even after retirement. More than anything else, a person in uniform has become an authority unto himself.

The military is bad enough. But India’s intractability is worse. It is hurting those who want to have contacts with people across the border. Rubbed on the wrong side are the liberal elements: lawyers, doctors, artists and human rights activists. Activists like Asma Jahangir and I.A.Rehman, dubbed India’s agents in their own country, have not been given a visa. Because of “cross-border terrorism”, the scrutiny of visitors’ credentials is understandable.

But New Delhi’s new policy, implemented by the home ministry, is keeping out those who have been fighting against military regimes and who have been endeavouring for normalization of relations with India. But then the BJP-led government is using the Pakistan card to serve its domestic politics. It labours under the impression that the more intransigent it is towards Pakistan, the more will it gain votes in India.

The writer is a leading columnist based in New Delhi.

“The presidential election will decide whether the nation faces a future of war or peace,” said South Korea’s presidential candidate Roh Moo-hyun, suggesting that his opponent (and Washington’s favourite) Lee Hoi-chang was the war candidate.

He also implied that US President George W. Bush’s policies risk war in the Korean peninsula — and spelled his position out for the slower voters. “Just because I haven’t been to the US, does that make me anti-American?” he asked rhetorically. “Well, what if I am?”

Well, come February Roh Moo-hyun will be South Korea’s president: his victory over Lee in the election on 19 December was narrow but decisive. If Roh takes his own rhetoric seriously, he will be dreading what comes next, for he will shortly have to choose between good relations with the United States and peace with North Korea. In real life, however, things are a lot less black-and-white.

Roh’s facile anti-Americanism appeals to younger South Koreans who do not feel the deep psychological need for American approval that was typical of the generation who lived through the disaster of the Korean War. His determination to go on talking to Kim Jong-il’s threadbare Communist regime in North Korea is a continuation of the ‘Sunshine Policy’ begun by his political mentor Kim Dae-jung, the outgoing president, which has already led to some cross-border visits and family reunions after half a century of almost no contact.

President Bush, on the other hand, runs the most confrontational and conservative government that Washington has seen in a very long time. He rejected the idea of further negotiations with the North Korean regime soon after taking office, and then included the country in the ‘axis of evil’ last January. The predictable consequence was that Pyongyang resorted to nuclear blackmail.

North Korea’s economy is in collapse and its population is literally starving, but it still has a nuclear power programme and a suspected nuclear weapons programme. Pyongyang put both programmes on hold in 1994, in return for a promise by the US, South Korea, Japan and the European Union to deliver half a million tonnes of free oil each year and to build two ‘proliferation-resistant’ pressurised-water nuclear reactors in North Korea. But the reactors never got built, and the rest of the deal unravelled very rapidly this year.

“The problem is that at some point there has to be dialogue with North Korea, and there has been no dialogue since Bush came into office,” says former US ambassador to South Korea Donald Gregg. Pyongyang is not good at dialogue either, and tried to get more aid out of Washington in October by saying that it was still running a uranium-enrichment programme. So the Bush administration stopped the oil shipments in November, and North Korea responded last week by restarting the Yongbyon nuclear reactor (closed down under the 1994 deal), whose radioactive waste contains enough weapons-grade plutonium for one or two bombs each year.

It is clear to almost all outside experts, however, that the North Korean regime is looking for a deal: end its weapons programme in return for enough aid to stay in power. “Basically, we can buy the North Korean nuclear programme, and for not very much money,” explained Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “There is a deal here waiting to be made.” But will Washington make it?

Actually, it probably will. Consider, for example, the resounding administration silence that greeted the recent plea by Senator Bob Graham, chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, for a shift of target from Iraq to North Korea. “If you put the two, North Korea and Iraq, on the scales and ask the same question — which today is the greater threat to the people of the United States — I would answer the question, North Korea...and I think that needs to be part of the re-balancing of our foreign policy priorities.”

Now the truth, with due respect to Senator Graham, is that neither country poses any threat whatever to the American people — but North Korea, possessing at least lots of short-range rockets and maybe (just maybe) a nuclear warhead or two, certainly does pose a threat to its immediate neighbours. — Copyright

PRESIDENT Khatami’s recent visit to Pakistan will be seen as a manifestation of the desire of the governments of Iran and Pakistan to put the Taliban interlude behind them and to reinvigorate their long-standing and bilateral relationship. This was reflected in the public statements made by the distinguished Iranian visitor and the joint statement issued by the two sides.

Although the significant changes in the region, including the end of the Taliban order in Afghanistan, has opened the doors to renewal of a close and trusting relationship, political will is required at the highest level to build anew on the identity of geopolitical interests between Pakistan and Iran in an insecure and volatile environment.

Since the early years of Pakistan, the affinity of geopolitical interests between the two neighbours has been mutually recognized. Hedged in as Pakistan is by an adversarial India, an unstable and turbulent Afghanistan and the Russian Federation, which has not given up its reservations about Pakistan, Iran is its only secure and workable land link to the outside world.

The deterioration in Pakistan-Iran relations during the 1990s resulted from their conflicting interests in Afghanistan and divergent postures in relation to the Taliban, as also from rivalry over economic opportunities in Central Asia and the rise of sectarian terrorism in Pakistan.

