FOR the last couple of weeks I have tried to analyze why the electorates in so many developing countries have abandoned the political centre and moved to the fringes of politics. I will take a pause this week from that analysis and write about something quite different. My subject today is the state of the economy in Pakistan. It is related in many different ways to the political shift that was brought about by the elections of October 10.

A good place to start this discussion is to tell my readers what I heard in London where I was for three days between November 6 and 9. I had gone across the Atlantic to gauge how bankers and businessmen with knowledge of and interest in Pakistan saw the economic situation in that country. I met more than a dozen people prominent in these two areas — finance and business — to gauge whether the two communities they represented had some appetite in making investments in Pakistan. However, in the conversations I had I was asked more questions but provided only a few answers.

The question I was asked most often was how I saw the situation in Pakistan. After three years of successful stabilization could Pakistan expect to return to the path of rapid economic growth? If that happened which sectors of the economy would lead the country back to growth? What are the policies the government must pursue in order to get the economy moving again? Would the politicians support such policies or would they plunge the country into economic chaos as they had done so many times before?

Some of the people I met recalled the pessimism I had shown in some of my earlier writings about the future of the Pakistani economy. In those writings I had also shown considerable consternation at the way a series of policymakers operating out of Islamabad had destroyed the country’s institutional base and my regret that Pakistan had lost the economic momentum built over a period of many years. For forty years, between 1950 and 1990, Pakistan was transformed from being by far the most backward area of what was once British India into the most prosperous and vibrant part of South Asia. I had then said - in particular in a long lecture I gave in 1997 at the annual conference of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics - that policy missteps by Islamabad in the 1990s had turned Pakistan from a healthy economy to the sick man of South Asia. Had my views changed? Did I continue to be as pessimistic as I was in the late 1990s, or did I see now some reason for hope?

My answer was simple. I had shed my pessimism and I saw considerable reason for hope. This switch in my perception was the result of five developments in Pakistan’s recent economic history each one of which suggested that the country could begin to grow once again - to change the structural rate of growth from the present three to four per cent a year to six to seven per cent a year in the next several years.

To change the structural growth rate it is obvious that the underlying structures - the economy’s foundations - must be rebuilt. Pakistan’s earlier growth spurt when GDP expanded by over six per cent a year and gross domestic incomes by a bit more than three per cent a year was produced by a combination of factors. Of these three were important. Pakistan had a reasonably well developed physical infrastructure, particularly in irrigation. This supported two green revolutions, one in the late 1960s when high yielding wheat and rice varieties were introduced into the country.

The other green revolution occurred in the 1980s when Pakistan adopted modern farming practices in the production of cotton - its most important crop. Pakistan then also had reasonably well functioning administrative and legal infrastructures. And in the 1960s, it began to develop a vibrant financial sector built around private commercial banking and a rapidly developing capital markets. Not a week passed in the mid-1960s when an IPO - initial public offering - was not listed on the stock market. The economy’s structure, therefore, rested on fairly robust institutional and physical infrastructure.

The economy was also helped by a large infusion of foreign capital which came in mostly in the form of concessional assistance from the United States and from such multilateral institutions as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The Americans were generous with Pakistan since they appreciated its partnership in their struggle against communism. Multilateral development banks were good to the country since it had built a good record for using aid.

All that changed for a variety of reasons that I don’t have the space to go into in any great deal. For more than a quarter century - from 1972 to 1999 - Pakistan’s economy weakened since its institutional base was systematically and wantonly destroyed. This trend came to be reversed after General Musharraf assumed power and handed the management of the economy to a team of competent managers.

I have differed with Islamabad on the approach it adopted in the fall of 1999 when it chose to emphasize stabilization over growth. I would have liked to see stabilization and growth pursued simultaneously. Nonetheless, with stabilization having been achieved, the country is now poised to return to the path of rapid growth it abandoned in the early 1970s. The institutional ground has been prepared and with the continuation of the policies followed, we should be able to see the revival of economic growth.

One of the most impressive legacies of the Musharraf period is the restoration of health to the financial system. A group of highly dedicated and professional managers has guided public sector commercial banks away from bankruptcy. Privatization has reduced the public sector’s share in the banking sector. A major public sector bank, UBL, has been transferred to the private sector. It has been bought by investors who include a business group of Pakistani origin that has a thriving business in Britain and by people in the Middle East who are once again looking at Pakistan as a place where they could place their savings. These developments may signal the return of foreign capital to Pakistan.

