ALONGSIDE the efforts to form a government, which appears to be a waiting game to see which group of legislators breaks ranks first, attention is focused on the pressure being exerted in respect of the sovereign powers of parliament.

This is not a new debate in Pakistan, having originated as choosing between the parliamentary or presidential forms of government, and later taking the shape of a struggle between the government and the army over which should control Pakistan’s defence and foreign policies and, in effect, which institution should control the other. It has been an unfortunate waste of the nation’s time.

Other countries have courts, parliaments and armies but because of a strong commitment to the rule of law, they do not flounder from one constitutional crisis into another. In Pakistan however, elections have become synonymous with a change in the political system and the electoral process of 2002 was no exception.

Consequently, it is no surprise that the birth of this parliament comes pre-packaged with possibilities that threaten its future. There is dissatisfaction with the quantum of its powers and there is concern that it may be ineffective in view of being a “hung parliament.” A positive outcome in case of both is clouded by doubts whether the parties and legislators can muster the degree of responsibility necessary to help this parliament complete a full term of life.

To hope that this parliament, if invested with sovereign powers, can transform our society into a fuller democratic polity is as premature at this time as it was earlier. This is because parliament, which is both a repository and fulcrum of power, does not operate in a vacuum but requires for its effective functioning objective conditions, currently non-existent, in the judicial and executive branches of government. For its survival, parliament requires also a far greater measure of commitment from the legislators.

Those intellectuals agonizing over the question of oath-taking might recall that a large section of the representatives have already sworn, on more than one occasion, to serve parliament and protect the Constitution, and then worked to bring down both when they were excluded from a share in power.

The principal obstacle to the proper functioning of the parliament lies in the fact that it remains captive to special interests and privileged sections of society that use this institution to protect and promote their own interests at the expense of the rights and interests of the electorate.

The major assaults on civil liberties and personal freedoms, indeed the roots of political destabilization, are traceable to governments that possessed brute parliamentary majorities — those of Ayub Khan, Z.A. Bhutto, Ziaul Haq and the “heavy mandate” of Nawaz Sharif coming readily to mind. That two of these parliaments were sovereign supports the fear that a self-perpetuating parliament, without checks and comprised of a self-serving body of legislators, can become more dangerous than a dictatorship.

Given, however, the representative ratios in this parliament, any debate on its sovereign powers is at this point merely of academic interest. There is the immediate worry of a “hung” parliament” and the spectre of political instability arising from weak coalitions, frequent making and breaking of government. The situation is not without its brighter though, which is that fractured representation is by itself not necessarily a cause of instability.

For example, Italy has continued to prosper despite experiencing more than fifty governments in the past fifty years. In India, the minority-represented BJP has led multi-party coalition governments thrice since 1998 and a preponderance of coalition governments does not seem to have politically weakened Israel.

But in these countries, and other democracies, coalitions are not politically destabilizing because their constitutions, political systems and basic laws are settled issues that cannot be changed by extra-constitutional means, nor is it conceivable for their armed forces to abrogate the constitution. These conditions of course do not prevail in Pakistan and, therefore, a collapse of government that elsewhere would result, at worst, in early elections here take the shape of a constitutional crisis that may lead to power vacuum and inevitably to a military intervention.

Even if by a quirk of circumstances these factors suddenly turned favourably, in this parliament the working of a coalition government will be hampered by the sharp differences among the parties regarding the LFO (Legal Framework Order). This is compounded by disagreement in major areas of foreign policy, concerning relations with India and cooperation in the US-led war against terrorism, basic laws covering the economy (the issue of riba) and critical areas of governance relating to the spread of religious extremism. Considering that in Pakistan foreign policy impinges on the management of the economy and matters of internal governance have a correspondingly high effect on foreign relations, this cyclical interdependence can be used by any of the parties to disrupt the government.

Other problem areas for the would-be coalition governments arise from the inclination of the component parties neither to share power nor to sit in opposition with a sense of commitment. Not even the clear majority of an incumbent government has a deterrent effect on its opponents, in or out of parliament, as witnessed in the “horse-trading” sagas, involving switching of sides by scores of legislators, motivated solely by desire for power or revenge, during the revolving Bhutto and Sharif governments of the early ‘1990s.

