Hiring and firing of PMs

GENERAL Musharaf’s government has invited a national debate on the merits of the constitutional amendments it has recently unveiled. A widespread disapproval of his proposals is emerging. The critics argue that, in the first place, the general has no right to change the Constitution; and second that, even if he does, the Supreme Court’s authorization in this regard does not allow him to change our governmental system from the parliamentary to the presidential type, which the proposed amendments will do.

Much depends on the mode by which the amendments are made effective. If the general issues a proclamation or an ordinance to accomplish this result, his action will probably be challenged in the Supreme Court, which may or may not sustain the challenge, depending on how the logic of “necessity” happens to be unfolding at the time.

But if General Musharaf chooses to be patient, waits for the next parliament to come to session, presents his proposals to it, and if it does adopt them, his conduct will have been blameless at least in the technical sense. But it is likely that substantive objections to some of the amendments will remain and continue to divide the nation. Let us first turn to the concern that the proposed amendments will transform our parliamentary system to one that is essentially presidential.

It should be understood that, if genuine in their form and working, both systems can be equally democratic. The presidential system, however, is infinitely more complex because of its constitutionally mandated separation of powers and checks and balances. The fact of the matter may well be that General Musharraf does not want a fully democratic system, and that the issue of form is really nothing more than peripheral. He desires the authority and powers of a prime minister but not the political chores, burdens, responsibilities and risks that go with that office. He wishes to be known as president without having to contend with the restraints that a presidential system imposes on that office. He wants an assistant who will do his will-in situations where he does have a will — and who will be called prime minister. He wants to have his cake and eat it too.

The general has said repeatedly that he does not believe in sharing power, seeking to cause the impression that he does not covet the powers that normally belong to the prime minister. Actually, what he means is that he, and not the prime minister, should have the final say in all matters that are important enough to engage his interest. But the blame for whatever goes wrong should be thrown at the prime minister. He wants power but not the concomitant responsibility.

Let us now see how some of his proposed amendments will detract from the parliamentary nature of our system. But first a quick summation of its essence may be in order. In the first place, an assembly representing the people functions as a repository of both legislative and executive powers. It chooses a committee of its members (cabinet), headed by a prime minister, to oversee the execution of the existing laws and to sponsor any new legislation that may be needed. The assembly’s choice in this regard is routinely approved by the head of the state (king, queen, president).

The prime minister and his cabinet are accountable to the assembly and hold office as long as they command the support of a majority of its members.

General Musharraf wants to be the one to initiate the process of finding a prime minister. He wants to appoint an assembly member of his own choice to the office, swear him in, and give him sixty days to gather a majority in the assembly that will endorse his appointment. The general’s plan here invites two questions.

Normally, following an election, the identity of the next prime minister is fairly well known: he/she is the leader of the majority party in the house or the leader of the larger party in a coalition. The president invites him/her to be the prime minister and form the government. There is no room for presidential discretion here unless the forces in the assembly are so splintered as to exclude the likelihood of a majority coming together.

General Musharraf, however, wants to be able to nominate the next prime minister regardless of the line-up of forces in the assembly. He would like to be free to ignore the majority and its leader, even if they are out there for all to see, and look elsewhere in the assembly to find the “right” nominee. Why does he want to do all this? His advisers in the NRB may have persuaded him that he, and not the parliament, should effectively be the governing agency in the state. He should then have as prime minister someone who does not have much of a support base of his own, and who would therefore be easily amenable to presidential advice or direction.

How will the president’s nominee obtain the assembly’s endorsement of his appointment and its on-going support? Seeing that he enjoys the president’s favour, minority members and many of the holders of reserved seats (FATA, “technocrats.” and some women, especially the ones who are politically uninitiated and unaligned) may be willing to stand by him. Since the established parties will contest the forthcoming election under numerous handicaps, the number of “independent” members is likely to be substantial. They will be open to recruitment if the terms are right.

