ELECTIONS are already history. The trio of PML(Q), PPP and MMA have been struggling to come to an understanding between themselves about issues and policies relating to government formation. Two out of the three must join hands to form a stable coalition.

But these parties, along with their candidates for the coveted post of prime minister — Mir Zafrullah Jamali, Amin Fahim and Maulana Fazlur Rehman, respectively — are as much masters of the political situation as they are allowed by circumstances. Among those of other political actors, the formidable role of President Musharraf continues to cast its shadow on the way political negotiations are progressing. He is the architect of the political as well as constitutional framework that produced the post-election conundrum in the first place. The nature of his role in the new set-up is the kingpin of the whole process of government formation.

Indeed, there are two parallel processes currently in progress: one, negotiations between the three contenders for power in the parliament and between each of them and smaller groups such as the PML(N), Muttahida Qaumi Movement, PPP (Sherpao) and various minuscule parties; two, negotiations between the Musharraf government on the one hand and various big and small parties on the other . The former process is front-stage, open and generally covered by the media. The latter is back-stage, secret and only sparingly reported by the press.

Initially, the PML(Q) felt comfortable with the MMA as a traditional ally in its bid for power. But, the latter has changed over time. It was not ready for co-option any more, after its impressive performance in the October elections. It staked its claim as a serious contender for power and showed a level of tenacity in its new role which surprised even its erstwhile senior partners in the PML(Q).

On its part, the MMA looked at the PML(Q) as a party of the president, which had no leader and no policy profile of its own. The MMA’s electoral performance drew essentially on its stand against President Musharraf’s pro-US policies in the context of the war against terrorism. An alliance with the PML(Q) would have required it to sign on the dotted line of Islamabad’s foreign policy and thus turn against its mandate. Similarly, that option would have forced it to accept the writ of the military-bureaucratic establishment, which had been perceived and projected by the ulema as essentially pro-western and potentially secular.

Ideally, President Musharraf would have liked the MMA’s MNAs on his side but not its policies and priorities. The military establishment has amply shown an inclination to use what it considers the ‘Islamic card’ against contenders for power especially the PPP. But after the elections, it considers the MMA to be too big for its boots and has shunned bargaining with it. The PML(Q) duly obliged, and turned to smaller parties in its bid to muster numerical strength to form government without the MMA and the PPP. However, its candidate for prime minister, Mir Jamali, has no support base of his own, either institutionally, that is, in the PML(Q), or locally, that is, in his home province of Balochistan. A leader only in name, Jamali would have served the purpose of the military government in the context of a different party count in the parliament.

The Musharraf government’s interaction with the PML(Q) is largely perceived as an in-house arrangement. At the other end, it has shunned the MMA as its nemesis. Holding the third position in the parliament, the MMA represents a mandate which cuts across the aims and objectives of the ruling elite in terms of its strategic priorities, diplomatic profile as well as its educational and cultural policies.

However, the government seriously pursued secret negotiations with the PPP during the last four weeks. As a party which shares a major part of its national, regional and international perspective with the government, the PPP was no outsider to the political system.

All this reflects the fact that the deadlock is not between the three parties, as largely covered by the media, but essentially between the two — the PML(Q) and the PPPP. In more precise terms, it is a deadlock between President Musharraf and the PPP leadership. For President Musharraf, the real question is: how not to transfer real power and yet gain legitimacy by installing a representative government in Islamabad.

For Benazir Bhutto, the issue is multi-faceted. First, her party has made a comeback against heavy odds. It feels that a PML(Q)-led government would be considered a government of President Musharraf under another garb and thus create a dampening effect on the democratic sentiment throughout the country.

The PPP has argued that a government led by itself could create a new image for the ruling set-up at home and make it more acceptable to the EU, Commonwealth, SAARC and the international community in general.

The PPP has all along maintained a liberal stance on international issues, Islamic politics, as well as economic, cultural and educational policies. It boasts of a relatively stable leadership in both organizational and operational terms than its rivals such as the PML(Q), which is headless, or the MMA which has a collegial pattern of leadership led by the two heads of the JI and JUI.