Also impressive is the work done by both the State Bank of Pakistan and the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan in bringing about a dramatic improvement in the regulatory and supervisory environment within which financial institutions must now work. Both the SBP and SECP are now professionally managed institutions which watch over the functioning of the various segments of the financial sector by applying rules and regulations based on good practices followed all over the world.

Another important legacy of the Musharraf era - or perhaps half a legacy since the work in this area has still to be completed - is the reform of the civil service and civil administration. Both had suffered massively since the assumption of power by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the governments that followed. Reforms have been undertaken to improve the structure of the services, the accountability of civil servants and compensation paid to government employees. Once upon a time Pakistan had an efficient, well trained civil service committed to economic development and public service. This is not to say that the old structure did not have flaws - for it did. But a long line of politicians, instead of removing the flaws, destroyed the structure. It was in their interest not to be constrained by the civil servant as they went about ravaging the economy.

Decentralization of many powers of the state to the district level is another reform undertaken by the Musharraf government that will have profound implications for the country’s development. It has been recognized by the practitioners of development in many parts of the world that people get served effectively only by bringing government closer to them. Islamabad is very distant from most of Pakistan’s nearly 150 million. Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta are somewhat nearer but then the provinces don’t wield much economic power and authority. By creating the office of the Nazim - an elected official who, at least in theory, is responsible for managing the affairs of the district of which he (or she) is in charge - is a move in the right direction.

While the reform of the financial system and improvement in the system of civil administration may not meet much resistance from the politicians to whom General Musharraf will soon transfer executive authority, it is the devolution of power that is at most risk. The reason is obvious. Politicians working at the national and provincial level draw their support from the local electorate. The Nazim will now come in between the people and the provincial and national legislators. Of all the reforms introduced by the government of General Musharraf, it is this which needs to be protected the most from political assault.

Continuity of policies should also restore foreign confidence in Pakistan’s economic future. This is why it is so important to continue to move in the direction in which Pakistan has been proceeding for the last three years. The politicians should be encouraged to build on the foundations that have been laid. They should not be allowed to destroy them brick by brick as they did in the past.

I said above that my optimism about Pakistan’s economic future is based on five developments that have occurred in the last three years. Taking into consideration what I said above, the following five developments — provided they are sustained - gives me hope about what lies ahead. Introduction of professionalism in economic management, giving clear regulatory and supervisory authority to the SBP and SECP over different segments of the financial sector, improvements that are palpable in the working of the financial system, devolution of power to the local level and some revival of foreign investment in the country are the five reasons for hope.

To these five I would like to add a sixth - the ability of economies to recover from a dip in growth when the environment becomes supportive. The best example of this is perhaps the much celebrated performance of the Indian economy over a fifteen-year period from 1985 to 2000. Readers would recall that for nearly forty years after independence the Indian economy was stuck at what their own economists called the Hindu rate of growth. Once the highly debilitating licence raj began to be dismantled, and the hold of the Indian bureaucracy on the economy began to be loosened, the suppressed growth the country had experienced for so long catapulted the economy towards a considerably higher growth rate.

The same could happen in Pakistan. Like India in 1947-85, Pakistan too has experienced suppression of growth for a decade and a half. Once conditions are put right, we should expect the rate of growth to bounce back. There are some unused assets that could be now deployed. Some segments of the population have skills that could be put to productive use. There are markets, both abroad and inside the country, that could be tapped. Going by the experience of the countries that have returned from slow to rapid growth, we can expect the “bounce factor” to add a percentage and a half points to the rate of growth and bring it to five per cent a year.

To add another couple of points will need two things: one a clear indication from the politicians who are taking office that they are committed to accelerating growth. Two, the new rulers are prepared to launch a series of policy initiatives in the areas that still need to be fully tackled.

BABU was a mechanic who worked in my brother Satto’s factory. He was decidedly not an automobile engineer and even the word ‘mechanic’ would be too generous a description.

Babu was a ‘fixer’ and if a car needed to get started and become road-worthy, he had the magical touch. I owned a beat-up Standard Vanguard, which earned its keep by allowing me to write columns about its routine break-downs. The best workshops in town had washed their hands off it. Only Babu knew how to keep it running. This was, obviously, not a long-term solution but it was the best that I could manage given my financial circumstances.

