ON September 27, Pakistan was elected by the UN General Assembly to be a member of the Security Council, for a two-year term beginning January 1, 2003. We secured 172 votes, or over 90 per cent of the current membership. Other countries elected were Germany, Spain, Angola and Chile. Pakistan has come back to the Security Council after a gap of eight years. The gap in the case of India before its probable election to the most powerful organ of the UN is about 12 years.

Pakistan’s election, by such an impressive margin, reflects the esteem in which the country is held. Prior to September 11, 2001, there was frequent reference to Pakistan being isolated, and to its grim economic outlook. The courageous and principled stand taken by President Musharraf in joining the international Coalition against Terrorism, on that fateful day, has been a major factor in the change in Pakistan’s status and fortunes. Not only is it a frontline state in the war against terrorism, its economic prospects have also been transformed, as evident from its foreign currency reserves that now exceed $8 billion. However, the translation of this enhanced status into the membership of the Security Council is not going to be an unmixed blessing.

Given the state of the world, and the profusion of trouble spots in our vicinity, our membership of the Security Council confers both influence and opportunities to shape matters in a manner that is in conformity with our interests. Pakistan is in a region that abounds in unresolved problems, and actual and latent tensions. Starting with the dispute with India over Kashmir, and the unstable status of Afghanistan, there is a whole gamut of problems to our east in the Gulf. The most pressing of these relate to Iraq, still under UN sanctions, and now facing a stark threat from the US, that is determined to bring about a regime change in Baghdad. Israel’s hardline government headed by Ariel Sharon seeks to reduce the Palestinian Arabs to servitude, and makes ominous threats even to rid itself of their presence.

As the principal organ dealing with political issues and threats to peace and stability, the Security Council enjoys a powerful mandate under the UN Charter. Its resolutions, especially those under Chapter 7, are binding on members, and can be enforced by military force. While the major responsibility for enforcing its decisions rests with the five permanent members, namely the US, Russia, china, Britain and France, which also have veto power, the non-permanent members have their own role to play, and represent the vast majority of the mankind. As such they play a significant role, both in providing representation to their geographical regions, and by focusing on issues in their vicinity.

Security Council membership is likely to force Pakistan to make difficult choices at this particular juncture in international affairs. After the events of September 11, 2001, the lone superpower is totally preoccupied with the response to the terrorist attack on America. A parallel is drawn between the US entry into the Second World War in December 1941, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, and the war declared on terrorism after the 9/11 events, that saw the US mainland attacked for the first time since 1812.

Even before this attack, the US had embarked on a unilateralist and assertive path following the election of George W. Bush in December 2000. The terrorist attack has not only brought enormous public support to Bush, but also strengthened the hands of the hardline advisers around the president, headed by Vice President Cheney.

The Bush administration is engaged in a style of diplomacy based on the complete domination of the globe by the US on the basis of its unprecedented power. The parameters of the UN Charter are there on paper, but the actual decisions are being tailored increasingly to the dictates of Washington. For instance, though the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which filled a gap in the multilateral sphere in addressing gross violations of human rights, came about with active US support, the Bush administration refused to accept obligations flowing from it.

When the time came to renew the mandate of the UN forces in Bosnia earlier this year, the US demanded and got exemption for its forces from the jurisdiction of the ICC, since the US rejected the notion of its forces being subjected to any jurisdiction, except its own.

The manner in which the US under Bush has expanded its concepts of self-defence, by adding the doctrine of pre-emption, will present the UN Security Council with new challenges, in reconciling traditional approaches with more radical ones. The agenda of the Security Council normally consists of over one hundred items, though all of them are not given equal priority. The resolutions on Kashmir and Palestine are half a century old, though more recent one has been added, such as 1172 adopted after the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan that underlined the need to pursue solutions of political problems between the two countries, with Kashmir specifically mentioned. Members of the Security Council are expected to attend to this agenda, on the basis of emerging priorities. Given its own priorities and concerns, Pakistan would seek to concentrate on the problems in its own region, though, in the spirit of give-and-take between the members, it would be following the agenda agreed for meetings starting in January 2003. It is probable that, by that time, the Council would be acting largely on the priorities set by the US, and might have to adapt to situations created by it. A whole agenda of problems, and definitions relating to the “war against terrorism”, and a redefining of the concepts of self-defence, and of threats to peace might have to be tackled. It is more than likely that there will be some resistance to any wholesale redefinition of concepts enshrined in the Charter.

