THE electoral performance of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Action Committee, MMA) shows that three proverbial factors of Pakistan politics — Allah, America, and the Army — continue to be relevant to the political process. The MMA comprises six Islamic political parties that have sidelined their religious-sectarian differences, at least temporarily, to work together for pursuing a shared political agenda.

These include the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam of Maulana Fazlur Rahman (JUI-F), the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam of Maulana Samiul Haq (JUI-S), the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) led by Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan of Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani (JUP-N), Jamiat Ahle Hadith of Professor Sajid Mir (JAH-S), and the Tehrik-i-Jafria Pakistan (TJP) headed by Maulana Syed Sajid Naqvi.

The two factions of the JUI are the followers of the Deoband school and have a strong following in the Pakhtoon areas of the NWFP and Balochistan. Both had strong links with the Taliban movement and supported their cause. The JI does not limit itself to a particular school of Islamic fiqh but it has been a supporter of the Taliban and Jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The JAH(S) pursues the Ahle-Hadith (Hadees) school (“maslak”) of Islamic Fiqh. The JUP(N) is the follower of the Barelvi school which disagrees with the other two schools on a number of issues. It was not involved with the Taliban or the insurgency in Kashmir. The TJP follows the Jafria (Shia) fiqh and stayed away from Afghanistan and Kashmir.

Despite sectarian-denominational differences, they decided to work together to advocate an Islamic alternative to the existing politico-economic arrangements, underlining the supremacy of the Quran and the Sunnah. Though they emphasized supremacy of “Allah” in their election campaign, Pakhtoon ethnicity influenced their electoral performance. The two factions of the JUI enjoyed support mainly amongst the Pakhtoons (Pashtun) in the NWFP and Balochistan. Their electoral performance in these areas is mainly responsible for the MMA’s electoral triumph. The JI chief is also a Pakhtoon but that party’s support cuts across denominational differences and ethnicities.

However, the JI is not in a position to pull through an electoral triumph all by itself. The support base of the JUP(N) is limited to the followers of its leader in Sindh and Punjab. The JAH(S) and the TJP do not have any known strongholds and they played a symbolic role in the MMA campaigning by showing unity across the sectarian divide. Some strains exist between the MMA leadership and Professor Sajid Mir of the JAH, which are expected to sharpen with the passage of time.

The MMA electioneering in the NWFP and Balochistan was at two levels. At one level, its leaders and candidates focused on constituency-specific issues. Like elsewhere in Pakistan, they talked about improvement of civic amenities, construction and repair of roads and streets and development work for improving the quality of life for the ordinary folks. They promised to work for increasing job opportunities, schooling for children and ending corruption in government. They also vowed to make the administration more responsive to the needs of the people.

The second level of electioneering emphasized broader themes with strong ideological overtones. This included a sharp critique of Pakistan’s socio-political and economic order and projection of an Islamic alternative. They talked of the primacy of the Quran and the Sunnah and demanded the restructuring of the socio-political and economic order on the basis of Islamic principles. However, they did not offer any detailed plan of the Islamic order they wanted to introduce. No specific solutions were offered for any constitutional, administrative, economic or legal problem.

America figured prominently in their election campaigning. The major focus was the US military operation in Afghanistan and its consequences for Pakhtoons on both sides of the Durand Line. The JUI was the major supporter of the Taliban and its leaders launched street agitation after the US began air raids in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. This effort fizzled out because other political forces did not join in. Some of the JUI and JI leaders were arrested and placed under “house arrest” for a couple of months. Anti-American sentiments intensified when dead and injured Pakistani Pakhtoons or their Afghan relatives were brought to the NWFP and Balochistan. The arrest and killing of Taliban armed personnel by the Northern Alliance after the fall of Kabul perturbed them the most because a good number of them were Pakistani volunteers who had gone to Afghanistan to fight on the side of the Taliban. Some Pakistanis are still in detention in Afghanistan and at the US military base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.

The neglect of the reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan by the US convinced them that Washington was interested mainly in dislodging the Taliban and Al Qaeda and that it had no sympathy for ordinary people who suffered a lot in the American air and ground operations. Another factor that contributed to anti-American sentiments was the rise of the Northern Alliance with American support, which was blamed for deaths of a large number of the Taliban and other Pakhtoon prisoners in its custody. The over-representation of the Northern Alliance in the present-day Afghanistan government is another Pakhtoon grievance.