There is also the proclivity of the parties not to accept election results with good grace when they find themselves in the opposition. Ms Bhutto had already said that the elections were rigged to keep the PPP out of power. The MMA, with only 15 per cent of the seats in the house and 11 per cent of the popular vote, insists it will “not let any one stop it from implementing the agenda for which (it) has received a mandate.”

Smooth functioning of the new parliament also depends greatly on how it connects with the judiciary. The legislators are already in a state of discomfort because of the several judgments favouring the military regime during the past three years and their vulnerability to disqualification, through the new electoral laws, indicates that these relations will remain uneasy. Similarly, in the area of accountability, the largest party in parliament happens to be a sanctuary for many who might otherwise be facing prosecution, giving rise to apprehension that parliament’s interest in this vital area of governance will be less than enthusiastic.

Also, what the parties and combinations bidding for power would do once in power is perhaps best exemplified by the candidates proposed for prime ministership. Without exception, the nominations reflect an acute insensitivity to the prevailing external and internal realities, as though Pakistan somehow revolves on an axis different from that of the rest of the globe. The candidates represent feudalism, status quoism, religious intolerance, disrespect for the law, and preference for isolationism that are a throwback to the past that this country desperately needs to break away from.

The upshot of it all is to argue that investing parliament with sovereign powers is as important as its commitment to norms and principles of parliamentary democracy. Parliament’s strength does not arise from constitutional provisions, but from its own usefulness and efficacy. Where parliament responds to and serves the needs of the electorate, it is able through moral integrity and the support of the people to ensure respect for its writs by all other institutions of the state.

The leadership to bring about such a change in political culture must come from parliament itself and, although the immediate prospects may not appear to be very encouraging, there is still reason for hope. “An institution,” wrote Ralph Waldo Emerson, “is but the lengthy shadow of one man.” How the new parliament develops will be shaped largely by whoever is the leader of the house. He or she can choose to dissipate the parliament’s energies in debates questioning the legitimacy under which it functions or in attempts to retrieve those of its powers that have been abridged by the LFO. Or he can choose the path of pragmatism, accepting that there is no magic wand by which this fractured assembly can help transform society or, given the intellectual and moral limitations of the representatives, propose policies better than the existing ones to solve the serious internal and external problems facing the country. Similarly, Gen Musharraf has the choice of taking the institution of the presidency in a positive or negative direction.

There is little point to debating whether the system envisaged under the LFO is workable or not. It is not. It is a self-serving amalgam, born out of force of circumstances, and should be treated at best as an unavoidable transitory arrangement.

The larger national interest lies in ensuring that the new parliament and government become accountable during their incumbency, that their valid efforts to bring other state institutions to account are not hindered and that this parliament, no matter how many governments are made and broken, lasts out a full term. If General Musharraf of and the prime minister together can effect a constitutional transfer of power from this parliament to the next, it will be an important milestone in the transition to democracy.

THE recent visit of President Jiang Zemin to the US en route to Mexico for participation in the APEC summit presented Chinese pragmatism at its best. So extensive was the area of convergence between the two countries that the New York Times carried an article on October 25 with the title “Has China Become an Ally?”

Considering that when the Bush administration assumed office, it had declared China to be a “strategic competitor”, the signs of cooperation in almost all spheres represent a remarkable transformation. China has worked closely with the US in the global campaign against terrorism, it is backing efforts to enforce UN resolutions on Iraq, has adopted stringent regulations on the export of dual-use technology exports and other proliferation issues and is ready to cooperate with the US on North Korea. The US has responded by supporting China’s entry into the WTO, and recently put a key group in China’s Xinjiang province on its terrorism list. President Bush demonstrated personal warmth when he hosted President Jiang at his ranch in Texas.

That China has muted its well-known objections to the assertive Bush policies represented in the Nuclear Posture Review, and the Bush Doctrine of pre-emption represents its resolve to safeguard its economic interests that are served by trade and investment from the US. Despite the frequently provocative rhetoric from the Bush team, China has eschewed declaratory reactions, and maintained a pragmatic stance, availing opportunities for strategic cooperation with the US with great skill. In this, the central place has been occupied by cooperation in counter-terrorism, which has been the central focus of US foreign policy since September 11, 2001.

Another key element introduced into China’s post-1978 posture has been that the championing of communist ideology has been abandoned. While retaining the leadership role of the party within the country, China has clearly abandoned any role in advancing the cause of socialist ideology, and thereby removed western concerns about the challenge that existed during the cold war years. The emphasis has been on adopting the successful western techniques of management and decentralization, which, together with advanced technologies, have brought about the economic miracles of the second half of the twentieth century. The central objectives of the modernization drive, which is the top priority for China in the post-Mao phase, are being achieved by “opening to the outside world.”

The current period, that will witness the induction of the “fourth generation” of leadership, requires additional care in the handling of China’s international relationships, in which its equation with the “unique superpower” occupies a central place. Since the demise of Mao Zedong, China has set its priorities consistently in a manner that enables the pursuit of its goals of modernization that require at least half a century of uninterrupted progress.

The quarter of a century of uninterrupted progress through the pragmatic policies introduced by Deng Xiaoping has given China a sense of confidence, and it is now accepted as a major actor in the international arena. Without any declaratory announcements, China seeks to demonstrate its adherence to a moderate and peace-loving approach, in which principles, such as those of the UN Charter and Panchsheel prevail.

The lessons of China’s own past since the Revolution of 1949 are that Mao’s ideological experiments of the Great Leap Forward, between 1958 and 1961, and the cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976, put China back, and it was the pragmatism of Premier Zhou Enlai that had steadied the ship of state that was exposed to perils of epic proportions as a result of these experiments of the “great helmsman”. China’s march towards greatness started after Deng Xiaoping introduced the policy of “opening to the outside world” that, together with the policies of economic reform and modernization that served to harness the traditional Chinese gifts for hard work and enterprise to transform China into a modern and prosperous country.

The convergence of perceptions seen during the latest visit of President Jiang to the US reflects a new set of realities that have emerged very recently. Among these, the revelation that North Korea has a uranium enrichment programme of its own has confronted the US with a serious dilemma. Though the military superiority of the US is overwhelming, it cannot launch threats of the kind it has directed towards Iraq.

With some 40,000 US troops deployed in South Korea, the US cannot risk a conflict that could cause heavy losses, including those of its own military forces. In the quest for diplomatic leverage to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear programme, the support of China is of immense importance. President Jiang’s statement that China had always favoured the view that the “Korean peninsula should be nuclear weapons free” was welcomed by the US.

It suited President Jiang to underline areas of convergence with the US as the process of the transfer of power to his chosen successor begins with the shift of Party leadership before the end of 2002, to be followed by the end of his Presidential term next March. As the Bush administration adopted an assertive posture, and identified China as a possible target of pre-emption, he skilfully adopted a nuanced and pragmatic approach, to take advantage of opportunities for strategic cooperation with the US.

While the tenor of Sino-US relations has been improved through deliberate Chinese initiatives to stress the areas of convergence, there remain many significant issues over which the strategic and political perceptions of Washington and Beijing diverge. It would be premature to conclude that the Sino-US relationship has stabilized. Even in areas where they are cooperating, such as counter-terrorism, China has reservations about the US tactics.

If the US were to attack Iraq without the mandate of the United Nations, Beijing would be seriously perturbed. The effects of a war and occupation would undermine governments in the Islamic countries extending from the Middle East to the Far East. China’s economic growth would also be affected by the high prices of energy that would result from such a US policy.

China has worries about long-range US policies, ranging from Ballistic Missile Defence, to its vastly increased military strategic posture all around China’s periphery. Acting in the name of counter-terrorism, the US has established its military presence in Central Asia, and Afghanistan, apart from entering into strategic military cooperation with India, and even Russia. Furthermore, conservative segments of the Republican Party in the US continue to be critical of warm ties with China, which is seen as a potential threat to US primacy and interests.

Within China, long-term US goals in its region are viewed with growing concern, notably with regard to Taiwan, to which both military sales and political support have been increased under Bush. The adoption of pre-emption as the core strategic doctrine by Bush cannot but be a further irritant. Though lip-service is paid to the concept of one China, the US considers the maintenance of Taiwan’s autonomy, and security as crucial to its interests, and the liberal arms transfers to Taiwan have led to an escalating arms race across the Taiwan Strait. President Bush had declared after his election that he will do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan.

The extension of the concept of Theatre Missile Defence to Taiwan is strongly resented in Beijing, as is the support extended to Tibetan irredentism. The gratuitous criticism of the human rights situation within China by all and sundry in the US is seen as unwarranted, specially after the excesses within the US that have grown since the 9/11 events.

In summing up the parameters of the evolving relationship between the world’s “hyperpower”, and the Asian giant whose total GDP may exceed that of the US in two decades, the existing mix of “engagement” and “containment” will undoubtedly continue. China sets special store by the economic benefits of a cordial relationship, since modernization goals will continue to be the main priority for several decades. The US is also cognizant of China’s role in the war against terror, and in fostering peace in the Korean peninsula.

China will not compromise over its goal of reunification with Taiwan, nor will it tolerate interference into its internal affairs, whether it is over Tibet, or human rights. However, China will maintain a low profile, and pursue its goals of fostering a peaceful and multipolar world order, without provoking a confrontation with the US.

It will also maintain its opposition to hegemony, whether regional or global. It can also be expected to continue its identification with the developing countries in their quest for a more just political and economic order. The all-weather relationship between China and Pakistan can be expected to remain on course, as it serves the national interests of both countries.

THE allocation of female seats in the legislatures was a commendable step for the promotion of female representation in the political system of the country.

The crisis of female representation came to the fore after the provision of the reserved seats in the national and provincial assemblies under the 1973 Constitution expired after the 1988 elections.

The securing of the reserve seats will have a positive impact on the promotion of female rights in society. The election of a number of female candidates on general seats from the remote areas to the national and provincial assemblies indicate that the society would be more accommodative of their role as representatives in future.

The lack of women representation in the assemblies reflected on the political system. The women who constitute around 41 per cent of the total eligible voters had below 0.5 per cent representation in the electoral system. Despite their sizable vote bank which increased during the five previsions elections, the women had a negligible representation in the legislatures.

It became apparent after the 1988 elections when the provision for special seats for women in the national and provincial assemblies expired. A need then arose for making legislation to restore the female seats in the assemblies but no consensus could be reached on the issue between the two leading political parties — the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).

This would not have been difficult if they had agreed to do so. A two-thirds majority was required for the legislation to restore female seats but nothing was done. In the wake of 1996 elections, when the PML-N secured a landslide victory and got rid of the 8th Amendment, it showed little interest in the issue of the restoration of female seats.

The Pakistani political system has always been marred by the crisis of participation and representation. Having been under martial law for much of its existence, the country finds a specific class of ruling elite whenever a democratic order was allowed.

A class of society, comprising feudals, the moneyed people and the industrialists had been in power and in opposition. A large section of society seemed unable to be elected to the assemblies on a party or individual basis. In wider political analysis such an inadequate representation under an elected system cannot ensure the promotion of women’s rights in society.

In addition to that male chauvinism in an entrenched tribal and rural social system was a major handicap for women to contest the elections. Those who supported female representation believed that women’s rights under a democratic system can be better secured if they are allowed a separate electoral or reserved seats system.

In the past political parties gaining strength on ideological or ethnic grounds, such as Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-i-Ulema Islam, Balochistan National Movement, Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party and even Mohajir Qaumi Movement hardly allotted a seat or two for female contestants.

They supported the doctrine of lower and middle class people participation and raised their voice in support of female rights but in practice did not nominate female candidates in elections. The ratio of women elected on their party seats was below one per cent. While the ratio of women’s votes in favour of the parties’ candidates was fairly high.

The writer is professor of political science at Balochistan University, Quetta.

Morocco is very reasonable about the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla which Spain has controlled for over four centuries (although it says it would like them back eventually).

France never quibbles about the Channel Islands, which have been under English control for almost a thousand years, although they are just off the French coast. Canada raises no claim to the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon off the coast of Newfoundland: for Ottawa, the Treaty of Paris in 1763 settled that question once and for all.

So why is Madrid so obsessed about getting back the British enclave of Gibraltar, a barren peninsula on Spain’s southern coast that was ceded to Britain in perpetuity by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713? And why is the British Foreign Office determined to push the 30,000 residents of Gibraltar, whose only wish is to remain British, into a ‘shared sovereignty’ arrangement with Spain?

The last time Gibraltarians were asked to vote on a closer relationship with Spain, in 1967, over 12,000 voted ‘no’ and only 44 voted ‘yes’, so they are understandably unhappy about the current Anglo-Spanish talks on the Rock. Excluded from the negotiations because he wanted the right of veto, the elected chief minister of Gibraltar, Peter Caruana, has called a referendum for 7 November. The question is: “Do you agree that Britain and Spain should share sovereignty over Gibraltar?” The answer will again be an overwhelming ‘no’.

Officially, that will make no difference, for the British government says it will not recognise any referendum that it does not call and run itself. Caruana’s referendum is an attempt to sabotage the talks by demonstrating the total opposition of Gibraltarians to the whole idea of shared sovereignty, whose result, he says, would be “to curtail our rights, to legitimise the Spanish sovereignty claim and, in effect, to say to us ‘sooner or later you are going to have to be Spanish — if you don’t want it to be now it’s up to you to choose the timing in the future’.”

It is much the same deal that the British government was preparing to impose on the people of the Falkland Islands before the Argentine generals jumped the gun with their 1982 invasion, and thereby forced a reluctant British government to accept continuing responsibility for the welfare and defence of the Falklanders into the 21st century.

Britain has been off-loading its former imperial possessions with a cynical disregard for the views of the local inhabitants for decades. But the Gibraltarians know a bit about public relations, and they are fighting back.

Spain today is a prosperous and fully democratic country that has left the era of civil wars and dictatorship far behind, and Spanish citizenship has exactly the same value as British citizenship within the European Union. Britain no longer runs an empire, so Gibraltar has no strategic value for London.

A deal on shared sovereignty would end the petty harassment that Spanish governments have inflicted on Gibraltar’s residents since the dictator Franco first made it a major nationalist issue, and might even lead to increased prosperity for Gibraltar in the long run.

In other words, there is nothing vital at stake in the deal being cooked up by Britain and Spain. The Gibraltarians, for purely sentimental reasons, want to remain British, but why should the views of a mere 30,000 people take precedence over the desire of the British and Spanish governments to tidy up their relationship in these post-modern, globalised times? There is no rational reason, and yet it feels all wrong.

It feels wrong because the Spanish really are trying to have it both ways. They insist on the return of a rocky peninsula on their south coast that Britain acquired by treaty almost 300 years ago, but they flatly refuse to discuss the return of two almost identical enclaves on the north coast of Morocco that Spain acquired by treaty over 400 years ago. (Morocco, of course, says that if Spain gets Gibraltar, it wants Ceuta and Melilla back at the same time.)

—Copyright

LAST week, the brutal war in Chechnya reached a new nadir of barbarity when Chechen fighters seized 700 hostages in a Moscow theatre. Bungled efforts by Russian security forces to gas the attackers caused the deaths of 118 hostages. Fifty unconscious Chechens were summarily executed.

Russia has come under heavy international criticism for using a modified anaesthetic, Fentanyl, mixed some other still unknown agent, against the assailants. Yet Russian security forces were right to use an opiate gas in a hostage-taking where the attackers were ready to detonate powerful explosives and kill all 700 captives. Tragically, the operation was badly executed. Worse, security forces refused to tell hospitals what gas they had used.

One fascinating reason for trying to keep the nature of the gas secret: In 1988, a C-130 carrying President Ziaul Haq was sabotaged by a still mysterious gas. The aircraft went out of control and crashed, killing Zia — who was primarily responsible for defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan — and most of his senior generals.

The Soviet KGB, which often employed chemical weapons, remains the prime suspect in the assassination, which was quickly covered up by the US and Pakistani governments. The same potent Fentanyl derivative may have been used to quickly render the air crew and passengers unconscious.

There can be no excuse for taking civilians hostage. The Moscow outrage was an act of terrorism, as Russia insists. But it was a smaller act of terror within a greater one: Moscow’s ongoing war to crush the Chechen independence movement, an inconvenient cause ignored by the outside world. The hostage-taking in Moscow was a desperate act by desperate people without voice or hope.

Chechen, a Muslim people of the Caucasus mountains, have fiercely battled Russian occupation for 300 years. In hidden genocide during the 1940s, Stalin had thousands of Chechen shot and 500,000 (half the population) sent in cattle cars to frigid Central Asian concentration camps, where 25 per cent died.

The survivors of Stalin’s gulag filtered back to Chechnya in the 1960s.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Chechen, led by Gen. Jhokar Dudayev, declared independence. While Moscow allowed other republics independence, Chechen were denied freedom because of important oil pipelines that ran through their territory and the Kremlin fears that other Muslim peoples of the Caucasus would seek independence.

In 1994, Boris Yeltsin ordered an invasion of breakaway Chechnya. Much of the cost of the war was financed by the United States, which sought to support Yeltsin against his domestic political enemies. President Bill Clinton even called Yeltsin, who was slaughtering Chechen in vast numbers, ‘Russia’s Abraham Lincoln.’

In a near military miracle, lightly-armed Chechen fighters defeated and drove out the Russian army, but at appalling cost. Russia razed the Chechen capital, Grozny, and killed an estimated 100,000 civilians. President Dudayev was assassinated by the Russians, thanks to secret electronic equipment supplied to the KGB by the US.

In 1996, Russia granted Chechnya de facto recognition and promised a referendum within five years to decide its future. Chechnya seemed free. But in 1999, in an eerie harbinger of the 9/11 attacks on the US, a series of mysterious explosions destroyed apartment buildings in Russia, killing 300 people. Then prime minister Vladimir Putin, a former KGB officer, blamed ‘Islamic terrorist’ Chechen ‘linked to Osama bin Laden.’ Russia was swept by nationalist fury and anti-Chechen hatred.

When an FSB (formerly KGB) team was caught planting bombs in another building, and a KGB officer blamed the bombings on the war party in Moscow, the news was hushed up. Putin became president, almost by acclaim, and promptly ordered another invasion of Chechnya.

In the Second Chechen War, 60,000 civilians have so far died in Russian shelling and bombing, according to Chechen sources; 170,000-are refugees. The tiny nation has been shattered, covered with mines, and turned into a nightmare free-fire zone for 80,000 ill-disciplined, often drunken Russian soldiers and interior ministry troops, who are paid special monthly bonuses to fight in Chechnya.

In spite of massive firepower, including devastating fuel air explosives and carpet bombing, Russian forces have failed to crush small bands of fierce Chechen mujahideen. In mass roundups called ‘zachistki,’ the Russians seize all male Chechen over 16, routinely torture and, often, execute them. International rights groups accuse Moscow of widescale murder, torture, rape, and looting. The Muslim world, watches in embarrassed silence. Malaysia and Kuwait continue to buy Russian arms.

War in Chechnya has degenerated into a savage battle of attrition, with atrocities and banditry committed by both sides. Moscow conducts its brutal operations under a blanket of secrecy.

Foreign and Russian journalists who try to report the ugly truth about this conflict are killed or silenced. Russia has lost an estimated 10,000 soldiers killed, 66 per cent of total losses in Afghanistan. The Bush administration has shamefully adopted Moscow’s propaganda line by branding the Chechen independence fighters ‘Islamic terrorists,’ the price of Kremlin support for its anti-Islamic campaign. The Kremlin now claims the hostage-taking was ‘Russia’s 9/11.’

Not so. ‘Terrorism’ is the only weapon the weak have against the mighty. Russia could end ‘terrorism’ by finally giving Chechen the independence they have long sought and richly deserve — and be well rid of this pointless bloodbath.

If America truly cared about human rights, it would be encouraging Moscow to set the Chechen free instead of turning a blind eye to what the rights group, the International Helsinki Federation, calls a second attempted genocide against this tortured, forgotten people.— Copyright Eric S. Margolis 2002