EMPHASIS on ‘national interest’ assumed the dominant note of President Pervez Musharraf’s wide-ranging exposition of his proposed constitutional amendments, in Islamabad on July 25. Now, what exactly ‘national interest’ is and who determines it.

In the famous Socratic Catechism, Thrasymachus calls justice ‘the interest of the stronger party’. In any debate on the definition of ‘national interest’ one would arrive at the same conclusion more or less. The individual or group (party) in power lays down the rules to break or observe them according to their perceived notion and preferred definition of national interest.

An essentially undefinable term, national interest may well be and, not too unoften, is interpreted (and depending on the ‘interest of the stronger party’) moulded accordingly to mean only what it should at a given point of time. More than an ethical concept or a legal norm, it acquires a pragmatic value as a part of realpolitik and routine statecraft.

In Pakistan perhaps the most flexible, almost ludicrous, definition of ‘national interest’ was aired, in full view of a TV audience, in December 1971 after the military surrender at Dhaka. A BBC documentary on the tragic event was telecast by our own PTV. It might have been a bold attempt to let the nation face up to the grim reality and learn a lesson or two from that.

As might have been expected, however, the weird telecast created a furore in the armed forces still deployed all along the border at full post-ceasefire alert. Army chief Lt-Gen Gul Hassan Khan personally lodged a strong protest with President Bhutto, urging him to withdraw the documentary forthwith. The president accepted the army chief’s plea and got his law minister, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, to explain the dual circumstances governing the release and withdrawal of the documentary.

Mr Pirzada’s response to his TV anchorman, in each case, was ‘in supreme national interest’. The decision to telecast the film was as much in ‘supreme national interest’ as the one to withdraw it, he said.

The expression (supreme) ‘national interest’ dominates the president’s recent statement in support of his intended constitutional reforms. And just as well; for as a thoroughbred soldier and elected head of state, nothing would matter to him more than ‘national interest’. One’s only reservation on this score would be: how to define national interest? Whether as a precept universally shared by all citizens regardless of personal likes and dislikes or as something exclusive to the man on the horseback or the civilian in authority.

Regarding the authority and the standing of the prime minister under the new order, President Musharraf said: he (the prime minister) would not be allowed to indulge in corrupt practices and he would have to be a “very responsible” person. About the role and power of elected parliament in either reversing or rejecting his proposed constitutional amendments, he said: if the amendments made in national interest were rejected by the elected body, “we will take this seriously... and would not allow mala fide intentions to amend the Constitution. But if the intentions “are good, we will see ...”.

Now who are we? We the people of Pakistan or we on the pulpit or in the seat of supreme authority? In any case, what is the dividing line between intentions — mala fide and intentions, bona fide? Allah Almighty alone knows what might be at the bottom of one’s heart. Even Christ at the Last Supper wouldn’t know what Judas had at the back of his mind.

Questioning the bona fide intent of the amendments ‘introduced by the assemblies’ in the past, the president said that those were made on “short notice and for personal and party interest.” The 13 amendments enacted since the adoption of the 1973 Constitution should bear ample witness to the presidential argument. However, whether such constitutional aberrations could for ever be prevented or pre-empted remains a moot point.

The efficacy, in fact, the very raison d’etre of the future assemblies would depend on their own institutional strength and assertive character vis-a-vis the ‘interest of the stronger party,’ an individual or a group. The legislative / constituent assemblies of the past found themselves pitifully helpless against strong individuals like Ghulam Mohammad and Gen Ayub Khan. The fate of the assemblies (and prime ministers’) between 1977 and 1999 had been as grim and unfortunate.

The president took particular notice of the political environment during the past 12 years accounting for Benazir’s and Nawaz Sharif’s two terms each, as prime ministers between 1988 and 1999. Unfortunately and, equally painfully, both returned to power with thumping majorities only to throw those away. Mian Nawaz Sharif, in particular, enjoyed an unprecedented two-thirds majority in the house which he wantonly threw away like a valuable wicket on an excellent batting pitch.

While both Ms Bhutto’s and Mr Sharif’s performance as prime minister might have been (and was) exceptionally poor, their predecessors’ were hardly better ever since the assassination of prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Such had been the bane and the misfortune of Pakistan’s political and constitutional history. After the consistently dismal past, one, therefore, could only wish history would not be repeating itself in the years to come.

The question now staring us in the face and calling for a positive answer pertains to the root-cause of the downfall of so many of our elected governments. Whether to lay it at the door of mala fide intent or to attribute it simply to lack of will, skill and imagination to serve ‘national interest’ to the best of our ability.

On a more charitable view, perhaps, the failure to serve national interest could be attributed to such errors of judgment as are often unavoidable in human affairs regardless of the pull of bona fide intent.

Yet another serious reservation about a generally acceptable and enduring definition of national interest arises from the question as to who lays it down. Unless under the fundamental law of the land, as defined and defended by the supreme judicial authority, the term ‘national interest’ must remain perilously open to the preferred interpretation of the individual or group in power at a given point of time.

No matter how unselfish, non-partisan and patriotic the ruling authority might be, it can hardly be above the instinct of self-preservation under law, if possible, and above it, if necessary. Hence the pernicious doctrine of necessity.

A sorrier state of affairs would be hard to imagine if we are still looking for a working definition of ‘national interest’ in the 55th year of our national independence.

The writer is a retired brigadier