It is almost certain that leaders of the “mainstream” parties will rebuff the president’s nominee, but some of their “rank and file” may be willing to listen. But these potential recruits will respond only to a combination of the proverbial “stick and the carrot.” They will have to be promised rewards if they enter the prime minister’s camp, and threatened with punitive action in case they decline. Acting on his own, the designee will have neither the political influence nor the skills to win over the requisite number of assembly members. He will need massive assistance, which will have to come from government agencies known to have expertise in such shady undertakings.

Let us assume that the president’s nominee has won a majority’s approval of his initial appointment. What have we got at this point? A government universally known to have been born of intrigue, corruption, and coercion and one whose continuance will require on-going resort to the same means. A disrupter of established parties, internally incoherent, unstable, and ineffective, it will be a festering sore on the body politic, an object of ridicule at home and low esteem abroad. And all this so that General Musharraf may have supreme authority. One wonders if any of his advisers has told him that authority and power are not the same, and that while he may appropriate as much authority as he wants, it may be in vain, for he may lack the power (infrastructure and institutional capacity) to exercise it.

General Musharraf also wants to have the authority to dismiss his appointee if the style and substance of the latter’s work do not meet with his approval. Presidents in Pakistan have dismissed prime ministers five times, and the military has overthrown them three times, on the alleged grounds of incompetence and corruption.

Levels of competence vary within all crafts and professions. An employer may remove an employee on grounds of gross incompetence. But the prime minister is not the president’s employee. He is an agent of the people who may punish his incompetence at the next election and, in the meantime, they have put in place a body (parliament) to keep an eye on his work and to remove him from his post if his performance is found to be incompetent. Normally, it should then be none of the president’s business to dismiss a prime minister (or, for that matter, anybody else except perhaps his cook) for want of an appropriate level of competence. Note also that competence in a politician involves capacities and skills that may be vastly different from those expected from a good bureaucrat or soldier (which is what most of our presidents have been).

As others and I have said in this space before, it is preposterous to hold any prime minister personally and directly responsible for the corruption in which hundreds of thousands of public servants across the land engage. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that he should be held accountable for the corruption of which he himself, and those acting in his name, may be guilty. Who is to deal with him in that event? The obvious answer is that it should be the body the people have chosen to watch the prime minister’s conduct, the body to which they, and the Constitution, have made him responsible — that is, the parliament, if our presidents and generals will allow it the opportunity to become mature enough to do its job.

The proposed amendments will, deliberately or inadvertently, have the effect of further debilitating parliament which should normally be the principal organ of our system of governance. The president’s authority to appoint a prime minister, give him sixty days to obtain (by means fair or foul) the parliament’s approval of his appointment, dismiss him later if he finds it expedient to do so, disqualify him for re-election, and his authority to dismiss the parliament itself if it will not go along with him are all invasions of its authority intended to diminish its status and role — and ultimately those of the people it represents — in our system of governance.

The amendments will work to weaken the parliament in other ways also, but we will have to keep that subject for another time.

Dial ‘D’ for dialogue

DIALOGUES between countries do not necessarily start after the situation normalizes. They take place to normalize the situation. India and Pakistan are two countries, which are known for picking up the thread after the end of hostilities. They did so at Tashkent when the 1965 war ended and again at Shimla after the 1971 war. And when the guns fell silent, they, ritualistically, adopted a long list of peace measures, which unfortunately remained only on paper.

Today’s standoff between the two countries is similar to the ones witnessed earlier. The difference is that there has been no last-minute agreement or dramatic declaration, although both sides say that the war is over. They are more used to wars than to think of peace.

There is yet another difference: never before have the forces of the two countries, 10 lakh in number, stood eyeball-to-eyeball for six months at a stretch. The two countries do not know how to get out of the corner to which they have painted themselves. Once Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf publicly stated that the war had been averted, they should have restored the status quo ante, following the precedent at Tashkent and Shimla. Maybe it wouldn’t create an ideal situation, but at least there would be a modicum of normalization.

The two countries should have begun de-escalation by now. There is no doubt that the tension, which you could feel at one time, has now lessened. Soldiers on both sides have begun to go on leave. The atmosphere of confrontation looks somewhat relaxed. It is childish to insist on the other side taking the first step. Maybe both countries should withdraw their troops simultaneously, after the field commanders have worked out the modalities.

