DAWN - Opinion; October 5, 2002

Published October 5, 2002

The regime is main candidate

By I. A. Rehman


THE principal candidate in the forthcoming election and certainly the most active of all the characters on the electoral stage, is the Establishment itself. This alone can be the reason for its latest affliction — populism. That is, apart from its various activities, overt as well as covert, aimed at securing ‘positive results’.

A number of legislative and policy measures have been taken on the eve of the general election. These include the new police law, defamation law, a law for newspapers and publications, the Press Council law, the freedom of information draft (which may be issued any time), the labour policy, proposals for reform of civil services, and, above all, the allocation of financial resources to provinces under the NFC award. Regardless of the controversies these measures generate or the degree of support they may in the short run receive, they are much too transparently designed to impress the population of the Establishment’s goodwill and concern for the various sections of society, which is populism pure and simple. The electorate is clearly being told to hitch its fortunes on to a particular bandwagon.

Voices have already begun to be raised that finalization of important legislation and policy instruments should have been left to the parliament due to be elected soon. Of course, some legislation is necessitated by the election process. Thus, whatever one may think of the Political Parties Order, the Election Commission Order or the Conduct of General Elections Order, they can be defended as election requirements. Everything else done in the past few weeks, or what may be done before the new parliament is sworn in, falls outside the area of election contingency. The critics of the present rush for legislation are on a solid ground because in all democracies legislation or policy shifts after an election has been called are considered bad, even malafide, because they amount to a kind of abuse of power to influence the electorate beyond the limits prescribed by democratic norms.

This is so even in situations of a normal election, when the exercise means replacement of one group of representatives with another. In Pakistan the situation is radically different. The October 2002 election is supposed to ensure transfer of authority from a temporary military regime to elected representatives. In this case, the need to save the coming parliament from being bound down by the decisions of the present regime is much greater than in normal elections.

That the people wish important decisions affecting their lives, rights and interests to be taken by a body of elected representatives, rather than by military caretakers, is not a matter of fad or undue obsession with a particular form of decision-making bodies. It springs from the fact that a parliament offers greater possibilities of interaction with the people, especially those affected by a particular measure, than when power is exercised by a closed group which is often a matter of a single individual’s choice or preference.

The argument that the future parliament will be able to change the new legislation or policy instruments does not go far. Pakistan’s statute book is full of measures adopted in the absence of democratic legislatures. No measure adopted by a military regime has been upset by parliament except for the repeal of Article 58(2)(b) through the 13th Amendment of 1997, which is now considered a gargantuan aberration and has been undone vide the Legal Framework Order. The only other exceptions have been the changes made in the Press and Publication Ordinance of 1963 under Federal Shariat Court orders or the departures from the Land Reform Regulation of 1972, again under court decisions.

One reason of parliament’s failure in the past to do anything about legislation inherited from non-representative predecessors has been the lack of its freedom from the permanent establishment. Each period of deviation from democratic rule has also given rise to a vested interest which has made defence of extra-constitutional measures a part of its creed.

The Constitution of 1973 expired in 1985 and what has been in force since then is a basic Law crafted without the sanction of the people. Whatever some jurists may say, a people’s acquiescence into orders they cannot overturn for a variety of reasons does not amount to constitution-making by their free will. Despite unanimity in the country on the urgency of purging the Constitution and the statute book of the Zia period amendments and ordinary legislation, the task proved to be beyond the governments formed after 1985.

Take the case of Hudood laws. A very small section of society defends them. A large section of the population has steadfastly called for their repeal while many demand that at least they should be reviewed and revised. And yet the Hudood Ordinances continue to blight the life of a large number of women every year.

The Hudood laws fall in the category of ordinary legislation. Much more difficult it is to change or modify measures that are protected under the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. Till a few weeks ago the number of such measures was 24. The present regime has added 11 enactments to the list. These are the State Bank Act, the NAB law, the four local government ordinances issued by provincial governments, the Election Commission Order, the Conduct of General Elections Order, the Political Parties Order, the order prohibiting a third term as prime minister / chief minister, and the Police Order.

Amendment of protected enactments was difficult even before the LFO came, as under Article 268 of the Constitution any such initiative was subject to prior approval of the president. However, the president was supposed to act on the advice of the prime minister. The Legal Framework Order has made review or revision of these protected laws even more difficult, perhaps impossible in the short run, in view of two amendments to the relevant constitutional provision. Now even implied modification of a protected measure will require the president’s approval. Another amendment is to the effect that while giving or withholding his approval to a proposal for amendment the president will not be bound by the prime minister’s advice. The latter will only be consulted and consultation has now been defined in the LFO as “discussion and deliberation which shall not be binding on the president.”