This is how democracy works. It is a flawed political system and no constitutional experts can get it to be a perfect system. There will always be flaws and because it is a winner take-all game, large sections of the electorate, in fact, get disenfranchised, if they happen to be on the losing side. That is, until the next time, provided there is a next time that is a part of a process.

It is the process that provides continuity. It is because we have been given to throwing out the baby with the bath water that we appear to be beginning all over again every time we have had elections and a national assembly comes into being. It is, as if, we have invented the wheel. We are given to saying that we are making a fresh start or that democracy has been restored.

In a sense, this may be true because there are some new faces and because there are so many women in the national assembly and they may bring some vigour to the proceedings. I have some reservations. In the elections, which I admit I did not follow too closely, there seemed to be an emphasis on personalities rather than on issues and it was difficult to tell one political party from another. But it was good to see the elected representatives, graduates all, greeting each other, as if returning from school holidays, to start a new term.

Much scorn has been heaped on those who have changed loyalties after they were elected on a party ticket. Ideally, this should be a matter between the candidate and those who elected him or her. It is the trust of the voters that seems to be betrayed. But since no high principles are involved, no specific turnabout of doctrine, I would imagine that the voters are not unduly concerned. Once an election is over, the voter ceases to have any importance for the duration of the tenure of the assembly. If this were not so, much would have been done by previous assemblies to lift living standards of those mired in poverty or near-poverty, whose numbers continue to grow rather than diminish. This is true of India as well, and India claims to be the largest democracy in the world and India, unlike Pakistan, has not had its democracy interrupted as we have. There is, probably, no connection between democracy and poverty alleviation.

What distinguishes this national assembly from others is that there is a healthy and articulate opposition and no matter how the numbers are manipulated, there will be no ‘heavy mandate.’ It is the presence of the opposition that will make the government or ‘establishment’ members stay faithful to the pledges that have been made to those who elected them. One never knows when the opposition may succeed in pushing through a vote of no-confidence. Though one sincerely hopes that this assembly will last through its tenure and there will be elections and the democratic process will take root. Trial and error and trial, once again.

These are not only tumultuous times but very dangerous times that we are living through. There is our intransigent neighbour who is not on speaking terms with us, but itself is undergoing a profound social change with the revival of a militant and blood-thirsty Hindu radicalism. There is Afghanistan, war-ravaged and seemingly out of control and which can unravel. The war in Afghanistan may have been declared as being won, but peace has not returned. President Pervez Musharraf has skilfully managed a balancing act. Whatever else he may have accomplished or not accomplished. Pakistan has escaped from the fall-out of the war in Afghanistan with Pakistan’s sovereignty more or less, intact. At least such sovereignty that is allowed to countries heavily in debt and still borrowing.

The prospect of war against Iraq will convert the dangerous times into perilous ones. This is the right time to have a civilian government, answerable to the people. But the wrong time to be squabbling among ourselves.

The safety and welfare of the people cannot be made hostage to political bickering. Democracy needs a culture of tolerance and it should not be made dangerous to dissent. An elected government should be given respect. So too those who sit on the opposition benches. The interaction between the two should be positive. No individual or a group has a monopoly on patriotism, or the wisdom to see Pakistan through the troubled times that lie ahead. We need to be all on the same side, though there may be many voices.

AT the NATO summit in Prague last week, President Bush and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder were on speaking terms again. That’s a start.

During the final phases of his election campaign in September, Schroeder had exploited German fears over a war with Iraq and unleashed anti-American sentiments that had lain dormant for nearly two decades. It would have been understandable if Bush had given Schroeder a cold shoulder, but he didn’t. The German chancellor looked noticeably relieved, as he clenched Bush’s hand and smiled into the television cameras.

Schroeder needs his Texan partner. And so does the rest of Europe. For as much as Europe wants its political voice heard in international crises, and on issues of war and peace, its dwindling contribution to NATO’s military preparedness leaves the United States at the fulcrum of any major decision.

Despite the cheerleading about European and U.S. unity in Prague last week, and the warmth of a moment that also served as Czech President Vaclav Havel’s going away party, the NATO summit could hardly conceal growing fissures in the Alliance. By all accounts, the United States would be happy to have a vigorous partner in global security and Europe wants strategic leverage. But how can Europe have an equal voice when NATO’s military strength rests so lopsidedly in the hands of the United States?

