Split verdict and after
By Roedad Khan
LONG ago, Karl Marx, famously borrowing from Hegel, said that “everything happens twice in history — the first time as tragedy, the second as farce”. The repetition of past mistakes qualifies as folly, when it is a perverse persistence in a policy that is demonstrably unworkable. Regrettably, this is what is happening in Pakistan today. After three years of army rule, pre-poll rigging and horse-trading, Pakistan has an elected a parliament and a prime minister once again.
Not surprisingly, what has emerged is a distorted picture which does not quite reflect the ground reality and has aroused fears about the prospect of political stability ahead. The split verdict has created a hung parliament incapable of ending the political uncertainty. Consequently, there is no strong reason to be optimistic as Pakistan steps into a democratic future.
In the post-election scenario, the substance of power remains in the hands of the president who is also the Chief of Army Staff and chairman of the powerful National Security Council. Cohabitation — coexistence between the president and the prime minister and between conflicting ideological stripes — has not been a great success in France. How can it work in Pakistan? President Zia tried it towards the end of his long army rule but it did not work. He had to sack Mohammad Khan Junejo, his prime minister, and dissolve the National Assembly with disastrous consequences for the country. Why make the same mistake again?
Why not profit from past experience and let the prime minister govern the country without the president breathing down his neck? Why keep the presidential sword hanging over his head? The history of Pakistan might have been different if the governor-general, Ghulam Muhammad, and his successors had not intervened and derailed the political process.
“The commonest error in politics (Salisbury’s note to Lytton) is sticking to the carcasses of dead policies. When a mast falls overboard you do not try to save a rope here and a spar there in memory of their former utility. You cut away the hamper altogether. And it should be the same with a policy. But it is not so. We cling to the shred of an old policy after it has been torn to pieces; and to the shadow of the shred after the rag itself has been torn away”.
I was present at the swearing-in ceremony of Mr. Junejo at the State Guest House in Rawalpindi. He said all the right things in his speech and expressed the hope that he will have the blessing and support of the president in facing the arduous task that lay ahead of him. Not a bad beginning, we all thought and heaved a sigh of relief. But in his very first meeting with the president, without expressing a word of thanks, he asked abruptly: “Mr. President, when do you plan to lift Martial Law?” Zia kept his cool but realized that he had made a wrong choice. Relations between the two became frosty. They were soon on a collision course and a showdown ensued.
Junejo was a democrat and made no secret of his determination to get rid of martial law and missed no opportunity to assert his independence. Zia resented this. What upset him most was that power was fast slipping out of his hands and flowing in the direction of the prime minister and he could do nothing about it. When I called on him at the presidency in Rawalpindi a few days after Junejo was sworn in, deathly silence prevailed. There was not a scrap of paper on his table and he looked visibly under-employed and quite unhappy. Things had not worked out the way he had planned.
He wanted Junejo to seek his prior approval in all important matters. Junejo was in no mood to oblige and was not prepared to be a puppet prime minister. There can not be two suns in the sky. Junejo’s fate was sealed. His days were numbered. It was now only a question of time.
How will things pan out between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali? Will history repeat itself? Musharraf is not Zia and Jamali is not Junejo. Musharraf is impulsive and not as cool as Zia was. On the other hand, Jamali is more tactful and flexible than Junejo. Will it make cohabitation between the two easier or more difficult? We have to wait and see. Mir Jamali’s biggest problem in the days ahead will be the president, his benefactor, who got him elected as the prime minister of Pakistan. The notion that the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) elected Mir Jamali as prime minister reminds me of a rooster who took credit for the dawn.
Mr. Jamali has inherited a dysfunctional political system that most Pakistanis describe as democracy with a dictator sitting on top. He faces a daunting task. Pakistan is at the crossroads today. In the virtual absence of the Constitution, the country is, to borrow George Washington’s words, united only by a “rope of sand”. A plethora of amendments has defaced, disfigured and mutilated the 1973 constitution and changed it beyond recognition. General Musharraf has literally reappointed himself president on the basis of a dubious referendum. “No man ever willingly gives up pubic life”, President Roosevelt once said, “no man who has ever tasted it”.