Some of the enactments now protected, such as local government ordinances, the Political Parties Order, the Police Order, are patently in their experimental stage and are bound to require review in the light of experience. Indeed the Police Order has already attracted a lot of criticism. It is not difficult to visualize a situation that the prime minister, the cabinet, the whole parliament may be convinced of the urgency of amending the Police Order but their considered views will have less weight than the personal opinion of the president.

There is no point in pleading with the government that fresh legislation and policy measures should be left to the coming parliament. Having become a candidate in the election, with a stake larger than that of any political party or candidate, the Establishment has become impervious to public entreaties. The only point one can make in this situation is that the legislative steps being taken at present will aggravate tensions in society, increase wasteful political wrangles, and make the task of establishing a democratic and just order harder than ever.

What Advani never said: LETTER FROM NEW DELHI

By Kuldip Nayar


THIS is nothing new in India. The upper castes have not allowed the dalits for centuries to share a pond, tank or well. Many temples remain barred to them even now — after 55 years of independence.

The story would not have been any different in Chakwada village, Rajasthan, if the police had not interfered to restore equal rights as guaranteed by the constitution and stopped the upper castes from denying the dalits the use of the local pond. Constant clashes did not deter the dalits. Nor did the boycott by the upper castes which considered the water ‘sullied.’ But it was a long battle, which the dalits took 10 months to win. The upper castes still have not accepted the right of the dalits to use the pond and the situation remains tense.

I thought that Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, also in the know of the incident, would refer to the victory of the dalits at the rally in Lucknow a few days ago. It would have been appropriate because the Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Mayawati, a dalit herself, had organized it. Advani’s speech would have been a warning to the upper castes — a warning to read the writing on the wall — that the dalits would ultimately overcome the arrogance of superiority and win the battle against discrimination.

But he did not even discuss the issue, let alone mention the Chakwada village incident. In Advani’s long speech there was only a passing reference to an observation by Dr B.R. Ambedkar, the dalit icon, that India lost its independence because it had not got rid of narrow considerations of caste and creed.

Why couldn’t Advani express the same thoughts on his own? The dalits would have liked an assurance by the deputy prime minister that the BJP would join them in the fight against the upper castes to root out for all time the hatred and haughtiness which the lower castes faced in their day-to-day living. Obviously, a party of the upper castes, dependent on their vote, could not afford to go against its constituents and their entrenched beliefs.

If at all Advani had to invoke Ambedkar’s name — probably a must at a dalit rally — he should have done so to recall Ambedkar’s relentless battle against the bias of the upper castes. Ambedkar led his followers 75 years ago to Chavdar Talab (tank) as the dalits have done in Chakwada village to assert their right to use the water of the pond. Advani could not have said all because Ambedkar had burnt the Manusmriti, which the BJP and other members of the Sangh parivar regard as their Bible.

As expected, Advani dwelt on politics, not social divisions. His eyes are fixed on power all the time. He explained how a joint front of the dalits represented by the BSP and the BJP that claimed to have a large support among the upper castes, could dominate the political scene after the next general elections. By all means the two should join hands. But they should be doing so not to capture power but to break the shackles of social ostracization, a stigma that Hinduism bears.

Advani’s purpose turned out to be personal. Mayawati let the cat out of the bag when she said that her government would not issue notification to revive the special court, which was established to try those who had demolished the Babri masjid. Advani is one of the accused. On a mere technicality, the UP high court let him off and the co-accused, including HRD Minister Murli Manohar Joshi and Coal Minister Uma Bharti. The government constitutes special courts after seeking the high court’s permission.

Such a notification was issued when the cases relating to Ayodhya, where the Babri masjid stood before demolition, were sent to a special court. Subsequently, another notification, which was irrelevant, was issued mentioning the Ayodhya cases. The second notification did not have the court’s permission. But that was not necessary. The high court dismissed the case on the basis of the second notification. The appeal is being argued before the Supreme Court. The court has asked the UP government to answer the question why it does not want to issue fresh notification to revive the special court.

I really do not know why Advani and other BJP leaders should take shelter behind technicalities. The CBI filed the charge sheet against them before the special court. Charges were framed. The stage had reached for evidence. Would it not be better for the country’s image if its deputy prime minister, his two colleagues and others were acquitted on the ground that the charges against them had not been proved? To go scot-free on the mere technicality of notification may be legally tenable but not morally.