The case of Germany is illustrative. One of the ways the German government has tried to atone for sins the Schroeder team committed during the election campaign has been to offer to take over the leadership of the peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan. Many Germans like the idea; it fits with their ambitions for Germany to become a big European power with a global role. Besides, the British and Turks have managed to lead the peacekeeping mission. Germany will now take over those forces next year. But as a practical matter, Germany’s military leaders doubt whether the country can do it. With good reason.

Germany currently has 1,200 troops taking part in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a U.N. group. To take over the leadership of the ISAF, another 800 soldiers will need to be sent to perform functions such as logistics, communication and managing the strategically important airport in Bagram near Kabul. You would think that unified Germany, with Europe’s biggest economy and a population of 84 million, could manage such a modest step. But many defence experts think that taking over the ISAF leadership will be a considerable stretch for Berlin. How is that possible? Thirteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany’s military forces are still largely structured to defend against Soviet tanks streaming across the Fulda Gap. True, progress has been made. A decade ago it was politically unthinkable that German soldiers would be sent on missions abroad. Today roughly 10,000 of them are abroad in places from Kosovo to Kuwait. Germany is a leader, after the United States, in contributing to peacekeeping missions.

And the plodding German military has begun restructuring, by having the Bundeswehr (the German Armed Forces) adopt the idea of crisis-reaction forces. The number of troops assigned to such work has grown from next to none to 50,000 in less than 10 years. Retired German general Klaus Naumann says we must “reduce the tail and favour the teeth.”

But the bigger picture remains a dim one. Germany has 280,000 men and women under arms, most of them equipped for national defence of the cold war variety and not the new mobile, flexible rapid-reaction work the global fight against terrorism requires. That’s why adding a few hundred troops to ISAF and taking the lead is a challenge.

The current ISAF mandate ends on December 20, but Turkey, the lead nation on the ground now, won’t be able to turn over the reins before February because Germany won’t be ready. Germany needs a good two months to get troops and materiel to the field, and this only with the help of others. Berlin has to rely on a private London-based company that rents the Germans Ukrainian and Russian transport aircraft. That’s dozens of flights over weeks to deliver a modest contingent. (And a licence to print money for any company that helps the poorly equipped Germans.)

In fact, calling Germany the new lead nation in Afghanistan is a bit of an exaggeration. The Dutch are “partners in leadership” with Berlin and without them, Germany’s plans would not be possible. Unfortunately (but not surprisingly) the capabilities of the Dutch are not much better than those of the Germans. But let’s say the German-Dutch contingent gets on the ground and set up for business. What then?

It can work under the present climate. But what happens if the warlords misbehave or Afghan President Hamid Karzai falls into real trouble? ISAF controls Kabul (and the Bagram airport) and nothing more. The lightly armed, battle-soft Bundeswehr and their Dutch partners can keep the peace, not make it. If things go badly, according to a senior Bundeswehr officer who is training Germans for the Afghan mission, then there is really only one strategy: Koffer packen und raus@, pack your bags and get out.

Even that strategy can’t be executed without help. Germany would either have to go back to leasing aircraft to evacuate troops (the Dutch do not possess significant airlift capabilities either), or march forces out through perilous conditions in Pakistan under American protection, or appeal to the United States for airlift help. While the United States has more than 250 long-range transport aircraft, all of Europe has 11. Germany has dozens of shorter-range, tactical transport aircraft, and at 20 to 30 years of age, they resemble flying buses. With most lacking armour or armaments, these military craft can only fly safely to peaceful places.

The German and Dutch shortcomings represent a microcosm of Europe’s military problems. In Prague, East Europeans were complaining that they have to spend at least 2 per cent of GDP on defence, while their West European mentors lag far behind. (Germany spends 1.1 per cent.) In Kosovo, allied forces were nearly wholly dependent on the Americans for airlift, communications and intelligence. At the time, German general Naumann warned that the gap between American and European troops was so wide that their soldiers would soon be unable to fight together on the same battlefield. And the gap is growing wider.

The NATO summit in Prague set out to solve this. The idea is “smart procurement.” Europe will never match U.S. defence spending, but it can spend more wisely. For smaller European countries this strategy of developing “boutique” capabilities works.

But for Germany this is not enough, especially if it wants to play a major international role on matters of war and peace. Germany tried to show off its “boutique” capabilities in chemical and biological warfare by deploying 50 soldiers and their half-dozen specialized tanks, equipped to detect and deal with lethal contaminants, to Kuwait. Then, when it soured on the Bush administration’s bellicose stance toward Iraq, Germany threatened to withdraw the contingent. A senior Bush administration official said Germany should get out before the tiny troop contingent gets in the way. But the 50 specialized forces remain in Kuwait. To get home, they would need a lift from a leasing company or a NATO ally.

The contingent is a metaphor for Europe’s place in comparison to America’s. Europe needs political cohesion and leadership, and it cannot shirk from its responsibilities to NATO. The way that Europe _ and Germany, in particular _ has responded to the threat of Saddam Hussein and the challenge of U.S. policy toward Iraq suggests unity and commitment is still a vision. Which means it’s good that Gerhard and George are talking again. If things in Afghanistan go badly and Germany needs to make a 911 call next year, it will have to be routed through the switchboard at the White House.—Dawn/Washington Post Service

The author is a research fellow at the Academy of the Federal Armed Forces for Information and Communication in Germany.

THE struggle for power in Pakistan is also a struggle for nuclear power. This may not seem immediately obvious, but it is a critical subtext for those who seek power in the pursuit of an agenda. Just two members of the newly elected Pakistan National Assembly prevented Maulana Fazlur Rahman from becoming prime minister of the country with the support of an array of parties which were ready to back him not because they wanted him but because they wanted General Pervez Musharraf and the army even less.

The man who got the job, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali received 172 votes in the 342-member house. Although only 328 votes were cast we must assume that the 14 absentees were not ready to support the army establishment, for the usual fee. Otherwise they would have been around to beef up the establishment support, which was widely touted as being over 200.

This is not to suggest that the leader of the six-party mulla alliance called the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal, or MMA, which campaigned with Osama bin Laden’s portrait on its active shoulders, would have blown up the world the moment he was sworn in. But I do suggest that our world would have been a different place if the Maulana had fulfilled the fantasy of so many mosques and madressahs and become prime minister of Pakistan. An ideologically-committed group, motivated by the worldview of Osama, would have acquired a measure of administrative control, and substantial say in policy-making, in the world’s most powerful Islamic state. To dismiss this lightly is to — using the imagery of so much eastern writing — wear the mask of complacency over the eyes blinded by ignorance.

When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto launched Pakistan’s nuclear-bomb project, he discreetly (or not) put it about that out of this programme would emerge the world’s first ‘Islamic Bomb.’ There is a difference between a ‘Pakistan Bomb’ and an ‘Islamic Bomb.’ The first can be justified as a legitimate weapon of self-defence. The second assumes a larger geopolitical purpose.

It is, by declaration, available for export to any Islamic nation that feels threatened.The argument sounded persuasive. Every other ‘major faith’ had its bomb. The Christian nations were of course in the forefront, assuring them of political and economic dominance over large parts of the globe. Communism protected its frontiers and resources with the bomb as well. The Jews had their arsenal too, even if Israel officially denied that it possessed the bomb. With India going virtually nuclear after Pokhran in 1974, the ‘Hindu Bomb’ had also arrived. History demanded that Pakistan restore the equilibrium of world power with an ‘Islamic Bomb’.

It is a moot point how much Bhutto actually believed in this artful argument. He was more interested in Islamic money than in the defence of the faith. He wanted this cash to pay for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons; he did not really want to lend the bomb to any green-cap dictator who had misplaced his security blanket.

But the concept of the Islamic Bomb has its devotees, including powerful lobbies in Pakistan. They believe that the various governments in Pakistan which have not played out this option have betrayed the cause, internationally.

The MMA believes that Pakistan’s nuclear bomb must have an Islamic dimension. This belief is not necessarily thought-through, or totally rational; nevertheless it exists. The partisans and activists of the Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Islam or the Jamaat-i-Islami, and related theocratic movements, spread across frontiers. They exist in India as much as elsewhere. I met a senior cleric who was one of them. You can hear the deep sense of dismay in his voice at the fact that the army stole the leadership of Pakistan from Maulana Fazlur Rahman. His anger rose to a scream as he accused General Pervez Musharraf of being a puppet at the feet of America and Britain.