The people of Pakistan have been denied the right to elect their president in accordance with the Constitution. President Musharraf’s Legal Framework Order, the bedrock of the new political dispensation, is under attack and its legality in dispute. Major political parties refuse to take oath under the Legal Framework Order which they reject and do not accept as a part of the Constitution. Devolution, the brainchild of General Naqvi, trumpeted as a revolutionary concept, is in a mess, its future uncertain. The system of district administration, which had stood the test of time for centuries, has been demolished with nothing but chaos to replace it. No one knows who is in command at the grassroots level.
From the time of Herodotus democracy has meant, first and foremost, the rule of the people. Every country gets the kind of democracy it deserves. Pakistan is no exception. How meaningful is our new democratic order replete as it is with parliaments, cabinets and political parties when crucial decisions are made elsewhere. How can authentic democracy flourish in the country when people are not prepared to defend the core values of the nation — sovereignty of the people, inviolability of the Constitution, supremacy of civilian rule, an independent, incorruptible judiciary, rule of law, an impartial, independent and incorruptible Election Commission, a neutral, non-politicized and honest civil service, social justice, egalitarianism and unsparing and transparent accountability of rulers?
How can authentic democracy take root if people have no faith in their democratic institutions; if they do not value representative governments; if they are not prepared to make any sacrifice for its sake; if they are unwilling to defend it and if they are unable to do what it needs? How can you have authentic democracy in a country where sovereignty does not reside in the parliament, nor full power in the executive? Power resides where coercive authority resides. It is the ‘puvois occult’ which decides when to abrogate the Constitution, when to dismiss an elected government, and when to restore democracy and to what extent.
All our civilian prime ministers — Z. A Bhutto, Junejo, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir — made a fatal mistake when they lost sight of this reality. ZAB paid the ultimate price. He went to the gallows. Benazir is a fugitive from justice, living the life of an exile in London and Dubai. Nawaz Sharif faces an uncertain future in the holy land of Saudi Arabia. Junejo died a frustrated and unhappy man.
Mir Jamali will have to proceed warily if he is not to meet the same fate. It is difficult to predict how long he will last, but a Pakistani ruler, history shows, has only the briefest time to make his mark before the power slips away. Power is evanescent. It can come in a rush, but it also tends to evaporate quickly. Mir Jamali must therefore hurry up and draw upon it quickly, putting it to good use in public interest, or he will never achieve any result. I was born in slavery. On August 14, 1947, I was a free man, a proud citizen of an independent, sovereign, democratic country I could call my own, a country I could live for and die for. For me, and for all those who belonged to my generation, Pakistan symbolized all our dreams, our hopes, our aspirations. Today it is an abode of despair and despondency. The rich are getting richer, while the poor are sinking deeper and deeper into a blackhole of poverty. The country appears to be adrift, lacking confidence about its future. Disaster and frustration roam the political landscape. Look into the eyes of a Pakistani today and you will see a smouldering rage. Our entire political system has been robbed of its vitality by periodic army intervention and prolonged army rule. People wonder if Pakistan will ever take the high road of uninterrupted evolution and strength.
President Musharraf started with a blank cheque of goodwill and popular enthusiasm given to him by the people of Pakistan. But after three years of absolute rule, he has ended with a bankruptcy of moral and political support, leaving the country in worse condition than he found it in. A perfectly good country has become a laughing stock of the world once again. The country is in the grip of a grave political crisis but President Musharraf does not seem to comprehend the gravity of the situation and somehow persuades himself to believe that all is well and things are working out according to plan. This is delusion pure and simple.
To no country has fate been more malignant than to Pakistan. We thought the past was dead and gone on October 12. It is not even past. Will Pakistan ever recover its elan vital and regain its lost dignity, its past glory? Will Pakistan ever convert itself into a more proud country, a more self-respecting and just country, a country that is truly sovereign, fiercely independent and genuinely democratic? Will consensus on the nation’s core values ever emerge in this country and will the people ever protect and defend those values? Today, Pakistan has trouble agreeing on whether the sun will rise tomorrow morning.


The Saudis: friends or foes?
By Eric S. Margolis
AMERICANS used to take for granted that Saudi Arabia was one of their most faithful, obedient and useful allies. The 7,000 or so princes of the Saudi royal family who control 30 per cent of the world’s proven petroleum reserves could always be counted on to support American interests in the Mideast, buy lots of US arms, and sell their oil at low prices.
That was until the attacks of September 11, 2001, when 15 of the 19 aircraft hijackers turned out to be Saudi citizens. Angry Americans accused Saudi Arabia of being a hotbed of Islamic fanaticism and main paymaster of militant anti-American groups. Conservatives and Israel’s partisans unleashed a stinging campaign in the media and Congress against the Saudi royal family, calling for ‘regime change’ in Arabia as well as Iraq. Arabia’s oil, warned Washington’s oil imperialists, was too precious to be left to the Saudis — or to any Arabs, for that matter.
Then came week’s huge embarrassment. Princess Haifa, the wife of Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s high-profile ambassador to Washington, was alleged to have given thousands of dollars of private charitable donations for medical care to individuals she did not know that may have ended up in the hands of two of the US-based 9/11 hijackers.
Prince Bandar and his wife insist they had no knowledge their largesse would go to the hijackers, which sounds credible. They appear to be victims of exceptionally bad luck — if the story is true. True or not, the allegations further inflame anti-Arab feeling in the US and are giving Israel’s partisans in the media and Congress more ammunition to shoot at the Saudis. The White House is using the nasty episode to increase pressure on Riyadh to reverse its refusal to allow US forces to use Saudi bases to attack Iraq.
So, are the Saudis in fact responsible for financing what Americans call terrorism? It depends what one calls terrorism. The Saudis were the main financiers of the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s, in a secret alliance with the United States. During the same era, the Saudis covertly joined the US in financing Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran. Saudi money went to the US-backed Nicaraguan Contras, and to the UNITA forces of Jonas Savimbi in Angola — all ‘freedom fighters’.
The Saudis also bankrolled small, militant Islamic groups - often with full US backing — provided they stayed far away from Arabia. In Afghanistan, Saudi money financed the Taliban, who warred against Afghanistan’s communist Northern Alliance, Wahabi fighters battling pro-Iranian Shia groups, and militant Wahabi missionaries.
Individual Saudis, a few of them princes, and some Saudi religious charities, gave millions of dollars to groups they held to be freedom fighters: notably Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine (branded ‘terrorists’ by the US and Israel). Financial aid to the needy and oppressed is a basic tenet of Islam.
Osama bin Laden, a Saudi, has long received funds from a small number of wealthy Saudis who see him as the Che Guevara of the Arab world battling US domination. However, the Saudi regime had nothing to do with these contributions. At the time they were made, the Saudi government was trying to assassinate Osama bin Laden. Most of the funds came from foreign bank accounts over which the Saudi government had no control.
The Saudi royals are now in a dangerous predicament. They depend on American military power for protection against Iraq and Iran — and their own people. The 5,000 US troops based in Saudi Arabia and 40,000 American civilians there are regarded by many Saudis as an army of occupation. Most Saudis idolize America, but are furious at Washington for its unquestioned support of Israel and impending war against Iraq, which they view as naked aggression.
So the royal family must play a risky game, balancing their people’s growing anti-Americanism, which is mirrored across the Muslim world, with their military and political dependence on the US, and need to stay in Washington’s good books.
But the US also needs the Saudis. First and foremost, they supply oil to the US, Europe and Japan in great quantity, at very low price. Today, oil sells for $25 a barrel. Osama bin Laden asserts the West is robbing Arabia’s resources: oil, he insists, should cost $300 a barrel.
The Saudis buy huge quantities of advanced US arms they cannot use and mostly keep in storage: $40 billion from 1993-2000. These purchases keep US military production lines open, reduce costs of US weapons, and employ large numbers of highly paid defence workers in key electoral states. The Saudis keep at least $100 billion in the US financial system, with big chunks in government debt.
No matte how dismayed Americans are with the Saudis and vice versa, they need each other. Sweep away the royal family and a Col. Gaddafi or Saddam Hussein would likely seize power; they will not so readily be at Washington’s beck and call. Or, if true democratic elections are ever held, Islamists might win. They hold the subversive idea that Arabia’s vast oil wealth must serve all the Muslim world and not just 7,000 Saudi princes.—Copyright Eric S. Margolis, 2002