If India were to take the initiative, it would in no way lose its izzat (honour). In fact, its stock in the international community would go up for taking the step towards normality. Nowhere in the world are hostilities allowed to be permanent because they affect all in some way or other.

We are on a strong wicket because our demand has been more or less met. New Delhis condition was that it would not withdraw its troops or hold talks with Islamabad until infiltration stopped. After facing an undeclared war from across the border for some 13 years, such a reaction was understandable. But when there is proof of infiltration lessening why drag your feet? Home Minister L.K. Advani, not known for understatement, himself says that infiltration has decreased. Defence sources also confirm it.

Whether infiltration has completely stopped or whether no such act will be repeated in the future is a matter of conjecture. Even after the employment of all modern facilities, the earliest we would know about the complete stoppage of infiltration is six months. Should forces stand in a war-like position for such a long time? We are talking about human beings who are stationed at perilous heights or in the sweltering heat of the deserts, not robots.

As for infiltration, the West is also in the picture. Musharraf has repeatedly said that infiltration has been stopped. He has even given an assurance to that effect to Washington and London. In fact, he has assured America that he will stop infiltration permanently. He can do shadow-boxing as he has done before but he cannot renege on the promise made to Washington, which is Pakistan’s economic lifeline.

New Delhi’s response should have been more positive. Even our first reaction to take the forces straight to the border was hasty. It is nobody’s case that there should be any let-up in meeting cross-border terrorism. But exhausting the forces by keeping them on the border is counter-productive. It may be because of pressure but Islamabad is making efforts to stop infiltration.

It is true that most of the camps that the ISI has established to train and equip militants for cross-border terrorism have not been closed yet. And there are reports that a few more are coming up. The international pressure on winding them up is increasing and Islamabad will have to do that ultimately. In any case, the end product is stopping infiltration. Since it is lessening, it is in our interest to take further steps.

For example, people-to-people contact is an important ingredient of better Indo-Pak relations. New Delhi should resume the bus and train services to Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan air service to India should be allowed to operate.

Once people from both sides meet, they might be able to goad their respective governments towards peace. At least, the atmosphere will become more conducive to it.

Islamabad is not making things easier. Even what New Delhi has done has not been reciprocated. For example, New Delhi’s gesture to allow Pakistani planes to fly through the Indian airspace. Similarly, Islamabad, unlike Delhi, has not named the high commissioner to India. Our Pakistani friends tell us that we should not make them as a test case. Their argument is that Musharraf is under a lot of pressure from the jihadis, religious groups and other fanatics. By not reciprocating India’s steps he is trying to give an impression that he is not yielding even an inch to New Delhi. The propaganda against him in Pakistan is that he has sold Kashmir to India at the behest of America.

Rhetoric on both sides may be difficult to check in the days to come because it is grist for their propaganda mills. Hardliners in the two countries are digging in their heels. Yet, there should be some steps to indicate that both of them have left far behind the period when they were about to fly at each other’s throat.

In a way, they have because the foreign dignitaries making visits to New Delhi and Islamabad to normalize the situation is far less than before. Although they are talking to New Delhi and Islamabad all the time, they are still a little worried. The second visits of British Foreign Secretary J. Straw and America’s Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in less than six weeks suggest that the international community is still on tenterhooks. They want de-escalation. Armed forces, if they are not in the barracks, give an impression of disturbed conditions.

For reasons best known to him, Defence Minister George Fernandes has said that the troops will not be withdrawn until October. What is he trying to convey? Pakistan and Kashmir are scheduled to hold elections in October. How are they connected with the withdrawal of troops unless the stationing of them is meant to influence the elections?

India and Pakistan have to find a way to get away from the present situation so that a dialogue can get off the ground. Once New Delhi makes an announcement that a dialogue could begin soon, the pressure on Musharraf from within his own country will go down. The reported jehadi plot to kill him sounds ominous.

Whether we can trust him or not is not as relevant as the situation we may face if he is ousted. At present he has the upper hand but the reports that there are jihadi elements in the army does not augur well for the future.