All these factors strengthened anti-American sentiments which were widely shared in the NWFP and Balochistan. The MMA understood the ground realities in the two provinces and successfully articulated anti-America sentiments amongst the Pakhtoons there. Most Pakhtoon secularists and nationalists lost badly in both provinces because they had either supported American action in Afghanistan or stayed neutral on this. Commenting on the extremely poor performance of the ANP, a leader of MMA remarked that they lost for siding with the aggressor — the US.

It is interesting to note that foreign policy issues, including US action in Afghanistan, did not figure prominently in Punjab and Sindh. Some candidates did make comments on security and foreign policy issues but the election campaign focused primarily on constituency-related issues like how far the candidate would work for the welfare of the people and improve civic amenities for the community. The main reason was that these two provinces were not directly affected by American military operations in Afghanistan or by the predicament of the Afghans in the post-Taliban Afghanistan.

The third important element of Pakistan politics, the Army, figured in the election campaign of the MMA. The military regime of General Pervez Musharraf was subjected to sharp criticism for “betraying” the Taliban and for facilitating American military operations in Afghanistan. The military regime was also criticized for letting American military and FBI personnel function in Pakistan. Their resentment against the military government made them vocal champions of democracy and participatory governance. They talked of constitutionalism, fair and free elections, and return of military to the barracks. Rejecting the amendments made by the military government in the 1973 Constitution, they demanded its restoration minus these amendments. They highlighted their electoral performance to distinguish themselves from the Taliban, arguing that they appeared on the political scene though the ballot, not by the bullet, and therefore, they believed in dialogue and persuasion for implementation of their political agenda, including Islamization of the polity.

Though the three leading factors of Pakistani politics — Allah, America, and the Army — promoted unity amongst the MMA partners and facilitated their electoral triumph, these factors might undermine internal cohesion and good governance after the MMA assumes power in the NWFP and Balochistan. The MMA will have to tone down its rhetoric on Islamization and relations with the US and adopt a down-to-earth approach towards domestic affairs, especially the army, and foreign policy. They may also have to accommodate some non-MMA elements for smooth functioning of their governments. This is likely to force them to dilute their domestic agenda. A failure to do so may entangle them in so many political controversies and confrontations that they will find it difficult to pursue their domestic and foreign policy agendas.

WITH the elected leaders to come into office within weeks and face the economic problems to appease their anxious voters, the exasperating issue of the large non-performing loans of banks has come to the fore again.

The governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, Dr. Ishrat Husain, says that non-performing loans as on June 30, 2002, stood at Rs 259 billion. The principal sum lent by the banks out of that was barely one-third. The rest of the amount is the result of the accumulation of high interest rates or compound interest, which however have been coming down in recent years following public clamour and a new realistic official policy.

Since the caretaker government of Moeen Qureshi came up with the disclosure of a loan default of Rs 80 billion on outstanding loans above Rs one million for over one year, the amount has been rising. New loans went into default in a failing or faltering economy.

Since the issue of loan default was disclosed in Pakistan, and it become a major public issue, with many rich countries in the West and East Asia experiencing very large defaults. Germany and France have been affected, apart from Latin America where Brazil and Argentina have been hit the most. And Japan has an incredibly large portfolio of non-performing loans worth some 1,900 billion dollars. China too suffers from this malady with most of its public sector companies among the culprits.

If in Pakistan non-performing loans have snow-balled mainly because of high interest rates, to reach Rs 259 billion now, Japan provides the classic case of a country with no or very low interest rates for deposits as well as lending. If instead Japan had Pakistan’s very high interest rates its total default would have been too giddy.

Since the debate on the abolition of interest in the name of Islam began 15 years ago in Pakistan Japan was quoted as a unique case of a non-Muslim country which had almost done away with interest rate both at the deposit and lending level in practice. And we were advised to follow such a model instead of having a high interest rate in practice in the name of mark-up after formally abolishing interest.

But now we see that doing away with interest in practice does not eliminate or block the loan default problem. The solution lies in good or wholesome banking, which is far-sighted as well, unlike in what the West calls Japan’s “bubble economy”.

Of course, what we in Pakistan tried was a two-tier system: raising foreign loans on the basis of interest and local loans on the basis of mark-up or technical profit, but at a far higher rate than the normal interest rate which was 14 per cent before formal abolition of interest.

