AS we are well aware, Yahya Khan set, for all his faults, the electoral standard for Pakistan in 1970. The elections he held were unique in being impeccable. What transpired thereafter, in the shape of the loss of half of the country, was not the logical or necessary outcome of those elections or their results.

That, as the Hamoodur Rahman report has amply shown, was the effect, partly, of administrative bungling though, more largely, of an exercise in bad faith. Whatever the case, we should be the wiser for all the electoral experiments, conducted as of 1977, resulting in virtual systemic failure in the country in 1999. And we should be perfectly ready for the 1970 electoral model to be just that for us as, in our quest for democracy, we stand at the threshold of elections once again.

But, then, we ought also perhaps to be engaging in a microscopic examination of our bonafides with regard to the forthcoming elections. In this context, we could be scrutinizing the various electoral rules the government has made, in the shape of the PPO and other ‘laws’, to see if they are free of bias or whether they happen to be malafide and obstructionist. Have these been framed with a view to ensuring that the electoral process is carried out smoothly? That candidates can contest elections without undue constraints being placed on them and the people of the country vote, unhampered, for representatives of their choice?

The government asserted, in response to misgivings in this connection ostensibly expressed by Colin Powell during his recent visit to Pakistan, that there was no ban on anyone contesting elections in this country. Yet obstacles tantamount to a ban have systematically been put in the way of the leaders of booth our major political parties, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif. There is surely no other way of describing the two-term limit for aspiring prime ministers, coupled with the different grounds for disqualification from elections, the ‘conviction’ bar in particular.

Moreover, for a host of different reasons, ranging from the allegedly ‘political’ postings of officials to the ‘tactical’ delimitation of constituencies, political parties of note have been complaining of “pre-poll rigging.” So that, at the moment, electoral prospects look, on the whole, rather bleak.

However, all this was, manifestly, a foregone conclusion. Especially when considered against the proposal that the military’s traditional role in the country’s politics be subsumed in the Constitution, there would never really seem to have been, at least from a military angle, any other option. The die would appear to have been cast on the very day that Gen. Musharraf staged his coup, a coup characterized not just by the usual strident moralism of such occasions but a peculiar sort of schematic exclusiveness.

The scope of Gen. Musharraf’s seven-point agenda was such as to suggest that there would be no room for prime ministerial activism in the future. Had we been a little more alert to the signals in this regard, we would not have been in for a rude awakening today. It was, in other words, on the cards, from the time of the takeover, that the country’s future prime minister would be suitably prefab and thus less than life-size.

Of course, the requisite cat’s paw was already there in the guise of the QA Muslim League, comprising volunteers for the new ‘cause.’ However, it is hard to say to what degree, after the departure from the scene of Ejazul Haq, this faction of the League is still entitled to the sobriquet of the ‘king’s party.’ At the same time, it is eminently possible that the ‘contest’ between Mian Mohammad Azhar and Ejazul Haq was a mere coup de theatre and that the Ejazul Haq faction has been floated to serve as a decoy designed to attract a greater following for a supposedly generic ‘king’s party’ than the QA Muslim League on its own might be able to.

The permutations of Pakistan’s political scene are endless and fascinating. But how, under the circumstances, will the promised democratic dispensation come about? How does Gen. Musharraf propose to make good his pledge to the international community in this regard? If the expected happens and the elections yield, as in the case of the referendum, unconvincing results, this will simply drive a further wedge between governing and governed.

Where will that leave democracy, which is patently about governance with the formal consent of the governed? What will it say about representative? We cannot, properly, carry on with a system of non-representative or surrogate governance indefinitely. Surrogation in the political sphere can, at best, serve to disguise a void.

Here is where the danger lies. This is what facilitates its unaccounted for areas or political no-man’s land, both anarchy and terrorism. This is where lethal assaults such those on the American consulate in Karachi, the Convent of Jesus and Mary in Murree and the Christian hospital in Taxila have been made possible.

Hence, the need for a genuine democratic system rather than a sham, merely insulated adaptation of one with all its built-in hazards. Hence, too, the need, given the link between terrorism and religious extremism, for harnessing and, in fact, politically empowering the country’s representative moderate forces so as to allow for the strategic containment of the two menaces.