Again, it is not in our interest that Pakistan becomes a failed state. Its weakness can create innumerable problems for India. Islamabad’s strength will be in proportion to the steps India takes to normalize the situation. The withdrawal of troops is on the top of western powers’ list. New Delhi’s intransigence on this point can cost it the support of the international community which has been so consistent in putting pressure on Musharraf and which has been saying that the Line of Control (Loc) is sacrosanct.

The writer is a freelance columnist based in New Delhi.

Endless wait

A year ago it would have been unthinkable for the American government to hold indefinitely US citizens whom it was unprepared to charge with crimes and not permit those detainees access to lawyers. Today, however, Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi are both sitting in military brigs, still unable to communicate with attorneys or defend themselves in court. Neither character, to be sure, evokes much sympathy: Mr Hamdi was caught fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan, while Mr Padilla is suspected of involvement in a nascent plot to set off a dirty bomb. But the government’s position that these offences need not be substantiated, or even alleged, in court before either man can be indefinitely imprisoned is enormously dangerous. That danger exists even if it arises from the cases of men who may need to be locked up.

Messrs Hamdi and Padilla are imprisoned on nothing more than the government’s claim that they are enemy combatants. According to the government, the president alone has the power during wartime to designate people, including citizens, as enemy fighters subject to detention until the end of hostilities. Courts, in the government’s view, have no power to review these designations.

There are no easy answers to the question of what rules should govern these cases but the right answer cannot be that the president’s power to detain Americans during wartime answers to no meaningful oversight by the courts and that detainees have no chance to be heard. The government’s adopting such a hard-line position only ensures that a cloud of lawlessness will hover over detentions that need not be controversial.—Los Angeles Times

Implications of the package

THERE is an air of deja vu about the on-going exercise of introducing constitutional changes to pave the way for a political set-up in the country. We have been through this phase a number of times before, whenever a military dictator has attempted a transition to democracy, at least in form. We had Ayub Khan attempting to legitimize his regime through the Basic Democracy system and the constitution he promulgated in 1962.

Yahya Khan had his Legal Framework Order of 1969 under which elections were held in 1970. But before handing over power to a civilian government he plunged the country into a political crisis followed by a war which cost us East Pakistan. Ziaul Haq saddled the nation with the Eighth Amendment in an attempt to retain control over the state machinery.

All these were devices to ensure that each military ruler retained his hold on power and could not retrospectively be held accountable for his abuse of authority while in office.

Whether the autocratic rulers succeeded in saving their skin after they stepped down is a vital question. But of long-term significance was the impact their constitutional changes had on the country’s political, economic and social structures. With every such phase the country has experienced, matters have gone from bad to worse. Hence the public trepidation at the latest constitutional package being thrust on the country.

True, some measures in it might be in the interest of the people, and in keeping with worldwide trends, such as the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 years. But many others are definitely designed to institutionalize the role of the armed forces in the political system of the country and give extraordinary powers to the president in the new dispensation. The fact that they are being introduced shortly before elections are to be held in the country in October has also cast doubts on their credibility and the good faith of the proponents.

What is most disturbing, however, is the long-term implications of these measures. Of course, the political disruption that will be caused is worrying enough. But equally disquieting is their impact on society. Experience shows that social and economic restructuring is more difficult to reverse than many other changes. Pakistan’s is a deeply fragmented, stratified and polarized society. The absence of a steady and uninterrupted political process as well as decades of elitist and short-sighted socio-economic policies have left the country sharply divided between the haves and the have-nots. While there has been an increasing concentration of wealth, the masses have been steadily pauperized. Political power has remained in the hands of the privileged classes who have used it to perpetuate their hold on the state machinery and enhance their fortunes and influence.

Three measures among those recently announced will widen the division between the privileged and the underprivileged even further. One is the academic qualification condition for candidates desirous of contesting elections to the assemblies. The second is the mode of election of the women candidates. The third is the provision for a National Security Council.

Requiring the candidates to hold a graduate degree, theoretically speaking, debars a very very large number of otherwise competent people from contesting elections. True, only a very small minority actually enters the electoral fray. But there is something basically wrong with a system that excludes a large majority from the contest because they do not hold a degree. Pakistan will probably have the dubious distinction of being the first country in the world to impose this condition on its aspiring law makers.