The strong Iranian reservations about the Taliban were exploited by India as a means of policy convergence with Tehran on Afghanistan. On Iran’s part, the importance of political and economic cooperation with major Asian states, especially with a country of India’s size and importance, was enhanced during the mid-1990s by the US drive to isolate Iran economically and by Iran’s need to look for economic partners beyond the Gulf.

Former Iranian president Rafsanjani’s idea of “Asian Cooperation” involving India, China and Iran, was an attempt to break out of the political and economic quarantine sought to be enforced by the US in Europe, Asia and the Middle East at a time when Iran was desperately trying to rebuild its economy shattered by eight years of war with Iraq. The call for ‘Asian Cooperation’ was echoed by the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who also called for closer cooperation between India, China, Russia and Iran to combat world-wide US interference in other countries.

The growth of fundamentalism in Pakistan during the Zia period and increasing sectarian terrorism had created doubts in the Iranian mind about the availability of a level playing field for promotion of Pakistan-Iran relations. These misgivings should now be allayed with the tough action taken against terrorist elements by the Pakistani authorities in recent months and the change in the policy towards the Taliban.

President Khatami’s declarations during his recent visit were not merely routine statements customarily made on such occasions but mirrored the geo-political identity of interests which the two countries share. the Iranian president declared that “Pakistan’s security was very important for Iran and that Iran was interested in enhancing strategic cooperation with Pakistan”, that “Iran’s borders with Pakistan were those of peace, security and friendship”, and that “Pakistan and Iran’s interests were the same and the dangers and threats to them were alike.”

On Indo-Pakistan relations, the Iranian leader reiterated his country’s desire to defuse tensions and to help in resolving problems between New Delhi and Islamabad, as Tehran has tried to do in the past also. On Kashmir, he referred to the need for negotiations, and for a solution keeping in view the will of the Kashmiri people. Maintaining that he was speaking as a human being, as a Muslim and as an Iranian, he expressed deep anguish at the brutalities and sufferings inflicted on the Kashmiri people and asked that these should come to an end.

It is important to note, however, that the significant political and economic inroads made by India during the period of Pakistan’s estrangement with Iran will continue to act as a limiting factor on those aspects of its bilateral relations which impinge directly on India. For instance, in spite of the positive references to Kashmir and the Kashmiris in the Iranian president’s speeches, the joint statement issued at the end of the visit does not include any such references.

In regard to Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq, the two sides shared a similar perception. Both agreed to make all efforts to promote Afghanistan’s stability and security and to help in the revival of Afghanistan’s economy and in rebuilding its infrastructure. Both warned against any preemptive or unilateral military action against Iraq, while asking the latter to fulfil its obligations under the UN resolutions on arms inspections.

The emphasis repeatedly placed during the Khatami visit on the need for increasing economic cooperation should be viewed as an admission of the disappointing performance in this field in the past. It is imperative that the agreements signed during the visit, particularly the decisions made at the 13th session of the joint economic ministerial commission, are effectively implemented.

The various proposals for joint ventures and related projects ought to be approached as an integrated package, taking into account the interests of both countries to avoid foot-dragging of the past over various projects on grounds of perceived comparative gains or costs.

The RCD failed to register progress in economic cooperation because of the absence of complementarity in the national economies involved despite the affinity of security interests. Its expanded successor ECO too has failed to make any headway for somewhat different reasons. While economic opportunities are available for cooperation with the newly independent Central Asian states, the divergence between the political interests of Iran and Afghanistan had stymied progress in regional and even bilateral cooperation.

Now, for the first time in recent years, Pakistan and Iran share a considerable affinity of security interests in the region as well as a complementarity of interests in bilateral and regional economic cooperation.

Keeping in view their respective interests and policies in Central Asia and Afghanistan, it should not be beyond the diplomatic ingenuity of the two countries to work out a common ground. The potential for economic cooperation with the Central Asian states and the prospects for transit routes involving export of oil and gas are varied enough to permit productive collaboration as long as regional states do not become cat’s paws of outside powers.

President Khatami raised the level of the global political discourse by reiterating his call for “a dialogue between civilizations” rather than the glib and tendentious talk of ‘a clash of civilizations.’ In referring to Islamic unity, he made it clear that this was not directed against any group. He disagreed with the extremists in the Islamic world who reject everything western and called for a synthesis of the best in the two cultures, the western and the Islamic.

As for America’s threatening posture against Iran, which President Bush has described as part of an ‘axis of evil’, Pakistan should reiterate its strong concern to the US against any move to coerce Iran which would be disastrous for the region. There is no evidence to link Iran to any sponsorship of terrorism. With its close relationship with the US, Pakistan is well placed to use its good offices for a rapprochement between the two.

Even the European Union’s policy on Iran differs significantly from that of the US. Europe seeks continued engagement with Iran, opposes any military action against it, and welcomes the reformist trends in Iran. It has adopted an understanding and positive stand on Iran’s legitimate interests in Afghanistan and on Iran’s wish for economic and transit trade cooperation with Central Asia.