However, it would be wrong to believe, with Kissinger, as in his article (Dawn, August 11) that a pre-emptive military strike against any Islamic country, whether Iraq or any other, will prove in any way “beneficent”. This would only serve to further fuel Islamic militancy and, in the process, effectively marginalize and, in fact, alienate moderates throughout the Islamic world. Then, as Kissinger himself admits, the “preemption” principle could easily snowball and be adopted even by India vis-a-vis Pakistan. Backed up by his conviction that the “road to Jerusalem leads through Baghdad”, Kissinger’s is a recipe for global disaster.

Whatever the Bush administration eventually decides about Iraq, the fact is that militant Islam cannot be eliminated, militarily or otherwise. It can, at most, be socially and economically accommodated and controlled to some extent. A drastic adjustment, upwards, of vital social and economic indices could, certainly in Pakistan, coax zealotry back, to some extent, into the traditional secular/religious fold. The question, then, is how to allow religion to preserve its due place in our national culture and ethos without letting it impinge negatively on our polity.

We must also bear in mind here that the standoff with India is simply serving to exacerbate the situation. In any case, what began as a standoff has today become a stalemate. The Indians surely want to pull back their troops from the border and are merely waiting, despite appearances to the contrary, for a plausible excuse to do so. Clearly, it is up to us to provide them with such an excuse. It may be that a democratic government being in place with the promise of a repeat of the failed Agra summit might fulfil this function. After all, the Indians, like ourselves, have nothing to gain from a fearsome war.

The Kashmir issue will take time to resolve. It will certainly not admit of resolution against a backdrop of mutual suspicion and bellicosity. After our elections in October are over, Prime Minister Vajpayee could consider bussing it once again to Lahore. We too could extend an olive branch by putting aside the notion of ‘centrality’ of Kashmir as a condition for talks. Overall goodwill and even trade or a more subtle approach to the problem of Kashmir could go a long way towards breaking the stalemate over the issue.

WHEN General Ziaul Haq was killed in an air crash in 1988, the chief of the army staff asked Ghulam Ishaq Khan to take over as the President of Pakistan. Power, however, remained with the army and with a veneer of democracy it continued to be associated with government’s major decisions of political nature.

During the next ten years, four elections were held. These were ‘monitored’ by the army. The selection of the interim cabinets installed to ‘conduct’ the elections and to run the affairs of the country for a period of three months was approved by the chief of the army staff, funds were disbursed to politicians under the directions of the president by a team headed by a general in the president’s secretariat.

In one election I was waiting for the results and noticed that results from most of the remote areas of the country had been announced by midnight on TV but the result of a Rawalpindi constituency had not been announced. I telephoned the election commission and spoke with the secretary, election commission to enquire why, when results from remote areas had been announced, the result of the Rawalpindi constituency, right under their nose, had not been declared.

He replied that these results had not reached the election commission from the GHQ as yet. The results were announced late the next morning. I saw the chief of the army staff and inquired whether it was true that the election results were being sent to the election commission through the GHQ. He replied that this was correct but they were performing only a ‘monitoring’ role.

In another case, the army officer incharge of ‘monitoring’ the election in a district had given strict instructions that no result was to be sent to the GHQ without he being informed first. He had received no result from this district and was watching the election results on TV when he heard the announcement by the election commission that a particular politician of that district was declared successful with a large majority. He telephoned his subordinate and inquired why his instructions had been disobeyed and the results sent to the GHQ without he being informed first. He was told that no result had been sent to the GHQ as yet.

There are many examples of such manipulations, of the use of money and of other devious methods adopted in all the four elections, to show what a farce these elections have been. A former director-general of the Inter Services Intelligence directorate is on record as having said that he was responsible for the creation of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad in the 1988 elections. A former corps commander of Karachi had claimed that he had created the MQM Haqiqi. It is therefore no surprise that all the governments installed in this manner were beholden to the GHQ and took guidance from it when taking any major decision.