Does this speak well of a country which has failed even to provide primary education to all its citizens? According to the report of the task force on higher education, only 2.6 per cent of the people in the higher education age bracket in Pakistan are enrolled in institutions of higher learning. The figure stated is 475,000. Of course, all of them will not graduate. The 1998 census had put the number of graduates and those with a post-graduate degree at about six per cent of the total population. In other words, the number of graduates is on the decline. After having denied millions of Pakistani citizens access to higher education, it is appalling that the powers that be are seeking to keep the teeming millions permanently beyond the pale.

The mode of elections proposed for the reserved seats for women in the assemblies will further harden the gender divide which is the bane of our society. Three methods of election have been proposed. In the first and second “alternatives” a variation of the proportional representation has been suggested. Every party will be required to announce a list of women candidates (indicating the order of priority) for every province. From the list the top candidates will be declared elected according to the percentage of votes (alternative 1) or seats (alternative 2) won by a party in the general elections. According to alternative three, on election day voters will cast their ballots simultaneously in every constituency for women candidates for the special seats. But only as many of the top few candidates will be declared winners as there are reserved seats to fill.

Admittedly, the previous system whereby women were elected indirectly by the House for the reserved seats was never found to be a very satisfactory method. Women members were inclined to become answerable to their preponderantly male electors in the assemblies. The proposed system, whichever is adopted, will not improve the representation of women who are already handicapped by social prejudices born of centuries of patriarchy.

The restrictive elements in this scheme discriminate against women. While the elections to the assemblies’ general seats are to be held on the first-past-the-post basis as has been the practice all along, women’s seats will be filled by proportional representation. In other words, it will not be easy sailing for female candidates who will be more dependent on a male-dominated political party for their candidature. Not having the option of contesting a reserved seat as an independent candidate, a woman’s dependence on her political party, rather than the electorate, would be formalized.

The third “alternative” would somewhat free female candidates from the stranglehold of the political parties. But they will be required to contest on a provincial basis rather than on a constituency basis as men will do. Besides, women will be restricted by having to register as voters in the province from which they contest when no such condition is provided for the general seats.

Another dividing factor will be the National Security Council which has been proposed ostensibly to give the armed forces a role in the political system. This “inclusive forum of consultation”, whatever that may mean, will lead to greater polarization among the civilian members and the military leaders.

The NSC will be designed to provide the benefit of its collective wisdom to those who exercise power. One of the issues it will deal with is strategic security. One only has to visualize the scenario as we have had in the post 9/11 period to understand the dilemmas we will encounter. When faced with a serious crisis which can lead to war — even a nuclear war — will the NSC actually allow a rational debate on the key issues? Will it allow the civilian leaders to interpret security issues in non-military terms? Will the Council give sympathetic consideration to the women’s perception of peace and security? The danger is that the NSC might be polarized between the men in uniform and their civilian counterparts.

The only positive aspect of the proposed constitutional restructering is that the NRB is asking the people to discuss the proposals. However, with some measures already having been adopted, one wonders what the purpose of the debate is. Democracy should seek to remove the inequalities and class barriers in society.

The issues to be discussed are not simply how political power will be shared, how the checks and balances will operate and where the locus of power will lie. These are important questions and they will determine the stability or otherwise of the country. It is also important to study the potential impact of these changes on the unity of the nation. We cannot afford to polarize and divide the country any further.

Movie pirates rule streets

David Tan sits on the ledge of a sidewalk in Malaysia’s Bangsar suburb, holding a wallet full of pirated video discs of the latest US movies and music.

“Only five dollars, sir,” he says, meaning five ringgit (US$1.30), as he holds out a copy of “Spider-Man” to a tourist.

It’s a regular day’s work for the streetside vendor and others like him, who will make a few hundred ringgit selling pirated CDs, VCDs and DVDs from nooks and crannies all over the Malaysian capital.

But on the same day, the US movie, music, software and publishing industries together would have lost almost a million dollars to crooks who have made Kuala Lumpur one of the world’s hottest piracy markets.—Reuters