Election: geopolitical fallout
By A. R. Siddiqi
POST-ELECTION Pakistan, once again, finds itself face-to- face with a complex political and geostrategic setting portending an uncertain future. Its political challenge emerges from the badly-fractured electoral verdict, and geostrategic complexities from the presence of foreign military forces; a not- too-friendly irreconcilably anti-Taliban Afghanistan to the west, and an inimical India to the east.
Historically, election in Pakistan tended to compound internal politics and external factors to create a setting conducive to outside (military) involvement — chosen or imposed — and domestic polarization.
In the 1964-65 the general election under Ayub’s Basic Democracy system, his brazenly manipulated ‘victory’ against the Quaid’s sister, Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah, acted as one of the principal causes of the 1965 war.
Fantasizing a sure win against a then relatively poorly-trained and armed India, Ayub launched a series of disjointed operations — Rann of Kutch to Gibraltar and Grand Slam (May through August 1965) — to invite India’s naked invasion of our international borders, on Sept 6, 1965.
The first general election, on the basis of universal adult franchise under Yahya Khan in December 1970, led to the military crackdown; civil war; the Indian invasion of East Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh in the aftermath of a humiliating military defeat.
Seven years later in 1977, the general election, under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, would toll the death knell of democracy for the next 11 years, under the longest unbroken spell of martial law of Gen Ziaul Haq.
Bhutto, an undisputed winner in 1977 polls under his and his party’s own steam, had his minions resort to massive electoral malpractices to destroy the credibility of his unquestioned victory. Thus what might well have promised him another term as prime minister led to his incarceration and execution under the country’s third martial law.
That was the domestic, geopolitical dimension of the ill- fated ‘77 polls. Externally, through an uncanny combination of military rule in Pakistan and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan was unstoppably sucked into a geostrategic setting to change its political and ideological mores beyond repair.
Zia’s deep involvement in the Afghan jihad led Pakistan off its chosen course of national revival and reconstruction after the loss of East Pakistan. Rather than be master of the game at its own home turf, Pakistan turned into a pawn on the US-dominated international chess-board at the height of the cold war.
Zia’s 1985 non-party-based election saw three years of promising democratic revival under prime minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, until halted abruptly by yet another military faux pas in the shape of the Ojheri camp disaster — easily the largest ordnance depot of the US-supplied military hardware through the Afghan jihad.
Junejo’s insistence on making public the findings of the inquiry commission, blaming the military for negligence, impelled an enraged and frustrated Zia to dismiss his own hand-picked prime minister at a wink.
That was in May 1988. Barely three months later in August 1988, Zia died in an air crash, with a planeload (a C-130) of others, including the US ambassador and the military adviser.
Come the second party-based general election after 1970, in November 1988 to bring Benazir Bhutto as the chief executive. Her naive handling of the military top brass and sensitive affairs (including the nuclear programme) would lead to her ignominious dismissal some 20 months later on Aug 6, 1990.
General elections again and yet again in 1991, 1993, 1997, to bring, alternately, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto in and out of power — until Pakistan’s fourth military takeover — less martial law — on Oct 12, 1999. Army Chief Gen Pervez Musharraf elbows Nawaz Sharif out without a whimper from the public. Gen Musharraf’s bloodless coup d’etat reaffirmed the military (geopolitical / geostrategic) dynamics of political change in Pakistan.
At the end of the initial three-year phase of his rule under a Supreme Court mandate, Musharraf holds a party-based general election on a relatively restricted franchise, open to BAs only. In the political vacuum resulting from the disqualification of the chiefs of the two major parties, the PPP and the Muslim League (N), emerged a medley of political groups and coalitions still untested and largely uninitiated into the complexities of statecraft.
While the political background and activism of the Muttahida Majlis-i- Amal (MMA) remains beyond question, their familiarity with the actual conduct of civil-military affairs at national / international levels lacks the practical touch born only after years of actual experience.
In the complex geopolitical and geostrategic environment Pakistan finds itself at present, the smallest error of judgment and misstep could at once land us in a big mess.
The MMA’s commitment to Islamic ideology is one thing — for that is a shared national commitment — but their zeal to enforce it anytime too soon is quite another. Internally, that would be specially relevant in terms of enforcement of the Shariat code (legal, penal and social) and externally in the context of Pakistan’s role as a ‘key’ ally in the US global war against terrorism.
Even if the Musharraf regime might have gone too far in its almost unqualified support of America by way of lending it crucial logistics support, there is no immediate turning one’s back on that. Such a rollback or about-turn would be conceivable only at the cost of America’s friendship, no matter how expedient, opportunistic and overwhelmingly in its own national interest.
Infinitely more damaging than the erosion of America’s goodwill would be the Indian gains resulting from our alienation from America. Unfortunate but true.
Balochistan and the NWFP, closest to Afghanistan territorially, ethnically and culturally, have emerged as the two political strongholds of the MMA. That is regardless of their ability and opportunity to form part of (or even head) a federal coalition.
The Afghan reaction to the likely formation of governments by dominant religious groups (mainly MMA) in the two provinces has not been too good. The Taliban fear stays as the most dominant psychological fear or aberration of the Afghan mindset. And anything rubbing it up the wrong way could be fraught with far-reaching consequences.
After Islamabad vis-a-vis India, therefore, much of the weight of the geostrategic fallout of the election would have to be borne by Peshawar and Quetta vis-a-vis Afghanistan.
The writer is a retired brigadier.

