BEFORE the United States of America launched its assault on Afghanistan last year, it was initially suggested by Islamabad that its assistance would be limited to allowing the use of Pakistani airspace. That fiction could not be maintained for very long.

From the Musharraf administration’s point of view, a reasonably strong case could probably be made for extenuating circumstances: Pakistan lacks a tradition of independence in international affairs, and Washington wasn’t in any mood to take no for an answer.

The success — after considerable carnage and amid continuing uncertainty — in replacing the Taliban with a favoured regime in Kabul has whetted the American appetite for “regime change”. It is a game that the US has enjoyed playing for many decades, often using subversion and bribery as means of installing favoured generals, businessmen or politicians in power. However, seldom before has it been able to pursue its goals so openly. And next on its menu is the Bush family’s favourite hunting ground.

Although its services may not be required in this context — certainly not to the extent they were in Afghanistan — Pakistan will, sooner or later, have to make clear where it stands vis-a-vis the coming American invasion of Iraq. Plain common sense dictates that Washington’s plans for Baghdad ought to be resisted in no uncertain terms. Not because Saddam Hussein’s insalubrious regime is worth defending, but because the idea of powerful nations determining, through the use of military force, how weaker countries are run is worth opposing.

Besides, even if the matter is viewed purely from the perspective of self-interest, it would be profoundly unwise of Islamabad to accept Washington’s “pre-emptive self-defence” justification. The dubious legality of the concept is unlikely to deter the US from pursuing the path to which it has committed itself, and once the deed is done, regardless of how much bloodshed it involves, a dangerous precedent will have been established. It will be a precedent that Israel may well invoke if Ariel Sharon decides to decapitate the Palestinian leadership. And it will make available to India a ready excuse for incursions into Pakistani territory.

The US once considered Saddam a useful bulwark against the influence of the Iranian mullas. That changed 12 years ago, with the Iraqi dictator’s military takeover of Kuwait. Following the UN-sanctioned, US-led reversal of that invasion, Saddam was not only allowed to remain in power, he was left with sufficient forces under his command to ruthlessly put down uprisings by Iraqi Shias and Kurds — rebellions that the US propaganda machinery had helped to foment. Saddam has since then remained high on the list of American enemies, being eclipsed in recent years only by Osama bin Laden and, briefly, Slobodan Milosevic.

As for Osama bin Laden, one doesn’t hear much about him these days. Which, come to think of it, is a trifle surprising, given that we were led to believe his capture — or elimination — was the primary objective of the military campaign in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda continues to serve its purpose as a bugbear. But American efforts to establish a connection between that organization and Saddam have been conclusively discredited. Nor has any link emerged between Baghdad and the anthrax-contaminated mail that added to American fears in the wake of September 11.

So, what has Saddam done lately to incur the wrath of Uncle Sam? Well, nothing actually. Even the allegation that he is likely to possess some weapons of mass destruction is tempered by the charge that, well, even if he doesn’t, he’s bound to try and obtain them, and he may succeed one day, so let’s finish him off now. And if tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis perish in the process, that’s just too bad.

Iraq’s stocks of biological and chemical weapons — which Saddam had used against Kurds and Iranians in the 1980s, without exciting much concern in Washington, but did not deploy during the confrontation with the US — were destroyed after the previous Gulf war. It’s possible that his scientists have been able to replenish the stocks in the four years since weapons inspectors left the country, despite sanctions that deny Iraq desperately needed drugs and medical equipment, lest they be put to military use. That would mean that the sanctions have not only contributed directly to the deaths of at least a million Iraqis, most of them children, but they have also failed to prevent Saddam from rearming.

But evidence of such weapons is circumstantial at best, and it is almost certain that Iraq does not own anything resembling a nuclear bomb. Even if it did, it is unlikely in the extreme that Baghdad would ever have contemplated using it against the US. A murderous tyrant Saddam may be, but he is not a suicide bomber. So, how does he pose a threat to the US? He does not appear to have any designs on any of Iraq’s neighbours either. He has mended fences with most of them in recent years. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran favours an attack. Even Kuwait is opposed to the idea.

The US would obviously like to replace the Takritis with a pliable, pro-western regime, preferably one that can aspire to some sort of legitimacy. But that’s easier said than done in view of the fractured opposition and competing interests, not to mention the unpredictable consequences of the dynamics of warfare.

