Treading the straight and narrow
By Tahir Mirza
THE extensive political engineering that President Pervez Musharraf and his associates have had to undertake ever since they decided on a date for general elections is before all of us. Much of the deviousness could have been avoided, and the Constitution and the political process prevented from being corrupted, if the straight and narrow path of conciliation had been taken. The general would have saved himself much embarrassment and discomfiture.
Despite the disastrous referendum, which no one in any case wished to remember, the Musharraf government could have opened negotiations with the country’s two major parties, the PPP and the PML(N), on a sensible pre- and post-election strategy. Even if it didn’t want to talk to Ms Benazir Bhutto or Mian Nawaz Sharif, the government could have invited the interim leaders of the two parties for talks. He could have put his (or the military’s) cards on the table, and said there were certain issues, such as indemnity for actions taken in the past three years and a more active role for his presidency, on which it sought politicians’ cooperation. In return for this cooperation, he could have promised that the elections would be held fairly, under a new chief election commissioner appointed by consensus, parties winning the largest number of seats would have the right to form governments at the centre and in the provinces, and the legislatures’ independence would be respected. Other political groups could have also been associated with the talks.
A pre-election compromise might thus have been possible. None of the parties would have been shortsighted enough not to realize that the objective of restoration of elected government was more important than temporary adjustments on the military’s demands. Agreement on many clauses of the Legal Framework Order was in any case reached with the MMA — but this was after the elections and after the formation of a “king’s party”. If an effort had been made to reach such an agreement earlier with all the major parties, there would have been no need to create the PML(Q), seek to fix elections, and then run around trying to bribe or cajole MNAs and MPAs belonging to the PPP. It would not have been necessary to issue ordinance after ordinance to meet every new contingency that arose in mustering support for the PML(Q). Many of these measures ordered by presidential fiat have already rebounded on the general, such as the provision including a conviction of contempt of court as a disqualification for contesting election. This was aimed specifically at Ms Bhutto, who was convicted for refusing to turn up in court, but it now appears that one of the prime minister’s advisers was among those sentenced after the storming of the Supreme Court by the Sharif mafia. At least two ministers of Balochistan faced National Accountability Bureau proceedings before their induction into the provincial cabinet, and the present federal interior minister was also reportedly under investigation and on the exit control list.
A little foresight and honesty of purpose might have averted much of this. Instead, we were treated to the almost daily spectacle of the president’s uniformed spokesman ridiculing politicians, particularly Mr Sharif and Ms Bhutto. They were reviled as thieves. What does this gentleman have to say now about some of those in government, not least the redoubtable Chaudhrys of Gujrat who are allegedly bank loan defaulters? The moral case built up to justify keeping some politicians out of the process, and which was not entirely without some basis, has collapsed.
The graduation clause incorporated by Gen Musharraf has created problems of its own. It isn’t clear whether the MPA favoured as chief minister of Sindh by the PML(Q) — and chosen after much running back and forth between the MQM headquarters and Kingri House — is a graduate or not. The educational credentials of some other elected legislators have also been challenged as bogus or fake.
A more straightforward and honest transition might have preserved some of the goodwill built up by the Musharraf government amongst sections of the people. Its obsession with keeping the PPP and the PML(N) out of government led it into over-managing the elections. Even then it could not stop the PPP from emerging as the party with the highest number of popular votes. After the elections, trying to sideline the party in Sindh has led to further distortions. This is now a matter of retrospect, but if the regime had come to an amicable pre- election arrangement with the PPP and the Nawaz League, it would probably still have got what it wished without suffering such deep erosion in credibility and creating a crisis at every step. Even a government of national consensus might have been possible. Instead, political polarization has been sharpened. Treading a crooked path is never a sensible way to get from one point to another. It may still be possible for Gen Musharraf and the Jamali government to hold a roundtable conference with all political leaders to reach a working accord on fundamental constitutional issues so that constant bickering is avoided and the new dispensation given a lease of life a little longer than may seem possible at the moment.

