Going through the motions

ELECTIONS are already history. The trio of PML(Q), PPP and MMA have been struggling to come to an understanding between themselves about issues and policies relating to government formation. Two out of the three must join hands to form a stable coalition.

But these parties, along with their candidates for the coveted post of prime minister — Mir Zafrullah Jamali, Amin Fahim and Maulana Fazlur Rehman, respectively — are as much masters of the political situation as they are allowed by circumstances. Among those of other political actors, the formidable role of President Musharraf continues to cast its shadow on the way political negotiations are progressing. He is the architect of the political as well as constitutional framework that produced the post-election conundrum in the first place. The nature of his role in the new set-up is the kingpin of the whole process of government formation.

Indeed, there are two parallel processes currently in progress: one, negotiations between the three contenders for power in the parliament and between each of them and smaller groups such as the PML(N), Muttahida Qaumi Movement, PPP (Sherpao) and various minuscule parties; two, negotiations between the Musharraf government on the one hand and various big and small parties on the other . The former process is front-stage, open and generally covered by the media. The latter is back-stage, secret and only sparingly reported by the press.

Initially, the PML(Q) felt comfortable with the MMA as a traditional ally in its bid for power. But, the latter has changed over time. It was not ready for co-option any more, after its impressive performance in the October elections. It staked its claim as a serious contender for power and showed a level of tenacity in its new role which surprised even its erstwhile senior partners in the PML(Q).

On its part, the MMA looked at the PML(Q) as a party of the president, which had no leader and no policy profile of its own. The MMA’s electoral performance drew essentially on its stand against President Musharraf’s pro-US policies in the context of the war against terrorism. An alliance with the PML(Q) would have required it to sign on the dotted line of Islamabad’s foreign policy and thus turn against its mandate. Similarly, that option would have forced it to accept the writ of the military-bureaucratic establishment, which had been perceived and projected by the ulema as essentially pro-western and potentially secular.

Ideally, President Musharraf would have liked the MMA’s MNAs on his side but not its policies and priorities. The military establishment has amply shown an inclination to use what it considers the ‘Islamic card’ against contenders for power especially the PPP. But after the elections, it considers the MMA to be too big for its boots and has shunned bargaining with it. The PML(Q) duly obliged, and turned to smaller parties in its bid to muster numerical strength to form government without the MMA and the PPP. However, its candidate for prime minister, Mir Jamali, has no support base of his own, either institutionally, that is, in the PML(Q), or locally, that is, in his home province of Balochistan. A leader only in name, Jamali would have served the purpose of the military government in the context of a different party count in the parliament.

The Musharraf government’s interaction with the PML(Q) is largely perceived as an in-house arrangement. At the other end, it has shunned the MMA as its nemesis. Holding the third position in the parliament, the MMA represents a mandate which cuts across the aims and objectives of the ruling elite in terms of its strategic priorities, diplomatic profile as well as its educational and cultural policies.

However, the government seriously pursued secret negotiations with the PPP during the last four weeks. As a party which shares a major part of its national, regional and international perspective with the government, the PPP was no outsider to the political system.

All this reflects the fact that the deadlock is not between the three parties, as largely covered by the media, but essentially between the two — the PML(Q) and the PPPP. In more precise terms, it is a deadlock between President Musharraf and the PPP leadership. For President Musharraf, the real question is: how not to transfer real power and yet gain legitimacy by installing a representative government in Islamabad.

For Benazir Bhutto, the issue is multi-faceted. First, her party has made a comeback against heavy odds. It feels that a PML(Q)-led government would be considered a government of President Musharraf under another garb and thus create a dampening effect on the democratic sentiment throughout the country.

The PPP has argued that a government led by itself could create a new image for the ruling set-up at home and make it more acceptable to the EU, Commonwealth, SAARC and the international community in general.

The PPP has all along maintained a liberal stance on international issues, Islamic politics, as well as economic, cultural and educational policies. It boasts of a relatively stable leadership in both organizational and operational terms than its rivals such as the PML(Q), which is headless, or the MMA which has a collegial pattern of leadership led by the two heads of the JI and JUI.

The PPP’s handling of the post-election situation of utter confusion relating to government formation reflects its cautious approach to an agreement with the Musharraf government. For the latter, it involves a partial loss of political initiative inasmuch as Benazir Bhutto would continue to direct the party activity by remote control. The strength of the PPP is a minus point for the military government.