Given its close relationship with Washington with regard to the operations in Afghanistan as well as the war against terrorism, and heavy dependence on US goodwill and assistance, Pakistan would have a difficult task in striking a balance between normal handling of issues in the Council and catering to US sensitivities. We would not wish to be seen as a rubber stamp for anything Washington may want. Indeed, not only Pakistan but the entire international community has a stake in maintaining an effective UN system capable of facing up to all the problems this planet faces.

The strategic partnership the US is developing with India is predicated on goals that do not necessarily conform to our perceptions and interests. Though this partnership had been initiated before the 9/11 events, it has acquired a deeper dimension on the basis of a convergence of goals in the Indian Ocean region. The US relationship with Pakistan is described as tactical, and serves its immediate goals in the region, whereas the equation with India is relevant to its strategic goals, including the containment of China.

While Washington would like to see the Kashmir issue resolved, it would not press for a change in the status quo, mainly because India has succeeded in winning acceptance of its view that the indigenous freedom struggle in Kashmir is fuelled by “cross-border terrorism.” India now takes a leaf out of Israel’s book by practising state terrorism against the Kashmiris who are struggling for the right of self-determination promised to them in UN resolutions. More than three decades ago, when the UN discussed the definition of terrorism, an exception was made for liberation movements that were in progress in several parts of the world. That distinction appears to have disappeared in the post-9/11 world.

International terrorism is currently the primary preoccupation of the US, and Pakistan itself is experiencing the problem. At the same time, the right to pre-emption being claimed by the US that translates into political goals of regime change is rightly causing doubts and misgivings among countries everywhere. The so-called Bush Doctrine is also encouraging countries like India and Israel to use genocidal violence to suppress people whose right of self-determination is enshrined in the resolutions of the UN. As a result, the role of the UN is being circumscribed.

The next two or three years are likely to witness a lively debate on the long-term need for an effective UN machinery that is not subordinated to the goals of its most powerful members, but serves the wider goal of fostering a world order based on justice and democratic values. One would hope that the current focus of attention on the Islamic world as the hot-bed of terrorism would give way to a more objective evaluation that is divorced from the prejudices rooted in the memories of the crusades. Pakistan’s tenure on the Security Council will enable it to play its role as a moderate, progressive, and democratic Islamic country, that is committed to augmenting the role of the UN for creating a stable and peaceful world order.

NOT so long ago, Inspectors General of Police would meet annually in New Delhi to discuss the law and order problems. The conference still takes place; there was one even last week. But now the bosses, directors-general, have taken over because today every state averages more than six inspectors-general. However, the Intelligence Bureau continues to be the host.

The focus goes on shifting from year to year, depending on the situation. Before the BJP-led government took over at the centre, the spotlight was on communalism, particularly that of the Sangh Parivar brand. Islamic fundamentalism also figured but in a small way. Leftists were even then in the doghouse. So are they today.

What is noticeable is that since the advent of the Vajpayee government Hindu communalism does not get the attention it did in the past. Once the state was under strain with Hindu mobilization by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). Its threat to India’s secular polity has suddenly become minimised in proportion and extent. I wish I knew how the conference viewed the Gujarat carnage. It should have been interesting to find out the explanation, if any, the director-general from Gujarat gave for the state police’s tacit support to the rioters.