The PPP’s handling of the post-election situation of utter confusion relating to government formation reflects its cautious approach to an agreement with the Musharraf government. For the latter, it involves a partial loss of political initiative inasmuch as Benazir Bhutto would continue to direct the party activity by remote control. The strength of the PPP is a minus point for the military government.

Benazir has kept her options open by getting the ARD on board and keeping the MMA as a possible coalition partner in case the government and its parliamentary allies stay away and the process of government formation is halted at that end. Already, the postponement of the inaugural session of the National Assembly has agitated the public mind. Under these circumstances, President Musharraf would not like to keep the process of coalition-building pending for long.

At stake is reconsideration of the role of President Musharraf in terms of presidential powers under the LFO vis-a-vis parliament and prime minister. The National Security Council as a supra-cabinet body is widely understood to negate the very principle of representative rule. Article 58(2) (b) remains the antithesis of parliamentary sovereignty, much like it was in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1996. The accountability of elected representatives to the non-elected government functionaries, instead of the electorate at large, is a mockery of public mandates.

The MMA as a contender for power is a residual category. It can lead a coalition government by default, if the two leading contenders fail to agree to coalesce. What will be the profile of a PPPP-MMA coalition government? Will it be a stable coalition? Is it likely to take a tough stand on all the controversial issues facing such a government, with the additional problem of re-electing the president, given the farcical nature of the April referendum? On the other hand, the PML(Q) and the MMA have resumed their talks, after the PPPP is said to have got engaged in serious discussions with the Musharraf government.

All these patterns of negotiations will stare all major players on the political chessboard of the country in the face in the coming days and weeks.

As long as an elected government is not in place, the arbitrary process of law making of the present set-up will continue. An ordinance a day keeps democracy away. Whether the government should make and amend laws even after the October elections is a question of legal morality. It is time to revert to the legitimate process of law making through public representatives.

Ironically, far more than mere numbers on the floors of elected assemblies, it is Islamabad’s US policy, Kashmir policy, diplomatic profile in general, future relations with India, and at home Islamization of laws, institutions and public morality that can make or break negotiations between any two or more contenders for power.

THE most striking feature of the post-election scenario in Islamabad has been the singlemindedness of purpose the political leaders have displayed in their bid for power. Had it not been for the fact that the political future of the country looks so grim, one would have found these toings and froings in the capital quite amusing. So desperate do our leaders appear to be to get into office that the permutations and combinations that are being tried or being spoken of in speculative newspaper stories leave people aghast.

This mad scramble for office is throwing up the strangest of bedfellows. Those whose political ideologies appeared at one time irreconcilable are now willing to make compromises and enter into a coalition. Politics does seem to be, after all, the art of the possible.

Given the composition of the National Assembly as it has emerged by accident or by design — it seems to be a bit of both — there is much leeway for manoeuvring. And that is what political parties are busy doing, with the present government also an active player in the shaping of the future dispensation. Every party is so focused on getting into office — the be-all and end-all of politics in Pakistan — that principles are being thrown to the winds unabashedly.

But does it necessarily have to be that way? If elections produce winners, they also produce losers. In the case of a split verdict, it requires great discretion in a party leadership to forgo the lure of office. In the days immediately after the polls on October 10 it was heartening to find some leaders discreetly hinting at an opposition role for their party. The People’s Party was the first and the most vocal in this respect when the difficult choices to be made came to the fore. But as the prospects of expedient bargaining opened up, all that spirit of self-denial and self-abnegation has evaporated in no time and we find the PPP leaders in warm embraces with the heavyweights of the MMA and the PML-Q.