It was also a feature of this decade of a ‘sham democracy’ that the ‘opposition’, or the second ‘military alternative’ spent all its energies and attention to win the favours of the GHQ in their effort to try to oust the government by other than democratic means.

All governments during this period were dismissed for either ‘corruption or incompetence’ by the president using his special powers. While in office, the civilian governments wielded very little power and were in fact working under the guidance, if not the control of the GHQ. It was disclosed by a former minister in the PPP government in a PTV panel discussion recently, that no prime minister has ever been allowed to inspect the Kahuta nuclear installation or has been privy to its functions. Considering the quality of those who have been in government and their representative character, this is probably just as well.

Considering the subservience of the civilian government to the GHQ, the action taken by Nawaz Sharif in dismissing General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999 showed a lack of understanding on his part of the place of the prime minister in the power triangle in Pakistan. In spite of having installed a president of his choice and himself having selected the chief of army staff, he did not still have the power base to overrule the GHQ and the chief of army staff of his choice.

The government-run media and a generously fed press led him to overestimate his popularity and power and he forgot that with a turnout of 26 per cent in the 1997 elections, only about 15 per cent of the electorate had voted him to power. His wealth and generosity in distributing favours, including these to some generals, did not save him from the fate which was the result of his indiscretion. The coming election of October 2002 should therefore be seen in the light of our past experiences and the ground realities in Pakistan.

It would however be wrong to assume that the people of Pakistan do not want democracy or that they think that army rule is a better alternative. But the country has not experienced real democracy so far. Our experience of the last half century, the break-up of Pakistan, the absence of the Bengali factor in our politics and the Indian threat as perceived in Pakistan, are major factors that will always hinder the evolution of democracy in the country. As long as East Bengal was a part of Pakistan, there was a powerful political factor which could not be ignored.

This democratic pull was resented by some top generals in the army and the feudal class of West Pakistan. It was this thinking which led Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Yahya Khan to refuse to hand over power to an elected majority, thus causing a civil war and the dismemberment of the country.

After 1972, Pakistan has felt increasingly threatened by India. Although the political consciousness has grown and the urge for democracy among the people is real, they see the Pakistan armed forces as the only force that can save them from India’s aggressive designs. India’s handling of the Kashmir problem and the fate of the Muslims in India leave no doubt in problem and the fate of the Muslims in India leave no doubt in the people’s mind that the Pakistan armed forces alone can save them from this powerful threat.

No matter what political forces emerge in Pakistan, no matter what their performance, and no matter how well they conduct themselves, so long as the people of Pakistan perceive India as a threat to their existence, the armed forces of Pakistan will be seen as the saviour and no matter what the people’s political preferences, they will always look towards the armed forces for their security and survival.

Should India by a just settlement of the Kashmir problem and a change in its policy of persecuting the Muslims be able to show the vision and wisdom that they have so far lacked and should the people of Pakistan have no fear of an expansionist India, democracy will surely take root in Pakistan. If such a situation is created, the people’s representatives freely chosen, will assume their rightful role in national affairs. As long as the people of Pakistan perceive the Indian threat to be real, the armed forces in Pakistan will continue to enjoy the position of authority and trust, and it will be unreasonable to expect any political leadership to assume that position. Paradoxically as it may sound, therefore, the key to real democracy in Pakistan lies with India. So long as the present situation vis-a-vis India, lasts, a realistic balance between democratic institutions and military power in Pakistan, institutionalized and recognized by the Constitution would confer stability in an otherwise uncertain situation.

Whatever the moral strength of Pakistan position on the Kashmir issue it is not realistic to expect India to walk out of occupied Kashmir. The facade of a secular India would be exposed which India fears will lead to the strengthening of centrifugal forces in different parts of the country. A settlement on Pakistan’s terms, therefore is unlikely to be acceptable to India and if both countries maintain their stand on this issue, the Kashmir problem is likely to remain unresolved for another fifty to a hundred years. The chances are that before the end of this period, the only two nuclear powers with a common border, will destroy themselves in a senseless nuclear holocaust the likes of which the world has not seen.