One of the main Kurdish factions has indicated that it would be willing to instigate hostilities on America’s behalf. It stands to reason that the Kurds will want a reward at the end of the day — if not an independent state, then at least substantial autonomy within a federated Iraq. However, such a solution would upset not just Iran but also Turkey — the latter a longstanding US ally and a member of Nato, which has systematically discriminated against Kurds as doggedly as any Iraqi regime.

At 45 million strong, the Kurds are the world’s largest ethnic group without a state of their own. No power has even shown any interest in correcting this historical anomaly. Turkey has denied them the most basic rights, while Iraq and Iran have used them as cannon fodder. Now the US is about to do the same.

The Kurdish conundrum is by no means the only reason for suspicions that an American invasion of Iraq will destabilize much of the Middle East. The Gulf monarchies, which have traditionally allied themselves with the US, are particularly vulnerable, but the ripples could travel right across the region.

The general standard of governance in the Middle East would appear to suggest that a bit of a shake-up may be of some benefit. The trouble is that in most countries the only viable opposition consists of Islamists of varying hues. A fundamentalist ascendancy could oblige Washington to extend its notional “axis of evil” right up to North Africa. That could hardly be an exciting prospect even for the most hawkish American strategic planners, given that their primary interest in the region is two-fold: guaranteeing an uninterrupted supply of oil and Israel’s defence.

One of the chief reasons Washington has been salivating in anticipation of a regime change in Baghdad is that a puppet administration coupled with a US military presence would mean ready access to Iraqi oil — and a considerably reduced dependence on supplies from Saudi Arabia. The Bush administration has been going out of its way to placate the ruling family in Riyadh after Rand Corporation analyst Laurent Murawiec described Saudi Arabia as “the kernel of evil” in a presentation to a high-level government advisory board and suggested that if it could not be brought to heel, it should be targeted by the US.

This may indeed not be the administration’s view — not so far, at least — but it is indicative of changing perspectives among right-wing strategists, the very people who were once more than happy to accept Saudi support and cash in on the pursuit of purportedly anti-communist goals. After all, there is a much more logical case to be made for a Saudi-Al Qaida nexus than for any connection between Baghdad and the September 11 hijackers.

Meanwhile, it is at least equally significant that the US is rapidly losing international support in its vendetta against Saddam. France and Germany have all but dissociated themselves from the venture. The British and Australian prime ministers are still parroting the White House line, but amid declining public confidence in their ability to make the right decision. Tony Blair may even have to contend with a serious revolt within his cabinet.

Russia and China have displayed little interest in targeting Iraq. Most crucially, the Bush regime’s motives and plans are increasingly being questioned in the US Congress and by the American media as well as by military strategists. Even George W. Bush has been forced, as a consequence, to temper his rhetoric, although his intentions are unlikely to have changed.

The main exception to this trend is Israel, which is keen for its protector-in-chief to get on with the job. It is true that if Saddam has any dangerous weapons (and delivery systems) he is likelier to lob them in Israel’s direction than anywhere else. But it is highly improbable that he would do so without an obvious provocation — that is, as a last resort. The first US strike could serve that purpose.

Neither that danger, nor the absence of a clear-cut casus belli, is likely to change Bush’s mind. Nor would one expect any compunctions on the basis that his family already has too much Iraqi blood on its hands. His administration may even be able to arm-twist the UN Security Council into sanctioning its aggression. Iraqi efforts to negotiate the return of arms inspectors will most probably come to naught.

Pakistan would do well to steer completely clear of the coming firestorm. It may not be a simple task in view of Islamabad’s entanglement with American strategic goals in the Afghan context, and its determination to keep the US on side in the conflict with India. But a declaration of independence — perhaps a suitable subtle one — is the only respectable option. The alternative would be an abiding sense of guilt and shame, an indelible stain on the national conscience. It’s not a price worth paying — not for aligning ourselves with what is indisputably an indefensible cause.

mahirali@journalist.com

SINCE the emergency Loya Jirga held in June this year, the situation in Afghanistan has been evolving rapidly along several fronts. The war against terrorism, which is the primary concern of the US, is entering into a final phase, and spilling into Pakistan’s tribal areas along the porous frontier with Afghanistan.

The political infighting has been intensified, after the Jirga, and affects the primary task of Afghan reconstruction, which has yet to be launched in right earnest. Given the impact of the Afghan scenario on Pakistan, there has been lively interest in the emerging situation, that is being considered by think tanks, and is the subject of lively discussions even at the popular level.