But when due to a combination of economic and political factors 3,000 to 4,000 industrial units close down and the number rises to 6,000, as reported now, the loan default has to be very expensive.

The public sector banks have been facing a double disadvantage: nationalization with all its abuses, and high interest rates to cover their weaknesses. Both led to an increase in the loan default which went on soaring. Moeen Qureshi’s solution was to raise the interest rate to 22 per cent officially plus one per cent tax. That meant the borrowers had to pay 25 to 30 per cent in real terms depending on their financial status. The result was the snow-balling of the default.

While the steady accumulation of such default is now sought to be prevented through reduction of interest rates, the other solution sought is privatization of banks. After the earlier sale of Muslim Commercial Bank, Allied Bank and Bankers Equity, the United Bank, the third largest bank in Pakistan, has now been sold to the Abu Dhabi Group. And Habib Bank is now on the auction block.

Finance minister Shaukat Aziz says all the public sector banks would be privatized by the middle of next year. Does that include the National Bank of Pakistan as well, which was to continue as an official bank after 10 per cent of its shares were sold to the small investors?

Banks can suffer varied abuses if they continue under the control of the government, particularly with too many political parties in the government in view of our bad traditions in the area of patronage lending. The political ministers can direct the banks under them to give large loans to their supporters, friends and family members. They can make the loans to be given on very favourable terms and on low interest in a country with high interest rates.

Political favourites can be appointed as bank chiefs or as senior officers. They can also be promoted or given plush foreign assignments. And recovery of loans could be slowed down, or the loans written-off or scaled down.

Officials in the ministry of finance love to keep the banks under them. They can head such banks after their retirement from the government and then move from one bank to another and acquire a reputation as banking experts. Such unfair practices can be prevented if the banks are privatized quickly.

The government can also borrow from banks at concessional rates if they are under its control, especially in times of financial difficulties, and thereby increase the budget deficit and enlarge the national debt. The government may also be forced to invest large sums in such banks to improve their capital base or increase their liquidity. The people may then have to pay more as taxes to make up for such investments. Under pressure from the World Bank the government had to invest large sums in Habib Bank and United Bank to improve their capital base. Critics of the privatization of UBL point out that the government had invested Rs 32 billion in the bank before and then sold it for a mere Rs 12 billion. But without such investment the Bank might have folded earlier and the depositors might have lost heavily. Or the Bank would have been sold at a negative value as the public sector units were sold in East Germany after the fall of communism.

But privatization alone is not the solution to the problem. The examples of Allied Bank, which was misused by its senior officials after privatization, and Bankers Equity are before us. So are instances of some small private sector banks which came up after 1991 and then folded after gross misuse of their resources by their top management. So the State Bank of Pakistan is strengthening its vigilance of the banks and enforcing the prudential regulations more actively. And it is extending its vigilance to micro-credit institutions as well and has raised their capital requirement to Rs 500 million.

Shaukat Aziz says the problem in the financial sector is fragmentation or proliferation of small financial institutions. Too many small modarabas, very many leasing companies, and investment or other banks crowd the market with small capital and often with poor management which is also too costly. He wants them to merge and become stronger. With that end in view the State Bank has been stipulating a larger capital base for such institutions.

The problem which the banks and the country face in this regard is two-fold: recovering defaulted loans and providing new loans for investment and industrial expansion. The same families which are in default in respect of some loans have to be helped to set up more units to provide employment and increase production. In recent times it so happened that if a member of a family defaulted on repaying a loan the whole family business was made to suffer. Or if a person with a loan defaulted in one company out of six companies the other five companies too could not get new loans. Such blanket boycott of lending cannot continue without doing serious damage to the economy.

The country cannot, within a short period of time, create a large new set of investors or entrepreneurs. Nor can it rely on foreign investors to do all the major investing. The Pakistani investors have to lead the way for others and wherever possible become co-investors with foreign partners who find a shortage of suitable local partners. The newly elected leaders are talking of self-reliance in the economic sector. Self-reliance begins with making investment and producing the things that we import now and creating new wealth to replace the foreign aid we are seeking.

To achieve that the new leaders have to reach out to the possible new investors and encourage the newcomers. And that has to be done on a priority basis now as that is how new jobs can be created.

The Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and its affiliated chambers have to play a dynamic role in this area instead of only seeking more and more concessions from the government and doing little more thereafter. This is the time for business dynamism after many of the businessmen had dragged their feet for long and virtually perpetuated the economic stagnation.

Under the initiative of the State Bank the banks have to come up with well secured loans at reduced interest rates. And the banks can’t afford to be too slow in doing that. But the banks report that while the government had provided for private sector borrowing of Rs 94.7 billion for the current financial year the off-take of loans by that sector is too slow. The banks maintain that borrowing in the first quarter of this year was Rs 26 billion and in the current month it may not go beyond Rs 6 to 8 billion owing to economic sluggishness and the reluctance of investors to take undue risks in an uncertain economic climate.

That means the government, the banks and the investors have to work together to produce a better investment climate. Foreign direct investment is reported to have increased by 146 per cent in the last quarter over the previous quarter. That is a welcome development, but that has to be sustained and augmented by domestic investors.

The State Bank has come up with a scheme to help the sick mills pay off their defaulted loans within three years through agreements with the banks after making a down payment of 10 per cent of the defaulted amount. The agreements would cover write-off of the loans partially at the end of the three-year period but the agreements have to be honoured in full by the borrowers.

The Central Board of Revenue too is coming up with tax concessions for the revival of the sick industries to restore their financial health. These are good moves, but far more remains to be done. The new leadership should be making such moves.

ONE of the main features of the recently concluded elections in Pakistan was the sweeping electoral victory of the alliance of six religious parties (Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal) in two of the country’s four provinces. The victory of the religious parties in the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan, and to a lesser degree in the other two provinces of Punjab and Sindh, was not only a rejection of the secular political parties. It was also a direct consequence of the events that have unfolded since the fateful day of September 11, 2001.

Both the NWFP and Balochistan share a common border with Afghanistan. Their people share a common linguistic and cultural tradition. After the events of September 11 and the US-led war against terrorism that destroyed Afghanistan, the once porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been sealed by Pakistan. But the sympathies of the people inhabiting the Pakistan side of the border for their unfortunate kin on the other side has grown. And so has the antagonism towards the United States and the western world that is associated with it.

There is no doubt that the weakness of the two largest national parties, the Pakistan People’s Party headed by Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan Muslim League headed by Nawaz Sharif, contributed to the rise of the Islamic parties in the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan. Both these parties and their leaders have themselves to blame for their plight. During their respective periods of governance both undermined democratic institutions. When President Pervez Musharraf removed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999 his action was widely welcomed. Apart from allegations of phenomenal corruption involving his family and friends, Nawaz Sharif also undermined the judiciary by confronting the Supreme Court and sacking its Chief Justice.

While the two national parties had little to offer the people by virtue of their past sins, they were further debilitated by the actions of President Musharraf. The president played upon the soiled reputation of the two former prime ministers to find means of excluding them from the general elections. He passed a law that prohibited people convicted of crimes from contesting elections. He also passed another law that prevented any person elected prime minister on two occasions from entering parliament. As Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had each been prime minister on two occasions they fell within the category of persons ineligible to enter parliament. Further, as both these leaders are in exile, they lost much of their political clout. Both the PPP and the PML splintered into several factions with some of them extending support to the president.

The religious parties that formed the MMA do not have a track record of governance in Pakistan or the two provinces in which they won a majority of seats. Previously when they contested as separate parties they won only a handful of seats in the parliament. The reason why North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan fell to the MMA is primarily because of the September 11 and Afghanistan factors. The strong anti-US and anti-West sentiment in the NWFP and Balochistan gave the MMA the necessary boost to overtake their secular rivals, a feat they failed to achieve in Punjab and Sindh.

On an invitation from the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) to undertake election monitoring in Pakistan, a team of PAFFREL election monitors from Sri Lanka led by its executive director Kingsley Rodrigo and with Prof. Susirith Mendis and myself were able to get a first hand view of life and thinking of the people of Pakistan at this critical time in their history. The religious parties completely swept the polls in the Swat district to which I was sent to perform election monitoring. Two nights before the election, I met one of the two MMA parliamentary candidates for Swat, Qazi Abdul Bahis Siddiqui, a member of the central committee of the MMA and a vice-president of one of its constituent parties. The religious leader had a simple message to give.