Advani and others should have themselves asked the court not to drop the case on the grounds of a legal flaw. Mayawati feels that her party has paid the BJP the price for supporting her government. The BJP is gratified that Mayawati has acknowledged the debt by not issuing the notification. True, but what about the image of Advani and his two colleagues? Look at the future. Posterity may recall that they were let off because there was a flaw in the state government notification. Doubts may continue to lurk whether and how far Advani, Joshi, Uma Bharti and others were responsible for the demolition of the Babri masjid. Mayawati too has got something in return from the BJP. Advani has defended her pet project, the extremely costly Ambedkar memorial put up by the BSP government in the cash-starved state. It is the same memorial the construction of which was stopped by the earlier BJP governments. It has been expanded by the acquisition of land belonging to the Indira Gandhi Prathisthan. Mayawati has unnecessarily made the memorial an issue. None is against it. The real issue is the discrimination perpetrated by the upper castes despite constitutional provisions against it. But she is more interested in keeping her chief ministership than fighting against the upper castes because they sustain her in power.

The reason why the dalits go on losing is that their leaders prefer political power to social equality when they make a bargain. There will always be Mayawatis and Kanshirams to “sell” the dalits for positions in the government. Mahatma Gandhi tried to wash off the stigma of the dalits by calling them Harijans (children of God). But the lower castes resented this. They considered Gandhi’s gesture patronizing. They forced the government to drop the word, Harijan, from all official records and references.

What the dalits do not realize is that the identity politics articulated by the RSS has made their life more difficult because the economic problems have been pushed into the background. In the name of Hindutva, the nation has been made a hostage to parochialism and communalism.

With the rise of Hindu Rashtra politics, the ideal of social equality is slowly becoming an unattainable dream. The dalits in the villages will suffer not only the pangs of starvation but also all forms of social deprivation.

Untouchability, the curse of our nation, will go on thriving. One-sixth of India’s population, some 16 crore people, will therefore continue to live a precarious existence. They will be forced to overlook their own interest and they will be shunned by much of society because of the stigma “untouchable” or “dalit.”

The writer is a freelance columnist based in New Delhi.

What are Saddam’s options?

By Gwynne Dyer


PUT yourself in Saddam Hussein’s boots. What are his options now?

There was a global sigh of relief when President George W. Bush went to the United Nations last Thursday and said he would seek a Security Council resolution before attacking Iraq: all his allies had feared that he would do it unilaterally and in defiance of international law. But what he wants is a Security Council resolution making so many demands that Saddam is almost bound to reject it, and they all know it.

The Bush administration has not abandoned the goal of ‘regime change’ in Iraq; the other big powers have just decided that a veneer of legality must be laid over what the US was going to do anyway, to minimise the damage that Bush’s actions would otherwise do to the fragile edifice of international law. The following day, however, Bush stated the reality plainly: “We’re talking days and weeks, not months and years. I am highly doubtful that (Saddam) will meet our demands.”

Going through the UN doesn’t derail or even delay the Bush administration’s determination to overthrow Saddam. It merely legalises it, in return for a tip of Washington’s hat towards the principles of international law. And the war could come very quickly.

A US attack is unlikely before the US Congressional elections in November, and Bush would not want to plunge the US back into recession by launching a December attack that sends oil prices soaring and kills the great pre-Christmas retail binge. The smart money is still on a January war that ends before the heat gets too great in April, like Bush the Elder’s ‘Desert Storm’ offensive twelve years ago. But the soldiers can be ready much sooner.

If the US decides to strike directly at Iraq’s urban centres using light, air-mobile forces (the so-called ‘Outside-In’ option), it could happen within two weeks of the decision being taken: 30,000 of the 50,000 US troops required are already in the region. Even the ‘heavy’ option, with up to a quarter-million American and British troops launching an invasion across the borders of Kuwait, Turkey and possibly Jordan, could start in mid-November if the orders were given today.

So what does Saddam do now? He has been told repeatedly by the Bush administration that the US wants to overthrow him — in practice, to kill him — no matter what he does, so he has little incentive to behave cautiously. He also has a well-established reputation for being a strategic gambler of near-lunatic boldness: consider the attack on Iran in 1980, or the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. We should therefore expect the unexpected.

The orthodox strategy for Iraq, given US air superiority, would be to leave only poorly trained conscripts on the frontiers and pull the better troops back into the built-up areas.

There they will be in the right place to suppress any revolts, and if US forces plunge into the cities after them the street-fighting would cause huge Iraqi civilian casualties (good for anti-US propaganda), and perhaps quite heavy American casualties too.