Perhaps the most wide-ranging discussion took place in a regional seminar organized recently by FRIENDS with the collaboration of the Hanns Seidel Foundation at Islamabad with the participation of five senior representatives from Kabul, and of scholars from Russia, China, Iran, Germany and Pakistan. At this forum, and in other subsequent discussions, it was generally agreed that the main challenge facing the international community was that of reconstruction in the war-ravaged country. However this could not be faced effectively unless peace and security had been established. This required addressing the challenge of establishing a broad-based government whose writ would extend to all parts of the country.

The war against terrorism had resulted in further destruction, and it was incumbent on the worldwide coalition against terrorism to accord a high priority to the rehabilitation of the Afghan economy. The promotion of peace and stability is not only imperative for the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, but would also facilitate the exploitation of the rich resources of Central Asia for which the country provides a natural corridor. Conversely, an unstable Afghanistan is likely to remain a source of a wide variety of problems for the entire region.

The Jirga was undoubtedly a landmark development, even though the arrangements were far from perfect. The main weakness was the poor representation of the largest ethnic group, the Pakhtuns, who have traditionally ruled the country. This was because of the dominating role of the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, on whom the US relies heavily. However, the fact remains that Hamid Karzai, a Pakhtun, was elected president, and as former deputy foreign minister Jamil Shams observed, the Jirga was a step in the right direction, and provided the foundation on which to build the policies of reform and reconstruction. The fact that emerged during the Jirga was that the shots were called by the US through Zalmay Khalilzad, President Bush’s special representative in Afghanistan.

The basic task of economic reconstruction cannot get under way, unless the institutions to provide security and an effective administration are in place. After the departure of the Taliban, whose remnants are being hunted together with those of the Al Qaeda network, the country is in a virtual state of anarchy, with warlords establishing their sway in different parts. The US, which does not favour expanding the role of the International Security Assistance Force, has chosen to rely on the warlords, both to pursue its anti-terrorist campaign, and to maintain law and order till the country’s own military and police forces have been trained. Given its dominant role, the US will determine the course of developments in the political, economic and security affairs in Afghanistan, with other members of the coalition playing a secondary role.

The key to establishing a modicum of security lies in the creation of a National Afghan Army. As Gen. Amin Nooristani observed at the Islamabad seminar, there are 10,000 Afghans claiming the rank of general, but very few troops on the ground. Another Afghan, Dr. Sultan Aziz, special adviser to the UN representative in Afghanistan observed that the creation of an 80,000 strong Afghan army was agreed during meetings in Geneva held after the Bonn Accord. Its main components will be an army of 60,000, an air force of 8000, and border security forces numbering 12,000. Since only 16,000 members can be trained every year, its formation will take five years.

The ethnic rivalries and, in particular, the position of power acquired by the Tajik Panjshiris in the current setup in Kabul are obstructing progress towards the establishment of an effective governmental apparatus in the capital, and in extending its writ to the far corners of the war-ravaged country. What should come first: the economic reconstruction that will create peaceful avenues of employment for the multitudes now serving warlords, or a generally acceptable political dispensation that will utilize the promised foreign aid effectively for development is the point at issue.

For the present, there is little enthusiasm for investing funds exceeding $4.5 billion that were promised at Tokyo in January, because conditions on the ground are still chaotic. The Karzai government drew up a budget of $455 million, but had resources of just about $80 million, leaving a deficit of $375 million. Several governments, including that of Pakistan, have made cash donations to enable the government in Kabul to function.

Two Pakhtun Ministers of Karzai’s government have been assassinated, one before the Loya Jirga, and the other after it, with the finger of suspicion pointing to the Panjshiris, though Al Qaeda could also be blamed. The government departments in Kabul are said to have been infiltrated with Tajiks, and both their efficiency and credibility remains low. Virtually all institutions, judicial, administrative and technical, have to be created from scratch, with heavy reliance on technocrats returning from abroad.

As various ethnic groups contend for representation, there is controversy about their relative strength in the population. For instance, the Pakhtuns claim to be 62 per cent of the population but Tajik leaders put their strength at 35 per cent. A national census is therefore an early requirement.

In creating the conditions conducive to security and development, the regional powers have to play a major role, with a special responsibility to the neighbours. With its 2,500 kilometre long border with this landlocked country, and deep historical and cultural ties, Pakistan cannot escape playing a key role, both bilaterally, and in facilitating the aid from regional and global players.