Benazir has kept her options open by getting the ARD on board and keeping the MMA as a possible coalition partner in case the government and its parliamentary allies stay away and the process of government formation is halted at that end. Already, the postponement of the inaugural session of the National Assembly has agitated the public mind. Under these circumstances, President Musharraf would not like to keep the process of coalition-building pending for long.

At stake is reconsideration of the role of President Musharraf in terms of presidential powers under the LFO vis-a-vis parliament and prime minister. The National Security Council as a supra-cabinet body is widely understood to negate the very principle of representative rule. Article 58(2) (b) remains the antithesis of parliamentary sovereignty, much like it was in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1996. The accountability of elected representatives to the non-elected government functionaries, instead of the electorate at large, is a mockery of public mandates.

The MMA as a contender for power is a residual category. It can lead a coalition government by default, if the two leading contenders fail to agree to coalesce. What will be the profile of a PPPP-MMA coalition government? Will it be a stable coalition? Is it likely to take a tough stand on all the controversial issues facing such a government, with the additional problem of re-electing the president, given the farcical nature of the April referendum? On the other hand, the PML(Q) and the MMA have resumed their talks, after the PPPP is said to have got engaged in serious discussions with the Musharraf government.

All these patterns of negotiations will stare all major players on the political chessboard of the country in the face in the coming days and weeks.

As long as an elected government is not in place, the arbitrary process of law making of the present set-up will continue. An ordinance a day keeps democracy away. Whether the government should make and amend laws even after the October elections is a question of legal morality. It is time to revert to the legitimate process of law making through public representatives.

Ironically, far more than mere numbers on the floors of elected assemblies, it is Islamabad’s US policy, Kashmir policy, diplomatic profile in general, future relations with India, and at home Islamization of laws, institutions and public morality that can make or break negotiations between any two or more contenders for power.

Will there be no opposition party?

THE most striking feature of the post-election scenario in Islamabad has been the singlemindedness of purpose the political leaders have displayed in their bid for power. Had it not been for the fact that the political future of the country looks so grim, one would have found these toings and froings in the capital quite amusing. So desperate do our leaders appear to be to get into office that the permutations and combinations that are being tried or being spoken of in speculative newspaper stories leave people aghast.

This mad scramble for office is throwing up the strangest of bedfellows. Those whose political ideologies appeared at one time irreconcilable are now willing to make compromises and enter into a coalition. Politics does seem to be, after all, the art of the possible.

Given the composition of the National Assembly as it has emerged by accident or by design — it seems to be a bit of both — there is much leeway for manoeuvring. And that is what political parties are busy doing, with the present government also an active player in the shaping of the future dispensation. Every party is so focused on getting into office — the be-all and end-all of politics in Pakistan — that principles are being thrown to the winds unabashedly.

But does it necessarily have to be that way? If elections produce winners, they also produce losers. In the case of a split verdict, it requires great discretion in a party leadership to forgo the lure of office. In the days immediately after the polls on October 10 it was heartening to find some leaders discreetly hinting at an opposition role for their party. The People’s Party was the first and the most vocal in this respect when the difficult choices to be made came to the fore. But as the prospects of expedient bargaining opened up, all that spirit of self-denial and self-abnegation has evaporated in no time and we find the PPP leaders in warm embraces with the heavyweights of the MMA and the PML-Q.

True, the ultimate goal of politics is acquisition of power so that a party can put into effect its programme — political, economic, foreign policy, social, et al. But this is not always possible for every party at all time. To be able to pursue its own manifesto, a party must enjoy a comfortable majority or substantial plurality in the legislature in a parliamentary system. Besides, it should also be a cohesive organization without infighting in its ranks so that its leadership is not required to make questionable political compromises to win the approval of one faction or another. If the party’s structure is solidly organized at the grassroots, it will find it easier to enlist the cooperation of the people in implementing its policies, not all of which will always be palatable to the public.

Regrettably, none of the political parties involved in the current shenanigans in Islamabad has these characteristics. Hence their need to make compromises which are so drastic at times that it is robbing them of whatever credibility they once enjoyed. For instance, what is there in common between the MMA, the PPP, the PML-Q and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement to bring them together on the same political platform? They do not even have a minimum common programme — except the charm of holding office — on the basis of which they could be expected to govern in a coalition.