That was Saddam’s strategy in 1991, and it saved him then: US forces stopped once Kuwait was liberated. But Bush I had Arab coalition partners to keep happy, and a plan for a comprehensive Middle Eastern peace, and a keen awareness that the US public would not tolerate many American casualties.

Bush II has no Arab allies willing to contribute troops anyway, no peace plan, and a clear belief that the US armed forces have invented a way to win wars without significant American casualties (though that belief has yet to be tested in urban warfare).

Saddam can play the ‘cities’ strategy and hope that mounting US casualties or uprisings in the wider Arab world will end the war before US forces find his bunker, but he could easily be dead before that happens. As a fall-back strategy it makes sense, but the current political situation in the Arab world creates opportunities he did not have in 1991, when most Arab leaders were furious at him for seizing Kuwait.

Nowadays Arab public opinion is inflamed by daily television images of Palestinians dying under the guns of the Israeli occupation forces, and sees the Bush administration as wholly in Israel’s pocket. So there is a potential for changing the subject that simply wasn’t there twelve years ago.—Copyright

LTTE’s new stance: lessons to learn

By M. P. Bhandara


MR ANTON BALASINGHAM, the chief negotiator of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), declared the other day that they were no longer campaigning for “eelam” — an independent state — in Sri Lanka’s north-east region, but were prepared to accept “regional autonomy and self-government”.

A ceasefire pact negotiated by the Norwegians on February 23 this year is holding. The first round of talks between the two parties recently in Thailand was described by the elusive LTTE chief as “satisfactory”.

Why this turnaround after nearly 20 years of some of the bloodiest guerilla fighting and terrorism in contemporary times (Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by an LTTE suicide bomber)? A small band of LTTE guerillas-cum terrorists became a virtual army fighting pitched battles against the Sri Lankan army. Doubly intriguing because the LTTE controls large parts of the north and east of the Island, if not always by day, certainly by night.

There are three keys to understanding this dramatic development:

(a) the Norwegian mediators have apparently convinced the LTTE that a Tamil state wrested by terrorism has no future. It would have the shades of Afghanistan under the Taliban.

(b) As a renegade state it would be bereft of economic and development aid.

(c) Under international law, Sri Lanka would be entitled to stop the flow of Tamil funds sent by Tamil expatriates in the western countries and by Tamil mainlanders in India to such a state.

A Tamil state “liberated” by terror would jeopardize the interests of the large and economically vibrant Tamil minority in Sri Lanka.

The initial stance of the government negotiators at the talks between the parties in Thailand (sponsored by the Norwegian government) was non-compromising — which means autonomy “strictly within Sri Lanka’s constitutional limits and within a unitary state”. This is widely seen as an opening position of a government in uneasy cohabitation between the president and the prime minister who belong to different parties. The Norwegians must have secured guarantees of real autonomy for the north-east from the Sri Lankan government.

Do these developments in South Asia have a bearing on Kashmir? What are the similarities and dissimilarities between the two situations? What conclusions, if any, can be drawn?

The most outstanding feature in the Lanka-LTTE standoff is the patient, quiet, sustained, low-key diplomatic role of the Norwegian government. The Norwegian role is purely humanitarian. It has no interest — historical, cultural or trade — with Sri Lanka. It acts merely as a friend to both sides. A revolving door without a stopper. Patience and tact appears to have been rewarded with interim success.

The Kashmir problem could do with a friendly country respected for its neutrality and integrity with a humanitarian spirit to offer its good offices to India and Pakistan, without offending the sensibilities of either country. Not as a mediator, conciliator, or arbitrator, but as a disinterested friend to both sides. A good choice for such a role would be Switzerland or Sweden.

Norway has persuaded the LTTE to permit refugees expelled from the north and east to return, rebuild their houses and de-mine the areas. According to reports, about 100,000 former inhabitants have returned. Mosques of the Muslims in the Tamil-majority areas, which were targeted by the LTTE, will be reconstructed by the Tamils.

This again has a direct bearing on Kashmir. Is it not foolhardy to discuss ‘final solutions’ to vexed problems without first a ceasefire and a modicum of civility and respect between the sides? A friend might be better suited to bring about a ceasefire in the present hot and cold war with India rather than the sole superpower whose actions are governed by its global interests.

The LTTE has shown the way: by going out of its way, from a fairly strong military position, to agree to create the right atmospherics for the hard negotiations ahead.

In the Sri Lankan ethnic civil war, the firmly entrenched LTTE has decided to settle for autonomy. What pointer does this have for Kashmir?