However, in the context of recent history, during which there was a trend to seek strategic depth through close relations with Kabul, the new relationship must be based on non-interference. Apart from the US, which is expected to continue its dominant role, there are many others interested in Afghanistan. Indeed it can be stated that a new ‘great game’ is starting in the region that includes Central Asia, Afghanistan and the adjoining region.

The EU has played a role in facilitating the Bonn Accord, and has a stake in the rich resources of Central Asia, that is shared by other developed countries, notably Japan. Russia’s involvement in Afghanistan has been manifest through the centuries of the earlier ‘great game’. China is another major power that shares a border with Afghanistan. Other countries that are anxious to reassert their influence in this strategically vital country include Iran and India.

Apprehensions have been expressed that Pakistan may be at a disadvantage, at least in the near future, in playing its natural role as an important neighbour. This is because it had alienated the Northern Alliance during the years it backed the Taliban, and had now lost the goodwill of the Pakhtuns by joining in the US-led war against the mainly Pakhtun Taliban. However, facts of geography and history demand good-neighbourly relations between the two countries. Not only has Pakistan provided sanctuary to over three million Afghans over the past two decades, but also its communication facilities remain vital to any reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Given the close ethnic links between the Pakhtun tribes straddling the long border that a relationship of hostility is virtually unthinkable.

Both President Musharraf and President Karzai have shown awareness of the need to develop a cordial relationship, and have evolved a close rapport. Despite its own problems and needs, Pakistan has pledged $100 million in aid, and has also rendered critical assistance with food supplies. In addition, a considerable proportion of help from other sources is being extended preferential transit facilities. Despite its strained relations with New Delhi, Pakistan has provided transit support to Indian aid for Afghanistan, including a fleet of buses donated for Kabul.

It was expected that the reconstruction process in Afghanistan would provide opportunities for Pakistani exporters and artisans. Though private builders from the border regions have participated actively in the work of repairing housing in Kabul and elsewhere, the anticipated boom in such activity has yet to materialize. The internal situation inside Afghanistan, and notably the concentration of anti-terrorist operations in eastern Afghanistan, which are spilling into our tribal areas, has affected the situation. The promised aid by the foreign donors has been slow to materialize.

One can expect that there would be an improvement in this regard before long, so that the long suffering Afghan people can benefit from the fruits of reconstruction. There has been a rapid exodus of Afghan refugees from Pakistan back to their country, and UNHCR figures indicate that over a million Afghan refugees have already gone back. One fact, which is said to be emerging as a negative factor in the return of the refugees, and the resumption of trade with Afghanistan, is the level of corruption at the lower level among our officials at the border.

Both refugees returning home and the transporters bringing goods are harassed as all branches of authority at the border seek to capitalize on the bonanza. Many Afghan traders now prefer to use Iranian transit facilities since there is no hassle or extortion. This is a matter that needs to be addressed with firmness.

The long-term prospects for Pakistan-Afghanistan relations are fairly bright. In the current phase, the anti-terrorist operations have to be handled with due regard to the sensitivities of the population along the border. The return of peace and stability in Afghanistan will facilitate the return of the remaining Afghan refugees to their homes, and also lead to an expansion of trade as well as multilateral cooperation. The endemic corruption at the border must end if the full potential of bilateral as well as transit trade is to be realized. Pakistan can step up its participation in the ECO-sponsored projects, and explore other arrangements such as the proposed Pakistan-Afghanistan-Turkmenistan gas pipeline on which agreement was reached at a summit meeting of the countries concerned.

The regional seminar in Islamabad, as well as other recent moots, have all urged the implementation of the Bonn Accords to facilitate the return of Afghanistan to normalcy which is also in our national interest. No less important is the fulfilment of the pledges of financial assistance made by the international community to Afghanistan. Doubts are sometimes raised whether the US and its western allies will remain engaged in Afghanistan long enough for the return of peace and prosperity. Pakistan, whose destiny is inextricably linked with that of Afghanistan, must maintain its traditional friendly approach without any hint of our wanting to interfere in its internal affairs. We need also to exert our influence with our friends in the Islamic world, as well as the larger global community, in favour of a positive and helpful attitude to this war-ravaged land. Only then shall we have peace and stability along our western border.