True, the ultimate goal of politics is acquisition of power so that a party can put into effect its programme — political, economic, foreign policy, social, et al. But this is not always possible for every party at all time. To be able to pursue its own manifesto, a party must enjoy a comfortable majority or substantial plurality in the legislature in a parliamentary system. Besides, it should also be a cohesive organization without infighting in its ranks so that its leadership is not required to make questionable political compromises to win the approval of one faction or another. If the party’s structure is solidly organized at the grassroots, it will find it easier to enlist the cooperation of the people in implementing its policies, not all of which will always be palatable to the public.

Regrettably, none of the political parties involved in the current shenanigans in Islamabad has these characteristics. Hence their need to make compromises which are so drastic at times that it is robbing them of whatever credibility they once enjoyed. For instance, what is there in common between the MMA, the PPP, the PML-Q and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement to bring them together on the same political platform? They do not even have a minimum common programme — except the charm of holding office — on the basis of which they could be expected to govern in a coalition.

In these circumstances, the outcome of the political waltz in Islamabad when the music stops is quite unpredictable. If our misfortunes stem from the army’s Bonapartist ambitions, the failure of our party system is equally to blame for making it so very easy for the military to walk in at a time of its choosing and take over. No political party in the country has concentrated on its Organizational structure. Hence gradual decline and splintering of the Muslim League, the party that had spearheaded the movement for Pakistan, created a vacuum which has not been quite filled yet.

The PPP started off in the right direction but power fell in its lap before it had consolidated its base. Once in office, it was too distracted to attend to mundane matters like party organization. The religious parties present a different picture. They attend to party organization on the ground very methodically and with a sense of ideological commitment because they envisage a proselytizing role for themselves.

While all the parties have devoted considerable time and effort, as well as money, to electioneering, they have neglected their other functions. Any primer on the party system defines their functions additionally as aggregating and representing social interests, providing policy alternatives and training political leaders in the role of governing society.

At the stage at which Pakistan finds itself today a political party which voluntarily stays out of the race for power and chooses to play the opposition’s role would be rendering a great service to itself as well as to the country. It is now plain that those in office cannot act as a unifying force for the people. The country is too polarized and a military-backed government — as it inevitably has to be — will have so little credibility that it can hardly hope to perform the functions of unifying, educating, mobilizing and organizing the people. A party, which is willing to reach out to the people at a time when elections are not round the corner, would evoke a positive (though initially surprised and cynical) public response.

It could win popular support for specific programmes which promote the good of the community. For a change, the parties should organize themselves as any CBO (community-based organization) would to promote public development through participatory methods.

At the same time, the opposition party would be expected to perform three other important functions. One, it should strive to restore the dignity of parliament. Unburdened by the chores of office, its MNAs should have ample time on hand to devote to their role as legislators. Let them train themselves to become seasoned parliamentarians that would be no mean contribution to democracy in the country.

Secondly, it is time the parties began learning to do their homework on various issues facing the country which they have woefully neglected so far. They should set up their own research cells and study the problems of society and devise feasible solutions. Even if a party cannot implement those solutions straightaway, being not in the government, it can least mobilize public opinion in support and press for their adoption by the government in power or move them in parliament as policy alternatives. In this way it can act as a pressure group rather than merely as agitators and also emerge as the true custodian of public interests.

Thirdly, political parties need to re-learn their lesson of playing the role of monitors and watchdogs. By remaining alert, the opposition can help keep the government on its toes and thus provide the checks and balances to the system which are needed to make the government accountable.

One only hopes that the parties which have to sit on the opposition benches show maturity and decide to serve the nation in this way. This might prove to be a rather long route to power. But it will certainly be a steadier and durable one. It will also bring stability to the country.

Here it should be added that the government, whoever runs it, should recognize the role of the opposition in the political system. The opposition parties should not be treated as a bunch of pariahs and malcontents to be treated with contempt — something that unfortunately has been the norm in Pakistan — and should be accorded the respect and importance due to them as representatives of the people. This would give the opposition the dignity, which is essential to make it an integral and vital part of the political system. This would also instil confidence in the parties sitting in the opposition and would help in the growth of a culture of tolerance and accommodation.