Even if this did not happen, the population explosion alone would impose a burden on the economy of both the countries which they cannot bear when they are spending their meagre resources on non-productive expenditure. Both are purchasing expensive weapons of war; ships, aircraft and missiles from the US and western countries, helping to strengthen the economies of these countries and impoverishing themselves.

Pakistan’s population of 14 million will be 25 million in another 20 years and 50 million by 2050. India which is also expanding at this rate will have overtaken China and doubled its population in another 20 years. There will be millions dying from starvation in both countries while politicians continue to mislead their people. Even water will be scarce. It is a frightening prospect that we should address ourselves to.

If this is the prospect for the future, politicians especially those who claim to represent the people should seek a solution that may be different from what the two countries have been advocating all these years, but which is reasonable and holds the promise of a better future. The only solution that would not only resolve the Kashmir issue but also open the prospects of a bright future for all the people of the subcontinent is to agree to those parts of Kashmir which India and Pakistan hold to be one independent state with one legislature and one government. It should be a condominium. The three countries with whom Jammu and Kashmir has common borders, China, India and Pakistan, should guarantee the sanctity of the borders of Jammu and Kashmir. The new state of Jammu and Kashmir should have no armed forces and should only maintain a police force for internal security.

This will not burden the economy of the new Jammu and Kashmir with unnecessary defence expenditure. It would open up new vistas of co-operation for both India and Pakistan. Ideally both countries should give up nuclear weapons and convert themselves to non-nuclear powers. If India feels that it has a threat from China or if it needs nuclear weapons to pose as a world power, Pakistan should not make this a condition for giving up its nuclear weapons. Pakistan cannot be attacked by nuclear weapons when it has none of its own and it would in any case be more and not less secure.

The solution of the Kashmir problem in a manner which would meet the needs of both India and Pakistan, will open new opportunities of peace and prosperity for the people of the two countries. Will the leadership of these two countries rise above personal vanities and narrow political considerations? If they show the vision and the courage to do so, they will save their people from disaster and help the establishment of democracy in Pakistan.

The writer is a former chief of Pakistan Air Force.

THE people of Pakistan will go to polls on October 10 to elect their new civilian rulers but they will be more interested in knowing whether the new government will really make a difference for them as far as their day-to-day expenses are concerned.

In the past, after 1985, the major parties had raised high hopes of a better life for the masses in the successive polls but the latter got disillusioned each time when the winning parties failed to deliver what they had promised.

What the people got in real terms ware higher prices and more taxes, while the nation became more and more indebted and came to be known as the fifth to the second most corrupt country in the world. As the utility charges keep on rising and the taxes keep on spreading, — the latest is the parking fee of Rs 10 — the people are little optimistic about any relief as the new administration comes in under the umbrella of President Pervez Musharraf. But they prefer to be a part of the democratic world than be one of the few countries in the world under military rule. They can at least censure the government publicly without fear.

To be precise, most parties are incapable of delivering what they promise. No party has been able to win a simple majority in the National Assembly except the Muslim League under Nawaz Sharif’s leadership. But its leadership had the knack to tangle with other forces in the set up and be driven out of office twice. The PPP, though better organized could not win a simple majority in the National Assembly in 1988 or 1993.

Small parties do not take their economic commitments seriously, even when their slogans are loud and sometimes very attractive. They know they will not be asked by the people to implement them unless they are in office. So they can promise the sky to the voters.

The religious parties, which are too many are more interested in their religious slogans and commitments to enforce Islamic principles and practices as they deem fit.

The leaders of political parties are usually rich. Many of them are feudal lords and do not know what poverty or hunger is. Those not rich also become so in due course of time after coming into power. The religious parties too become resourceful by collecting Zakat and other contributions from their supporters. So they do not feel the urge to fight for poverty reduction earnestly.

Many of the political leaders do not understand modern economics nor make earnest efforts to study the subject. Some of them do have experts of some kind, including the PPP and the Jamaat-i-Islami. Before the PPP came into office the second time it had set up a committee of its economic experts who had many sittings. The programme it came out with was ambitious, but cold not implement it, except in small parts.