In these circumstances, the outcome of the political waltz in Islamabad when the music stops is quite unpredictable. If our misfortunes stem from the army’s Bonapartist ambitions, the failure of our party system is equally to blame for making it so very easy for the military to walk in at a time of its choosing and take over. No political party in the country has concentrated on its Organizational structure. Hence gradual decline and splintering of the Muslim League, the party that had spearheaded the movement for Pakistan, created a vacuum which has not been quite filled yet.

The PPP started off in the right direction but power fell in its lap before it had consolidated its base. Once in office, it was too distracted to attend to mundane matters like party organization. The religious parties present a different picture. They attend to party organization on the ground very methodically and with a sense of ideological commitment because they envisage a proselytizing role for themselves.

While all the parties have devoted considerable time and effort, as well as money, to electioneering, they have neglected their other functions. Any primer on the party system defines their functions additionally as aggregating and representing social interests, providing policy alternatives and training political leaders in the role of governing society.

At the stage at which Pakistan finds itself today a political party which voluntarily stays out of the race for power and chooses to play the opposition’s role would be rendering a great service to itself as well as to the country. It is now plain that those in office cannot act as a unifying force for the people. The country is too polarized and a military-backed government — as it inevitably has to be — will have so little credibility that it can hardly hope to perform the functions of unifying, educating, mobilizing and organizing the people. A party, which is willing to reach out to the people at a time when elections are not round the corner, would evoke a positive (though initially surprised and cynical) public response.

It could win popular support for specific programmes which promote the good of the community. For a change, the parties should organize themselves as any CBO (community-based organization) would to promote public development through participatory methods.

At the same time, the opposition party would be expected to perform three other important functions. One, it should strive to restore the dignity of parliament. Unburdened by the chores of office, its MNAs should have ample time on hand to devote to their role as legislators. Let them train themselves to become seasoned parliamentarians that would be no mean contribution to democracy in the country.

Secondly, it is time the parties began learning to do their homework on various issues facing the country which they have woefully neglected so far. They should set up their own research cells and study the problems of society and devise feasible solutions. Even if a party cannot implement those solutions straightaway, being not in the government, it can least mobilize public opinion in support and press for their adoption by the government in power or move them in parliament as policy alternatives. In this way it can act as a pressure group rather than merely as agitators and also emerge as the true custodian of public interests.

Thirdly, political parties need to re-learn their lesson of playing the role of monitors and watchdogs. By remaining alert, the opposition can help keep the government on its toes and thus provide the checks and balances to the system which are needed to make the government accountable.

One only hopes that the parties which have to sit on the opposition benches show maturity and decide to serve the nation in this way. This might prove to be a rather long route to power. But it will certainly be a steadier and durable one. It will also bring stability to the country.

Here it should be added that the government, whoever runs it, should recognize the role of the opposition in the political system. The opposition parties should not be treated as a bunch of pariahs and malcontents to be treated with contempt — something that unfortunately has been the norm in Pakistan — and should be accorded the respect and importance due to them as representatives of the people. This would give the opposition the dignity, which is essential to make it an integral and vital part of the political system. This would also instil confidence in the parties sitting in the opposition and would help in the growth of a culture of tolerance and accommodation.

Entering politics

WE are quick to question the propriety of an otherwise qualified person being appointed as a public servant by administrative fiat or personal selection by the powers-that-be. (General Pervez Musharraf, as President, is doing it every day, and it’s the regular procedure in the United States). But nobody is surprised or indignant when a patently unsuitable person becomes a legislator and an arbiter of the people’s destiny through the short-cut of elections.

We have many distinctions that entitle us entry into the Guinness Book of World Records, only if Mr Guinness would pay some attention to this part of the globe. I have no intention of recounting these distinctions; my purpose today is to point out just one fact that relates to our politics.

Pakistan must be the only country in the world where people with privileges derived from family or other connections, can join politics at the top level and don’t have to slog for recognition in humble positions, or start at the bottom as mohalla politicians or ordinary party workers. The elections have brought to the fore countless “legislators” who have stepped into the shoes of father, uncle or father-in-law (because these elders were not graduates), and among them are numerous young women, some of whom look as if they have come straight from a beauty parlour.

On another plane, sportsmen like Sarfraz Nawaz and Imran Khan or socialites like Tehmina Durrani or retired military-men like General Mirza Aslam Beg, simply announce that, with effect from such-and-such date, they are to be counted as politicians which they have perforce become for the good of the common man. But the word “politician” is not considered enough for them. Newspapers at once start referring to them as “eminent leader of this or that party,” even though they may have no one to lead.