Terrorism was reportedly discussed threadbare. But this has been there for years. Surely, the September 11 incidents in New York and Washington should not have woken us up. Little do the police realize that they too, probably unwittingly, contribute to terrorism. Study the profile of most terrorists. They went on hardening in proportion to the treatment meted out to them by the police. They are categorized as criminals even after the very first petty lapse. In Victor Hugo’s famous novel, ‘Les Miserables’, it is narrated how an ordinary man, Jean Valjean, turned into a hardened criminal. His original crime was that he stole a loaf of bread because he was hungry. The rest was the police’s doing.

Unfortunately, the approach of Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani, also home minister, is not very different. It was clear from the speech he made at the roundtable arranged by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. He said that his government would undertake police reforms from the point of governance, not human rights. That means, it does not matter how the suspects or accused are treated so long as the message of danda (lathi) goes out. Already armed with stringent laws, including POTA, the rulers are determined to crush dissent or defiance in the “interest” of governance. They do not feel that they have to bother about human rights — the inalienable rights of all human beings. No democratic country can afford to dilute or suppress them.

If this is what Advani feels, what made him resist the Emergency (1975-77)? Indira Gandhi also asserted that the Emergency excesses were in the interest of governance. Then why was there so much hullabaloo against her authoritarian rule? It is clear that over the years, the police have been reduced to an instrument in the hands of the government.

Whether the instruments are used for tyranny or transparency depends on the rulers. There is no impartiality per se. Is this the rightful attitude to adopt?

The worst part of the meets of directors-general — and their assessments — is that the existence of a situation depends on their inputs. They change with the complexion of the government. The analysis is far from objective. The reason is apparent.

The rulers want things done in a particular way. During the Congress rule, the Sangh parivar was the whipping boy. Now it is the other way round. What one government considers objectionable, another may not.

The criteria for assessment go on changing. Take the example of officers recruited to all-India and central services. At one time any connection with the BJP or Sangh parivar was regarded as “undesirable” and the candidate was not cleared for appointment. Now those having links with the Congress are suspect. A person with a leftist background has always been a doubtful case. Many years ago, Jawaharlal Nehru intervened to clear two candidates with Marxist leanings. But it was only a one-time exception.

There is no doubt that the release of the police from the clutches of the rulers will help. The implementation of the 1999 Dharam Vira Commission’s recommendation to constitute a security board, with the opposition leader as one of the members, will go a long way to control the whimsical transfers of superintendents of police and other senior police officers. The Vajpayee government was in favour of the recommendation when some of them were part of the Janata government. But now it seems it does not want the police to be independent in the light of Adavni’s views on governance. At least a new act should immediately replace the 1861 Police Act, now in force.

But even if the best of reforms are made, it does not mean that the police would become an ideal force. There is the problem of temperament. The attitude of the police is still that of a colonial force, which the British constituted to keep the people of this country under subjugation. The force has not changed mentally. The police still do not function as public servants. The stage has, in fact, been reached when the police do not have to be told anything. They change the moment there is a change of government.

They begin to act on their own in a manner that would please the new government. At least that is what they believe.

I wish our policemen were to remember what Robert Mark, the ex-chief commissioner of police of London, said: “Our authority under the law is strictly defined and we are personally liable for the consequences whenever we invoke it.

We play no part in determining guilt or punishment and our accountability to the courts, both criminal and civil, to local police authorities, to parliament and to public opinion is unsurpassed anywhere else in the world. In the legal and constitutional framework in which society requires us to enforce the laws enacted by its elected representatives, the most essential weapon in our armoury are not firearms, water cannon, tear gas or rubber bullets, but the confidence and support of the people on whose behalf we act.”

The government should seriously try to insulate the police from the politics of the country and employ it scrupulously on duties for which alone it is by law intended. On the other hand, the policemen should realize that politicking by them is outside the domain of their responsibilities. They would suffer because of that. How would reforms help if they do not change themselves?

In fact, the problem before the nation is not how to bring police reforms but how to change the police attitude. The crux of the matter is accountability. The Shah Commission appointed to go into the excesses of the Emergency found that some police officers behaved as if they were “not accountable to any public authority.” The decision to arrest and release certain people was entirely on “political considerations” which were intended to be “favourable” to the ruling party.