The fact is that for a country of 145 million people the available cash resources are small. And the efforts to increase them can be very frustrating due to the resistance of vested interests. Feudal lords, trade and industry and organized trade unions are among them. Secondly, the government has also to follow the dictates of the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank and other donors. The scope for free movement for a government in the economic sector is very narrow.

Year after year the government faces a mammoth budgetary deficit — about Rs 200 billion eventually or more in recent times. It is easy to project larger revenues but too difficult to achieve that so one year’s failed target becomes the next year’s target, and the governments are most of the time coping with what may be called survival economics, and pleasing the donors or soothing their rage at times has a higher priority over satisfying the basic needs of the people.

The basic problem of each government has been that it can’t increase the revenues substantially or reduce the expenditure considerably. While the economy has not been expanding fast enough in recent years particularly the tax paying sectors, the expenditure has been rising.

In spite of the liberal aid received after September 11 and the debt write-off and re-scheduling, and the reduction in interest rates of domestic debt, the debt servicing cost this year is to be Rs 290 billion, a drop of Rs 30 billion or half a billion dollars from last year’s debt servicing cost. Viewed against these facts, the tax revenue target this year is to be Rs 460 billion. This is a very large amount and hamstrings all political leaders and finance ministers. Then when the total debt, including domestic debt, is around Rs 4,000 billion, such a huge debt servicing, particularly interest payments of Rs 192 billion domestic debt becomes imperative.

The government wants to reduce interest rate on public debt particularly on the national savings schemes and the depositors are outraged. And their protests are sharp. Will the elected rulers continue reducing the interest rates or let them remain stay put where they are? The political leaders do not believe the inflation rate has come down as low as the government claims — between 4 and 5 per cent in a year. The IMF and the World Bank too have been pressuring the government to bring down the national savings rate to the lower bank rates so that there can be one uniform interest rate.

The second major item of expenditure is defence on which Rs 146 billion is to be spent this year after that had risen to Rs 151 billion last year. In addition, there is the defence-related expenditure in the civilian sector which is not specified in the budget.

A third item on which there has been a great deal of emphasis in recent years is downsizing the government which is euphemistically called right-sizing. That means throwing out a lot of people from government service for which the government has not been ready. The elected leaders are likely to sack even less people, particularly when alternate employment is not available. When it comes to golden hand share the very large sum needed is not forthcoming. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, which are pressing the government for downsizing its structure are willing to provide some amount of money for the golden handshake and not all the money needed.

The political leaders on assuming office would want to increase employment than reduce the number of the already employed, particularly in the face of the increasing unemployment suicides. And that can bring in a conflict between the new government and he IMF and World Bank.

As a result of such compulsions small amounts are available for social sector development, education and public health. International agencies supplemented those resources in the past through Social Action Programmes I and II. But a good deal of that money was wanted. So the donors want more effective social programmes? There has to be far less of ghost schools and ghost teachers and ghost hospitals and more effective public service.

According to the proposals under consideration the Auditor-General is to be strong and assertive and the Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly is to be vigilant and effective. The National Accountability Bureau too is to be diligent and report major causes in which action is not taken to the National Security Council.

Political leaders tend to be slack when taking action against politicians, particularly those who belong to their parties and those who support them politically. Will it be different this time and political leaders will stand up for principles and not for the erring partymen?

The success of the next government would depend on the extent of cooperation it gets from trade and industry, particularly the investors who have to create employment on the one hand and increase production on the other, which would mean larger tax payments.

During the Benazir period she could not get the full support of businessmen, although she tried. The people thought businessmen would be more cooperative during the term of Nawaz Sharif, particularly after the privatization and de-regulation were undertaken in the financial sector. But he did not have much of a success.

While Nawaz Sharif was the prime minister, his brother Shahbaz Sharif was the chief minister of the Punjab. He has also businessmen as governors, including Mumnoon Hussain in Sindh. He had plenty of businessmen in the federal and provincial cabinet. Despite that the businessmen said he does not understand business. He knew only SRO business, they said, which helped his family.