I once had the edifying experience of launching a friendly maulvi, a bit of a firebrand, as chairman and convenor of his own “Islamic Socialist Inquilabi Party” in Islamabad, but the ship sank soon after sliding into the sea, without even the compensation of fame of The Titanic, but like an unknown tramp steamer. This was some 15 years ago. Any misconceptions that I harboured about entering politics after retirement from government service, also foundered along with maulvi sahib’s party. As was the case with the three eminent political leaders named above, and numerous other like them, maulvi sahib was averse to joining any one of the existing 72 political parties (like the proverbial 72 sects that we have created in Islam) or one of the many religious parties, at the humble level of a new entrant and avowed worker. He had wanted to be known as a leader, and might have become one if he hadn’t made the grave mistake of selecting me as his PRO.

You must have noticed that the facility of entering politics from the top of the ladder is not available to Majhas and Gamas — the Pakistani equivalent of Tom, Dick and Harry. Poor fellows. They will have to become members of ward or mohalla units of their favourite political party and go up slowly through silent and unselfish service, maybe making a start by raising slogans at the public meeting of one of the privileged lateral entrants who rarely leave any room at the top for those labouring day and night to reach it.

These lateral entrants who smuggle themselves edge ways into the political game usually belong to elite families and are known more for their social connections than any pronounce penchant for politics or for holding certain definite views on how the country should be run. A feudal, whether landed or industrial (or commercial) who is in politics, must have his son there to replace him when ultimately he decides to call it a day.

If there are two sons, they’ll be made to align themselves with two different parties, so that there is no feeling of deprivation if one is in power and the other is in the woods. A well-known landed industrial family from the Frontier holds the record for this kind of judicious placement of sons, for at one time it had its boys (and even their mother) in five political parties. Some of the boys later became governors or chief minister or federal ministers. None of them had ever raised a slogan in a public rally.

Again, Pakistan is probably the only country where anyone can join any political party at any time without as much as a by-your-leave. Your views may be entirely contrary to a party’s manifesto. In the past you may have done your damnedest to revile the party or harm it. You may be a self-confessed non-believer in democracy and party politics. You may have caused irredeemable loss to your country. You may be corrupt to the fingertips, or a lecher and debauch, or a drug pusher, or even a practising dacoit and murderer. None of these attributes is considered a handicap. In fact it all adds up to your experience.

You merely announce, usually at a “crowded” press conference that you have decided to join Party X, and no one in Party X will ask any questions., because political parties are waiting in the slips all the time to make a catch. There will be no formality of filling up a form, or a routine action on the part of the relevant committee in Party X to accept your membership. Just declare your decision and lo and behold! You are a leader in that party. Its as simple as that.

No wonder we have all sorts of Toms, Dicks and Harrys. As well as Mrs Toms, Mrs Dicks and Mrs Harrys falling over one another to get into a popular or even a not-so-popular party, though top priority is given to the party in power or one of its allies. As if that were not enough, the new entrants are also granted party offices to fight elections to the assemblies.

If they are lucky to get elected, we have the phenomenon of political nobodies being catapulted into the National Assembly or a provincial assembly, or even the senate, and rubbing shoulders with veterans double their age. The will simultaneously start the process of making up the lakhs (nowadays crores) spent on electioneering.

In the early days of the United States the slogan for the country’s youth used to be “Go West, young man.” Here, in Pakistan, carefree youths rolling in the family millions, with no academic distinction to their names, or a taste for scholarship of any kind, and for want of anything better to do, may well be advised to join politics. “Go into the assembly, young man! You’ll never rue the day.”

A strike in Yemen

BUSH administration officials described the missile strike on a car carrying six al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen a week ago as a battlefield operation in the war on terrorism, even though it occurred far from Afghanistan and in a country where no conventional military conflict is under way.

Other observers called it a targeted assassination, or even an extrajudicial killing — terms usually reserved for violations of human rights or international law. Such condemnation is not justified: The Yemen operation did not target political or criminal figures, but trained combatants of an organization that has declared war against the United States, that itself has defined the battlefield as global and that recently has landed its own military blows in Yemen.

The distinction is important not because the Bush administration needs to be defended from criticism, but because participants in numerous civil and ethnic conflicts — especially those where terrorism has been employed — would like to take cover behind the war America is fighting.

If the United States can fire a missile at an al-Qaeda leader in Yemen, some ask, why shouldn’t Israel aim one at Yasser Arafat in Ramallah, or Russia target exiled Chechen leaders in Turkey and Azerbaijan?

It sometimes appears that the Bush administration either accepts these comparisons or doesn’t care about the difference. And yet the differences are fundamental: Al-Qaeda has no conventional cause, no homeland, no purely political leaders; there is no territory at stake in its fight with the United States, and no possibility of negotiations or settlement.

The only course, chosen not by the United States but by al-Qaeda, is a scattered and unconventional military conflict across continents, lasting until one side is eradicated. There is no way to treat al-Qaeda’s members other than as combatants, because they have no other understanding of themselves.

America’s war also differs from others in that it is rightly being fought primarily with the tools of law enforcement, financial regulation and intelligence. Al-Qaeda combatants as dangerous as those killed Sunday are scattered throughout Europe, the United States and Asia, yet these have not been targeted by American assassins or missiles — nor should they be.

Military action makes sense only when it is impossible to work through law enforcement or local authorities. Yemen clearly falls into that category: Its authorities tried and failed to capture numerous al-Qaeda militants operating in remote parts of the country, and now they appear to have acquiesced in the CIA’s use of missile-armed drones.—The Washington Post

Drift to the right amid countdown to war

KEEPING a wary eye on political developments in two of its traditional allies in the region, the United States must be aware of the role its policies have played in pushing voters towards Islamist parties in Pakistan and Turkey. Don’t hold your breath in anticipation of any acknowledgement from the State Department, although the trend ought to have rung a few bells.

Not all that many decades ago, a comparable set of policies was driving nations towards the left, sometimes into the arms of the Soviet Union. In the light of subsequent events, it is particularly remarkable that early efforts by the governments of Ho Chi Minh as well as Fidel Castro to establish friendly relations were rebuffed by Washington, which tended to be extremely suspicious of national liberation movements and blindly supported multinational corporations in their often ruthless exploitation of Third World economies.

Things have, of course, changed since then. Efforts earlier this year to encourage a coup in Venezuela suggest that left-wing radicalism has not quite dropped off the State Department’s radar as an area of concern. But radical Islam — or anything that can be painted in those colours — has replaced communism as the most formidable foe in American eyes. September 11 was a symptom of, rather than the trigger for, this transformation.

The irony, of course, is that until the 1990s the US was more than willing to employ elements of radical Islam as a shield against what was perceived, until the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the greater challenge to US global interests.

Needless to say, domestic considerations too have played a crucial role in the Turkish landslide for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the emergence of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) as a leading political player in Pakistan.

The AKP derives its membership from a range of banned Islamist organizations of various hues, and its success can be interpreted as a popular verdict against the military machinations that aborted a previous electoral triumph by religiously inclined elements. Its remarkable showing also highlights the bankruptcy of Turkey’s traditional secular political forces.

Notwithstanding the AKP’s vow to uphold Turkey’s secular constitution and to vigorously pursue the nation’s membership of the European Union, the new regime will be viewed with suspicion by the West — as borne out by former French president Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s recent outburst against the very idea of considering Turkey a European nation — and the US will be counting upon the army to guarantee that the country remains a committed ally.

The AKP is keen to portray itself as a mainstream conservative force, the Muslim equivalent of Europe’s Christian Democrats, and it is hard to ascertain the extent to which reservations about America’s regional designs played a part in propelling it into power. In the considerably more convoluted Pakistani context, however, there can be little doubt that the MMA’s appeal in the NWFP and Balochistan had a great deal to do with its sharp opposition to US bases and intervention.

The MMA’s militancy has been moderated since October 10, in view of the possibility of power-sharing at the centre. That is no more surprising than the fact that Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s emergence as a prospective prime minister, at the helm of a coalition with the Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarians, has set the cat among the pigeons. General Pervez Musharraf would find it extremely hard to live down the embarrassment of having to swear in as the head of government a man whose outspoken defence of the Taliban earned him a stint under house arrest last year. Even more crucially, such an arrangement couldn’t possibly qualify for a nod from Washington under the existing circumstances.

Hence the military regime’s ham-fisted efforts to thwart a distasteful democratic outcome. As if the perpetuation of clumsily disguised dictatorship wasn’t a sufficient breach of the promise of “real” democracy, the army is now sponsoring a free market in horse trading.