According to Advani’s thesis, all such things are permissible if they fit into the pattern of governance. In such circumstances, it is naive to believe that the rulers will become angels or that a few steps will reform policemen.

Both are inbred in an environment where accountability is only on paper and where the influential have their way. A system reeking of politics and corruption cannot be improved in bits and phases. It has to be destroyed lock, stock and barrel and built afresh. The writer is a columnist based in New Delhi.

THE terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 impelled Washington to re-evaluate its policies towards Pakistan and reaffirmed its strategic importance. One result of this reassessment has been renewed efforts to supply arms and weapons to Pakistan as a means of expanding influence and bolstering support for the US-led “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan.

During the cold war, Pakistan had been an enduring ally of the US and sought its weapons to counter any Indian assault. In the 1950s, the US included Pakistan within the broader framework of the anti-Soviet alliances — SEATO and CENTO and offered Pakistan significant military assistance. Pakistan procured over $900 million worth of military equipment through these military alliances. Which included tanks and other small arms and transportation equipment, aircraft including F-104, B-57, F-86 and C-130 aircraft. A US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was also established at the Pakistan army GHQ to help senior Pakistani commanders in their efforts to modernize the armed forces. Despite all these, the US suspended military assistance to Pakistan during the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971. Their relationship further deteriorated when Gen. Zia ousted Bhutto’s government in July 1977.

But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 bolstered the US security ties with Pakistan, which supported the anti-Soviet mujahideen. Besides, Pakistan itself was the recipient of significant US military assistance, including advanced Stinger surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. The Reagan administration gave a five-year $3.5 billion aid package to Pakistan in 1981 to “give Pakistan confidence in our commitment to its security and provide us reciprocal benefits in terms of our regional interests”.

Until 1990, the US provided military aid to Pakistan to modernize its conventional defensive capability. During this period the US allocated about 40 per cent of its assistance package to non-reimbursable credits for military purchases, the third largest programme after Israel and Egypt. The remainder of the aid programme was devoted to economic assistance.

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union led to the erosion of the US security interests in Pakistan. The Pressler Amendment sanctions were imposed against Pakistan which stipulates that unless the President “certify on an annual basis that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device” Pakistan would receive no economic or military assistance. This amendment banned most economic and military assistance that Pakistan had procured during the Afghan resistance war.

The sanctions particularly stopped the sale of 28 F-16s, which Pakistan had already paid for. The Pakistani air force still flies 32 F-16A/B Block 15 fighters, first delivered in 1983. In 1988 and 1989, Pakistan ordered an additional 71 F-16 Operational Capability Upgrade fighters. Of those aircraft, 28 were built and paid for by the time the sale was stopped in 1990.

The termination of the deal remains an irritant in US — Pakistan relations.

In 1995 the Congress passed the Brown Amendment which provides for the delivery of $368 million of military equipment purchased but not received by Pakistan before the imposition of the Pressler amendment sanctions in 1990. It allowed the supply of Lockheed Martin P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, Boeing (BA) Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Raytheon (RTN) AIM-9 Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missile components, support equipment for the F-16s and 24 M198 155mm towed howitzers.

After a series of reciprocal provocation, both India and Pakistan detonated nuclear weapons in May 1998. In response, the US imposed Glenn amendment sanctions against both countries. However in July 998, Congress passed the “India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998” (also referred to as Brownback I), that provides the president with the authority to waive, for a period of one year, Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions against India and Pakistan, except for sanctions on military assistance, dual-use exports and military sales. Brownback I was signed into law in October 1998.

Conventional arms exports have always been the key element in the US foreign policy. The Clinton administration’s support for arms exports was codified both in Presidential Decision Directive 34 (PDD-34), which stated that “transfers of conventional arms are a legitimate instrument of US foreign policy — deserving US government support — when they enable us to help friends and allies deter aggression” and in the Clinton’s administration’s $16.5 billion in direct assistance to defence companies from 1993 to 1997. The Bush administration has continued aggressive advocacy of arms exports.

