Advani’s ‘war-war’: strategic dimension
By A. R. Siddiqi
“The subcontinent remains one of the most tense, if not explosive, regions in Asia and the world.” — Jaswant Singh, a former foreign minister of India.
UNLESS dismissed as one of Mr Advani’s weird ‘war-centric’ jokes, his challenge to Pakistan to ‘dare’ fight ‘a fourth round’ acquires a sombre strategic dimension in the context of India’s rising militarism.
As a chip of the old block, the Hindutva-ravaged Gujarat’s chief minister, Narendra Modi, would go even a step or two ahead of his superior in replicating his war song. He went on to invoke the legend of ‘Chattarpati Shivaji’ — and 18th Century Hindu ‘Dharam Yudh’ (religious war) warrior to inspire every Hindu youth with the message “Har Yuva Bane Shivaji (Every youth should become a Shivaji)!”
Beyond the scope of a short newspaper comment, I choose to illustrate my point with a number of relevant quotes from India’s former foreign minister Jaswant Singh’s Defending India, published in 1999. Mr Singh’s work (earlier reviewed by me in detail) makes a provocatively candid statement of India’s inbred militarism, yearning to translate itself into a lethal panoply of hardware and manpower.
Mr Modi’s resuscitation of the Shivaji legend, integral to India’s traditional military mindset, draws its contemporary rationale from Jaswant Singh’s Defending India where he speaks nostalgically of Shivaji’s failed effort to sustain his fledgling navy.
“Had Shivaji’s naval fleet not been destroyed by the machinations of the Peshwas, the European trading powers could never have established themselves in peninsular India... The destruction of the Maratha navy was, therefore, a fateful strategic error for which India paid the price in the next two and a half centuries.” (P 266).
According to Mr Singh, wearing of arms was ‘de regeur’ in ancient India. That fact alone should make an excellent case for an armed India.
Of the strategic sweep and achievements of post-British India Mr Singh recalls...”the annexation of Sikkim; the aid to the Maldives in the late eighties; the two military assistance programmes with Sri Lanka, in 1971 and 1987; are all part of that same strategic culture of which the root lies in 1950.” (P 54).
In the context of India’s lack of expertise regarding foreign affairs under Nehru, Mr Singh observes that “except for what had only then technically become foreign territory, i.e. Pakistan, the people who manned the foreign office, all of whom I knew well, were (like myself) ignorant of foreign affairs.” (P 35).
What Mr Singh calls one of Nehru’s ‘critical strategic error’ was his decision to refer the Kashmir dispute to the UN in a “spirit of internationalism and that Western powers, under advice of British expertise, sought to treat the Kashmir question as if it was still some kind of an internal pre-independence problem — to determine whether Kashmir, with a Muslim majority, should be a part of India.” (P 31).
Mr Singh speaks proudly of India’s active military involvement and participation “in significant anti-insurgency operations starting with Nagaland around the mid-fifties and then in yet another state of the northeast, Mizoram, in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and when insurgency spread to the valley of Brahmaputra, in the state of Assam as well.” (P 151).
One could go on quoting from Mr Singh’s excellent work to re- inforce the point of India’s mounting militarism, if only space would permit. He would not mind expressing his utter disdain for the ‘moral aspect’ of the Nehruvian and Gandhian politics...
“It is a confusion that arises from not differentiating between individual human morality and ethics and the reality of national interests. It is also a consequence of not recognizing that between high idealism and the hard stone of a pursuit of national goals what will splinter is always this ‘moral aspect’.” (Pp 42-43).
He goes on to write: “Time and again Nehru demonstrated the same tendency; a vacillation born of his search for the idealistically moral. He appropriated the responsibility of Jammu and Kashmir, as distinct and apart from the portfolio of princely states held by his deputy prime minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Nehru was hesitant and tentative not simply about Kashmir but on the issue of relations with China and the vital question of Tibet as well. Witness, for example, the late Sardar’s clarity on the Sino-Indian question, or his firm directness about Hyderabad...” (Pp 42-43)
Now a bit of the lighter side of the Advani-Modi ultimatum to Pakistan. A typical election poster put up by the BJP’s campaign managers has chief minister Modi posing the question “as a choice between him and “Mian Musharraf.” (Dawn, Nov 30)
The writer is a retired brigadier.