Genuine autonomy, which is non-retractable, has a solving ingredient for the Kashmir dispute. But, the grant of autonomy to Kashmir by India in the past has a bad history. The Indian constitution has given Jammu and Kashmir a special autonomous status on paper. The status has been arbitrarily annulled. Thus, the Kashmiris have little faith in an Indian ‘autonomy’ solution unless guaranteed by an international covenant. The Indians have broken faith with Pakistan and the Kashmiris in the past. After all, the genesis of the dispute lies in the unredeemed promises made by India.

The LTTE’s decision to respect the feelings of the Tamil minority which would remain in Sri Lanka if an ‘eelam’ state came about, indicates that this once-implacable separatist outfit has graduated to the level of statesmanship.

This should have a bearing on Pakistan attitudes to Kashmir and India. We often behave as if the 130-plus million Muslims in India did not exist or do not matter in the subcontinental equation. Many acts of sabotage in India are routinely put at the door of Pakistan. It is seldom realized over here that a penalty is invariably imposed on the Muslims of India, who are hostage to a resurgent Hindu fanaticism.

If, in the unlikely event of the Mujahideen succeeding to oust the Indian army from Kashmir, the likely carnage of Muslims in India would probably dwarf the partition savagery of 1947.

Many Indian Muslims hold Pakistan responsible for pursuing a Kashmir agenda without consideration of its consequences for them. Recent communal riots in Gujarat, the worst since 1947, are an eye opener.

Each action has its own reaction. Chauvinism may ring bells of glee over here but may be of doom to a cause elsewhere. Kashmiri freedom is not a matter for the Islamic world alone to uphold and support. From the Tamils of Sri Lanka to the Walloons of Belgium, from the Kurds of Turkey to the Tutsi of Central Africa, it is part of the kaleidoscope of nationalisms competing for world attention.

If the sympathies of the western world today are with the Kosovan Muslims and the Christian East Timorese and not with the Kashmiris, it is not because one is Muslim and the other Christian, but that the fight for independence was indigenous — against Serb and Indonesian persecution and human rights violations. The Kashmir case lost a lot of moral force and appeal after the kidnapping of six foreign tourists by militant groups allegedly rooted in Pakistan and acts of wanton terrorism, killing and maiming civilians by the score.

A tactical retreat is at times a strategic advantage. The emerging statesmanship of the LTTE is a pointer in this direction.

A friendly country intervening in the Kashmir dispute is likely to be rebuffed by India, as it wants none to peer into the secret corner of its shame. But, how long can India afford to rebuff reasonable proposals. In the end, each action creates its own reaction.

The issue of world attention at the moment is cross-LoC movement of freedom fighters or militants. We all know that even if the LoC is “sealed”, say like the ceasefire line between North and South Korea, it will not end terrorism or violent agitation in Kashmir. It is difficult, indeed very costly, to hold down a sullen people who do not wish to belong. The Soviet Union finally realized that holding on to Eastern Europe against its will was the road to serfdom for the former and bankruptcy for the latter. It is, therefore, very much in the interest of Pakistan to seal the LoC, close down the Mujahideen camps, if any, and accept the proposal for joint patrolling provided it is equal to both sides of the LoC.

Strange as it may seem, the LTTE’s new stance shows that wisdom can also reside in a militant separatist heart. One hopes the conclusion is not premature. The final chapter in the Sri Lankan episode is yet to be written. One hopes that Vellupillai Prabhakaran inspires separatists elsewhere to reflect on the avenues opened by flexibility.

The writer is a former member of the National Assembly of Pakistan.

Email: murbr@paknet.com.pk

The need to chatter

IT was particularly chilling, as a worthy reminder of a more stark and lethal world out there, to read Sebastian Rotella’s recent account in ‘The Times’ of chatter recorded by Italian authorities of Al Qaeda terrorist cell members in Milan, Italy.

Those religious extremists knew authorities, like adult chauffeurs, were eavesdropping and bugging phones, apartments, even a mosque. So they drove around in a favourite car, which also was bugged. The need to chatter, even when strangers are listening, must be an international human compulsion; witness the growing number of public cell phone chats we must overhear.

Chatter can sound meaningless and still inadvertently reveal passing priorities or predicaments. Or it can provide terrorist plot details sought by police. But chatter is also important as social process, even for terrorist wannabes.

With each word spoken and heard, transcripts revealed, the talkers reassured themselves and each other of their belonging to that group at that time, of being listened to, laughed with, chided and most of all included.—Los Angeles Times

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