“Pakistan was formed 55 years ago to be an Islamic state,” he said. But this had not happened. “Six religious parties had united to achieve this unfinished task. No one could stand in their way. President Musharraf was not working for Pakistanis national interest — which was to make Pakistan an Islamic state. Instead he was working for American interests. Therefore he was an enemy of Islam and of Pakistan.”

However most urban and rural people I was able to speak with did not share this very negative opinion about their president. Most thought that he was one of the very few uncorrupt leaders of their country, and that his compromises with the United States were necessary to safeguard Pakistan’s national interest.

The absurdity of what the MMA spokesmen were saying became less so in the context of some of their other observations. They inquired into the massive election monitoring effort in Pakistan that had been funded by the western nations. They asked why a similar interest in democracy was not being shown in the case of US allies, such as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states. These dictatorships were acceptable to the United States because they served the interests of the West, so there were no pro-democracy monitors going in there to do their work and criticize those governments.

Wherever I went, whether it was to government offices, to police stations, to polling stations or to villages, I was considered to be an honoured guest. I was constantly treated to cups of steaming hot tea with fresh milk, to biscuits and cake, and sometimes to meat snacks where the hosts were richer. When I asked where this tradition of hospitality had come from, an intellectual and senior lawyer from the Swat district, Sher Mohammad Khan, traced it in part to the Buddhist civilization that had once existed in the area. Traces of this peaceful and serene culture still remain, even as the great Buddhist monasteries and universities of a millennia and a half ago still remain in places such as Swat and Taxila.

Giving credence to the inherent peacefulness and tolerance of the population, the polling that took place in the Swat district on election day, and which I had come to observe, was exemplary. There was absolutely no violence or intimidation to be seen, as has too often been the case in Sri Lankan elections. The reports of other election monitors also confirmed that there was no election day violence or clashes between rival political parties, except for a handful of isolated incidents. However, this is not to give a blanket approval to the elections of October 10. The fact that President Musharraf promulgated laws that disqualified candidates for election made that aspect of the elections significantly flawed. Further, the fact that he placed severe restrictions on political mobilization, such as limiting public rallies and the use of loudspeakers until a month before the elections also deviated from a free and fair election.

However, what was more important and hopeful than the flawed framework of the elections was the people’s eagerness to participate in the political process of their society. The precincts of the polling stations were crowded with people. There was even a sense of festivity, with different political parties having their stalls right outside the polling station. While strictly speaking this was not permitted by the election law, it happened in the breach to make the elections an occasion for the community to gather together. It was not in their culture to cast their vote in secret and go their own private way, as happens in many other less communitarian countries.

In Sri Lanka it is unimaginable that rival political parties could co-exist so peaceably in a time of voting. Within the polling station the polling agents of the different parties sat side by side in a friendly manner, without one trying to chase out the others. There are lessons Sri Lanka can learn from Pakistan in implementing the law impartially and peacefully on polling day. There are also duties that Sri Lanka needs to perform as a member of the international community, and one of those is to ensure justice for the people of Afghanistan, and by so doing to stem the growing tide of extremism in the world whether it comes from South Asia or the West.

The writer was a member of the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) from Sri Lanka which monitored the October 10 polls in Pakistan

WHO in the world is Tom Friedman? But more importantly, why should the world be hanging on to each word he says? Does he really call the shots at the State Department and is the New York Times columnist considered in Washington as more influential in the “formation of foreign policy” than the “old bulls” of the establishment?

It is not exactly a revelation to anyone here that the three-time Pulitzer Prize winner (including the 2002 Pulitzer Prize for Distinguished Commentary) and author of three best-selling books is America’s icon on globalization.

But are these credentials good enough for all to look upon Friedman as God’s gift to humanity? Is his 45-minute lecture touting a $40,000 price tag really worth attending?

Is he worth driving in the rain on a damp afternoon with no place to park but the windy rooftop of the parking lot and a 40-minute dumb wait in the cold Seton Hall gymnasium stuffed with strangers and cold steel chairs?

Maybe yes. Given the forty something, slick-spoken, Jewish journalist moves seamlessly through Saudi palaces, Israeli intelligence outfits, Indian venture capitalists and American elitist power houses, hearing him in person is perhaps a must. Value added is the reality that as Pakistan’s bete noire, (just read his New York Times columns), Friedman is an unabashed Indophile and pro-Israeli.