To be fair, he did not suggest that the ‘Islamic Bomb’ be used against India; perhaps it would have been impolite to do so. But he argued passionately for its use as a deterrent against America if it dared attack Iraq. This was what an ‘Islamic Bomb’ was meant for. The bomb had become a bit of an all-purpose superweapon in his naive imagination, but naivete did not interfere with his convictions.

These clerics do not lend themselves to easy caricature. It is wrong and unfair to dismiss them as mad mullas. They do not necessarily rant and rave at the drop of a skullcap. Maulana Fazlur Rahman, I believe, is a charming person. Certainly his smile in photographs is wide and honest. But simplicity is a natural characteristic of believers who have become missionaries. It is difficult, for instance, not to be impressed by the personal lifestyle of an office-bearer of the RSS at their headquarters in Nagpur. A corner of a small room, a simple dhoti and Spartan food is sufficient for his needs.

Such men do not want Aquascutum jackets and John Lobb shoes. A shalwar kameez and a turban is good enough. Generals and bureaucrats tend to convert their foreign exchange allowances into Alfred Dunhill glasses and Armani suits. The ideologues are not personally threatening. But their ideology is dangerous.

It is ironical that the great sceptic Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s daughter Benazir should have come close to making the Maulana a prime minister. Even in failure she has left a benchmark which will be difficult to erase. She has given the idea acceptability, and made the Maulana a front-runner for the job in any future dispensation. Her father’s motives for flirting with the Islamists were cynical, which is why he never became their leader despite all his wooing.

The man who introduced prohibition into Pakistan did not become a hero of the Jamaats thereby. They knew he was doing it for their votes. They accepted his decision and kept their votes for themselves. They could be even more cynical than Bhutto. General Ziaul Haq, on the other hand, did not need gestures to become their leader: they recognized in him one of their own, and that is what he quickly proved to be.

General Musharraf must have been tempted to include the MMA within the coalition he began to construct once the King’s party failed to win a majority in the elections. Politics all over the world follows what might be called the Lyndon Johnson Law (the former American president borrowed the dictum from the Arabs, incidentally): It is far better to have the camel inside the tent pissing out rather than outside the tent pissing in. You are not expected to be choosy about camels, either.

General Musharraf must have concluded that the price of a deal with the mullas would be unacceptable. He patched together a coalition by traditional means (in simpler English that is known as hard cash, either immediately or the promise thereof). When a coalition consists of individuals and groups that want nothing more than to eat, drink and be merry, life is easy. Some prefer eating, others drinking, and still others merriment: a fortunate few get all three. But nothing as disastrous as ideology ever breaks up such a party. (Witness the coalition in Delhi.)

The MMA has an agenda that is beyond the joys of this life. It also has two important allies. The first is time. Time is generally on the side of the opposition, but in this case time might do an extra favour to the MMA by creating difficult conditions for the elected prime minister, Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, too quickly. Mr Jamali’s biggest burden will be his benefactor.

Pakistan has put in place a political system without logic. Real power is in the hands of an armed oligarchy; and elected representatives have to feign that they are running the country. Mr Jamali may find this acceptable. But he is getting handsome rewards for such open-minded behaviour. Others in the elected parliament are not going to be so generous. The first confrontation has already begun, and it is over a nodal issue: the legitimacy of the Legal Framework Order by which General Musharraf literally reappointed himself as the real authority in the country. Mr Jamali has a majority shorter than a horse’s nose. And on this matter, two of his smaller allies, the Pakistan Awami Tehreek and the Pakistan Muslim League (Zia) are in disagreement with him.

The second ally of the MMA is the anger/hate of Benazir Bhutto. She will sup with the mulla if that is what is needed to embarrass the generals. The generals humiliated her further by taking ten MNAs away from her party, proving that not all her minions were as subservient to her as she imagined.

She will trim her own interests to give space to the mullas, if they can enlarge their potential alliance and defeat Jamali. The struggle for power in Pakistan has just begun. Osama bin Laden, now officially declared undead by the United States, is waiting and watching — probably from somewhere around the Binoori mosque in Karachi. He could do with a few nuclear weapons.

The writer is editor-in-chief, Asian Age, New Delhi.