The obvious alternative to an MMA-dominated dispensation would be a coalition between the PPPP and the PML(Q). Both parties operate in a more or less principle-free zone, so they should not find it all that difficult to accommodate one another. The main obstacle to such an arrangement is another potential embarrassment for Musharraf: the likelihood that the PPPP would insist on Benazir Bhutto being allowed back into the country without the threat of imprisonment.

It remains to be seen whether the general will find that a less bitter pill to swallow. He also has to countenance the risk that the MMA’s pious representatives could prove harder to control on the opposition benches than if they were to be placated with the trappings of power.

Although there can be little question that the electoral results of October 10 have substantially been determined by the highly questionable means employed to obtain a “positive” outcome, it is somewhat silly to suggest that the MMA’s predominance in the north-west owes much to the dubious decision to keep Nawaz Sharif and Benazir out of the fray. It deserves to be seen primarily as a protest vote against the military regime’s resolve to toe the American line. The role therein of misplaced empathy with the Taliban and even with Al Qaeda elements cannot be discounted, but it’s equally significant that no secular political force of note was able to articulate the popular concern in this context.

The rightwards drift in Turkey and Pakistan has been echoed in US congressional polls, whereby an effectively unelected president can now look forward to a Republican majority in both houses of Congress. George W. Bush campaigned hard and, given his cerebral limitations, rather well to achieve the result he wanted. His efforts were aided to a surprising extent by the Democrats, who doggedly refused to offer voters a serious alternative to Bushism.

Amid a gradually but steadily growing opposition to the coming war against Iraq, the Democrats were broadly unable to hold out the prospect of peace. It is certainly interesting, though, that candidates who did campaign against the war elicited a largely favourable popular response. Not enough of them did so, however. Nor were many Democrats prepared to challenge Bush’s plan to make permanent the tax cuts for the rich that he introduced last year, or to go on about Enron and other corporate scandals that ought to have rocked the administration. And they failed to capitalize on their resistance to a homeland security department which is ostensibly intended to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts but would also undermine labour unions.

As a disgruntled Democrat, Jesse Jackson’s long-time aide Steve Cobble, put it, “Bush was out there maximizing Republican turnout while the Democratic leadership was running around saying, ‘Look, we agree with the president on the war and we might agree with him on tax cuts and, hey, vote for us anyway.’ The Democratic message was not enough even to get Democrats excited.”

The result is Republican majorities in the House of Representatives as well as the Senate, which in turn will enable Bush to appoint his favoured brand of ultra-conservatives to the Supreme Court. Given his administration’s extremist nature and its determination to reinforce the power of corporate America as well as to kowtow to Christian fundamentalism, there is certainly the possibility that Bush will exceed the bounds of decency on a sufficient number of fronts to invite a popular backlash. But there would be little point in counting on it in the short run. Cursing Al Qaeda for helping create the conditions for this catastrophe won’t do much good either — although it’s probably worthwhile doing so anyway.

And if Baghdad is overrun by American troops within the next couple of months, Iraqis too will have plenty of cause to heap abuse on Osama bin Laden and his band of fanatics. It’s fairly likely compared to an invasion of Iraq was anyway on the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz agenda, but it may have proved harder to proceed with outside the context of the so-called war against terror.

Last Friday’s unanimous UN Security Council resolution on arms inspections was arguably a bigger victory for Bush than the November 5 election results. The resolution is supposed to contain no “hidden triggers” for military action: Saddam Hussein’s regime is expected to provide within 30 days a complete list of any “weapons of mass destruction” it may possess, and to allow weapons inspectors unfettered access to every conceivable site they wish to visit, including Saddam’s palaces. Any “material breach” of the resolution’s stringent and humiliating conditions will enable the Security Council to discuss what to do next.

The crucial point, however, is that nothing precludes the US from mounting an invasion at will. Such military action won’t exactly enjoy UN sanction, but it is also unlikely to be considered a violation of anything that the UN has decreed.

This you-can-have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too solution was devised by Secretary of State Colin Powell, who was entrusted with the task of disarming veto-wielding nations opposed to a war, namely, France, Russia and China, while placating the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz camp of hawks at home, who view inspections as a distraction and consider the UN a superfluous talking shop.

One can sympathize with the dilemma faced by France and Russia. Had either of them vetoed the resolution, the US may well have declared war immediately. In their view — and that of Syria, the only Arab country represented on the Security Council — the resolution is far from ideal, yet it represents the only chance of averting a conflagration.

E-mail: mahirali@journalist.com