“Stump him”, ask tough questions, a student sitting beside me advises. Pen and paper, I am ready with my question, once Tom Friedman stops rhapsodizing to the audience of mostly white, elderly couples, with a noticeable Jewish sprinkle (just as we are easily profiled, stereotyping Jews by their looks, attitude and carriage is a no-brainer).

Friedman freezes out Pakistan from his Islamic diaspora. Such lapidary dismissal epitomizes the ugly American — deleting from memory small and powerless states that the US doesn’t need any more and are therefore made invisible, non-existent for the state department.

Perverse prejudice more than anything prevents Friedman from mentioning Pakistan during his fatuous analysis of the Muslim world inhabited, according to him, by “anti-democratic leadership” and the “poverty of dignity of sitting around guys” which make them “pathologically jealous” of the United States and Israel. “These dwarfs search for towers” (Twin Towers) to bomb in expiation of their envy. What’s animated my journalism after 9/11 is the question: “Who were these 19 young men who punched a hole in the wall of civilization? To fill that hole, I really need to understand them as I don’t feel safe.”

A devoted provocateur and brilliant speaker, he employs fuzzy terms as he blames “Islamic traditions that have corrupted the world with their virus”. Muslims, he says, “think their God is 3.0 while the Christian and Judea gods are 2.0 and 1.0, respectively, who ganged up to take from the Muslim God.”

His talk is too facile to really resonate deeply.

Slapping two urgent tasks on fellow Americans, the foreign policy titan says: “Kill Osama bin Laden who is a unique combination of Charles Manson (murderer) and Jack Welch (ex-CEO of General Electric) and second, kill his ideas.”

While he cavorts with the Saudi royals, at home, Friedman obliquely advocates their overthrow: “Implement the Arab UNDP Human Development Report calling for a more open, democratic and humane governance.” Pouring scorn on Arab and Muslim leaders, he impugns them for having never challenged Osama’s ideas “because they themselves are not progressive, high achievers and visionaries.”

Diametrically opposite of his “autocratic” friends, India is glorified by him as the “second largest Muslim country” which “is a perfect example” of a billion people not wanting to blow up American interests. “There’s not a single Indian Muslim in Al Qaeda or Guantanamo Bay. Why?” The India-centric’s next sentence betrays a shallow and superficial thinking: “Because the president of India is a Muslim and so is its wealthiest man, Azim Premji.”

How disingenuous can one get? Friedman repeats himself ad nauseum. Pick up any of his weekly columns in the NYT or follow his TV talks and lectures, the little man is the greatest recycler of our times. Not to mention his bloopers and gaffes, as pointed out by a disgusted New York-based Indian journalist:

“I am pretty sure India has less Muslims than Indonesia and Pakistan if we go by official Indian census figures, so we should be the third largest. Friedman identifies the richest Muslim as the CEO of Infosys whereas Azim Premji heads Wipro. When Pulitzer Prize winning journalists get such basic facts wrong, that is why people often question their interpretation of facts and insights into Indian society or news events. Seeing him make such a blunder in such a confident and self-assured manner feels like someone has thrown cold water on your face and exposed an important facet of reality previously hidden: how such lionized media figures can make such blatant errors of fact. His India trip was a blur of faces and factoids that he had really not understood or digested all that well.”

Similarly, Friedman is reported telling a select dinner audience about an e-mail from a man in “northern Pakistan” who praised his “objectivity on Islam and Pakistan”. Either Friedman is covering up his anti-Pakistan bias or this mysterious northern Pakistani deserves a medal for being so enterprising as to be able to diligently dig out Friedman’s e-mail which the best of journalists here can’t lay their hands on since the New York Times does not list it.

On Iran, the only thing Friedman underscores (again for the umpteenth time, read his last Sunday’s column) is the “duplicity” of the religious leaders who sit on sand dunes drilling for oil while “there are more prostitutes on the streets than mullas in turbans”. And that the Iranian parliament was seriously considering legalizing prostitution.

Friedman’s biggest peeve? The Internet. Because it has postings blaming Israel for the WTC bombing and telling 4,000 Jews not to go to work on 9/11. “This is an open sewer of untreated filth.”

Indeed, while the war on terrorism has made Friedman into a “mover and shaker”, many contend that “his opinions are more shallow than sage”.

Don’t be surprised if he gets the 4th Pulitzer next year!

Writer’s e-mail: anjumniazusa@yahoo.com