NOW that we are playing international cricket again, albeit at a place where the game is unknown and the number of spectators is barely more than the number of players on the field, I ask myself what has happened to the Pakistani people’s dependence on divine blessing for winning matches?

Have we really become more rational or have the people lost their zest for cricket? I wonder how many of you remember the fact that when the Pakistan team won a test match in South Africa some years ago, its members prostrated themselves on the ground to thank the Almighty for His bounty. While it was decent of them to be humble (though they need not have made an exhibition of it) this was nothing compared to the frenzy the nation went through when it was in the midst of the World Cup in Australia. Even the then prime minister (Ms Benazir Bhutto) called upon the nation to pray for a final win.

Nothing surprising in all this. It was only symptomatic of the fact that the Muslim population of Pakistan, from the top boss to the common man, is firm in its credo: let’s not make any effort but just pray for things to happen our way. It is just not possible that Allah will ignore our wishes if we only remember to say Insha’Allah every time we want something to happen.

As children we were taught: “God helps those who help themselves.” Apparently this no longer holds good for Pakistanis. God is supposed to help us even if we do not lift one little finger to help ourselves.

To go back to cricket, nothing helped more to confirm my thesis than the way we behaved during the crucial match with India in Bangalore some years ago. Mass prayers were held all over the country to request the Almighty to grant us success. Even the ulema, who used to condemn cricket as frivolous entertainment, joined in the hysteria. And when we lost we wouldn’t tire of looking for scapegoats. The question is, why couldn’t we reconcile ourselves to God’s will, and also look at our faults?

If our faith teaches us to pray and ask Allah to fulfil our desires it also teaches us to submit to His decisions and accept that they were the bets and in our interest. Maybe by not granting a particular wish He meant to teach us a lesson. Though you may have noticed that we are not very good at learning lessons. No other sporting event had excited so much comment as that match in Bangalore. Even politicians had their say. Those of the official persuasion tended to remain glum, but the opposition found in it a good opportunity to blast the ruling regime. Nobody thought of God’s will and our team’s failings.

Some public figures conjured up truly weird reasons for the disappointing result. I shall never forget the comment of Chaudhry Shujaat Husain, a pillar of the PML(N), who really took the cake. In a burst of enlightenment he pronounced the verdict that “the PTV song which boasted that we must win, did not contain the word Insha’Allah. That is why we lost.” This is the man who aspires to become prime minister of Pakistan.

Maybe if this deficiency in the song had been rectified in time we would have come back from the grim encounter bathed in glory. But, as a wag aptly put it, “How does Chaudhry Sahib know that Mohammad Azharuddin had not said Insha‘Allah before PTV could have thought of it?”

If we go by prevailing beliefs, even a weak team sent to Bangalore to play that cricket match would have won if every Muslim in the country had recited Insha’Allah day and night. That this would have amounted to making fun of religion and treating the will of God as something that can be manipulated, would have bothered no one. How deep is our capacity for blindness in such matters? As Muslims do we need to be told what insha’Allah actually means?

Politicians in the country generally styled as the opposition have been shouting themselves hoarse for almost two years now that the military regime headed by General Pervez Musharraf is about to surrender to the public will and go back to the barracks. It is a different matter that their harangues are causing no dent in its armour. Maybe they forgot to say Insha’Allah every time they wished the khakis to disappear like a bad dream.

There is power in prayer if the prayer is imbued with sincerity and devotion. Prayer is not a mantra or abracadabra or a magical incantation intoned selfishly to obtain petty ends. Supplication to God is supposed to be for higher things, matters of life and death, and that too when we are sure that we have done our best and now wait for God to decide. As I see it, asking God for victory in war makes sense, but begging for a win in a cricket match with India is as bad as praying for a commercial plot in Islamabad’s Blue Area.

We have to be positive in our minds that we have done all that was required of us to remain cricketing champions, and then expect God to guide the national team to victories. That is, if we must bring God into it at all. Cricket is like any other game, and our team is like any other team. What were the divine intentions involved when the great West Indians lost a match to the puny Indians? Or do we believe that God is interested in cricket only when Pakistan is playing? And must He play our game for us? I have a feeling that many of my readers are not going to like what I have said. I shall be really sorry if that happens. But that would only mean on thing: that my faith in the Almighty is not dictated by the result of an important cricket match or by the number of times I say Insha’Allah. Speaking personally, I do say Insha’Allah many times during the day. Which means that I leave my affairs in His hands and don’t go berserk if His will does not coincide with my wishes.

AUGUST 6, 1945 saw the dropping of the first nuclear bomb in history by the United States on Hiroshima, reducing that city in an instant to a scorched expanse of rubble, causing loss of thousands of lives and effectively ending the city’s existence as a functioning entity.

On August 9, another bomb was dropped on Nagasaki causing similar devastation. It is believed that, in Hiroshima, 45,000 persons died on the very first day and another 19,000 during the subsequent four months. In Nagasaki, 22,000 persons lost their lives on the first day and a further 17,000 within the following four months.

The energy which these bombs released caused immediate fires, horrendous blasts and extreme local exposure to radiation. It, moreover, caused cancer and leukaemia and its effects on foetuses resulted in birth deformities.

The effects of radiation continue to threaten the lives of the survivors even after the passage of more than fifty years. The ionizing radiation also has the potential to cause genetic defects and various illnesses in future generations.

The dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an inexcusable crime against humanity. The passage of time has not healed the wounds inflicted on the people of these two cities. Regrettably, however, nations and governments have apparently not learnt any lesson from the terrible experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as some of them continue to frantically engage in nuclear arms races which are bound to prove inestimably destructive. The existence and development of nuclear weapons, which by their very nature are destructive beyond any rational requirement of war, pose serious threats to humanity.

The horrific experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has proved that human beings cannot coexist with nuclear weapons. In case of a nuclear exchange between two states, countless people would die instantly in these countries and hundreds of thousands would be exposed to potentially lethal levels of radiation.

Nuclear weapons do not recognize international borders. People living in countries hundreds of miles away will also be affected. In the words of the prominent writer and analyst, Russel D. Hoffman, “a nuclear war is never anything less than genocide”.

One of the cardinal principles of warfare is that the civilian population must never be made the object of an attack. Accordingly, warring states should never use weapons which do not distinguish between civilian and military targets as is the case with nuclear weapons. Such use will be a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides that every human being has the right to life.

According to this Covenant, this right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. The plea taken by some nuclear states that the Covenant in question seeks to protect human rights only in peace time has already been rejected by the International Court of Justice which ruled that civil and political rights do not cease in times of war.

Nuclear weapons have the potential of destroying all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet. The radiation released by a nuclear explosion would affect human health, agriculture, natural resources and demography over a wide area beyond the bounds of calculable time and space. The international treaties and instruments, therefore, specifically prohibit the employment of methods or means of warfare which are intended or are expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.

A UN General Assembly resolution, adopted on November 25, 1992, also lays emphasis on the protection of environment in the event of an armed conflict and categorically states that the destruction of environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, will be contrary to the international law. The existing international law relating to the protection of environment makes it incumbent upon the states to take environmental factors into account while taking a decision on the type of weapons they intend to use in an armed conflict.

In order to lessen or eliminate the risk of an attack, the states possessing nuclear weapons sometimes signal that they can use them in self-defence against any state violating their territorial integrity or political independence. They maintain that recourse to nuclear weapons could be justified only if their survival was at stake.

However, the nuclear states probably realize that nuclear weapons are not actually weapons of war but only a deterrent.

The fact that, since 1945, nuclear weapons have not been used confirms this fact. It also means that the states do not have an unfettered freedom of choice of weapons they may use in an armed conflict.

Pakistan never wanted to become a nuclear state. However, when India carried out nuclear tests in May 1998 and followed them up with extremely provocative statements by its leaders, who held out threats of aggression against this country, Pakistan had no choice but to respond by testing and demonstrating its nuclear capability in order to correct the nuclear imbalance in the subcontinent. Pakistan’s only interest was to maintain a minimum nuclear deterrence in the interest of its national security and territorial integrity. It has already declared a unilateral moratorium on further nuclear tests.

Pakistan, however, feels that complete elimination of nuclear weapons by it and by India was necessary to avert the threat of a nuclear war between them. Motivated by this consideration, Pakistan has already proposed to make South Asia a nuclear free zone.

Thus, it has reaffirmed its commitment to restraint and responsibility despite India’s continued obduracy and belligerence which has created tension and a war-like atmosphere in the region.

Unfortunately, Pakistan’s bold and constructive initiative has not been reciprocated by India.

For obvious reasons, this country cannot give up its nuclear capability unilaterally and thus become vulnerable to Indian aggression.