In the past, the US policy was designed to ensure the sale or transfer of advanced weaponry only to the most trusted allies. Even with prudence, the US found itself in the dilemma of fighting against its own machinery in Panama, Haiti, Somalia and Iraq.

The US has frequently sold advanced weaponry only to see it resold to other states that represent a national security threat. Nonetheless, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration has decided to use weapons transfers and arms sales as a means to both promote and reward cooperation with the US led military campaign against Afghanistan.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush issued ‘Presidential Determination 2001-28’, which lifted “sanctions on India and Pakistan in the interest of the national security of the US”. The main beneficiaries of this act were envisioned to be Pakistan and the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the administration has adopted policies designed to improve military relations with both Pakistan and India and to expand the US share of the regions arms trade.

The US arms policy toward Pakistan is designed to proceed along several lines and to provide a variety of types of assistance and address the strategic concerns of both India and Pakistan.

Pakistan’s military has been more dramatically affected by US sanctions than India’s, which has been able to acquire weaponry from Russia. For instance, India has advanced Russian-built fighter aircraft, artillery, cruise missiles, main battle tanks and even submarines.

In an effort to provide immediate rewards for Pakistan’s cooperation in the campaign in Afghanistan and to seal the border between the two nations, Washington announced a $73 million aid package on November 7, 2001. The centrepiece of the programme was the transfer of six AH-64 Apache helicopters. Additional aid involved communication equipment, night-vision gear and light-duty vehicles. The helicopters will be the most sophisticated weapons in their class and will provide Pakistan with meaningful anti-armour capabilities.

The Pentagon has notified the Congress in July of at least two potential sales of equipment, services and support, one of which involving six used C-130E Hercules cargo aircraft at an estimated cost of $75 million. More recently, the US Defence Department again notified the Congress of a possible military sale to Pakistan involving six Aerostat Radar Systems for a total value of $155 million. The transfer also sets the precedent for future purchases and underscores the fact that the greatest impact of US arms policy will be in the future. The Pakistan government wishes to improve its conventional forces and bring them more in line with the capabilities of the Indian forces.

Pakistan always wanted to improve relations with the US including the lifting of all sanctions. According to a Pakistani defence official, “we want the kind of relationship the US has with Egypt in terms of weapons”. Military aid to Pakistan was also constrained by Section 508 of the Foreign Appropriations Act, which forbids military assistance to nations whose elected governments were overthrown by a military coup. After 9/11, the US Senate approved legislation, which allowed the president to waive the 508 restrictions for up to two years. When President Pervez Musharraf met President Bush in November 2001, he presented the US president with a ‘wish list’ that included the sale of new F-16s, helicopters and an assortment of spare parts. While the US did not agree to the sale of F-16s, a diverse package of aid and military assistance was worked out, including one billion dollars in economic aid and debt rescheduling. The US-Pakistan Defence Consultative Group (DCG) suspended in 1998 has been revived which recently concluded its three-day meeting in Islamabad pledging to “enhance the Pakistan’s conventional defence capabilities”. Douglas Feith, US undersecretary for defence who led the US delegation said after the meeting that Pakistan and the US “have put together a good military relationship”. Hamid Nawaz, Pakistan’s defence secretary, said, “Pakistan has given a new defence list to purchase US arms”.

The US interest in resuming military assistance to Pakistan is a major development in the South Asian region. India, which is acquiring new and sophisticated weapons from the UK, Russia and Israel, will further fuel the tension between the two countries. India is one of the biggest weapons markets in the world, with an annual budget of $14 billion.

Pakistan foreign ministry spokesman Aziz Ahmed Khan commenting on the recent Indian weapons-buying spree said, “we are alarmed by India’s relentless pursuit and acquisition of defence equipment that is far beyond India’s genuine needs”. In order to counter-balance the Indian capabilities, the US must help Pakistan militarily, and importantly, exert pressure on India for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute.