August 10, 2002	Saturday	Jamadi-ul-Awwal 30,1423

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NEW DELHI, Aug 9: The Kargil conflict showed up major chinks in India’s military preparedness but also led to the diplomatic isolation of Pakistan which was seen as the aggressor, a US intelligence report was quoted by an Indian news group on Friday as saying.

Rediff.com online news agency quoted the Joint Intelligence Centre of the US Pacific Command as saying that weaknesses in the Indian military preparedness were not likely to be rectified quickly due to a paucity of funds.

The report, made available exclusively to the news group, said: “The new (Indian) tactics of massive artillery preparation preceding a ground advance proved successful but placed great strains on Indian logistics.”

The uphill, daylight assaults proved costly in casualties, it said, and noted that consequently, India plans to secure more individual night vision devices.

The report acknowledged that “developing a capability to move units under cover of darkness and attack with little warning will restore some tactical flexibility to units throughout the Indian army.”

It said: “Though costly, India’s preponderance of manpower and equipment eventually ensured victory. All the services realised that Kargil was a measuring stick to gauge the capabilities of their forces.”

India used frontal assaults supported by limited artillery in the first weeks of the conflict. After suffering heavy casualties with little success, it took several weeks to build up the troops and equipment needed to launch an effective counterattack. The Indian army began its offensive in the first week of June and, using high volumes of artillery fire and supported by Indian Air Force strikes, Indian army troops recaptured the heights in the Drass and Kargil area.

“Acclimatising troops for fighting in Kargil was a stumbling block to operations,” the report noted and said “it takes about a month for troops to acclimate to the altitude, let alone fight.”

The report, dated Sept 14, 1999 — a month before Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was deposed in an army take over by Gen Pervez Musharraf, the architect behind Pakistan’s foray into Kargil — said the lack of key cold weather equipment “forced India to commit ill-equipped troops in the harsh mountainous terrain that led to the Indians learning ‘hard lessons’ about ‘jointness’ and the conduct of ‘close air support in mountainous terrain.”

“Although the crisis was primarily an Indian Army and Indian Air Force affair, the Indian Navy took several steps to prepare for an expansion of the crisis, helping to prevent a widening of hostilities to the maritime realm.”

The report said while the international community remained largely neutral publicly, “most nations tacitly acknowledged Pakistan as the aggressor in Kargil.”

It said: “India’s restraint during the Kargil conflict earned it significant diplomatic accolades and increased Pakistan’s isolation.”

The report said the crisis had demanded that the Indian Air Force venture into new territory and opined that the difficult targeting conditions and operational constraints would help force the IAF to shift its doctrine to a ‘more modern, flexible, and precise use of airpower.’

The Joint Intelligence Center report predicted that “India’s defence establishment and the government will use Kargil to justify increased defence spending, but given India’s other economic challenges, only a modest after-inflation increase will likely materialize.”

“Despite this modest increase in defence spending spawned by Kargil, overcoming years of inadequate funding and limited modernization will continue to challenge the Indian armed forces to prepare for future conflicts.

“As a result, the defence weaknesses underscored by Kargil will not be rectified quickly,” the report said.